"The deprivation of life of civilians by members of the armed or security forces in violation of law governing the state of war or armed conflict"

and because they were deaths which took place:

"As a result of abuse of force by police, military or any other governmental or quasi-governmental forces".
[United Nations Factsheet No. 11 on Summary or Arbitrary Executions]

"Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life."

"so far as possible, to recreate the state of law in the Creggan and Bogside as and when he could." [Insight, Times, 23.4.1972].

'The civil rights march is not legal. Theirs [the DUAs], he said, would be. The authorities will have to keep their word and stop the civil rights march and give us protection."

"We were approached by the Government and given assurances that the Civil Rights march would be halted - by force if necessary. We believe wholesale riot and bloodshed could be the result of the Civil Rights activities tomorrow and we would be held responsible if our rally takes place. We have appealed to all loyalists to stay out of the city centre tomorrow."

"(c) The scoop up [arrest] operation is likely to be launched on two axes, one directed towards hooligan activity in the area of William St/Little Diamond and one towards the area of William St/Little James St."

"I asked...the question which in fact for a long time has...worried me. I said, 'What happens if there is shooting?' To which I got really a very...sparse reply to the effect that, 'Oh well, well deal with that when it comes.' It's my greatest regret that I didn't actually pursue that question and say, 'Right you know what - what do you want us to do if we're shot at?"'

"I did expect when we went into the Rossville flats to be fired at."

"I was just told that there was a possibility that gunmen would be in the area and to keep our eyes out especially for high ground like the Rossville flats - obvious sniper position."

"In the Parachute Regiment, at any rate in the 1st Battalion, the soldiers are trained to take what may be described as a bard line upon these questions. The events of 30 January and the attitude of individual soldiers whilst giving evidence suggest that when engaging an identified gunman or bomb-thrower they shoot to kill and continue to fire until the target disappears or falls. When under attack and returning fire they show no particular concern for the safety of others in the vicinity of the target. They are aware that civilians who do not wish to be associated with violence tend to make themselves scarce at the first alarm and they know that it is the deliberate policy of gunmen to use civilians as cover. Further, when hostile firing is taking place the soldiers of 1 Para will fire on a person who appears to be using a firearm against them without always waiting until they can positively identify the weapon.

"When we moved on the streets we moved as if we in fact were moving against a well-armed well-trained army.

". . . I was standing next to General Robert Ford at the time who was a new commander, and he was waving his swaggery stick saying, 'Go on the Paras, go and get them, go on, go and get them.' And then all was mayhem."

"Those accustomed to listening to witnesses could not fail to be impressed by the demeanour of the soldiers of 1 Para. They gave their evidence with confidence and without hesitation or prevarication and withstood a rigorous cross-examination without contradicting themselves or each other. With one or two exceptions I accept that they were telling the truth as they remembered it."

"None of the deceased or wounded is proved to have been shot whilst handling a firearm or bomb."

"Although a number of soldiers spoke of actually seeing firearms or bombs in the hands of civilians none was recovered by the Army. None of the many photographs shows a civilian holding an object that can with certainty be identified as a firearm or a bomb. No casualties were suffered by the soldiers from firearms or gelignite bombs. In relation to every one of the deceased there were eye witnesses who said that they saw no bomb or firearm in his hands. The clothing of 11 of the deceased when examined for explosives showed no trace of gelignite."

"The soldiers escaped injury by reason of their superior field-craft and training."

'The House will have heard with deep anxiety that a number of people were killed and injured in the course of disturbances in Londonderry yesterday.

A march was organised in deliberate defiance of the legal order banning marches. The GOC [General Officer Commanding] Northern Ireland has reported that at an appropriate point this march was stopped by the security forces and that those who were under the control of the organisers turned back. A large number of trouble-makers refused to accept the instructions of the march stewards and attacked the Army with stones, bottles, steel bars and canisters of CS [gas]. The Army met this assault with two water cannon, CS, and rubber bullets only. The GOC has further reported that when the Army advanced to make arrests among the trouble-makers they came under fire from a block of flats and other quarters. At this stage the members of the orderly, though illegal, march were no longer near the vicinity. The Army returned the fire directed at them with aimed shots and inflicted a number of casualties on those who were attacking them with firearms and with bombs."

"In view of the statements that have been made which publicly dispute this account, the Government have decided that it is right to set up an independent inquiry into the circumstances of the march and the incidents leading up to the casualties which resulted."

"In normal circumstances one could well claim that, since an inquiry is to be set up, it would be better that nothing should be said at this stage which might seem to prejudge what the findings of the inquiry will be. But, as the House knows, there has been a series of reports involving the most serious allegations against the Army's conduct. It is conceivable, although I much hope that it will not prove to be the case, that these allegations will be given further currency during the course of the debate.

I think, therefore, that it is right for me to set out in good faith the facts as I know them, although I realise that the facts as I know them conflict with the statements which have been made by other people. It is right because, however urgently the inquiry is conducted, some time is bound to elapse before the evidence can be collected and weighed. It is not right that the Army's case could go by default when bitter, intemperate, and, to the best of my belief, inaccurate or untrue statements have been made against it. It would be grossly unfair to the forces in Northern Ireland. We must also recognise that the IRA is waging a war, not only of bullets and bombs but of words. It is waging a highly skilled war of propaganda, in which corpses, the unutterable sadness of relatives, the confusion, the gullibility and the downright lies are all brought into play. If the IRA is allowed to win this war I shudder to think what will be the future of the people living in Northern Ireland.

To allow the Army's case to go by default would be to allow to go by default the very people whose sole purpose is to prevent Northern Ireland sliding into civil war."

"Civil rights marches suit the IRA's tactics and purposes well - not just because of their propaganda value but also because they give it a chance to create trouble."

Having created the impression that those involved in the Bloody Sunday march were either active supporters of or had been used by the IRA, he went on to suggest that responsibility for the violence on Bloody Sunday lay with the organisers of the march, a sentiment which was echoed by Lord Widgery in his report [Conclusion 1].

Lord Balniel then gave his version of the facts as he knew them:

"I turn now to the events of Sunday afternoon in Londonderry. Intelligence information had given the security forces good reason to believe that the IRA would exploit the opportunities afforded by the march and subsequent rioting to mount attacks on the security forces. Marchers began to gather in the Creggan, at about 2 pm. By about 2.45, when they numbered about 800, they set off on a tour of the Creggan and the Bogside, gradually building up their strength to about 3,000. The march was well marshalled at this stage.

Troops from the three resident Londonderry battalions were manning a number of barriers inside the edge of a Catholic area, and in particular in the area of William Street. The decision precisely when and where to intervene in an illegal march in order to frustrate it is a matter for the commander on the spot. In this case, no action was to be taken against the marchers unless they tried to break through barriers or to direct violence against the troops.

The marchers reached the barrier in William Street, east of the junction with Rossville Street, just before 3.40. There was a brief discussion between the march leaders, the Army and the RUC. The leaders began to move off, but stewards were unable to keep control and large groups of trouble-makers started to throw stones, bottles, steel bars, and other missiles - including canisters of CS - at the troops manning the barriers in the area. Water cannon were used, and the bulk of the crowd moved back to the open ground around Rossville Street, leaving behind a hooligan element still attacking troops at the barriers. At this stage troops used CS and rubber bullets against the rioters.

By five minutes past four the crowd in Rossville Street was largely dispersing. There was clear separation between the rioters at the barricades and the remaining marchers in the area. There had, however, already been two incidents foreshadowing the terrorist violence which was to come. At 3.55 a high-velocity round was fired across William Street from the direction of the Rossville Flats, striking a drainpipe four feet above the heads of a party of soldiers. A few moments later, a man was seen preparing to light a nail bomb in William Street; he was shot as he prepared to throw, was seen to fall, and was dragged away by his fellows.

Between 4.05 and 4.10, the brigade commander ordered the 1st Battalion, the Parachute Regiment, to launch an arrest operation against the rioters, who, as I have said, were well separated from the marchers. These rioters were flagrantly breaking the law; hurling missiles at the troops and establishing a degree of violence which was quite unacceptable. The level of their violence was highly dangerous to the police and Army.

The hon. Member for Leeds, South [Merlyn Rees, Shadow defence spokesman] has asked about the responsibility for the decision to arrest. The arrest operation was discussed by the Joint Security Council after decisions had been taken by Ministers here. Where the barricades are actually placed is a matter for the operational commanders on the spot.

The Parachute Regiment, the Belfast reserve Battalion, had been deployed to Londonderry as a precaution, and had been kept behind the line of barriers for use in this way in case it was needed. Three companies of soldiers therefore came through the barriers in William Street at about 4.15 pm. They fired rubber bullets when necessary. It is the noise of these rubber-bullet firings which, incidentally, I believe is the reason why many of the marchers who were well away from the area believed that the Army opened fire first.

Two companies made a number of arrests. One company found the rioters it intended to arrest withdrawing towards Rossville flats and followed them in armoured vehicles towards those buildings. On the way, three rounds struck one vehicle, and a burst of about 1 5 rounds from a sub-machine gun struck the ground just a few yards away from a group of soldiers as they got out of their vehicle.

The soldiers continued to arrest the rioters whom they had chased. They arrested about 28 in a matter of a few minutes. At the same time, they came under fire from gunmen, nail bombers and petrol bombers, some in the flats and some at ground level. Between 4.17 and 4.35 pm, a number of these men were engaged. Some gunmen and bombers were certainly hit and some almost certainly killed. In each case, soldiers fired aimed shots at men identified as gunmen or bombers. They fired in self-defence or in defence of their comrades who were threatened. I reject entirely the suggestion that they fired indiscriminately or that they fired into a peaceful and innocent crowd."

'The march in Londonderry on January 30 was held in contravention of the Government's ban on all processions and parades. This ban of course applies to both communities in Northern Ireland.
Of the 13 men killed in the shooting that began after the bulk of the 3,000 marchers had been peacefully dispersed, four were on the security forces wanted list. One man had four nail bombs in his pocket. All were between the ages of 16 and 40.
The shooting started with two high-velocity shots aimed at the troops manning the barriers. No one was hit and the fire was not returned. Four minutes later a further high-velocity shot was aimed at a battalion wire-cutting party. This shot also was not answered.
A few minutes later a member of the machine-gun platoon saw a man about to light a nail bomb. As the man prepared to throw, an order was given to shoot him. He fell and was dragged away.
Throughout the fighting that ensued, the Army fired only at identified targets - at attacking gunmen and bombers. At all times the soldiers obeyed their standing instructions to fire only in self-defence or in defence of others threatened.
The bulk of the marchers dispersed after reaching the barricades, on instructions from March Stewards. A hard core of hooligans remained behind and attacked three of the barriers. When the attacks reached an unacceptable level, the soldiers were ordered to pass through and arrest as many as possible. They were not, however, to conduct a running battle down the street.
As they went through the barriers the soldiers fired rubber bullets to clear the streets in front of them. They made 43 arrests.
The troops then came under indiscriminate firing from apartments and a car park. The following is the army's account of the return fire:

1. Nail-bomber hit in the thigh.
2. Petrol-bomber, apparently killed in the car park.
3. A bomber in the flats, apparently killed.
4. Gunman with pistol behind barricade, shot and hit.
5. Nail-bomber shot and hit.
6. Another nail-bomber shot and hit.
7. Rubber bullet fired at gunman handling pistol
8. Nail-bomber hit.
9. Three nail-bombers, all hit.
10. Two gunmen with pistols, one hit, one unhurt.
11. One sniper in a toilet window fired on and not hit.
12. Gunman with pistol in third floor flat shot and possibly hit.
13. Gunman with rifle on ground floor of flats shot and hit.
14. Gunman with rifle at barricade killed and body recovered."

None of the deceased or wounded is proved to have been shot whilst handling a firearm or bomb. Some are wholly acquitted of complicity in such action; but there is a strong suspicion that some others had been firing weapons or handling bombs in the course of the afternoon and that yet others had been closely supporting them."

No evidence was offered as to where the bombs might have come from, who might have placed them or why Donaghy should have been singled out for this treatment."

"I find the evidence too confused and too contradictory to make separate consideration possible,"

" .... constitutes ground for suspicion that he had been in close proximity to someone who had fired."

'There was no general breakdown in discipline."

"On the afternoon of the 30th January 1972 in the area of the Rossville Flats in Londonderry the Army launched an operation to arrest persons who were rioting after an illegal march. In the course of this arrest operation terrorist gunmen opened fire on the Army and bombs were also thrown at the soldiers, and some of the gunmen fired from behind a barricade between the Rossville Flats and Glenfada Park. The soldiers returned fire in self-defence and in order to protect their comrades, and the soldiers were entitled in law to return the fire of the bombers and of the gunmen who had fired first at them. As a result of the fire by the Army 13 persons were shot and killed.

In the summary of the conclusions to his Report, Lord Widgery said that some of the deceased were wholly acquitted of complicity in handling firearms or bombs, but that there was a strong suspicion that some others of the deceased had been firing weapons or handling bombs in the course of the afternoon and that others had been closely supporting them. But Lord Widgery also found that none of the deceased was proved to have been shot whilst handling a firearm or bomb.

Her Majesty's Government say that the Army and the Ministry of Defence are under no legal liability in respect of the deaths of the 13 deceased, because the troops acted lawfully in self-defence and in order to protect their comrades when they opened fire on the gunmen and bombers who had attacked them. But having regard to the finding of Lord Widgery that none of the deceased was proved to have been shot whilst handling a firearm or bomb, Her Majesty's Government now state that they accept that, by reason of this finding of Lord Widgery, all of the deceased should be regarded as having been found not guilty of the allegation of having been shot whilst handling a firearm or bomb and in a spirit of goodwill and conciliation towards the relatives and friends of the deceased and on an ex gratia basis Her Majesty's Government have agreed to pay to the relatives of each of the deceased the respective sums set out below:

Patrick Joseph Doherty

Gerald Vincent Donaghy

John Francis Duddy

Hugh Pius Gilmour

Michael Gerald Kelly

Michael Martin McDaid

Kevin Gerard McElhinney

Bernard McGuigan

James Gerard McKinney

William Anthony McKinney

William Noel Nash

James Patrick Joseph Wray

John Pius Young

The payment of the above sums shall, where claims have been made on behalf of infants, be subject to the approval of the High Court of Justice in Northern Ireland."

"The Government made clear in 1974 that those who were killed on 'Bloody Sunday' should be regarded as innocent of any allegation that they were shot whilst handling firearms or explosives. I hope that the families of those who died will accept that assurance."

" ..... an innocent passer-by going about his own business in Londonderry that afternoon and was almost certainly shot by accident."

a. the limitations Lord Widgery placed on his terms of reference;

b. internal inconsistencies contained in the report;

c. the failure to resolve the conflict of evidence and to give the evidence its due and proper weight;

d. the unreliability of the forensic evidence;

e. the incorrect application of the law on lethal force; and

f. the failure to reach conclusions which were justified by the facts.

'That it is expedient that a Tribunal be established for inquiring into a definite matter of urgent public importance, namely the events on Sunday 30th January which led to loss of life in connection with the procession in Londonderry on that day."

"I emphasised the narrowness of the confines of the Inquiry, the value of which would largely depend on its being conducted and concluded expeditiously. If considerations not directly relevant to the matters under review were allowed to take up time, the production of the Tribunal's Report would be delayed. The limits of the Inquiry in space were the streets of Londonderry in which the disturbances and the shooting took place; in time, the period beginning with the moment when the march first became involved in violence and ending with the deaths of the deceased and the conclusion of the affair."

"If the soldiers are wrong they were parties to a lying conspiracy which must have come to light in the rigorous cross-examination to which they were subject."

"Those accustomed to listening to witnesses could not fail to be impressed by the demeanour of the soldiers of 1 Para. They gave their evidence with confidence and without hesitation or prevarication and withstood a rigorous cross-examination without contradicting themselves or each other."

'The individual soldier ought not to have to bear the burden of deciding whether to open fire in confusion such as prevailed on 30 January."

"The standing orders in the Yellow Card are satisfactory."

"After consideration of the evidence, the Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland and I have decided that there is no evidence sufficient to warrant the prosecution of any member of the Security Forces who took part in those events. I have also decided that it would not be in the public interest to proceed further with charges of riotous behaviour which have been brought against certain civilians in respect of their participation in the events of that day; and accordingly directions will be given that no evidence be offered in support of charges already preferred and that the necessary steps be taken to apply to the court to withdraw such summonses as have been issued."

"To allow such a well publicised march to take place without opposition however would bring the law into disrepute and make control of future marches impossible."

"Quite honestly I owned the Bogside in military terms. I occupied it."

"We accuse the colonel of the Parachute Regiment of wilful murder. We accuse the soldiers of shooting indiscriminately into a fleeing crowd, of gloating over casualties, of preventing medical and spiritual aid reaching some of the dying. It is untrue that shots were fired at the troops in Rossville Street before they were attacked. It is untrue that any of the dead or wounded that we attended were armed."

"What really made Bloody Sunday so obscene was the fact that people afterwards at the highest level of British justice justified it and I think that is the real obscenity."

'This Sunday became known as Bloody Sunday and bloody it was. It was quite unnecessary. It strikes me that the Army ran amok that day and shot without thinking what they were doing. They were shooting innocent people. These people may have been taking part in a march that was banned but that does not justify the troops coming in and firing live rounds indiscriminately. I would say without hesitation that it was sheer, unadulterated murder. It was murder."
[Irish Times, 22 August 1972]