'Northern Ireland: Troubles Brewing' by Landon Hancock[Key_Events] [Key_Issues] [Conflict_Background] The following paper was contributed by Landon Hancock who, at the time of writing, was a temporary intern student at INCORE (INitiative on Conflict Resolution and Ethnicity). Landon Hancock is a Ph.D. Student at the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George Mason University in Fairfax, Virginia. This paper is based upon one chapter of his master's thesis, the patterns of ethnic conflict, published by San Francisco State University in 1996. The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect the views of the members of the CAIN Project. The CAIN Project would welcome other material which meets our guidelines for contributions. This article is copyright (© 1998) of Landon Hancock and is included on the CAIN site by permission of the author. You may not edit, adapt, or redistribute changed versions of this for other than your personal use without the express written permission of the author. Redistribution for commercial purposes is not permitted.
by Landon Hancock
Section Headings: Introduction
The Troubles, as they
are known to the populace, did not erupt on any specific date,
but emerged as the result of several years of escalating incidents
between Catholics and Protestants. This latest episode of the
long-standing conflict between Catholics and Protestants in Northern
Ireland has been going on for thirty years, and although a peace
agreement has been reached, a peaceful resolution to this costly
struggle is not yet in sight. The Troubles have been protracted
and costly in every sense of the word. From the time of the first
civil rights marches in 1968 the cost, in both human and material
terms, has been steadily mounting. Between 1968 and 1994, over
3,500 people died and over 35,000 were injured in Northern Ireland
as a direct result of the fighting. Robberies, bombings, assassinations,
and terror tactics spread to engulf Great Britain and the Irish
Republic, greatly decreasing the common person's sense of security
and impinging on the populace's personal freedom. Civil rights
in Northern Ireland have been seriously eroded, and freedom in
the name of safety has been sacrificed to some extent in both
Great Britain and the Irish Republic (Rowthorn and Wayne 1988,
51). In material terms, Northern Ireland drains over £3 billion
annually from the British treasury while increased security and
border patrols cost the Irish Republic over one-quarter of its
annual budget.
The economy of Northern
Ireland has also been deeply affected by the ongoing conflict.
Manufacturing employment in Northern Ireland has declined by over
40 per cent since the beginning of the conflict, increasing the
province's dependence on Great Britain for subsidies to maintain
its current standard of living (see fig. 1). While part of this
decline can be attributed to the decline of the world economy
in the early 1970s, the 'branch plant' structure of industry in
Northern Ireland has also contributed to the sharp deterioration
in economic conditions within the region. These foreign-owned
assembly or secondary production branch plants closed down when
violence increased operating costs in the province. The fact that
these plants lacked research and development or marketing facilities
and were secondary (as opposed to main) plants meant that these
low priority plants in Northern Ireland could shift their production
elsewhere at minimal cost to their foreign owners. The constant
threat of bombings, high cost of security, and lack of a stable
internal market made plant openings unattractive and drove away
large manufacturers in great numbers (Rowthorn and Wayne 1988,
84). In fact, only massive growth in government and security service
jobs held off increases in unemployment figures until the second
oil shock of 1979, when Northern Ireland joined the rest of the
world in recession. It is estimated that without annual infusions
of aid from Great Britain, the living standard of Northern Ireland
would approach that of Mexico or Argentina (Rowthorn and Wayne
1988, 90).
In examining the events
that led to this human tragedy, the case study of Northern Ireland
is presented as follows: (A) Cultural Identity, (B) Political
Power/Access, and (C) Economic Participation. Section D (Onset
of Conflict) explores the reasons that a society heading towards
real pluralism in the early 1960s degenerated into internecine
violence by the end of the decade.
To understand the historical
enmity between the Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland,
it is necessary to understand past conflicts between the two groups
and to examine the reasons they have remained separate throughout
their history. Catholic Ireland was ruled by Great Britain for
a considerable portion of its history, from the twelfth century
to 1920. During that time, there were numerous revolts by the
Catholics against their Protestant landlords. The historic province
of Ulster, a stronghold of Gaelic culture in the north of Ireland,
successfully resisted British encroachments until the Plantation
of 1609. Earlier waves of colonisation had supplanted the Irish
gentry with Protestant British landlords, leaving the bulk of
the population Catholic and Irish. The settlement of Ulster in
1609, by contrast, was massive in scale and resulted in the intrusion
of a Protestant culture that was completely alien to its Catholic
inhabitants (Darby 1976, 3). Massacres of both Protestants and
Catholics took place throughout the 1600s, as the two sides battled
for supremacy and the right to occupy the land each now called
home. The most important of these to the folklore of Ulster was
the Battle of the Boyne in 1690, in which the Protestants scored
a massive victory over the Catholics.
Mistrust and bad feelings
resulting from the colonisation of Ireland by Protestant settlers
were followed by centuries of political and social segregation
of Catholics and Protestants in all of Ireland. After the victory
of William of Orange (the Protestant challenger who deposed the
Catholic king, James II), laws were enacted by the all-Protestant
Parliament of Ireland barring Catholics from all offices, land
ownership, schooling, and other avenues leading toward wealth
and education (Darby 1976, 4). These laws effectively entrenched
the existing hatreds between the two communities and glorified
violent action by one community to 'defend' itself from the other.
The conditions created as a result of these laws became important
during the early part of the twentieth century, when escalating
violence and rebellion forced Great Britain to consider granting
Ireland some form of 'Home Rule', a limited form of self-government.
Both Catholic and Protestant extremists rejected the plan out
of hand. The Catholics, led by Sinn Féin, felt that only
full independence could satisfy them. The Protestant Unionists,
on the other hand, greatly feared being ruled by the Catholic
majority and went as far as to threaten the secession of Northern
Ireland from Great Britain into a sovereign state if the British
did not back away from their plans to give all of Ireland Home
Rule. The resulting compromise was the partitioning of Ireland
into the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland in 1920 (Rowthorn
and Wayne 1988, 24).
The Partition of Ireland
did little to ease the sectarian mistrust and separateness between
Catholics and Protestants left in the six counties of Ulster which
were devolved to Unionist rule. Each community continued to be
defined by its religious affiliation, with little mixture between
the two groups. Education, neighbourhoods, workplaces, entertainment,
and numerous other social activities remained segregated. The
names of places also continue to be used to denote religious and
national affiliation. For example, those aligned with the Protestant
Unionists call Londonderry1 by its official name, while those of
Nationalist sentiment refer to it as Derry (Rowthorn and Wayne
1988, 15).
After the Partition of
Ireland in 1920, sporadic violence continued between the two communities.
The violence was cyclic in nature and often coincided with downturns
in the local economy (e.g., riots during the depression of the
1930s). Conversely, when the economy picked up, as it did in the
post-war years, ethnic violence subsided; for example, during
a peak of the economy in the 1950s, the Irish Republican Army
(IRA) was unable to launch a successful bid for secession due
to apathy in the Catholic community (Darby 1976, 13). The pattern
of separate settlements, school districts, and employment, however,
continued as before.
The physical segregation
of the two communities can be attributed to various reasons, not
all of which stem from a fear of violence. For instance, as most
schooling is conducted by religious denomination, it makes sense
for Protestant and Catholic families to find housing closer to
their schools. Church attendance is high in Northern Ireland,
with the church community providing the structure for social interaction.
In addition, marriages in Northern Ireland primarily take place
with people from the same local area, creating elaborate family-based
structures that tend to be exclusionary and segregated (Darby
1976, 37). These trends tend to isolate and insulate local communities
from outside influences, preserving old attitudes towards outsiders
and considerable conformity within the community.
Like most cultural differences,
the roots of the Protestant-Catholic enmity in Northern Ireland
are buried in the distant past, with fresh incidents only serving
to reopen old wounds and solidify negative stereotypes. The siege
mentality of the Unionists continues to stem from the fortified
townships in which they were forced to live following the 'Plantation'
of 1609. Thus, each new threat is perceived as dire, within the
context of brutal pogroms which took place hundreds of years before.
For example, in 1964, the Unionists rioted in response to the
legal Nationalist opposition party flying the Irish Tricolour,
rather than the Union Jack, from their local headquarters in Belfast
(Darby 1976, 14).
The Catholics still feel
as if they have an alien culture living amongst them. This feeling
has been enhanced through the separation of the two communities
and the continued enforcement of the Special Powers Act of 1922.
This act, designed to combat IRA resistance to Partition, was
left in force until well after the beginning of the Troubles,
thus perpetuating a climate of mistrust that has yet to be dispelled
(Rowthorn and Wayne 1988, 28).
With the exception of
their competition for the same resources, the two communities
can be characterised by a lack of contact. Their lack of contact
has created feelings of deep distrust between the Catholic and
Protestant communities. This work argues that those deep feelings
do not condition daily relations, but flare up in response to
specific events. For example, the IRA started a new campaign for
secession between 1956 and 1962; however, its decision in 1962
to renounce military activity resulted from the fact that its
"defeat owed more to apathy than to the efficiency of law
enforcement machinery" (Darby 1976, 13). In other words,
since the Catholic community did not have a strong perception
of relative deprivation, the feelings of mistrust and hatred did
not surface. As a result, the IRA was unable to generate support
for its secessionist campaign.
The IRA was able to re-establish
itself and its military methods in 1969 / 1970, as a result of
the rising frustrations of the Catholic populace, rather than
the continuing ethnic hatreds between the two communities. Many
authors have noted that violence in Northern Ireland stems from
reactions to real (or perceived) discrimination between the two
groups. This discrimination has a long historical record, dating
to the fifteenth century when it was sanctioned as a tool to pacify
an occupied land and settle a Protestant populace who would prove
more loyal to the Crown than its Catholic inhabitants. Sections
B and C address the extent and forms of the discrimination in
terms of political influence and economic participation, respectively.
Politics in Northern Ireland
have always been dominated by the necessity for Protestant control
of the government and its processes. The requirement that a Protestant
majority be created in Northern Ireland was a major determinant
in drawing the boundary for the Partition of Ireland. Northern
Ireland is composed of six of the original nine counties of the
province of Ulster. The remaining three counties of Ulster were
not included in Northern Ireland due to the fact that the higher
percentage of Catholics in these counties posed a threat to Protestant
control of the country. As illustrated (see map 1), only those
counties of Ulster province that had a Protestant population of
at least 30 per cent were included in the Unionist enclave of
Northern Ireland.
At the time of Partition,
the government of Great Britain devolved authority to the two
governments of the Irish Isles. The Irish Free State in the south
(which later left the Commonwealth to become the Republic of Ireland),
and Northern Ireland were each allowed to elect their own parliaments,
implement local laws, and, in general, conduct their own internal
affairs. Stormont, the parliament of Northern Ireland, was given
control over all of its own affairs, with the exception of the
right to mint money, conduct foreign affairs, and raise an army;
however, it was able to circumvent the latter through the creation
of paramilitary 'police auxiliaries'.
Under representation of
Catholics extended throughout most levels of Northern Ireland's
government. For example, the proportional representation (PR)
system left in place by the British ensured that the Catholics
would control about 40 per cent of the local councils; but, the
ending of PR and the redrawing of local government boundaries
by the Unionist parliament at Stormont quickly reversed the trend.
While Catholic Nationalists won control of twenty-five out of
the eighty local councils in 1920, the gerrymandering of 1922
ensured that in the 1924 elections they controlled only two out
of eighty local councils (Rowthorn and Wayne 1988, 29).
The redrawn boundaries
were particularly effective as a result of new legislation introduced
to restrict voting rights. Two categories of voters were formed
to ensure Protestant dominance at the polls: (1) the 'ratepayers',
primary occupiers of a household as either tenants or owners,
and (2) persons who owned commercial property valued at £10
or more per year. As only two people per house were allowed to
vote, the ratepayer category effectively excluded lodgers or adult
children living at home. Both lodgers and adult children living
at home tended to be Catholics due to their lower overall economic
status and larger families; thus, Catholic franchise was restricted.
People in the second category, that is, owners of commercial property,
were allowed to nominate special voters for each £10 of value
of their property, up to a maximum of six voters (Darby 1976,
50). Since over 90 per cent of the commercial property in Northern
Ireland was Protestant owned, this provision expanded their voting
franchise and, along with the ratepayer category, extended Unionist
control over the ballot box and the government.
These types of discrimination
were so blatant that the Cameron Commission investigation of 1968
issued a report critical of the local electoral system. The Commission
reported that in Derry, while Catholics made up over 60 per cent
of the electorate, due to the districting system, they won only
40 per cent of the County Borough seats (Rowthorn and Wayne 1988,
30). This is only one example among many in which the gerrymandering
of districts produced Unionist majorities on local councils in
communities that were predominantly Catholic.
Acts ostensibly aimed
at increasing security but used to intimidate and discriminate
against Catholics were utilised by the Unionist parliament at
Stormont to ensure Protestant control of Northern Ireland. The
most prominent of these was the Special Powers Act of 1922, which
was implemented to stem the tide of Nationalist violence by splinter
groups of the IRA who did not accept the terms of Partition. Although
most of the secessionist violence ceased by 1927, the Special
Powers Act remained in force until it was repealed by the British
government in 1973, well after the beginning of the Troubles.
Under the Act, government forces were given a considerable latitude
in their conduct towards suspected individuals and broad powers
of search and seizure. The Act permitted actions such as Internment
without trial for unspecified periods of time, search and seizures
without a warrant, and powers of censorship. The most interesting
feature of the Special Powers Act was its clause that "if
any person does any act of such nature as to be prejudicial to
the preservation of the peace or maintenance of order in Northern
Ireland and not specifically provided for in the regulations,
he shall be deemed to be guilty of an offence against the regulations"
(Darby 1976, 56). Thus, if the police suspected an individual
of not preserving the peace or maintaining order, they could detain
the individual for an indefinite period of time without charges
or a trial.
The Special Powers Act
was enforced by the police force, the Royal Ulster Constabulary
(RUC), and its paramilitary reservists, the Ulster Special Constabulary.
The RUC was unique at that time in that, unlike their British
counterparts, its officers were required to carry arms and trained
with heavy weapons in military tactics. The RUC also differed
from the British police in that it was centrally controlled by
the RUC Inspector General and the Northern Ireland Ministry of
Home Affairs. Although the 3,000-man force (later raised to 3,400)
was legally required to reserve one-third of its spots for Catholics,
the number of Catholics never reached higher than 12 per cent
of the force. The small number of Catholics on the force is more
reflective of the perception in the Catholic community that the
RUC was a partisan force that bowed to political pressure than
of discriminatory hiring practices. Numerous incidents of the
RUC facing off with Catholic demonstrators while ignoring violence
from Protestant corners testify to the differential treatment
accorded the two communities (Darby 1976, 59).
In addition to the RUC,
the government of Northern Ireland created the Ulster Special
Constabulary in 1920 to combat IRA secessionist fighters, who
were opposed to Partition. The Ulster Special Constabulary was
divided into three corps: the A, B, and C Specials. The A and
C Specials disbanded after Partition-related violence subsided,
but the 'B Specials' survived until their group was disbanded
by the British government at the beginning of Direct Rule by the
British in 1972. Membership in the B Specials ranged from a maximum
of 25,000 people to a minimum of just over 8,000 in 1969. The
B Specials were usually several times larger in number than the
police force and, given the task of combating potential subversion
of the state, they were recruited as an exclusively Protestant
paramilitary force. There were open ties between the B Specials
the Orange Order and also with illegal Protestant paramilitary
forces such as the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF). Many members
of the B Specials were also members in the latter forces, and
the units of the B Specials often used Orange Order lodges for
training exercises and practice drills (Rowthorn and Wayne 1988,
37). The B Specials engaged in activities such as manning roadblocks
and protecting selected installations during times of suspected
IRA activity. Due to the large number of Protestant extremists
in their ranks, the B Specials gained notoriety for their use
of violence in the execution of their duties; offences included
beatings, harassment, and body searches of Catholics at checkpoints.
Some of the victims were known to the B Specials as neighbours,
but were nonetheless subjected to harsh treatments, unlike Protestants
who were merely waived through (Rowthorn and Wayne 1988, 38).
The B Specials came to be universally loathed by the Catholic
community as a tool of Protestant repression and intimidation
as a result of these and other well-published incidents.
It has been well established
that the police forces of Northern Ireland acted in collusion
with Unionist political forces in the systematic discrimination
and repression of Catholics. Several British-sponsored and independent
commissions investigated allegations of discrimination against
Catholics, publishing reports that universally condemned police
actions; however, these reports usually produced little change
in the situation. These reports, most of which were published
in the 1960s (including the Report of the Cameron Commission,
the Scarman and Hunt Reports, and investigations by James Callaghan
and Max Hastings), were critical of the RUC and the B Specials,
noting the poor leadership and lack of discipline of the B Specials;
the lack of protection for Catholic areas; and the paramilitary
character of the RUC, which increased the alienation of the Catholic
community (Darby 1976, 62). While these reports, issued at the
beginning of the Troubles, spurred some action towards reforms,
they appeared far too late in the process to avert the impending
crisis. By that time, even the disbanding of the B Specials and
the attempted conversion of the RUC into a community-based police
force did little to assuage Catholic demands, which had risen
as their communal mistrust of the Unionist and British systems
increased.
Protestant control of
the judicial system and the courts was also maintained by Unionist
control of the government of Northern Ireland. In the judicial
system, Protestants outnumbered Catholics by sixty-eight to six
in 1968. Fifteen out of twenty-eight appointees to the high court
of Northern Ireland between 1921 and 1972 were either current
or former members of the Unionist political party, strengthening
the link between political control and judicial control (Darby
1976, 64).
Jury selection was also
biased in favour of the Protestant community. Since potential
jurors were selected from the voting roles, only ratepayers, who
were predominantly Protestant, could be selected to serve on juries.
This practice generally excluded Catholic participation in the
court system, unless of course they participated as defendants.
Surprisingly enough, evidence shows that sentencing among Catholics
and Protestants was fairly even-handed. The judicial system, however,
did not incarcerate the same number of people from each of the
two communities. Discrimination within the judicial system stemmed
from the severity of charges lodged against defendants by the
police system. For example, charges against Protestant defendants
were often reduced or dropped, while Catholics were usually confronted
with the full force of the law.
Other areas of Protestant
domination included the public sector areas of employment, housing
allocations, and educational revenues, where discrimination was
more often the rule than the exception. These areas, along with
private-sector employment and investment, are addressed in further
detail in the following section on economic participation. In
general, though, the political balance in Northern Ireland was
weighted in favour of the Protestant community from its inception.
The political power of the Catholics began to increase after the
beginning of the violence, but still remains in contention today,
due in large part to the indifference of Westminster and the willingness
of the Unionists to use any means at their disposal to ensure
their continued Protestant dominance. The following sections address
the economic conditions and the shift in fortunes that precipitated
the Catholic civil rights movement, which subsequently resulted
in a violent response by the Protestants, signalling the beginning
of thirty years of conflict.
Control of the national
and most local governments also gave the Unionist majority the
power to determine Protestant and Catholic share of public sector
benefits. In Northern Ireland, the construction of public housing
has been regulated by the Unionist-controlled parliament and local
councils. Subsidised housing was controlled by Local Housing Authorities
(LHAs) that were appointed by the elected councils. The gerrymandering
of districts effectively gave the Unionists control over the selection
of LHA members. Generally, Unionist-controlled councils used their
power to deny housing to Catholics, and occasionally Protestants,
if the councils thought that Catholics could demand equal housing
in the same districts. The main reason behind a council's willingness
to deny housing to Protestants was to ensure Protestant political
domination in those districts where their electoral majority was
slim (Rowthorn and Wayne 1988, 31). By denying housing to Protestants
in districts in which they feared Catholics would also demand
housing, the councils effectively limited the number of Catholic
ratepayers, ensuring Protestant electoral majorities. In addition,
Unionist-controlled LHAs tended to build standard three-bedroom
units, without regard to larger-sized Catholic families. Incidents
have also been reported in which Unionist LHAs granting subsidised
housing to bachelors or to married couples without children even
though there were large, Catholic families who were desperately
in need of housing (Compton 1991, 37). In the County of Fermanagh,
despite the fact that they constituted a majority (albeit a slim
one) of the population, Catholics were awarded only one-third
of the 1,500 housing units built in the post-war period (Whyte
1980, 19).
There are, however, indicators
that abuse of this system ran both ways; that is, the few Nationalist-controlled
councils practised discrimination as effectively as did the Unionist-controlled
councils. Overall, due to the larger number of poor Catholics,
the proportion of Catholics in public housing was slightly higher
than Protestants. That there was a greater proportion of Catholics
receiving public housing does not necessarily indicate a lack
of discrimination in this area; but, the higher proportion of
Catholics living in poverty points to employment and access to
wealth as key areas of discrimination.
Catholic employment in
the public sector (aside from the police and judiciary) averaged
at about 30 per cent, a figure almost proportional to their percentage
of the overall population. A closer look, however, proves that
these statistics are misleading. While Catholics made up about
40 per cent of manual labourers, they held only 11 per cent of
senior positions in 1951. This figure shrank to 6 per cent by
1959, but began to rise subsequent to reforms which followed the
outbreak of violence, reaching almost 15 per cent by 1973 (Whyte
1980, 9). The Cameron Commission thoroughly investigated Local
Authority employment and found that Unionist councils had used
their power to discriminate against Catholics in the hiring process
(Rowthorn and Wayne 1988, 32).
In the private sector,
two main categories of imbalance existed between Catholics and
Protestants: the level of unemployment and the type of employment.
Catholic employment tended toward the lower end of the job market.
Catholics were employed predominantly in unskilled and lower-paying
jobs, such as clothing manufacture and textiles. Protestants,
on the other hand, dominated the relatively higher-paid areas
of shipbuilding and engineering. As illustrated in figure 2, the
more an industry paid (and the more regular the work) the fewer
Catholics it tended to employ, while the lower-paid and less regular
positions (like seasonal building work) employed Catholics at
a rate close to their demographic representation.
In each profession, Catholics
tended to occupy the lower ranks. Thus, in white-collar sectors,
Catholics would be far more likely to have clerical than managerial
positions, mirroring their distribution in the public sector (Whyte
1980, 15). Catholics also tended to work in industries (e.g.,
construction) that were more sensitive to economic downturns and,
therefore, more likely to layoff workers during periods of economic
recession.
In addition to discrimination
in hiring practices, several other factors account for this disparity
between employment in the two communities, including policies
that affected the location of new industries through zoning and
tax incentives and those that encouraged placement of industries
in areas difficult or dangerous for Catholics to reach. Discrimination
was also sanctioned and promoted by officials. For example, Sir
Basil Brooke, who served as Northern Ireland's prime minister
for twenty years, actively promoted a system of employment wherein
jobs were offered through social organisations such as the Orange
Order. In the Londonderry Sentinel (20 March 1934), Sir
Brooke stated that:
I recommend those people
who are Loyalists not to employ Roman Catholics, 99 per cent of
whom are disloyal; I want you to remember one point in regard
to the employment of people who are disloyal....You are disenfranchising
yourselves in that way....You people who are employers have the
ball at your feet. If you don't act properly now before we know
where we are we shall find ourselves in the minority instead of
the majority. (Rowthorn and Wayne 1988, 33)
In addition, trade unions
often acted as employment representatives; thus, since the unions
were sectarian in nature, Catholics were effectively banned from
employment in many instances. When word spread among the Catholic
community that a company would hire only Protestants, most often
Catholics would simply stop applying.
The segregation and imbalance
of the educational system also affected Catholic employment opportunities.
Religion and education in Northern Ireland have been linked for
almost the entirety of Irish history and remain so today. Due
to persecution after the victory of William of Orange, Catholics
have been deeply suspicious of state involvement in education
and have fought to retain church control of their own schools.
Likewise, the Protestant community has argued against the secularisation
of the educational system, successfully defeating proposals that
were suggested immediately following Partition to integrate the
school system and place religious education on a voluntary after-school
basis (Darby 1976, 126). The result was an educational system
that allowed bible teaching of predominantly Protestant ethics
and the withdrawal of Catholics to religious schools that received
funding equal to only 65 per cent of that given to the state-sector,
Protestant-affiliated schools (Darby 1976, 128).
The patterns that signalled
changes in Northern Ireland's peace and stability took place over
more than a decade. Beginning with changes in the economic outlook
following the recession of the 1950s, Catholics in Northern Ireland
experienced a rise in economic fortunes (albeit smaller than their
Protestant neighbours) as a result of stimulus programs instituted
by Stormont and Westminster. These changes generated a rise in
Catholic awareness of their political shortcomings, creating the
perception of relative deprivation. Demonstrations for redress
interacted with a culturally-generated fear of extinction (fanned
by extremists on both sides) on the part of Protestants, creating
the spark which set all of Northern Ireland ablaze for more than
twenty-five years. This section examines (1) the shift in economic
fortunes between the 1950s and 1960s, (2) the rise of relative
deprivation and its manifestation in the civil rights movements
in Northern Ireland from the mid to late 1960s, (3) the source
and meaning of the Protestant fear of extinction, and (4) the
dialectical cycle of demonstrations and violence that culminated
in the Troubles of the early 1970s.
Although unemployment
in Catholic sectors has always been higher than in the Protestant
community, several changes that benefited both communities in
Northern Ireland were brought about by modernisation programs
initiated in the late 1950s and early 1960s. In the early 1950s
demand in areas such as shipbuilding and textile manufacturing
began to decline, as the United Kingdom moved from war production
to rebuilding Great Britain's economy. Between 1951 and 1954,
linen production in Northern Ireland fell 15 percent, causing
a corresponding increase in unemployment. Shipbuilding and agriculture
also experienced sharp declines, as other nations began to realise
their own post-war recoveries. Since shipbuilding, textiles, and
engineering represented almost 50 per cent of the manufacturing
jobs in Northern Ireland, the effects of the slowdowns were devastating
to the province's economy (Bew et al. 1979, 133). Unemployment
jumped by over 40,000 jobs, offsetting gains in the public and
service sectors over the same period. Figures show that unemployment
in Northern Ireland at this time was more than twice that of the
rest of the UK, hovering between 5 per cent and 7.5 per cent (Bew
et al. 1979, 135).
Vocal demands from both
communities for Stormont to address the problem resulted in the
government's grudging willingness to implement a series of welfare
state programs similar to those in effect in Great Britain. Massive
increases in medical services and educational expenditures were
coupled with incentives to attract foreign capital investment
to the province. The implementation of the programs and services
reduced disparities between the two communities, although full
equality was not achieved (Rowthorn and Wayne 1988, 79).
In the fields of health
care and education, massive grants enabled medical workers and
teachers to be hired on a larger scale than before, and improvements
in facilities and training increased both Catholic access to these
services and employment in these fields. Catholic schools experienced
a sharp rise in standards of education, with government funding
improving both the facilities and the quality of Catholic teachers.
By the mid to late 1960s teaching facilities for Catholic students,
including the number of schools and the student-teacher ratio,
were rapidly approaching the quality of the Protestant-dominated
state educational system (Rowthorn and Wayne 1988, 73).
While private employment
did not favour Catholics to the extent that the public sector
did, Catholics experienced increased opportunities in private
employment as well. The formation of a Northern Ireland Development
Council in 1955 speeded the implementation of policies to jump
start industrial production. By the mid-1960s, 230 new firms had
been established, and 200 others had expanded. Companies from
Great Britain, the United States, and continental Europe were
lured to Northern Ireland with generous tax incentives and low
land prices. The number of foreign multinational companies in
Northern Ireland climbed from seven in 1958 to twenty-seven in
1968 (most of which employed more than 500 people) and resulted
in over 22,000 new manufacturing jobs (Teague 1987, 164). Even
though many of these new branch plants were established in areas
dominated by Protestant communities, the background of the owners
of the plants and their lack of direct connection to the conflict
meant that their hiring practices were less discriminatory. This
was especially true in the areas of semi-skilled labour, where
larger numbers of Catholics and women were employed by the new
multinational plants (Wichert 1991, 89).
The rise in employment
in Northern Ireland during this time was certainly not remarkable
in the overall scheme of the province's economic fortunes, nor
did the Catholic community benefit out of proportion to its size.
On a case by case basis, it is not possible to determine that
the practices of individual multinationals were overall less discriminatory
than the previous regime. Some companies implemented non-sectarian
hiring practices, while others employed the existing Unionist-dominated
hiring systems. One major difference, however, was a change in
perception on the part of the Catholic community. With advances
in some areas of employment (particularly following the recession
of the 1950s) and increased educational opportunities available
to Catholic children, members of the Catholic community began
to believe seriously in the possibility of an improved future
(Wichert 1991, 81-2).
Inspired by the civil
rights movements in the United States and elsewhere, in the late
1960s groups of Catholics and liberal Protestants gathered together
to form the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA).
NICRA set out to right wrongs through the dissemination of information,
street protests, and later the use of civil disobedience campaigns
aimed at changing the discriminatory practices and policies of
the Unionist government. Centred around equalising the political
and continued economic disparity between Catholics and Protestants,
NICRA's demands called for universal suffrage; the repeal of the
Special Powers Act; the disbanding of the B Specials; the re-drawing
of electoral boundaries; and the imposition of laws designed to
end discrimination in public employment and public housing (Rowthorn
and Wayne 1988, 39). NICRA, unlike the IRA and its disciples,
had decided to take a stake in the existing political formation
and was demanding certain changes so that their participation
could proceed on an equal and fair level. Rather than attacking
the legitimacy of the state or opting out, members of NICRA saw
their future as part of Northern Ireland's state, and they were
therefore willing to take steps to integrate more fully into the
existing system.
The fear of extinction
is generated out of a perception of threat to Cultural Identity,
with past perceptions being projected onto current events. In
the case of the Protestants in Northern Ireland, historical incidents
of violence and massacre have been mythologised and used as the
template for understanding modern Protestant-Catholic relations.
One event that has coloured perceptions of Protestant / Catholic
relations was the massacres of Protestants that took place during
the Catholic uprising of 1641. During this uprising Irish rebels
in Ulster killed and expelled several thousand Protestant settlers
(Bardon 1992, 138). This event, particularly the massacre of eighty
Protestant men, women and children at Portadown, has repeatedly
been used by Protestants (most notably the Reverend Ian Paisley)
in making comparisons between Catholic behaviour at that time
and the contemporary actions of the IRA (Crighton and Mac Iver
1991, 129). Although it seems improbable, fear of extinction is
quite real in the minds of Protestants who not only do not want
to lose their position in society, but fear a cultural 'genocide'
if they are forced into a union with the Republic of Ireland to
the south. Shortly after the Act of Union was passed by Westminster
in 1800, Irish extremists staged several unsuccessful revolts.
The bloodiest of these was called the Tithe War and was fought
because Catholics did not want to pay legally-owed tithes to the
Protestant Anglican Church of Ireland. The result was the conversion
of tithes into rent in 1838, severing the direct connection to
the church and easing the sectarian tension for a time. The third
reminder of violence between the two communities took place between
Irish Nationalists and British authorities between 1919 and 1922.
Sparked by the 'Easter Rebellion' of April 1916, Sinn Féin
members and a nascent IRA instigated attacks on the Royal Irish
Constabulary (RIC), the Auxiliaries and later the infamous 'Black
and Tans', resulting in an ugly war of attack and reprisal, which
killed hundreds (Macardle 1968, 314-5). It was during this uprising
and subsequent civil war that the British passed the Act of Partition
and set up Home Rule for the Irish Free State and Northern Ireland.
By the mid-1920s the pro-treaty forces had won the bitter civil
war and Northern Ireland had been created as a Protestant enclave
(Rowthorn and Wayne 1988, 26).
Among the issues that
contributed the most to Protestant insecurity and their fear of
extinction in Northern Ireland were the 3.2 million Catholics
who lived south of the border and their link (through the Roman
Catholic Church) to Catholics in continental Europe and the Vatican
in Rome. Within Northern Ireland itself Protestants make up about
58 per cent of the population of 1.6 million people, but if united
with the south, then the Protestants would move from being a majority
to a minority, subject (they fear) to the will of the Catholics.
(Rowthorn and Wayne 1988, 17).
The fear of extinction
manifested itself as fear of the Republic of Ireland's constitutional
ban on abortion (although recent changes will allow women to leave
the country for an abortion) and the difficulty of obtaining legal
divorces. Another target of Protestant fears was the special status
of the Roman Catholic Church in the republic's constitution, which
was not changed until the passage of a referendum in 1973. The
twin fears of Catholic violence and Catholic domination have become
a part of the Cultural Identity of Protestants in Northern Ireland,
lying below the surface and waiting for events (or individuals)
to bring them into full bloom, which is precisely what happened
when activists with NICRA began their public demonstrations in
1968.
By the mid-1960s there
were several movements to expand Catholic awareness and participation
in Northern Ireland's politics. Foremost among them was NICRA,
but others (including the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP),
the Campaign for Social Justice, and the People's Democracy) were
all advocating the return of Catholics to the ballot box and the
revamping of Northern Ireland's legal structure to provide more
equality for Catholics (Crighton and Mac Iver 1991, 135). Furthermore,
Northern Ireland's Prime Minister, Terence O'Neill, had launched
a mostly symbolic campaign to enlist Catholic support for the
Unionist Party. During his tenure in office (1963-69) he attempted
to move toward greater accommodation with the Catholic community
by offering limited reforms that were primarily economic in nature
(though some were political reforms). These reforms, while not
enough for most of the Catholic community, did result in the Catholic
Nationalist Party ending its twenty-five-year boycott of Stormont
in 1965 (Crighton and Mac Iver 1991, 134).
The dominant Unionist
Party in Northern Ireland was not sufficiently separated from
its Protestant support base to safely seek to bridge the gap between
Catholics and Protestants by offering economic and political reforms.
This can be seen in the harsh rhetoric and reprisals from hard-liners
in the Protestant community. One such hard-liner, the Protestant
fundamentalist leader Ian Paisley, stated that O'Neill was selling
the Protestants down the river with his reform campaigns (Crighton
and Mac Iver 1991, 135). By using the threats of O'Neill's reforms;
NICRA's actions (which Paisley thought was merely a cover for
the IRA); and the SDLP's call for an Irish dimension to Northern
Ireland's politics, the Protestant fundamentalists fragmented
the Unionist front through their creation of the hard-line Democratic
Unionist Party in 1971.
The violence itself began
in 1968 at the beginning of NICRA's campaign of peaceful demonstrations
to enlist the support of the Catholic community. Their first march,
from Coalisland to Dungannon, took place peacefully in March 1968,
but the second march in Derry was violently broken up by the RUC
and the B Specials (Rowthorn and Wayne 1988, 39). Three months
later the more radical student group, the People's Democracy,
staged another peaceful march from Belfast to Derry. Police and
Unionist crowds both attacked the marchers outside of Derry and
within the city itself. The Cameron Commission investigation of
these outbreaks of violence established (par. 40) "that on
the night of 4/5 January a number of policemen were guilty of
misconduct which involved assault and battery, malicious damage
to property in the streets in the predominantly Catholic Bogside
area....and the use of provocative, sectarian and political slogans"
(Rowthorn and Wayne 1988, 171; Cameron Report, paragraphs 97-101
and 177).
By the summer of 1969
increasing violence between the Unionist demonstrators (and police)
and the Catholics (and a rejuvenated IRA) led to the intervention
of the British government, in the form of the military. The main
incident was the annual Protestant Apprentice Boys of Derry parade,
which marched through the city and around the city walls and close
to the Catholic Bogside area. Instead of the usual stony looks
and silence from the Catholic community, stones, petrol-bombs,
and barricades met the marchers. After two days of fighting between
the Catholics and police, the British Army was finally called
in to separate the combatants. Between 1969 and 1971, the British
government tried to introduce a number of reforms including many
that had been demanded by NICRA and the SDLP. These included universal
suffrage; the re-drawing of electoral districts; the disbanding
of the B Specials; and the establishment of a new housing executive
to handle distribution of public housing through an objective
needs-based system. These reforms, however, were only partially
implemented and (by that time) were not enough to satisfy the
demands of the increasingly polarised Catholic community. For
example, even though the B Specials were disbanded and the RUC
disarmed, many of their members were allowed to enlist in the
new Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR) attached to the British Army
(Rowthorn and Wayne 1988, 41). This only served to strain the
relationship between the Catholic community and the Army, which
was increasingly seen less as saviours and more as oppressors
as time passed without significant lessening in violence.
The final straw, which
escalated the violence to an insurgency, was the 1971 introduction
of Internment without trial by the government of Northern Ireland.
Using legislation from the Special Powers Act, Stormont introduced
interment in August of 1971, with 342 men picked up in the first
dawn raids. Since the British Army was instructed to carry out
the Internment raids, they then became the focus of Catholic anger
and demonstrations. The most famous of these anti-Internment demonstrations
resulted in the Bloody Sunday killings in Derry in January 1972,
when British solders fired into the Catholic crowd, killing thirteen
people (Rowthorn and Wayne 1988, 42). By March of that year, the
British government had dissolved Stormont (to rule directly from
Westminster), Internment was in full swing with the implementation
of the 'Diplock Courts', and the IRA had reconstituted itself
fully by providing defence from police and Protestant paramilitaries
to Catholic areas. The Troubles, which have lasted thirty years
to date - resulting in thousands of deaths and millions of Pounds
of damage - moved on that fateful morning from small-scale clashes
to a full-blown sectarian conflict. At the time of this work,
tensions between Unionist and Nationalist, Irish and British,
Protestant and Catholic continue to run high. Regardless of the
optimism generated by the recently signed Good Friday agreement
mistrust between the two communities remains high and a host of
difficult issues - such as the routing of Loyalist parades - continue
challenge leaders and ordinary residents on all sides. One can
only hope that this agreement, unlike many that preceded it, can
provide the basis for better understanding and a lasting peace
between the two communities.
Footnote1 For ease of use, this paper will subsequently use the common term Derry for the city of Londonderry / Derry.Bardon, Jonathan. 1992. A history of Ulster. Belfast: The Blackstaff Press Limited. Bew, Paul, Peter Gibbon, and Henry Patterson, eds. 1979. The state of Northern Ireland 1921-72: political forces and social classes. New York: St. Martin's Press. Compton, Paul. 1991. The conflict in Northern Ireland: demographic and economic considerations. In Economic dimensions of ethnic conflict, edited by S. W. R. d. A. Samarasinghe and R. Coughlan. London: Pinter Publishers. Crighton, Elizabeth, and Martha Abele Mac Iver. 1991. The evolution of protracted ethnic conflict: group dominance and political underdevelopment in Northern Ireland and Lebanon. Comparative Politics 23 (3):127-142. Darby, John. 1976. Conflict in Northern Ireland: the development of a polarised community. Dublin: Gill and MacMillan. Macardle, Dorothy. 1968. The Irish republic. London: Corgi Books. Rowthorn, Bob, and Naomi Wayne. 1988. Northern Ireland: the political economy of conflict. London: Polity Press. Teague, Paul, ed. 1987. Beyond the Rhetoric. London: Lawrence and Wishart. Whyte, John Henry. 1980. Church and state in modern Ireland, 1923-1979. 2nd Edition ed. Dublin: Gill and Macmillan. Wichert, Sabine. 1991. Northern Ireland since 1945. Essex: Longman Group UK Limited.
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