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Review of the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Acts 1978 and 1987
Government Reports and Acts
Text: Viscount Colville of Culross ... Page Compiled: Fionnuala McKenna
Review of the Northern Ireland
(Emergency Provisions) Acts
1978 and 1987
Chairman: The Viscount Colville of Culross, Q.C.
Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for
Northern Ireland by Command of Her Majesty
Published in London by,
HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE, 1990
ISBN 0 10 111152 5
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REVIEW OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND
(EMERGENCY PROVISIONS) ACTS 1978 AND 1987
|CHAPTER 1: ||CONTEXT FOR THE REVIEW
|CHAPTER 2: ||STOP, SEARCH AND ARREST
|Additions to Bring the Powers Up to Date
|Are Emergency Powers Needed At All?
|CHAPTER 3:||ACCESS TO FAMILY AND SOLICITORS DURING POLICE DETENTION
|CHAPTER 4:||VIDEO AND TAPE RECORDING OF INTERVIEWS DURING POLICE DETENTION
|CHAPTER 5: ||COMPLAINTS AGAINST SECURITY FORCES
|CHAPTER 6: ||CODES OF PRACTICE AND GUIDE TO THE EMERGENCY POWERS
|CHAPTER 7:||THE EARLY STAGES OF ARREST AND DETENTION
|Bail and Remand|
|Remand in custody, and production from prison
|Remand of Young Persons
|Time Limits for Prosecutions
|CHAPTER 8:||SCHEDULED OFFENCES
|CHAPTER 9:||MODE OF TRIAL - "DIPLOCK" COURTS
|CHAPTER 10:||TRIAL PROCEDURES
|Onus of Proof in Relation to Offences of Possession
|Discretion to Order a New Trial
|CHAPTER 11:||DETENTION (INTERNMENT)
|CHAPTER 12:||EXPLOSIVES INSPECTORS - SECTION 16 OF THE EMERGENCY PROVISIONS ACT 1978
|CHAPTER 13:||INTERFERENCE WITH RIGIITS OF PROPERTY AND HIGHWAYS - SECTIONS 19 AND 19A OF THE EMERGENCY PROVISIONS ACT 1978
|CHAPTER 14: ||UNLAWFUL COLLECTION OF INFORMATION - SECTION 22 OF THE EMERGENCY PROVISIONS ACT 1978
|CHAPTER 15:||PROSCRIBED ORGANISATIONS
|Offence of Training in the Making or Use of Firearms and Explosives (Section 23 EPA 1978)
|Offence of Failure to Disperse (Section 24 EPA 1978)
|Public Order Regulations (Section 27 and Schedule 3 EPA 1978)
|Documentary Exhibits in Committal Proceedings
|Consent to Prosecutions
|Uniforms, hoods, etc
|CHAPTER 17:||ANTI-RACKETEERING MEASURES
|CHAPTER 19:||DURATION AND REVIEWS OF THE LEGISLATION
|CHAPTER 21:||SUMMARY OF PRINCIPAL RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
I was appointed by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland
in September 1989 with the following terms of reference -
To review the operation of the Northern Ireland (Emergency
Provisions) Acts 1978 and 1987, and to consider:
(a) whether any of these temporary provisions can safely be allowed
to lapse in 1990;
and taking into account the need to ensure that there are both
effective powers to deal with terrorist violence and adequate
safeguards for the individual,
(b) what changes to existing provisions should be made when the
time comes to replace the two Acts; and
(c) whether it would be appropriate to consolidate into new legislation
applying only to Northern Ireland any of the provisions relating
to Northern Ireland in the Prevention of Terrorism Act 1989 (either
in their present or some modified form);
and to report.
On the first matter, I published a brief report in February which
recommended no changes in the Renewal Order for 1990. That Order
Thereafter I embarked upon a process for the "enhanced review",
which included three weeks of discussions and interviews in Northern
Ireland, and meetings in London. These had been preceded by writing
some hundred letters last Autumn to as wide a variety of recipients
as could be devised. I was already acquainted with spokesmen for
a number of political parties and with numerous other organisations
who had assisted on previous annual reviews. Each of the local
authorities was contacted, as were all the main churches. All
were invited to send their views in writing by the New Year, and
to say if they would like a meeting. Advertisements were placed
in the newspapers, and this provoked a number of letters from
the public. I am not aware of having failed to see anyone who
so requested, and arrangements were made to seek out people who
could express some points of view or concerns not otherwise canvassed.
I went to all six counties, spending a full 24 hours each in County
Londonderry and County Fermanagh. I was invited to address, but
more particularly listen to, the Coleraine Borough Council, the
Derry City Council, the Strabane District Council and the Ards
Borough Council. The Army organised discussions in each of the
three Brigades, both at Brigade and Regimental level, with a visit
to a Border Crossing Point in County Tyrone, and two Permanent
Vehicle Check Points; while the RUC gave me their views at Headquarters,
in Londonderry and Enniskillen, and in the course of a tour in
West Belfast I was able to talk to all ranks, both in the Army
and Police. I spoke to several Departments and Agencies of Government.
The list omits mention of many others, both individuals and organisations,
who made a fascinating and perceptive contribution to the review.
This is from no ingratitude, but having thought long about it,
I concluded that this is the fairest way. There were some who
feared that they might be misunderstood for having participated;
yet to leave them out of a list would do serious damage to the
balance. For the same reasons there is little in the text which
attributes any comment to its source.
To everyone, however, I have to express my deep gratitude. They
accommodated my closely-packed schedule, were forthcoming with
ideas and propositions, and in many cases with kind hospitality.
I enjoyed and was much enlightened by meeting them all.
I must also thank most warmly the officials who made all the plans,
and helped with notes and papers, and, in no small way, those
who typed the manuscript. The time table has been very tight,
and without their generous help could not have been achieved.
|Colville of Culross
CHAPTER 1: CONTEXT FOR THE REVIEW
1.1 The temptation arises to embark on a definitive treatise on
the situation in Northern Ireland in early 1990. There is a wealth
of fact and opinion, and suggestions for policy too, in the written
and oral information which I have been given. Yet this was a snapshot
only of those months, albeit with a panoramic background stretching
back over seven centuries or so. Without a wary eye on that history,
it would be rash to make recommendations to fulfil my main terms
of reference, about a new Emergency Provisions Act in 1992; lasting
until 1997 as I see it. However, the task must be forward-looking;
though inevitably technical, and so for many hard work to read,
the report must represent raw material for formulating any new
Emergency Provisions Bill and for discussion in Parliament of
the text. That legislation will address only a small portion of
the situation in Northern Ireland. It is much better, therefore,
only to recognise and mention some of the strands which make up
the tapestry which includes the emergency. I recognise, anyway,
the constraints on any writer who was not brought up in Ireland.
1.2 Some who have contributed by their letters and in discussion
will be disappointed that I do not cover all their points. There
are those, like harmonisation of UK terrorist law with that in
the Republic, or the whole EEC, which go wide of my terms of reference.
So too does an overview of the criminal law in Northern Ireland,
including detention of young people during the Secretary of State's
pleasure, or indeterminate sentences. I have had no more success
than others in finding a way to prohibit amazingly realistic imitation
firearms from sale in a shop or by mail order, without comprehending
children's toys as well. I fear that many topics remain unaddressed,
but I do not believe that any of them would have added to the
fulfilment of the comparatively narrow remit which I have been
1.3 There is a direct challenge, in the representations made to
me, to a continuation of the EPA. The Labour Party puts it thus:-
"The Labour Party continues to believe that emergency
legislation cannot resolve the problems which exist in Northern
Ireland. Furthermore, the grievances to which the operation of
emergency powers give rise are in themselves one of the causes
of the continuing violence. They also lend credence to the claims
of the paramilitaries by giving them a status they would not otherwise
We believe that the basic task of government in Northern Ireland
is to ensure that the Province is administered on the basis of
the rule of law. It is an extremely dangerous fallacy to believe
that the absence of political stability justifies deviations from
the rule of law. On the contrary, precisely because the political
institutions lack legitimacy, the negative effects of deviations
from the rule of law are magnified."
1.4 They would be supported by the SDLP and others. They see the
Acts as an obstacle to a political solution. From an entirety
different source, the Ulster Unionist Party, I have been reminded
of the long history of emergency legislation in Ireland. Acts
to suspend habeas corpus (Coercion Acts) were regular features
in the 18th and 19th centuries, and the law was virtually codified
in the Criminal Law and Procedures (Ireland) Act 1887, which was
aimed primarily at "agrarian outrages". This was insufficient
to deal with the rebellions of 1916 and 1918, for which powers
under the Defence of the Realm Act 1914 and 1915 were used. Next
came the Restoration of Order in Ireland Act 1920. Stormont, when
it was set in place, passed an equivalent to the 1887 Act, which
was never implemented; reliance for years was placed instead on
the Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act 1922 and Regulations
made under it, until the advent of the Emergency Provisions Act
1973. It must therefore be conceded that "normality"
in the rule of law, as it is enjoyed in the rest of the UK, has
never been quite the same in Northern Ireland. I can readily understand
why there is a concern about human rights; and many nationalists
would say that I have not gone far enough into history.
1.5 An opposite point of view would set forth from the most basic
human right of all, the right of life. This is at the forefront
of the International Covenants, and of the European Convention
. Without it everything else loses its significance. In his
Annual Report for 1987 the then Chief Constable of the RUC said
in his Foreword:
"Terrorists are well schooled in methods designed to
impede investigation into their acts of violent criminality. They
are educated to a high degree in the working of the legal system
and use this knowledge to their advantage. Training in interrogation
resistance, with lectures and practical demonstrations, is standard
procedure to all so-called volunteers. They are also made fully
aware of the value of scientific evidence and take immediate steps
to remove or destroy any traces of their criminal actions. Detection
is thus avoided and justice thwarted.
This state of affairs inevitably raises a serious question which
must be faced: how is society to defend itself against a determined
criminal conspiracy which abuses the freedoms of democracy in
order to destroy it? The police and the courts must have adequate
powers to deal effectively with terrorist criminality in all its
forms. It cannot be right that known murderers can walk the streets
with apparent impunity and that the community can he intimidated
1.6 In the following Annual Report he was no less forceful:
"The perception of 1988 is one of terrorist atrocity
followed by terrorist atrocity and the year will undoubtedly stand
out as one in which murderous inhumanity was portrayed as never
before. The Provisional IRA in particular had intended a year
of seriously escalating violence and only the dedicated efforts
of the Police and the Army prevented their full plans from being
realised. In the event the number of deaths did not exceed those
of the previous year but the continuing loss of life is totally
unacceptable if Northern Ireland is to be regarded as a civilised
society. It is more encouraging to report that the overall level
of crime decreased substantially and the high detection rate was
maintained. Most importantly, stability was also maintained in
1.7 Some members of the public took the trouble to write to me
saying that the existing emergency laws are inadequate; and I
received the same message from some councillors whose Council
meetings I attended.
1.8 To illustrate the extent in recent years of terrorist activity
the following statistics present the facts-
*Deaths are up to 31 May - the remaining figures are as at 31
I would add a footnote: the weight of explosives in this table
does not differentiate between home-made explosives and Semtex:
the latter, lb for lb, causes vastly more damage.
1.9 Confronted with these diametrically opposing views, I am not
even allowed to come down somewhere in the middle, because my
terms of reference predicate a replacement of the EPAS. I would
not, in fact, be able to recommend otherwise, on the facts presented
to me; but I do recognise that, if there can be seen some glimpse
of a path leading to a political resolution of the emergency,
a larger prospect may have opened up by the time a new Bill comes
to be debated in Parliament; or even as late as May 1992 when
it is due to come into force. There is a long way to go, but I
suggest that it might be worth considering, for that purpose,
a commencement order procedure, so that no decision need finally
be taken until just before that date.
1.10 For the moment, however, I am happy to adopt the principles
supplied to me by the Alliance Party:
"(1) The principles of human rights and the preservation
of civil liberties are an essential priority in any democratic
society, Alteration in the processes of the criminal law may be
essential in the face of violent attack on the democratic process
and the rule of law, but any such alteration must be carefully
scrutinised and considered, and must not go beyond what is necessary
to protect the public.
(2) The preservation and promotion of public confidence in policing
and in the administration of justice is of the utmost importance
in ending Northern Ireland's years of division and communal violence.
The police and the courts, and the laws which they administer
and apply, must be clearly seen to be fair and impartial.
(3) The same standards should be clearly seen to apply in Northern
Ireland as in the rest of the United Kingdom. Legislation peculiar
to Northern Ireland must not limit the standards of human rights
and civil liberties prevailing in the rest of the UK without the
clearest possible justification, and where such legislation is
made necessary by the current political conflict in Northern Ireland
that linkage must be clearly identified.
(4) It is at all times essential that the letter and spirit of
the European Convention on Human Rights be complied with."
Note The derogation following the Brogan case is
not for an EPA review.
1.11 It has always been my approach that no deviation from the
normal law should be allowed to continue unless the case for it
is made out on each occasion when a decision falls to be taken.
That is the way to look at an emergency; if it is to be called
an "emergency" after all these years, only those measures
are legitimate which are the minimum needed to bring it to an
end. And even though one member of the public wrote that "the
so-called Troubles are the norm". it still seems to me most
unsatisfactory to adopt a policy which is based on that assumption.
1.12 There is universal agreement that the struggle to eradicate
terrorism in Northern Ireland must be conducted with the widest
possible support from the community if it is to be successful.
This is said by those, like the Workers' Party , whose recipe
would include abolition of the EPA. It must be an even more strongly
held tenet for those who support a continuation, or a reinforcement
of emergency powers. I have no doubt at all that Government in
all its forms, the police and the Army are fully seized of this
point, but there is no end to the vigilance required to temper
the inconveniences caused by the operation of the EPA. I give
a few examples:
(1) There is complaint, particularly in West Belfast and West
Londonderry that the police are very slow to respond to ordinary
crime; the point was made, too, in one country area. I may say
that this is not an annoyance unique to Northern Ireland. Most
police forces have their priorities and take longer to respond
to some categories of reported crime than others. However the
RUC's manpower is stretched, and they face the hazard which occurs
nowhere else that a call for the police to attend a burglary may
be a set-up for an ambush. It is, however, most encouraging to
find, in the Chief Constable's newly published strategy, that
two of the aims are to reduce the incidence and enhance the detection
of crime, and to reduce the incidence of road traffic accidents:
both are normal and traditional police priorities, and the emphasis
must be seen as commendable.
A businessman wrote to tell me that his premises had been bombed
8 times, and burgled on 73 occasions. He quite simply thinks the
policing has broken down and the EPA does not work: it is not
difficult to see his point.
(2) It can well be counter-productive, as the common complaint
tends to indicate, to pick on young men in certain areas for particular
attention by patrols. It is just these people who are potential
recruits for the terrorist organisations. If they believe themselves
to be victimised, or are humiliated in the company of a girl-friend,
such treatment may lead to permanent alienation from the forces
of law and order. If, however, they really are becoming "fed
up with being used as terrorist cannon-fodder", this must
be an attitude which needs every encouragement.
(3) Delays at Permanent Vehicle Check Points on the Border are
a continuing irritation to regular users. At the Clady PVCP in
West Tyrone it can take three quarters of an hour to get through
to Mass, on Sunday mornings. At Gortmullan in South East Co. Fermanagh
there are regularly delays which cause frustration to those who
cross the border to their work, and substantial financial penalties
for commercial firms. One industrialist calculated that the delays
at that crossing alone cost him nearly £300,000 pal, largely
made up from having to run 5 extra lorries.
It is not that people object to being checked, although frequently
they are waved through when their turn comes. It is the unnecessary
hold-up. I have much sympathy with proposals for some time-and-motion
techniques to be applied. Some PVCP's such as Aughnacloy have
a lay-by facility into which a vehicle to be searched is diverted,
allowing the other traffic to proceed; but at others, like Gortmullan,
the road is a narrow lane in each direction. The cost of purchasing
a small piece of land and surfacing it would bring a handsome
return in goodwill. It is very hard to devise a method of apologising
to individuals for delays which can badly upset the purpose of
a joumey; the better solution must be to avoid the tail-back.
(4) It appears that the security forces take photographs of people,
in the street and at Vehicle Cheek Points. The only reason can
be that policemen and soldiers wish to recognise those in whom
they have a security interest. This was, at the time of my visit
to Northern Ireland, a very sensitive subject, in the aftermath
of "montages" appearing on walls, and the inquiry carried
out by Mr. Stevens. It is not irrelevant to mention that there
would be a fair amount of support in Northern Ireland for a national
identity card system, which incidentally would provide photographs
(5) Apprehension can be caused by soldiers drawing a plan of the
house when a house-search takes place. Some house-holders are
convinced that this is part of a plot to enable ("Loyalist")
terrorists to find their way to, for instance, a bedroom when
they come to carry out an assassination. In fact, these sketches
are drawn in order to identify the position of any item which
may have been damaged during the search, so that the Civil Representatives
may accurately assess and pay compensation. They are also useful
in identifying where any suspicious items are found.
1.13 It would be impossible to remark on all the initiatives which
are currently under way in Northern Ireland. Social advances are
instrumental in reducing the draw of terrorism; employment and
prosperity, good housing and a better environment are as much
cherished in Northern Ireland as in the rest of the UK. The Central
Community Relations Unit and the Northern Ireland Community Relations
Council are engaged in cross-community contact and co-operation,
mutual understanding and respect, as well as equal opportunities
and equity of treatment, and a respect for the cultural roots
of both communities, including the use of Gaelic. Mutual understanding
truly needs developing. The same events are perceived, Bishop
Cahal Daly told me, in strongly different ways within the Catholic
and Protestant parts of his diocese. The Northern Ireland Community
Study Group has recently formulated some rules of dialogue, one
of which is this:
"In talking to each other we have to use language. I
realise that human language is not a perfect instrument. No matter
how well-educated a person may be, he will not always succeed
in saying exactly what he means, so if something you have said
makes me annoyed I will not immediately react angrily. I will
ask as many questions as are necessary to be clear about what
you actually meant. The chances are that there will be very little
to be angry about."
There is room for a wider application of this rule.
1.14 I was impressed by the fortitude of the communities whom
I met in the border area. It seems that they do apply the "rule"
just mentioned to very good effect. Their anxieties, however,
about terrorist activity in this sensitive zone deserves recognition;
Chapter 13.3.3 gives an example of what may be done.
1.15 Lastly, out of many instances of wise advice, I would wish
to give an example of a gesture which brought a beneficial response
in community perceptions. The Christmas release scheme for prisoners
was a most successful concession. It is worth considering Northern
Ireland prisoners in the GB prison system. A transfer to Northern
Ireland would be well received; visiting by relations is extremely
difficult and even accumulated visits are a rare event. With over-crowding
in England and wider use of capacity in Northern Ireland more
than one objective might be gained. The dominance of family and
community links in Northern Ireland would be acknowledged and
1.16 This must, however, suffice as an introduction to the detail
of the legislation.
CHAPTER 21: SUMMARY OF PRINCIPAL CONCLUSIONS
|Chapter 1: Context for the Review
|Widely differing views of emergency laws remain, reflecting continuing community divisions. Deviation from the normal law should occur only where it is clearly justified in each case.
|21.2||Consideration should be given to a commencement order procedure for any new legislation, so that no decision need be taken on its desirability until the last moment.
|Chapter 2: Stop, Search and Arrest Powers
|21.3||The search and arrest powers require simplification. EPA Section 17 should be amalgamated with Section 15, and Section 11 with PTA Sections 14 and 15. Part of Section 13(1) and all of Section 13(2) have been superseded. Other powers should be left as they are.
|21.4||The case for additional search powers in association with "hotpursuit" under Section 14 has not been made.
|21.5||No legal provision appears to allow for a speculative search through documents in a house or car, except as a by-product of the PACE Order; and we should await the courts' interpretation of the PACE provisions to see whether the position on searches of documents is clarified.
|21.6||A new offence, comparable to "going equipped for theft", should be introduced to cover the use of household or everyday items for terrorist purposes. It may assist with the problems of 4 and 5 above.
|21.7||The additional powers of the police and Army under the emergency legislation remain necessary, despite the introduction of PACE; and they cannot be safely relinquished.
|Chapter 3: Access to family and solicitors
|21.8||The provisions on access to family and solicitors are equivalent to those in GB.
|21.9||The Probation Board might be used as a bridge between a suspect and his family after his initial arrest.
|21. 10 ||The advent of the Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1988 does not require any counter-balancing measures in terrorist-type cases.
|21.11||While a duty solicitor scheme may be impractical in Northern Ireland, it is desirable that lists of solicitors should be posted in the holding centres, as in "designated police stations" under PACE.
|Chapter 4: Video and tape-recording of interviews
|21.12||Video-recording of interviews with terrorist suspects would allow allegations of brutality to be controverted and would enhance public confidence in the police. It should be introduced in the holding centres. Some repositioning of existing monitors would be required.
|21.13||Tape-recording of interviews presents greater difficulties, in relation to the co-operation of terrorist suspects with the police and the disclosure of sensitive intelligence information. Consideration should be given to trials in tape-recording summaries of interviews as in England and Wales.
|Chapter 5: Complaints
|21.14||Effective complaints procedures are essential especially while emergency laws are in force; although the police and Army make considerable efforts to deal with complaints swiftly and effectively, there is a widespread feeling that very few complaints are satisfactorily resolved, especially in terms of the receipt of an apology.
|21.15 ||Consideration should be given to extending the lay visitors scheme to the holding centres; and to appointing an ombudsman-like figure to appraise the effectiveness of complaints systems on a continuing basis.
|Chapter 6: Codes of Practice
|21.16||The new legislation should contain an enabling power to make one or more statutory Code of Practice.
|Chapter 7: Bail, remand, Preliminary inquiries
|21.17||Bail hearings should continue to be heard before the High Court, since the terrorist threat to magistrates remains. The bail provisions work well. Persons charged with a mixture of scheduled and non-scheduled offences should be capable of being remanded for 28 days.
|21.18||A new provision should be introduced relating to the remand of soldiers into military custody; and to allow the remand of suspects into police custody.
|21.19||The right of the defence to have the prosecution case tested at the preliminary investigation should remain.
|21.20||The power of the Secretary of State to set time limits in relation to preliminary proceedings for scheduled offences should be retained.
|Chapter 8: Scheduled offences
|21.21||The procedures for certifying offences, and amending Schedule 4, work satisfactorily. Although there are cases where non-terrorist robberies and armed burglaries are tried before 'Diplock' Courts, an alternative criterion for scheduling is difficult to establish.
|21.22||There is continued support for a change to "certifying in" offences, although the change would be largely one of perception and would have a number of procedural implications which would need to be fully considered, Racketeering offences may make "certifying in" a more attractive proposition.
|Chapter 9: Diplock Courts
|21.23||There is a general recognition that the no-jury system remains necessary for terrorist-type offences. There is a continuing risk of intimidation to jurors: the statutory basis of 'Diplock' Courts remains necessary. A change to multi-judge courts would have implications for the Appeal process and dissenting judgements would need to be prohibited. The arguments about the merits of multi-,judge courts have been fully rehearsed elsewhere.
|Chapter 10: Trial procedures
|21.24||The law on admissibility of confessions (Section 8) in scheduled cases is well established; the PACE provisions are much less certain in their effect on the validity of confessions. An enabling power to transfer to the PACE standard, if it becomes appropriate to do so, should however be made.
|21.25||The effect of the provisions of the Criminal Evidence (NI) Order 1988 on the conduct of trials is not wholly novel. The case for additional safeguards for the accused has not been established.
|21.26||The provisions on the burden of proof in cases involving the possession of firearms or explosives (Section 9) are confined to a single function, to require the accused to testify. They should be retained.
|21.27||A judge's discretion to order a new trial, or to proceed with the trial, after bearing evidence which he has ruled inadmissible, should be retained; but a pre-trial review to determine issues of admissibility should, where possible, be adopted, with some more public indication when such a review should be held.
|Chapter 11: Detention (internment)
|21.28||The provisions relating to detention without trial have not been in use since 1975, and the practice is widely condemned in other countries. The provisions should not be re-enacted.
|Chapter 12: Explosives Inspectors
|21.29||Section 16 of the EPA 1978. from which the Civilian Search Unit derives its powers to stop and search vehicles and pedestrians, should be retained.
|Chapter 13: Interference with rights of property and highways
|21.30||The powers to close roads, requisition property etc, in Section 19 of the 1978 Act remain an essential part of the security forces' armoury against terrorism and should be retained.
|Chapter 14: Unlawful collection of information
|21.31||The provisions relating to collecting information (Section 22 EPA 1978) should be amended to enable the list of categories of potential targets to be specified by regulations.
|Chapter 15: Proscribed organisations
|21.32||The proscription provisions remain valuable; decisions on proscribing or de-proscribing particular organisations are properly for Government.
|Chapter 16: Miscellaneous
|21.33||The power to make supplementary public order regulations should be retained.
|- The power to disperse crowds (Section 24 EPA 1978) has been superseded and should not be re-enacted.
|- Offences relating to training in the making and use of firearms and explosives should be retained.
|- The Magistrates' Courts (NI) Order 1981 should be amended to bring the law on the copying of written exhibits into line with England and Wales.
|- An amendment is necessary to allow a provision equivalent to Section 15(1) of the PTA, relating to fingerprinting, to apply in Northern Ireland.
|- The provision in Section 29 of the EPA 1978, which requires the DPP's consent to prosecutions under the Act, should be retained.
|- The uniforms, flags, hoods etc provisions in subsections 25 and 26 should be retained.
|Chapter 17: Anti-racketeering measures
|21.34||The provisions concerning regulation of security guard services (Part 111 of the 1987 Act) should be amended to tighten up the offences of deliberately giving misleading information, or failing to supply information, and to widen the kind of employee covered by the scheme. More general strengthening of the scheme may be justified.
|21.35||If racketeering in Northern Ireland is to be tackled effectively, new provisions to allow investigation, restraint orders and confiscation of proceeds should be made, relating to the criminal law generally. An investigating body with specialist knowledge may be required. These changes should be effected by Order in Council.
|21.36||Because of the danger of intimidation, certain currently non-scheduled offences would need to be tried before a 'Diplock' Court in cases of paramilitary fraud.
|Chapter 18: Compensation
|21.37||There is a case for compensating traders and owners of private property where loss of earning or blight has occurred as a result of security measures. Existing compensation law in GB suggests two possible models for consequential loss.
|Chapter 19: Duration and reviews
|21.38||New legislation should have a life of five years, with annual renewals of its operation. A permanent body, such as the Standing Advisory Commission on Human Rights, might be suited to this task.
|Chapter 20: Consolidation
|21.39||New legislation should consolidate those emergency provisions that are being retained with PTA arrest and detention powers and parts of PTA Part VI. Other powers should be dealt with as suggested in 21.35 above.
 I have seen the RUC's prospective concerns about changes
to PACE Code of Practice B, which is about endorsement of warrants
between the UK jurisdictions. This must be dealt with on a UK-wide
basis, and has nothing to do with the EPA.
 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Article 2: "Everyone's right to life
shall be protected by law".