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A note on the history of violence at the border,
and the possibility of violence following Brexit
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Text: Martin Melaugh [3 August 2018]
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A note on the history of violence at the border, and the possibility of violence following Brexit
Martin Melaugh (3 Aug 2018)
(minor updates: 22 Oct 2018, 29 Dec 2018)
If, for whatever reason, the UK leaves the single market and
the customs union and there is no new customs agreement between the UK and the
EU, then there is a real possibility that some form of monitoring of traffic
flows will take place close to the border. Some people have said that a return to a hard border could lead to
violence (see for example the warning by Lady Sylvia Hermon in the House of
Commons on 26 April 2018, and George Mitchell on 3 March 2018). How likely it is that violence would occur and
could it spark a return to wide scale communal conflict?
There is no doubt, as has been pointed out by the DUP and
supporters of Brexit, that the current border in Ireland is a political, social
and economic reality. Two sovereign
states exist on either side of it. Two
different currencies are used. Social,
political, and economic policy is different. However, due to the Common Travel Area between the UK and the Republic
of Ireland, and the EU customs union and single market, the free movement of people,
goods and services is allowed across the border. Currently it is referred to as 'a
frictionless border'. While locals know
where the border lies, many visitors to Ireland often cross the border without
initially noticing the changes in things like the road surface and the
traffic signs, which indicate a movement from one jurisdiction to another.
It is also worth repeating that all the major actors in the
Brexit negotiations – the British government, the EU negotiating team, and the
Irish government together with the other EU member states – have stated
publicly on many occasions that they do not want to see a return to the hard
border of the past. All of the political
parties in Northern Ireland have also stated that they are opposed to any hard
border. Most people implicitly assume
that the 'hard' border refers to both the security apparatus that existed from
the early 1970s to the 2000s and also the customs infrastructure up to 1993. If, regardless of the final outcome of the
Brexit negotiations, the border remains as it is currently, in other words both
frictionless and without visible security or customs infrastructure, then there
is little prospect of violence at the border.
Crossing points and border crossings
The land border is approximately 500 kilometres (310 miles)
long and has 208 crossing points (The Irish Times, 26 April 2018). This number refers to public roads and a mapping exercise carried out by the Irish Army, working with gardai, found almost another 100 crossing points (including country lanes, private roads, rights of way across private lands, and other unmarked access points) (Independent.ie, 29 December 2018).
It has been estimated that 177,000 lorries,
208,000 vans and 1.85 million cars cross the border every month (The Irish Times, 16 August 2017). In addition, around 30,000 people cross the
border daily (presumably by car, bus, train, pushbike, on foot, etc.). There are significant numbers of people who
live on one side of the border and work on the other. Many others cross the border for social or
family reasons and a lesser number who own property on both sides of the
border. In addition to this type of
movement of people, there are also many crossings involving goods and
services. While new border checks would
result in delays to trade and also increase costs, it is unlikely that the
business sector would be the source of sustained public protest. However, if the general public, or more
particularly the nationalist segment, were to find there were daily checks and
delays in place of the current free passage, then resentment would be
inevitable with a possibility of organised opposition to, and civil
disobedience at, the border. If this
were to occur then there is a prospect that one or more republican dissident
groups would seek to achieve political relevance by attacking the new
manifestations of the post-Brexit border.
Some examples of violence at the border
While there are limitations in the usefulness of historical
lessons when trying to forecast what will happen in the future, nevertheless it
is worth recall some of the opposition to, and attacks on, the physical
expressions of the border during the Troubles (1969-2005) and during earlier
periods of conflict. These few examples
are intended to highlight what form the violence took at the border. Some readers may be unaware of the history or
forgotten certain aspects of it.
"Blowing up customs huts had always been a favourite I.R.A.
tactic and a number had gone up in 1937 in protest against a visit by King
George VI and Queen Elizabeth."
(Coogan, 1987 edition; p 175).
In 1938 the IRA carried out a bombing campaign against
customs posts. A number of customs huts
were destroyed by bombs placed in attaché cases that were then delivered by a
bus parcel system to the posts to await collection by non-existent people. These bombs were timed to explode at night
when the post was unoccupied. However,
on one occasion three IRA members were killed at a farm cottage when preparing
a bomb.
On 11 November 1956, Clann na Gael and IRA members carried
out a series of attacks on installations along the border. A number of customs huts were burnt as part
of this operation.
While the IRA did engage in 'The Border Campaign' (codenamed
'Operation Harvest'; 12 December 1956 – 26 February 1962) prior to the outbreak
of the Troubles, most of the targets were in border towns and villages. However, there were a number of attacks on
customs posts and border infrastructure including roads and bridges. The Border Campaign was to result in the
deaths of six members of the police (Royal Ulster Constabulary; RUC) and eleven
members of the IRA. The campaign was
very sporadic but between 15 and 17 July 1958 it flared up and a number of
custom posts were destroyed in IRA attacks. One of the largest posts, at Killen on the main road from Belfast to
Dundalk, was demolished. On 24 August
1958 the RUC shot dead an IRA member close to a customs post at Mullan in County Fermanagh. The RUC said they had ordered him to halt but he had fled towards the
border. The IRA insisted he was unarmed
at the time he was shot.
During the recent period of Troubles (and the IRA's armed campaign 1969-2005) the
customs and security infrastructure along the border was the subject of many
attacks by Republican paramilitaries. In
addition they were also, from the earliest years of the conflict, the subject
of political protest.
The photograph on
the right (CAIN, Melaugh Photographs,
1970) shows a republican demonstration at an Irish customs post (on the Donegal
side of the border) in 1970. A group of
about 50 demonstrators walked the four miles from the Bogside to the border to
stage the protest and then walked back again to Derry. The protest was against the actions of an Irish government minister but the border post provided a focal point for the protesters.
The greatest loss of life in an attack on a customs post happened on
22 August 1972. Nine people died in a premature bomb explosion at the Customs
Clearance Office, outside Newry, County Down. Four customs officials and two lorry drivers were killed, as were three
members of the IRA who were in the act of planting the bomb when it exploded
accidentally (). While it is likely that
the intention of those planting the bomb was to give a warning, the outcome was
the death of four customs officials and two other civilians (both lorry
drivers) who happened to be present on customs business, and the total
destruction of the customs building. Even accepting that there was no intention of killing civilian staff and
members of the public in this attack, the use of primed bombs in such
circumstances always carries substantial risk to those in the immediate
vicinity. Earlier, on 27 November 1971, two customs officials were shot dead when the IRA fired on a British Army patrol which arrived to investigate a bomb attack on Killeen Customs Post near Newry (). In two other, separate, incidents, two part-time members of the Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR) were shot dead while leaving customs posts where they worked ().
On 13 December 1989 the IRA attacked a British Army
permanent vehicle checkpoint complex close to the border at Derryard,
north of Rossela, County Fermanagh. The IRA killed two British soldiers and
injured a further two ().
On 24 October 1990 the IRA adopted a highly controversial
tactic in its attacks on British Army security infrastructure along the
border. In a series of attacks it forced
three civilians to drive vehicles containing bombs to British Army check points
at border locations near Derry, Newry, and Omagh. The three men were selected because they
worked for, or supplied services to, the security forces. Two of the bombs exploded killing six
soldiers in total and one of the drivers (). It was clear that the IRA's objective was to kill as many British
soldiers on the day as possible and it considered the civilian drivers as
expendable (the tactic was referred to in the media at the time as 'suicide bombing by proxy').
Location of the border infrastructure
A key determinant of the likelihood and extent of violence
post-Brexit is which administration, British or Irish, will be responsible for
imposing any new border checks. If the
border infrastructure appears on the northern side of the border line then the
possibility of violence is likely to be higher. If it becomes the remit of the Irish government, as part of its
responsibilities as an EU member, to manage the flow of people and trade across
the border, this is likely to have different implications. The potential for republican paramilitary
violence against border infrastructure situated within the Republic of Ireland, is likely to be less than if it is in the north.
Possible scenarios that lead to violence
Given the long history of civilian / political /
paramilitary opposition to the existence of the border and to the physical
infrastructure at the border, it is likely that any new physical
infrastructure, say custom posts or even cameras being used in conjunction with
number plate recognition software, will attract at least civilian protest but
also protest organised by one or more political parties or one or more
of the republican political groups. It
is highly probably that protestors who travel to a border installation would
try to remove the infrastructure or render it inactive. Bertie Ahern, former Taoiseach (Irish Prime Minister) and an architect of the Belfast / Good Friday Agreement, was clear about his opinion of any new infrastructure at the border: 'There is not going to be a physical border across Ireland because if you tried to put it there you wouldn't have to wait for terrorism to take it down, people would just physically pull it down - the ordinary people' (BBC News, 10 April 2018). The relevant authorities might respond to such actions by
replacing or repairing the facilities, at least at the beginning of the
protests. However, at some point a
decision might be taken to protect or guard the infrastructure. Physical confrontations between protestors
and security staff might then become inevitable, with all the dangers they
entail.
Another scenario is that one or more republican paramilitary
groups decide to respond to popular opposition to the border infrastructure, by
attacking the installations with bomb or bullet. One of the problems that has
faced certain republican paramilitary groups in the past is a lack of even
tacit support amongst the Nationalist population. At times there has been no focus for public
protest and the paramilitary groups have lacked both relevance and
credibility. However, any widespread
public opposition to the border is likely to act as an impetus to paramilitary
groups to become involved as a means of garnering at least tacit support. If groups of civilian protestors were
removing or damaging new border infrastructure, then paramilitary groups would
not be long in following suit. Certainly
current dissident groups, or any group which forms in the future, would seek to
justify such violence within the context of historical actions against border
infrastructure.
People and groups who have raised the potential for
confrontations and violence at the location of any border structures have been accused
of 'scare mongering' by those in favour of Brexit. However, even George Hamilton, the Chief Constable of the PSNI, has expressed concern at the risk of violence at the border: 'The last thing we would want is any infrastructure around the border because there is something symbolic about it and it becomes a target for violent dissident republicans' (The Guardian, 7 February 2018).
At the time of writing it is still unclear whether the UK will leave the EU based on an agreement that would maintain a frictionless border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.
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