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Text: Sinn Féin ... Page Compiled: Fionnuala McKenna Material is added to this site on a regular basis - information on this page may change
'An Appalling Vista'
Collusion:
British Military Intelligence
And
Brian Nelson
A Case for an Independent Public Inquiry
Submitted to British Government 21 December 1997
by Sinn Féin
Submitted to Liaison Sub-Committee on Confidence Building
Measures
31 March 1998
"John Stevens told us he knew 'beyond a shadow
of a doubt' who was responsible for the murder.
He also said he knows the truth about Brian Nelson
and 'the full facts concerning his involvement in collusion and
murders"'
Report of the International Human Rights Working Party of the
Law Society of England and Wales.
(A 1995 report into the murder of Pat Finucane)
Introduction
In the north of Ireland citizens are compelled under emergency
legislation and at the point of British guns to provide details
about themselves. The details relating to nationaliists and republicans
are computerised, filed and passed on to loyalist paramiitaries.
Thousands of such files have been handed over to loyalist murder
gangs by serving members of the British army and the Royal Ulster
Constabulary.
Not a single member of the RUC - the primary source for security
and intelligence documents - was charged as a result of the official
inquiry into such collusion - the Steven's Inquiry. Such files
continue to be leaked to this day.
The man responsible for a period of several years, for collating
the information thus provided and targeting individuals for assassination
by loyalist murder gangs was British military intelligence agent
Brian Nelson. Nelson was a member of the British Army and given
a leading role in loyalist assassinations of nationalists and
republicans and others who were considered to be enemies of British
rule in Ireland.
He was assisted in his deadly work by British Military intelligence
who weeded out his files so as to make them more selective, provided
him with addresses of targets and a car to conduct his surveillance
activities.
He was directed in the supply of modern arms from South Africa
to loyalist groups in an increased loyalist assassination campaign
at a period in which killings by the RUC and British army were
coincidentally reduced.
Nelson played a very important role in all of this. He is undoubtedly
culpable. But the major culpability rests with his controllers
and with those in political authority at the highest levels of
the British political, military and legal system who moved decisively
and effectively to reduce the effect of their responsibility by
concealing the facts.
The political and moral enormity of what is involved is surpassed
by the toll in human lives and suffering inflicted. The precise
overall number of fatalities resulting from collusion between
British forces and the loyalist murder gangs over a period of
25 years is unknown. But what is for certain is this. In the six
years before the arrival of the South African weapons, from January
1982 to December 1987 loyalist murder gangs killed 71 people.
In the six years following, from January 1988 to 1 September 1994,
loyalists killed 229 people.
Defining Collusion
In the context of the north of Ireland the term collusion has
come to embrace a number of illegal activities on the part of
the British forces - the British army, the RUC and the intelligence
services. These include:
- conspiring with loyalist paramilitaries to carry out assassinations;
- taking part in assassinations;
- collecting information on individuals and passing it over
to loyalist paramilitaries;
- passing officially collected information to loyalist paramilitaries
for legitimate purposes;
- failing to prevent loyalist paramilitary assassinations;
- providing weapons to loyalist paramilitaries;
- running British intelligence agents involved in illegal loyalist
paramilitary activities up to the most senior levels;
- assisting in the commission of killings by loyalist paramiitaries,
for example, by lifting road-blocks.
- failing to investigate such killings rigorously.
- failing to inform individuals that they have been targeted
for assassination.
- failing to provide individuals targeted for assassination
with the nature of their personal details in the hands of loyalist
paramilitaries.
- failing to share information with other sections of the British
forces which should result in an individual being warned that
they were being targeted for assassination.
Various organs of the British state, such as the Attorney General,
the Director of Public Prosecutions and the Secretary of State
for "Northern Ireland", have:
- failed to prosecute those responsible for such killings;
- failed to prosecute or otherwise discipline those members
of the British forces involved in collusion;
- used Public Interest Immunity certificates and claims at
trials and inquests to withhold information concerning alleged
collusion.
- allowed members of the British forces to carry out illegal
acts, whether in conspiracy with loyalist paramilitaries or not,
with impunity and hindering official investigations of those acts.
An Appalling Vista
To borrow a phrase from Lord Denning, a senior member of the British
judiciary, in relation to the Birmingham Six defence at their
trial; what has been stated above represents an "appalling
vista". The facts documented below bear this out.
Justice for the Birmingham Six and their families took 16 years
to secure. This dossier deals with only a very narrow band of
the full spectrum of the whole issue of collusion yet it involves
a demand for justice for a thousand relatives of hundreds of victims
of the Nelson affair. Justice cannot wait another 16 years. This
'appalling vista' must be laid bare now.
There is nothing new in this dossier nor does it purport to represent
all that is in the public domain in relation to the subject matter.
But what is clear is that it is wholly unacceptable that the oft
publicly stated serious allegations it contains should go uninvestigated,
that the truth remains concealed and that those responsible are
not held publicly accountable for their actions.
Nelson - Panorama's Research
In June 1992, two and a half years after his arrest and four months
after Brian Nelson's trial the BBC's Panorama broadcast a programme
on the Nelson affair.
The Panorama teams researchers had secured a prison journal Nelson
had written in the previous twelve months.
Nelson's prison journal was a mainstay to the programmes research.
Many of the claims made by the programme are indeed based on this.
The main points of the Panorama teams research state that:
- British Military intelligence had two years notice of the
South African arms shipment. That their agent, Brian Nelson, describes
in his prison journal how he gave all the details to military
intelligence including the method he claims was used to smuggle
in the guns. In the same journal Nelson says that in 1987 military
intelligence told him they had decided to allow the first shipment
into the country untouched to avoid suspicions about their agent.
It goes on to say:
- The evidence suggests that Nelson played a vital role in
ten murders, attempted murders and conspiracy to murder.
- That Nelson also targeted a further sixteen people who were
murdered or against whom murder attempts were made.
- That Nelsons involvement with murder gangs was both allowed
and sometimes encouraged by military intelligence.
- That advance warnings of murders and attempted murders by
the UDA given by Nelson to British intelligence were not acted
upon.
- That an inquiry later found that military intelligence withheld
many details of Nelson's warnings from the RUC.
- That in 1987 military intelligence took from Nelson a binliner
full of documents - leaked by UDR and RUC personnel - and weeded
out details of targets that were regarded as out of date and returned
the more selective list to Nelson.
- That Nelson says that additional photo montages were supplied
to him by military intelligence at the same time. That is, while
the majority of the photo montages returned to him were already
in the possession of the UDA what was returned to him were more
up to date and of superior quality.
- That military intelligence further aided and abetted Nelson
in his UDA activities by
- buying him a taxi to conduct his surveillance activities.
- providing him with a hollowed out spirit-level for hiding incriminating
documents.
- photographing the home of one of Nelson's targets and giving
him the photograph
- providing him with the addresses of three alleged IRA suspects
the UDA were planning to kill.
- assisting in a plan to kill Sinn Féin councillor Alex
Maskey by confirming his car registration number.
- That Nelson had copied his files to both the UDA and UVF
with the full knowledge of his military intelligence handlers.
- That the UVF killed or wounded at least six people whose
names Nelson had recorded in his intelligence files.
- That Nelson was involved in targeting two Belfast lawyers
- Pat Finucane and Paddy McGrory.
- That Nelson was directly involved in the plan to kill Pat
Finucane who was shot dead at his home. Nelson says he passed
a photograph of Pat Finucane to UDA man Eric McKee on the Thursday
before the assassination. Loyalist sources claim that Nelson pointed
out the Finucane home to the killers before the attack.
- That British military intelligence files on Nelson have disappeared
so as to conceal facts.
- That British military intelligence encouraged the UDA, through
Nelson, to bomb targets in the south of Ireland.
The Killing of Pat Finucane
- On 3 October 1997 the United Nations Special Rapporteur,
Data Param Cumaraswany, having visited Belfast to inyestigate
allegations of harassment and intimidation of defence lawyers
by members of the RUC, called for a judicial inquiry into the
murder of human rights lawyer Pat Finucane.
- Pat Finucane was shot dead by two masked men on 12 February
1989 in front of his wife and three children. His wife, Geraldine,
was also injured in the attack.
- The killing was claimed by the UDA who said Finucane was
an "IRA man". This was denied by family members, friends
and in public statements by the RUC.
- One of the weapons used in the attack were one of 13 weapons
stolen from a British Army barracks in 1987 by a serving members
of the British Army's UDR regiment.
- The killing took place a few weeks after British minister
Douglas Hogg said to the British parliament: "I have to state
as a fact but with great regret that there are in Northern Ireland
a number of solicitors who are unduly sympathetic to the cause
of the IRA". Challenged Hogg said: "I state this on
the basis of advice that I have received, guidance that I have
been given by people who are dealing with these matters and I
shall not expand on it further".
- The killing of Pat Finucane took place in the context of
frequent allegations that RUC officers made regular threats against,
or derogatory comments about defence lawyers to detainees. Such
allegations have been recorded by Amnesty International, the London
based British Irish Rights Watch, Helsinki Watch and the Lawyers
Committee for Human Rights. Included in the allegations is a claim
by Loyalist sources that UDA members detained at Castlereagh,
prior to the killing were told by RUC Special Branch that Patrick
Finucane and a few other solicitors 'were helping to keep IRA
gunmen out of prison'.
Similar allegations, instancing the inquiry by the UN Special
Rapporteur continue to the present.
- However, Brian Nelson, the British military intelligence agent
who also served as chief intelligence officer of the UDA, alleged
after his conviction on other charges that he had directly assisted
in the targeting of Pat Finucane.
- According to the journal written by Nelson, and quoted on the
BBC Panorama programme in June 1992;
- Nelson was asked to gather information about Finucane some weeks
prior his killing.
- He informed British intelligence officers of this request.
- He passed a photograph of Pat Finucane to UDA member Eric McKee
just a few days before the killing.
- Loyalist sources claim that Nelson reconnoitred the Finucane
home with the killers before the attack.
- Despite this warning Patrick Finucane was not informed of this
threat to his life. A similar threat at the time, against another
prominent lawyer, Paddy McGrory, was not relayed until two months
after Pat Finucane's death.
- Nelson was never charged in connection with the killing.
- His claims have never been examined in an open court.
- No one to date has been prosecuted for the murder of Pat Finucane.
- No-one has been charged in connection with the murder. Three
men were subsequently charged with possession of the murder weapon.
- According to Ed Maloney, a journalist for the Sunday Tribune
the man who asked Nelson for the photograph of Pat Finucane and
who was subsequently brought to the Finucane home by Nelson was
the head of UDA's murder gangs. This man served a sentence for
possession of scores of leaked documents along with four others.
One of these was UDA leader Tommy Lyttle. All were arrested by
the Stevens inquiry team. Like the Nelson trial itself a deal
was struck which prevented the full details of collusion between
British forces and loyalist murder gangs coming out in open court.
In the Panorama programme Nelson names the man as Ernie McKee.
- The Stevens inquiry did not interview Pat Finucane's widow, his
partner, Peter Madden of the Madden/Finucane legal firm, or any
of his clients to whom threats had been made against Pat Finucane
himself.
- The 'Report of the International Human Rights Working Party of
the Law Society of England and Wales' in 1995 states:
"There is credible evidence of both police and army involvement.
We cite the most significant items below. There is further evidence
in the hands of the police to which we have not been given access.
"............ the Government told the UN Special
Rapporteur that the DPP ............ 'directed
that there should be no prosecution against any officer in connection
with Patrick Finucane's death'. Significantly the Government did
not deny that there was collusion by the government or the security
forces in relation to the murder.
"The following threats against Patrick Finucane by RUC
officers
a. death threats by CID officers;
b. false allegations by CID officers that he was a member of
the IRA;
c. threats by CID officers to pass his name and details to
loyalist paramilitaries.
"Our understanding is that none of these allegations has
been investigated by the police, let alone tested in court. DS
(Detective Sergeant -RUC) Simpson told the inquest that some
of them were investigated by the Stevens inquiry. John Stevens
told us that as far as he could remember they were not. It is
wholly wrong in our view that such allegations should remain unexamined.
"Since the inquest two British army officers have admitted
army participation in the UDA murder plot that involved Patrick
Fin ucane. The con text of each admission is very different -
one in a television programme and one on oath in Court. Yet
they are both credible. Together they raise serious questions
which require further investigation.
(a) Admissions by Brian Nelson
Brian Nelson was a British army intelligence officer who was placed
in the UDA in 1987. He is currently serving prison sentences arising
out of his involvement, while acting as an intelligence officer,
in other terrorist murders.
(Note: Nelson is now a free man. This 1995 report predates Nelson's
release in 1996.)
His admissions to involvement in the Finucane murder were transmitted
in a BBC Panorama programme on 8 June 1992.
He claimed:
a. He was asked weeks before the murder by a UDA terrorist what
he could find out about the movements of Patrick Finucane;
b. He told his army handlers of the UDA interest in Patrick
Finucane 's movements;
c. 3 days before the murder he handed a UDA terrorist a photograph
of Patrick Finucane leaving court with his client Patrick McGeown.
(b) Admissions by a British Army colonel known as "J"
Colonel J gave evidence on oath at Belfast Crown Court in mitigation
for Brian Nelson. He said:
a. Brian Nelson was infiltrated by the army into the UDA
b. The army directed Brian Nelson to work in and report on the
intelligence structure of the UDA. Nelson learnt the identity
of UDA assassination targets, sometimes suggesting them himself
He then assisted the UDA by providing it with information, including
photographs, on those to be assassinated. Nelson reported this
to his army handlers.
c. Brian Nelson had provided the UDA with a photograph of a targeted
victim leaving court. The army was aware that this individual
was a target for assassination.
d. The army told the RUC of assassination plots so that the
RUC could warn the victims and prevent the murders which Nelson
had helped to plan.
"We received no evidence that Patrick Finucane was warned
that he was a target for assassination.
"We asked the DPP, his deputy and John Stevens about the
Panorama allegations. If Panorama was right, Nelson had admitted
to conspiracy to murder Patrick Finucane. How then could there
not be sufficient evidence to prosecute him? They said they could
not comment on individual cases. However they indicated that the
full journal was not in police hands.
"We note that in spite of his admission on oath, Colonel
J has not been prosecuted.
"John Stevens told us he knew 'beyond a shadow of a doubt'
who was responsible for the murder. He also said he knows the
truth about Brian Nelson and 'the full facts concerning his involvement
in collusion and murders'.
"We do not. The public does not.
"While the facts are not disclosed by the police and known
to the public only through television, they remain untested, the
murderers remain unpunished, the allegations of collusion persist,
and a cloud remains hanging, not just over the legal profession,
but over the system of justice itself"
A thorough, wider investigation is required!
Brian Nelson
- Brian Nelson was a former British Army soldier - a member
of the Black Watch Regiment He was discharged in 1970.
- He was a member of the Ulster Defence Association (UDA).
He joined the UDA in 1972. In 1974 he was jailed for 7 years for
kidnapping Gerald Higgins, a partially sighted catholic man who
was tortured by electric shocks by his kidnappers He died shortly
afterwards. Nelson served just over 3 years in prison for the
offence. Sometime after his release from prison Nelson was appointed
as an intelligence officer in the UDA.
- Nelson was an agent of British Military Intelligence. They
have confirmed this to be the case in open court. The British
Defence Secretary and former Secretary of State, Tom King, in
a mitigation plea submitted at the Nelson trial in 1992 described
him as having been a valuable agent.
- Nelson who was convicted and sentenced to 110 years imprisonment
is now a free man. His concurrent prison sentences meant that
he served less than six years in prison.
- Nelson was recruited by British Military intelligence around
1983. He worked as an agent for some years before ceasing his
activities and moving to work in Germany. There he was pursued
by British intelligence to Regensberg and persuaded or pressed
into returning to Belfast in 1987 to resume his work as an agent
of British Military intelligence inside the UDA.
Allegations of Collusion between British
forces and Loyalist Paramilitaries:
Nelson's role emerges
- Allegations of collusion between British forces and loyalist
paramilitaries stretch back at least 25 years. Convicted UDA
killer 'Ginger' Baker claimed that four sectarian assassinations
carried out in 1972-73 were based on files given to him by senior
RUC officers. (See appendix)
- Collusion between serving British soldiers in the UDR and
loyalist paramilitaries has resulted in the thefts of hundreds
of British army weapons over the same period. Research by the
Irish News in 1985 showed that up to that point almost 600 rifles
and pistols were thus secured by loyalists. As is now proven such
a weapon was used in the murder of human rights lawyer Pat Finucane.
- In August 1989 UDA spokespersons attempted to justify the
killing of a nationalist, Loughlin Maginn, by claiming that he
was an IRA member, and that this information was based on RUC
files. They released the files and followed this up by distributing
to the media, between then and the end of September lists containing
over 250 names, photographs and addresses of 'suspects' from intelligence
files. The overall estimate on the number of intelligence files
which have ended up in the hands of loyalist paramilitaries runs
to thousands. This was publicly acknowledged by the RUC.
- As a result of the public outcry John Stevens, a senior British
police officer, was appointed to investigate these serious 'leaks'
in what became known as the Stevens inquiry.
- The terms of reference for the inquiry have never been made
public.
- A summary of the report of the Stevens inquiry was released
in May 1990. he full report has never been published.
- In the course of the Stevens inquiry:
- A fire gutted the office of the investigation team, sited
in a heavily guarded RUC barracks outside Carrickfergus. A sophisticated
infrared alarm installed by Stevens failed to go off. When his
officers tried to phone the fire brigade from another part of
the barracks the line was dead. All of the files Stevens had accumulated
relating to Nelson were destroyed, though the Stevens team later
stated they had arranged for back-up storage of some material
in England prior to the fire.
- Stevens discovered that military intelligence agents were
being used in the UDA. Senior British army officers at first denied
the army ran any agents at all. For the first four months of the
inquiry, they concealed 1,100 documents from it and only handed
them over when Brian Nelson revealed their existence to the Stevens
team.
- As a result of the inquiry:
- more than 2,600 documents came to light
- 59 people were charged or reported to the DPP.
- the offences for which charges were brought centred almost
exclusively on the mishandling of classified intelligence documents.
This included the unlawful possession of documents; communicating
documents to others without authorisation; collecting and recording
information.
- two members of the UDR were convicted in relation to the killing
of Loughlin Maginn
- some charges were also brought for firearms offences.
- the overwhelming majority of 32 of those arrested were members
of loyalists organisations as opposed to the serving British forces
personnel with whom the documents originated.
- no one was charged with conspiracy to murder save Brian Nelson
whose central role in the wider picture as an agent of British
intelligence was exposed.
- The inquiry failed to identify members of the British forces
with whom the documents originated.
- The refusal of British intelligence to provide full co-operation
left the inquiry with only the facts which Nelson chose to provide
in relation to the role played by British intelligence. Of itself
this was substantial involving an 800 page statement.
- The Stevens inquiry 1989-1990 exposed Brian Nelson as an
agent of British Military intelligence and as a senior intelligence
officer in the UDA. It uncovered only limited facts.
- The refusal of the British army to provide its fullest co-operation
and Nelson's own selectivity in the facts he chose to provide
obviously.
- helped draw a curtain around all the facts. Other facts were
to emerge as a result of the legal proceedings against Nelson
and from the work of journalists.
- Nelson was not the sole British military intelligence agent
in the UDA. More than a year after Nelson's arrest Noel Walker,
a British agent who had worked alongside him was taken into 'protective
custody'. Likewise another agent, martin McDowell, in September
1992. In a wrap-up operation, the RUC discovered a small arms
dump in a social club near McDowell's home. The cache included
arms from the South African shipment brought in for loyalist paramilitaries
in 1988. The facts of the activities of these agents and active
members of the UDA has never emerged.
The Stevens inquiry did not look at the issue of collusion as
a whole but was restricted rather to 'leaks' of security documents
at the time and related matters It did not look at evidence that
collusion between members of the British forces and loyalist paramiitaries
had been going on for many years or at the overall pattern as
it related to both targeted and random killings of Catholics.
It did not look at the British authorities' record during this
time in bringing criminal proceedings against British forces personnel
in this regard.
The Trial
Due Process and Brian Nelson
- Nelson was arrested in early 1990
- At a hearing on 15 June 1991 he faced 34 charges including
two counts of murder. A Military Intelligence witness, known only
as 'Soldier Z' admitted that Nelson had worked as a British agent
He claimed that Nelson had performed that role for the previous
ten years only.
- The trial finally opened on 22 January 1992, two years after
Nelson's arrest.
- The trial was conducted on 4 days over a 13 day period.
- Day 1 22.1.92: Nelson pleaded guilty to reduced charges and
the court was adjourned for a week.
- Days 2 and 3 29-30.1.92: The trial hears from a single witness
called by the defence; a Military Intelligence officer known
only as 'Colonel J'. No other witnesses were called. Colonel 'J'
was responsible for reactivating Nelson in 1987.
- Day 4 3.2.92: Judgement given by Lord Justice Kelly.
- In the week preceding the trial
- the then British Prime Minister, John Major, met the trial judge,
Lord Justice Basil Kelly, and the head of the British Judiciary
in the six counties, Lord Chief Justice Brian Hutton. This was
a telling parallel of the meeting between Ted Heath and Lord Widgery
on the eve of the Bloody Sunday inquiry.
- In the Independent, BBC journalist, John Ware and Geoffrey Seed
quoted a senior security source describing the case as 'the army's
Watergate'.
- The Irish Times headlined: "The most sensational trial
since the start of the Troubles opens next week".
At the trial;
- it quickly became clear that the boil was not going to be lanced;
a deal had been done. Fifteen charges including the most serious
of two counts of murder were dropped. The decision had been taken,
it was explained "after a rigorous examination of the interests
of justice".
- the usual counsel for the DPP was dropped. Instead, the then
Attorney General Sir Patrick Mayhew's representative in the 6
counties, Brian Kerr, prosecuted the case. A few years earlier
Mayhew had prevented prosecution arising out of the Stalker/Sampson
inquiry into shoot-to-kill by issuing Public Interest Immunity
Certificates.
- on the first day after Nelson pleaded guilty to the reduced
charges the proceedings were adjourned for a week.
- on the second day Sir Patrick Mayhew's representative, Brian
Kerr, spent most of the day in a lengthy defence of the decision
not to prosecute on the main charges.
- the rest of the trial proper which lasted only one more day
was taken up by the single witness called and pleas for leniency
for Nelson. This latter included a mitigation plea from the then
British Defence Secretary, in which he described Nelson as a 'valuable
agent'.
In his submission, the sole witness called - the British Military
intelligence officer known only as 'Colonel J' - portrayed Nelson
as 'a very courageous man', 'a hero', and 'a victim of the system'
to which he was loyal. At no stage did 'Colonel J' suggest Nelson
was a rogue agent On the contrary he asserted that Nelson's information
was always passed on to RUC Special Branch, and at monthly briefings,
to the General Officer Commanding the British Army in the 6 counties
as well as to other 'senior officers'. 'Colonel J' said:
"It would be normal for Nelson's information to be referred
to these security briefings. In other words, his information was
passed around throughout the intelligence community and at high
level. Because of that he has to be considered a very important
agent of high standing. His product was appreciated". He
added: "The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland might
also be interested in such information".
'Colonel J' also made clear:
"There is absolutely no doubt in my mind that Brian Nelson
was not loyal to the UDA, but loyal to the army".
- When sentence was passed on 3 February 1992, Lord Justice Kelly
described Nelson as 'a man of the greatest courage' but said his
plea of guilty to five conspiracy charges was an admission that
he had chosen to cross 'the dividing line between criminal participation
and lawful intelligence gathering'. In sentencing Nelson to a
total of 101 years imprisonment, Kelly ruled that the sentence
for each conviction would run concurrently. In effect this reduced
the sentence to 10 years. Brian Nelson has been a free man since
late 1996.
- A direct consequence of the accommodation entered into by
Sir Patrick Mayhew through his six country representative, Brian
Kerr and the defence was that only fragments of the truth bearing
on allegations of collusion emerged. Cross examination was almost
entirely dispensed with.
- The prosecution failed to probe fully the extent of Nelson's
knowledge and involvement in the UDA's activities. Nelson's 800
page statement did not see the light of day. Nor did the notes
of his debriefing by his handlers.
- The prosecution failed to probe fully the behaviour of military
intelligence which used Nelson as an agent.
- The deal ensured that allegations that the British army encouraged
loyalists to carry out bomb attacks in the 26 counties and then
obstructed RUC investigations were never aired.
- In its report "Political Killings in Northern Ireland"
Amnesty International summed the situation up thus:
"The trial of UDA intelligence chief Brian Nelson revealed
that a very high level of information on both loyalist personnel
and operations was held by the army and the RUG. The trial also
obliquely highlighted that little was done to disrupt these operations,
to save lives, to dismantle loyalist groups and to take severe
measures to deter known collusion in the passing of security information.
Brian Nelson's military handlers who allegedly provided information
which assisted in targeting some individuals for murder, were
not charged with any offence".
Nelson and the South African Arms
- In January 1988 Loyalist paramilitaries received a huge haul
of South African weapons. This consisted of 200 AK 47 assault
rifles, 90 Browning pistols, 500 fragmentation grenades, 30,000
rounds of ammunition and 12 RPG 7 rocket launchers.
- The weapons were divided between the UDA, the UVF and Ulster
Resistance, the organisation set up by Ian Paisley, Peter Robinson
and Alan Wright.
- In the six years before the arrival of the weapons, from
January 1982 to December 1987, loyalist paramilitaries killed
71 people of whom 49 were sectarian/political in nature. In the
6 years following, from January 1988 to 1 September 1994, loyalists
killed 229 people of whom 207 were sectarian/political in nature.
- Brian Nelson, the agent of the British army intelligence
and the UDA's chief intelligence officer, was a key personality
in this arms transaction. Another was Dick Wright, an employee
of the South African arms company Armscor. Wright - formerly of
Portadown, Co Armagh - was an uncle of Alan Wright, leader of
the Ulster Clubs and with Ian Paisley a co-founder of Ulster Resistance.
Wright visited the UDA in Belfast in 1980 and made an offer of
arms for cash or missile plans or parts from the Shorts missile
factory as an acceptable alternative to cash.
- On the instruction of UDA leader John McMichael, Nelson travelled
to South Africa in June 1985 to investigate the possibility of
a deal. (In February 1992, Private Eye reported that Nelson's
visit was cleared not only by senior officials from the British
Ministry of Defence but also by an unnamed British government
Minister.)
A deal was made. The loyalists were to supply South African agents
with missile plans or parts - if possible a complete shorts missile
system - in return for a substantial shipment of arms.
- Nelson sometime after the South African visit moved to Regensberg
in Germany where in 1987 British intelligence - military intelligence
and MIS - met with him and persuaded/pressed him into returning
to Belfast to take up again his role of British intelligence agent.
This was well in advance of the final stages of the arms transaction.
- The deal was completed and final arrangements were made in
December 1987. Nelson informed military intelligence of developments
at every stage of the proceedings; he passed on all the details
including the method to be used to smuggle in the weapons. No
action was taken.
In a jail journal, written by Nelson and obtained by the BBC's
Panorama team in 1992 he states:
"In 1987 I was discussing with my handler Ronnie the South
African operation when he told me that because of the deep suspicion
the seizure would have arouse, to protect me it had been decided
to let the first shipment into the country untouched".
- At the end of December 1987, Joseph Fawzi, a Lebanese intermediary
employed by a US arms dealer working for the South Africans, dispatched
the huge consignment of arms which were handed without intervention
from the British authorities in January 1988.
- Many of the weapons were later seized by British authorities
- the largest single cache being taken from Davy Payne, the British
exparatrooper and UDA Brigadier on 8 January 1988. Between a half
and a third of the weapons however still remain in the hands of
loyalist paramilitaries.
- Nelson's central role in the arms transaction and transport
meant he, and therefore British intelligence, knew the location
of the farmhouse where the weapons would be stored initially after
landing. Yet, at the time of Nelson's trial, British intelligence
was telling BBC's 'Inside Ulster' that their surveillance of the
shipment had broken down. Later they claimed they had lost track
of the shipment but never disclosed at what point this is supposed
to have happened.
- Subsequent attempts by Ulster Resistance to re-negotiate
the technology for arms deal with South African government agents
resulted - in 1989 - in the arrests of three Ulster Resistance
members and Douglas Bernhardt, a U.S. arms dealer, and a South
African diplomat, Daniel Storm in Paris.
- While Storm could claim diplomatic immunity the others cannot
No extradition request has been made by the British authorities
in relation to Joseph Fawzi, Dick Wright or U.S. arms dealer Douglas
Bernhardt.
Conclusion
John Stevens told the authors of the report cited at the beginning
of this dossier that he knew the "full facts concerning"
Brian Nelson's ''involvement in collusion and murders''.
The public does not. This needs to be urgently redressed.
Amnesty International in its report "Political Killings in
Northern Ireland" provides a succinct summary of what is
involved.
"The trial of UDA intelligence chief Brian Nelson revealed
that a very high level of information on both loyalist personnel
and operations was held by the army and the RUC. The trial also
obliquely highlighted that little was done to disrupt these operations,
to save lives, to dismantle loyalist groups and to take severe
measures to deter know collusion in the passing of security information.
Brian Nelson's military handlers who allegedly provided information
which assisted in targeting some individuals for murder, were
not charged with any offence".
The claims by Brian Nelson place him at the centre of the wider
picture which needs to be the subject of a comprehensive public
and independent inquiry. That is, collusion between British forces
and loyalist paramilitaries including a full investigation of
the shipment of South African arms used to rearm the loyalist
paramilitaries in the late 1980's.
The latter resulted in the deaths of 229 people between January
1988 and September 1994. Justice for the victims and relatives
must be comprehensively and urgently addressed.
This matter, too, has a direct bearing on the current peace process.
The 'decommissioning' issue was deliberately erected by the government
of John Major and the unionist parties as a tactical device to
prevent the commencement of negotiations, to keep Sinn Féin
out of the talks and to delay the start of the substantive phase
of the talks.
Sinn Féin's position on this issue is simple and straightforward.
We want to see the removal of all the guns from Irish politics;
the disarming of all armed groups to the conflict - British, loyalist
and republicans. That has to be an objective of the peace process.
In this the Sinn Fein position goes much further than the remit
with which the two governments tasked the International Body.
This was to take into consideration only those guns held by 'paramilitary'
organisations. That said, if is clear that even this narrow, and
therefore incomplete, focus cannot be fully considered unless
the full extent of the role of the British military and intelligence
agencies in arming loyalist paramilitaries is laid bare as part
of that consideration.
In particular the role of the British security and intelligence
apparatus supported politically and legally at the highest levels
of the British government in arming the UDA, the UVF and Ulster
Resistance through the activities of British Intelligence agent
Brian Nelson must be fully exposed.
There is clearly a direct linkage from the British government,
through its military and intelligence apparatus, intelligence
agent Brian Nelson to the loyalist paramilitaries and the 229
murders perpetrated by the latter after they received the shipment
of South African guns in January 1988.
Appendix
Ginger Baker
Allegations of collusion between British forces and loyalist paramilitaries
have been made since the early 1970's. No independent public inquiry
has ever been conducted.
Former British soldier Ginger Baker was sentenced to 25 years
imprisonment for killing 4 Catholics in the early 70s. Baker has
consistently claimed that RUC members drove weapons through checkpoints,
regularly gave RUC files to the UDA and tipped of loyalists to
prevent the seizure of their weapons.
On 27 September 1989 the Irish News received a letter from Baker
stating that he had been in contact with the Stevens inquiry.
Shortly before this Baker had claimed that an RUG officer was
second in command of a UDA battalion in 1972-73. Baker claimed
he has vital evidence and can name RUC officers who passed information
to loyalist paramilitaries in the early 70's.
In his letter from Long Lartin prison Baker stated
"In a telephone call from this prison on Friday, 22 September,
I informed a female member of John Stevens' investigative team
that on returning to Northern Ireland I would name the RUC moles".
Collusion between security forces and loyalist extremists in Northern
Ireland has always existed. I can prove this absolutely. However
the terrible truth which I can reveal may well result in another
'cover-up"'.
A spokesman for the Stevens inquiry confirmed that Baker had contacted
them. When asked if the inquiry would interview Baker the spokesperson
replied: "What Mr Baker has told us is being considered by
senior officers and a decision will be made".
Nothing more has been publicly heard of the matter.
Baker was, however, speedily transferred to Ireland. Later he
was transferred to England again and released in February 1992
from Frankland Prison.
The Baker era of the early '70's heralded an unbroken chain of
events ever since of allegations and proof of British forces collusion
with loyalist paramilitaries. This has been documented in court
cases, newspaper stories and television documentaries over the
past twenty-five years.
However, no comprehensive public independent inquiry has ever
taken place.
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