

Post-Mortem

An examination of the patterns of politically associated violence in Northern Ireland during the years 1969-2001 as reflected in the fatality figures for those years

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Database and background information available at:

<http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/victims/mckeown/>

Prologue

The following study represents both the revisiting and continuation of a task which had occupied me for over twenty years. The concluded work highlights complexities and ambiguities in the patterns of the violence in Northern Ireland over the past three decades which are often obscured by the polar interpretations offered by partisan commentaries. For that reason I believe it should be inserted into the public arena for further consideration and possibly as a methodological model for further enquiry.

As this has been a private individual study the initial distribution in 2001 was confined to groups or agencies judged to have an immediate interest in the issues examined as well as to individuals who are known personally to me to have such an interest. The mailing list included journalists, politicians, public officials and academics.

It has long been my hope to find an appropriate Web site which would include not only this text but also the database from which the figures are derived. This might enable researchers to probe areas not examined here but accessible from the data while also permitting a verification process to be effected. I am now (June 2009) making the database and this text available via the CAIN Web site (see: <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/victims/mckeown/>).

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'If I am rightly informed very great atrocities have been committed on both sides - a system of assassination, massacre and plunder '

Wolfe Tone at his court martial speaking of events of 1798

Introduction

Early in 1970 I began recording details of the circumstances surrounding the deaths of those who had been killed in Northern Ireland in the communal troubles which had erupted in the previous year. I eventually began publishing some of the analyses which I derived from that data. In 1981 I was approached by the Irish Information Partnership to make the data I was compiling available to the archival base entitled **Agenda** which the Partnership published. This I did thereby making the raw material accessible to subscribers to the **Agenda** while I continued on occasion to publish my own analyses of the data over my own name. In 1989 I decided that I had devoted enough time to the task of compilation and concluded my record with the publication of a monograph which sought to offer a statistical profile of the violence which had contributed to the deaths of the two thousand, seven hundred and sixty three people whom I calculated had died as a consequence of civil strife in Northern Ireland between July 1969 and July 1989. Because no adjectives seemed adequate to convey the horror of it, I simply entitled the publication '**2763**'.

At the beginning of 1999 I considered revisiting the material and updating it. There were several reasons for this. With the passage of time new details had emerged concerning the agencies and motivations involved in many of the deaths. More recent publications had revealed to me some errors in my own records. Furthermore I had deliberately confined my analysis to those deaths which had occurred in Northern Ireland thereby excluding deaths in the Republic of Ireland or in Gt. Britain and had explicitly excluded any reference to those reported missing and presumed dead. Those two groupings had subsequently become much more numerically significant than I had foreseen when first I had decided not to include them. As well as these reasons I was also driven by a hope or belief that it might be possible in 1999 to offer a complete and concluded study of the social pathology inherent in the violence which had led to the deaths of so many people. Events in the three intervening years have shown how ill founded such a hope was.

As I was nearing the completion of the task of updating and revising the data under study I thought that that work might be rendered redundant by the publication of '**Lost Lives**', the study by McKittrick, Kelters, Feeney and Thornton. That did not prove the case as that invaluable archive although providing a statistical analysis, is primarily concerned with the personal circumstances of the individual victims and consequently has a humanistic dimension which I have eschewed except for one specific area of enquiry. Accordingly I have proceeded with my original intention of putting my quantitative analysis and accompanying commentary into the public domain to ensure a wide accessibility. I do so in the hope that it might offer some further insights into the nature of this conflict which although insignificant in global terms, has already generated so much comment and analysis- some of it exceptionally incisive and of enduring value, and much of it quite ephemeral. Should the reader come to share with me, that sense of the madness of it, which I have experienced during the preparation of this material, I would not be surprised.

1 Methodology

1.1 The Numbers Problem

In earlier comments upon the question of the total number of fatalities, I have remarked on the difficulties confronting any researcher seeking to offer either a reliable total or a comprehensive profile of the death count in Northern Ireland. There is the initial difficulty of establishing just what that total is, and then there is the difficulty of trying to classify those deaths in some consistent and coherent manner. Indeed one of the epistemological problems is, that any attempt at classification imposes a pseudo order and coherence on events which frequently were not so ordered or consistent. Patterns of behaviour and purpose are inferred from circumstances and then implied in the classifications, but these patterns might not reflect the intent or purpose of the protagonists. While it is easy to ask the **who / whom** question, and to extend this to the **how, why, where and when** questions, the answers are frequently ambiguous and unclear. In the following commentary I will have occasion to return to this caution and to draw attention to conflicts of evidence.

1.2 Other Studies

When I published my first pamphlet '**The First Five Hundred**' (1) on the fatality totals accruing from communal violence I was satisfied that it should be possible through meticulous record keeping to provide a complete listing of all those killed in the Troubles which could serve as a definitive base for further research. It is now my judgement that it is not possible to arrive at an exact figure which could command universal acceptance. That reservation underlies the theme and purpose of this study. It is salutary however to note some features of other studies if only to explore the uncertainty principle. There is now a vast range of literature dealing with all aspects of the Northern Ireland conflict. As a consequence the issues of fatality totals and the responsible agencies have been explored from a number of perspectives including the geographical, the sociological, the military and the political. However most of these studies did not aim to provide a complete schedule of the identities of the fatalities and as they could not offer any assistance other than corroboration to the development of a fatality database, it is unnecessary to refer to them here. Consideration of several publications which can legitimately claim to be authoritative, might serve to illustrate the difficulty of getting agreement on the total number of fatalities attributable to the Northern Ireland conflict.

It might be beneficial to commence by comparing two sources which by now are merely historical. These were the listings published by the Irish Information Partnership (IIP) in '**Irish Information Agenda**' (2) and the schedule provided by Malcolm Sutton in his work '**Index of Northern Ireland Deaths**' (3) The time scales of these listings were not coterminous, as the IIP listing concluded in 1989, while the Sutton listing took the record up to the end of 1993. There was a further difference in that the IIP data related only to those killed in Northern Ireland. However the two studies can be compared in terms of the period 1969 to 1989 and in relation to Northern Ireland located deaths. It is clear that the Sutton record is more complete than the IIP record, and I make this judgement as the researcher who compiled the IIP data and used that data in the commentaries published over my own name. Sutton's work revealed errors in my records and analysis, although these did not go beyond the acceptable 1% margin of error I had stipulated as acceptable in '**Two Seven Six Three**' (4). Despite his reliability as a source, Sutton however, decided to make certain exclusions which seem to have been both arbitrary and inconsistent. Thus while he excluded deaths of paramilitaries arising from accidental weapons discharge, he included deaths arising from premature explosions. The outcome of this procedure was that for the common period of time covered by my IIP based study and Sutton's Index, my study did not include some fatalities which Sutton correctly had identified while he omitted fatalities which I judged should be included and the end result was that my figures for Northern Ireland fatalities as of July 1988, were in excess of his total at that point. It should be noted that Malcolm Sutton has revisited his compilation and a more inclusive listing is provided in the Sutton listing available on the CAIN

website established by the University of Ulster. As well as revising his earlier work the schedule has been extended to include fatalities occurring up to the end of 1998

This discrepancy phenomenon is evident in the two most recently published studies in this field- studies which to some extent had the advantage of being pursued from a quasi historical perspective rather than from the contemporary perspective of the earlier works. They also had the benefit of institutional support and collaborative research facilities. Both appeared in 1999. **'Northern Ireland Troubles' (5)** seeks to offer a sociological perspective upon the violence of the thirty years between 1969 and 1998. It does not contain a listing of victims but does specify that the 'database includes such categories as fatal heart attacks, suicides and includes all trauma related deaths that can be shown to be troubles related'. It is unclear however whether the total includes the high number of suicides within the local security force units. The fatality total it cites at the end of February 1998 is 3601. **'Lost Lives' (6)** which concludes its study with the death of Charles Bennett on July 29th, 1999, indicates a total of 3637 deaths. In this study civilian suicides are listed but as with the **'Northern Ireland Troubles'** study it does not appear to include details of the security force suicides. It should be noted here that neither does the revised Sutton listing on the CAIN website include such fatalities. Since **Chris Ryder (7)** suggests that seventy members of the RUC committed suicide during the period under study and that by 1991 forty one members of the UDR had taken their own lives **(8)** it is clear that the inclusion of all Security Force suicides would increase the stipulated totals considerably. If some civilian suicides are included on the basis that they were a direct consequence of the conflict it seems unreasonable not to take some account of the high number of security force suicides.

Despite the common exclusion of this category from both studies the total of deaths at the end of February 1998 is only 3583 in **Lost Lives**, which is eighteen less than **'Northern Ireland Troubles'** for the same period and this becomes twenty one when the 1966 figures included in the **'Lost Lives'** study are discounted. This is an insignificant difference and is well within the acceptable one per cent margin of error I suggest above. Both sets of authors acknowledge the inevitability of imprecision. **Fay, Morrissey** and **Smith** comment "any such database will inevitably contain data which are at variance with other available sources." while **McKittrick** et al. remark of the problem of exclusion/ inclusion "In the end decisions had to be made but many were borderline cases". The problem of inclusion/exclusion is further highlighted in two features in the **Daily Telegraph** of March 14th and 15th, 2000, which suggest a total of '719 British military victims of the Troubles' as distinct from the 703 total indicated in the **'Lost Lives'** study. A further illustration of the difficulty entailed in trying to ensure consistency is afforded by the decision of the authors of **'Lost Lives'** to include some victims of enforcement type Republican paramilitary killings in the Republic such as **Martin Cahill** (18/8/94) while excluding others such as the deaths of **Gerard Moran** (21/11/ 98) and **Kevin Fennell** (27/6/99) which according to newspaper reports the Garda Siochana place in the same category. The decision of the **'Lost Lives'** authors to include in their total the names of paramilitaries killed in road accidents but while on 'active service' while excluding the names of Security Force personnel who died under parallel circumstances, highlights the difficulty of applying a standard code of inclusion.

The exclusion noted above of certain enforcement style killings from the **'Lost Lives'** schedule highlights a further difficulty in establishing a definitive total. As will be seen below as time progressed more and more of the paramilitary groups shifted the focus of their activity from 'political'/'ideological' operations to illegal entrepreneurial activities which involved them directly in profit making criminal activities which entailed pre meditated murder and assault often resulting in death. It is very difficult if not well nigh impossible to identify the demarcation line which separates criminal activities which have some political dimension from those which have only a commercial or personal motivation. Any judgement on where that line lies must be arbitrary and unilateral.

My own procedure in compiling these figures has been to exclude as general groups, those who died from heart attacks, road accidents or indeed suicide. Some such individual cases have been included where I have been satisfied that the immediate causal connection has been well established but obviously such decisions must be judged as arbitrary as those I have instanced above, and could well be queried by other commentators. The total number

of fatalities contained in the schedule which I have analysed stands at **3623** (31/12/2001). The schedule lists fewer deaths than do either '**Lost Lives**' or '**Northern Ireland's Troubles**' for the common period all three cover, but the difference is within the one per cent margin which I have judged to be acceptable.

In concluding this section on quantification I must acknowledge the help I received from a study of '**Lost Lives**'. From it I was able to recover details I had lost sight of, or had never been privy to, especially in relation to the agencies responsible for a number of the fatalities and also in relation to deaths occurring long after the fatal incident had occurred. Although it might seem inconsequential in relation to the morbid theme of that study, the fact that it offers what appears to be an authoritative version of the names of the victims, in itself constitutes a worthwhile database of historical evidence. In a community where the prefixes O and Mac tend to be popularly added and elided in a random fashion and where so many people share common family names, name confusion and corruption can occur very easily as I found over the years of recording them from newspaper entries.

1.3 Categories and Classifications

Since I have always been reliant in compiling my own database upon information which was already in the public arena and have never had or sought access to information known only to the police or families of the victims, the data I have sought to classify is drawn from public records such as newspaper accounts of criminal trials, civil liability actions, coroners' reports, death notices and details to be found in the vast pool of published studies. From such sources it has been possible to identify a victim by name (not always correctly), sex, location where found, religion - generally, where it has been relevant, date of death in most cases and also in most cases the agents or agencies responsible for the death. Usually the role or occupation of the victim has been publicly known. Using this raw material I have classified each fatality under these various headings. It is also possible to derive from that material conclusions about the purposes and relative outcomes of the fatal incidents. This permitted the development of a matrix classifying each death under the following headings: **Year of death, Location of body, Sex, Religion (where appropriate) Responsible Agency, Purpose of Agency, Role of Victim**. In certain cases there were particular aspects of the event, e.g. relationship to other victims, which were also noted. A classification of '**context**' was also recorded but the information relating to this has not been used in this commentary. A record of the number of specific fatal actions was kept. Set out immediately below is a table indicating the main classifications with a brief comment on their significance, but it is in the next section that these classifications are explained and justified and the raw totals within each classification are given.

Dimension	Remarks
Name	Spellings might vary from other sources
Year	Relates to year of death rather than fatal incident
Religion	Only that of Northern Ireland residents is listed
Sex	
Agency	This refers to groups responsible for fatal incidents
Status	This refers to the role of fatality victims
Location	Westminster electoral areas are employed for Northern Ireland fatalities
Rationale	This refers to the inferred purpose underlying the fatal act
Causality	This probes the degree of inferred purposiveness of a fatal event
Context	This distinguishes between incidents such as gun fire, explosions, beatings
New Incident	This offers a count of discrete fatal incidents
1 st Fatality	This distinguishes multiple fatality incidents

Personal Culpability	This category identifies those who brought about their own deaths
Familial Link	This identifies victims within the same nuclear family

2 Characteristics of Fatal Incidents

2.1 The number and scale of fatal incidents

. This section is directed towards indicating the cluster of circumstances which define and determine the various weaves and waves of violence which contributed to the **3623** deaths under study. A useful starting point, prior to examining the fatalities, might be to focus initially on the number of fatal incidents. It is in the main relatively easy to identify and isolate each specific fatal incident but there were occasions where a sequence of killings was so closely related in time, location and rationale that it has seemed appropriate to conflate them and designate them as one incident rather than as a series of discrete incidents. The shootings in Derry on 30/1/72 represent such a case.

Working within this stipulation it can be said that the total of deaths under review represent the outcomes of **2771** fatal incidents. In **2366** of these actions a sole individual was killed. Expressed in percentage terms this indicates that just over **sixty five per cent** of the fatalities died in single fatal incidents. There were **405** cases of multiple fatal incidents which claimed the lives of **1257** victims. Thus the average death toll for each of these multiple killings was **3.1**.

There were three occasions on which more than twenty people were killed in a single incident. These were the **Omagh** bombing (15/9/98), the **Birmingham Tavern in the Town** bomb (21/11/74) and the **Dublin** bombing (17/5/74). There were another nine occasions on which a total of between 10 and 19 people were killed. These included **McGurk's Bar** (4/12/71), The **Derry** shootings (30/1/72), the **M62 coach** bomb (4/4/72). The **La Mon House** bomb (17/2/78), The **Narrow Water** bomb (27/8/79) **The Dropping Well** bomb (7/12/82), the **Deal** bomb (2/9/89), the **Remembrance Sunday** bomb in Enniskillen (8/11/87) and the bomb at **Frizzel's fish shop** (23/10/93).

In one way this schedule of multiple killings offers an authentic scan of the violence in that the very reference to the incidents evokes images of the carnage and destruction which seemed to be a constant feature of the news reports during this period. . They indicate also the involvement of the various agencies engaged and the manner in which the violence spilled out beyond the confines of Northern Ireland. The incidents specified above however only account for 177 deaths, just under five per cent of the total killed and a more accurate depiction of the violence is offered by reference to the victims who were killed in single fatality incidents. They are comprised of the security force member killed by a sniper's bullet, the victim of an opportunistic sectarian killing, the alleged informer executed for alleged betrayal, the joyrider shot because of an error of judgement, the paramilitary killed accidentally by 'friendly fire'. It is the aggregate of these individual deaths which highlight and best illustrate the pervasiveness of the violence which overwhelmed the community during those thirty years.

2.2 Establishing Purpose and Rationale

The thirty three year conflict under study began in 1969 in a series of riots and street disturbances in localized areas in Northern Ireland. These were in the main spontaneous and non directive, but over the course of a couple of years they became institutionalized and orchestrated in the form of a guerilla military campaign waged by republican groups against crown forces upholding the authority of the Northern Ireland government and its paramount power the UK government. From that fairly direct linear progression the conflict gradually metamorphosed into a more diffused train of violent events and incidents with a greater range of protagonists and participants. These gradually overwhelmed whole communities within Northern Ireland and brought many non participant or non combative citizens in to the front line of the conflict. How this happened might be illustrated by examining the different purposes or rationales which seemed to emerge with the passage of time.

Beginning with the **Security Forces** which were in the early part of the period the main agencies responsible for fatalities, it can be seen that they were engaged in the discharge of two discrete but interconnected roles. The first was the standard obligation under both common law and statute law of maintaining public order, whether this entailed

responding to criminal activity or quelling disorderly or riotous behaviour. As such its role was in the main reactive but this was gradually overlaid by a counter insurgency role in which the Security Forces had to become pro active and initiate preemptive measures. There were essential differences between the constraints on their discharge of these two roles but as time went on the distinction between the two tasks often became blurred. Despite this the two concepts of **public order** maintenance and **counter insurgency** activities provide the rationale and justification for security force actions.

When **Republican Paramilitary** units took on a pro active stance in 1970, they developed a strategic policy which had two main components. The first consisted of **attacks upon members of the Security Forces**. The second included a campaign of bombings which was directed towards damaging the commercial and industrial infrastructure of the community and have been categorized here as **economic sabotage**. To pursue this dual purpose strategy effectively, they had to police their own organizations and their own areas of control in order to justify exclusion of the security forces from ready access to those areas. To do this they took on a tactical role which is here characterized as **punitive**. This extension of activities was further reinforced when the activities of Loyalist paramilitaries in mounting attacks upon Catholic individual and groups, incited Republican paramilitaries to engage in acts of violence against Protestant communities which can only be characterized as **sectarian warfare**. Although the emphasis was to shift from time to time, the pattern of Republican violence was to reflect this four pronged range of activities, and within each of the four sectors the target areas were expanded and the scope of militaristic attacks became more diffused. .

The entry of organized **Loyalist** paramilitary groups into the conflict seems to have had the twin strategic purposes of pressurizing the Security authorities into taking more coercive measures against the Republican paramilitaries, while intimidating Catholic communities into withdrawing moral and practical support from them. Accordingly they adopted initially a strategy of attacks both upon individuals presumed to be Catholic and upon social centres where Catholics might gather. The Loyalist paramilitary campaign represents the other side of the **sectarian warfare**. . In the same manner as the Republicans, the Loyalists found that to sustain their strategic purpose it was tactically necessary to arrogate to themselves a **punitive** purpose and in that respect their campaign mirrored the tactics of the Republican groups.

Out of these diverse purposes it is possible to frame a taxonomy of purposiveness or rationale which permits the violence engaged in by all the protagonists to be classified in the following terms:

Public Order actions refer to actions taken by members of the Security Forces in response to non political criminal behaviour, the suppressing of riots and street disturbances and the maintenance of civic order.

Counter Insurgency identifies those actions taken by the Security Forces to counter subversive or inferred subversive activity. As such it includes pre-emptive as well as reactive measures and thus covers actions taken in response to what subsequently were revealed to be non political crimes, such as robberies and car theft, which had no political dimension.

Security Force Targeting refers to the campaign mounted by Republican paramilitaries against members of the various arms of the Security Forces. These included British Army personnel and auxiliary groups, as well as the Ulster Defense Regiment and its successor body the Royal Irish Rangers, and the Royal Ulster Constabulary and its Reserve. It should be noted that personnel in non-combatant roles such as recruitment officers and cadet officers came to be targeted within this policy. The purpose of this activity appears to have been to inflict as many casualties as possible in order to exert political pressure on the British government by generating an impression of a government unable to impose its authority on the disputed territory.

Economic Sabotage indicates the bombing campaign engaged in by Republican forces which was directed against industrial and commercial centres.

Punitive measures refer to the coercive actions taken by paramilitary groups against specific individuals and groups other than members of the Security Forces. The purpose of these measures seems to have been to enforce internal discipline, intimidate state functionaries,

punish informers and petty criminals and exact retribution from rival and hostile paramilitary groups for offensive actions. This category also includes actions taken by members of the Security Forces acting without sanction or authority. This range of activity became so diverse in its targeting that it has been necessary to divide it into sub categories and this is done below.

Sectarian campaign is employed to characterize the series of attacks by paramilitary groups on centres such as pubs, churches, etc. where it could be presumed that the patrons belonged to a particular religious group. It also includes the abduction and killing of randomly targeted individuals who were judged to be members of the other community. In this context it is necessary to include actions taken by non organized clusters of individuals acting independently of any superior sanctioning body.

It should be noted that there is a considerable overlap of purpose between the **punitive** killings and the **sectarian** killings and that the characteristic which distinguishes them in this classification is the specific targeting entailed in the former, as opposed to the more random and opportunistic targeting associated with the latter.

While it is legitimate to categorize most of the killings under these six headings some individuals died in circumstances where there was no identifiable purpose and the chain of causality was so tenuous that it would be misleading to group them in any of these headings. Included in this category are deaths arising from road accidents occasioned by spontaneous rioting or careless handling of firearms where no offensive action was contemplated. Those deaths have been identified as **adventitious**.

Finally it must be acknowledged that some of the paramilitary activity although clearly purposive cannot with any certainty be ascribed to the specific purposes noted above. Bank raids fall into this category, as also do those incidents involving premature explosions where it is not possible to judge upon the intended use of the explosives. Such events have been labelled **General Subversion**.

The total deaths attributable to each category of purpose is set out below.

Table 1 Fatalities Attributable To Specific Rationale

Rationale	Fatalities	% Of Total
Security Force Target	1130	31. 19 %
Sectarian	975	26. 91%
Punitive	671	18. 52%
Counter Insurgency	259	7. 15%
Adventitious	174	4. 80%
Economic Sabotage	171	4. 72%
General Subversion	100	2. 77%
Public Order	96	2. 65%
Not Classified	47	1. 29%

2.3 Punitive Activities

Although the distinctive character of each set of purposes or rationales is generally fairly clear and stark, this cannot be said of those fatalities denoted as arising from **punitive** actions. The range of purpose and victim within this group requires further breakdown. When these punitive actions are studied in terms of the imputed motivations of the perpetrators, seven

discrete purposes can be isolated. The first of these was the need of the paramilitary groupings to maintain their own **internal security**. This induced them to take punitive action against their own members, as well as non members, whom they felt might be conveying information about them to the security authorities. Informers or 'touts' to use one of the bellocant phrases employed by the paramilitaries, were generally killed and dumped after interrogations which often seem to have involved torture.

The arrogation of a civic legitimacy entailed in the rejection of the established governmental authority led paramilitary groups into a context where they attempted to exercise policing roles in those areas where they were active and enjoyed a measure of popular support, and so they took on what is characterized here as an **enforcement** role. This was directed against individuals who it was alleged were engaged in criminal and anti social behaviour in a local milieu. In discharging this role the enforcers claimed to have been acting with a popular mandate, but it is clear that they were animated to a considerable extent by the need to exclude the authorized police from the area and to cut off the flow of information to the police from petty criminals under obligation to the police. This policy of **enforcement** was also applied to paramilitary members who were judged to have engaged in criminal activities while utilizing the organization's resources or prestige. A further cluster of activities which fall within the scope of this category relates to the commercial enterprises established or colonized by paramilitary groups with the purpose of financing their campaigns. These ranged from regularized enterprises such as licensed premises and taxi services through to the illicit, such as shebeens, and the illegal, such as drugs trafficking. The extent to which such activities became a substantive element of the paramilitaries rationale was highlighted in a report published in 2001 by the Organized Crime Task Force of the RUC which suggested that of the 78 criminal groups under surveillance by that agency **'43 have current or historical links to republican or loyalist paramilitary organizations, most of which are on ceasefire'** (IT 24/3/01). The need to protect and consolidate these business operations led to executions of individuals who were judged to be untrustworthy or potential rivals. Such killings have been included in this **enforcement** category

The imperative towards control or hegemony noted above led the paramilitary groupings into taking action against civilian targets who were judged to constitute a threat or an obstacle to their primary purposes. A whole range of individuals eventually came to be seen as constituting such a threat. They included witnesses in court cases, members of the judiciary who presided in the courts, the lawyers who appeared in the courts, building contractors undertaking work for the security forces and civil servants whose routine tasks were held to legitimize the governing authority. The punitive action taken against such groups is here called **intimidation**.

One group of public servants who were especially vulnerable to this policy of intimidation were those engaged in the prison service whether as warders, prison governors or administrative staff. Such a substantial number of them were killed and in contexts directly related to conflict over prison policies that it seems appropriate to treat the murder campaign directed against them as singular and to identify it as having a **reprisal** purpose. However another small group merit inclusion in this category and they are the members of the RUC force deliberately targeted by Loyalist paramilitaries in response to police actions which were judged to be oppressive.

Just as the paramilitary organizations were driven by the need to protect their internal security, they were equally driven by the need to protect their ideological stance and their respective spheres of influence. In movements which of their very nature tended to be fissiparous, there were recurring divisions over policy and resources, and this led to conflict between groups which to the outside observer seemed to have a common goal. Frequently these conflicts led to one group taking punitive action against another. Such punitive actions are categorized here as **factionalism**.

It was noted above that it was difficult to draw a line between some of the punitive actions and some of the sectarian killings, and the point was made that the former referred to those incidents where the targeting was specific. That specific targeting of members of opposing paramilitary organizations was a development which occurred at quite a late stage of the

conflict and was to some extent probably inspired by a general revulsion from the randomness of the sectarian campaign. It is likely also that it was influenced by the enhanced intelligence gathering of the paramilitary groups. In that later phase individual members of the paramilitary organizations and of the political groupings which supported them were identified by the opposing forces and were killed. These punitive killings are classed as **retaliatory** and they include murdered paramilitaries as well as politicians and other individuals who had adopted a public stance about the conflict.

There is one final grouping of victims who died as a consequence of these punitive actions. These are the former members of the security forces who were killed. These were in the main individuals who had retired from the RUC or the UDR but they also included former members of the British Army. This grouping was targeted by Republican paramilitaries and occasionally there were exculpatory statements issued by the perpetrators to justify a killing by claiming that the victim was continuing to act as a security force agent as in the case of **Gilbert Johnston** (19/8/78) a former UDR member shot dead by the Provisional IRA. In some instances such as the killing of **Thomas Cunningham** (12/5/82) it was claimed that the PM. organization had not been made aware of the victim's retirement from the force with the implication that after retirement a member of the Security Forces would cease to be a target. However the numbers of ex service men who were killed supports the conclusion that regardless of the individual circumstances they were seen as a legitimate target group. Although it is a speculative consideration, it is not unlikely that as most of the individuals in this category belonged to the Protestant community, the general assault on them was a surrogate sectarian campaign. In so far as they were deliberately attacked for their past association rather than for their contemporary involvement the punitive actions directed against them have been designated as **victimization**.

The totals killed in these seven categories of punitive actions are set out below.

Table 2 Fatalities Attributable To Designated Punitive Actions

Punitive Category	Fatalities	% Of Punitive
Retaliatory	179	26. 67%
Enforcement	132	19. 67%
Internal Security	104	15. 49%
Factionalism	90	13. 41%
Intimidation	72	10. 73%
Victimisation	62	9. 23%
Reprisal	32	4. 76%

Although obviously each rationale set was contingent on the others, it is nevertheless illuminating to conflate the more cognate ones in order to highlight certain features of the conflict. Drawing upon the characterizations of each rationale offered above, it is possible to suggest that they reflect two dominant themes. The first is the **military campaign** directed against the institutional structures of the State and within this theme the rationales of Public Order, Counter Insurgency, Security Force Targeting and Economic Sabotage are embedded. The second theme relates to the violence engendered by inter and intra **community strife** and this is revealed in the Sectarian and Punitive rationales. The two remaining rationales i.e. those listed as **Adventitious** and **Not Classified** are not amenable to this clustering and consequently have been left isolated under **Other**. This conflation exercise is presented in Table 3

Table 3 Conflated Fatality Totals

Conflated Rationale	Fatalities	% Of Total
Military Campaign	1756	48. 47%
Community Strife	1645	45. 40%
Other	222	6. 13%

2.4 Outcomes

The foregoing has been concerned with the apparent motivation underlying fatal incidents. The outcomes frequently did not correspond to those imputed or intended purposes. The law of unintended outcomes is constantly to be observed at play in even the most cursory examination of this conflict. The scope of it may be inferred by looking at outcome rather than purpose. Accordingly the fatality list was examined to establish which deaths represented the intended purpose and which represented unintended purposes. Three categories of outcome were applied so that each death was characterized in terms of outcome either as **Volitional**, or **Contingent** or **Fortuitous**. The distinctions might be roughly equivalent to the legal usages of murder, manslaughter and death by misadventure.

Those classified as **volitional** embrace most of those contained within the purposive categories of Security Force targets, Counter Insurgency, Sectarian Campaign and Punitive actions and relate to those incidents where the victim's death was clearly envisaged and deliberately procured. . Those covered by the **contingent** label mostly arose from deaths occasioned by the Economic Sabotage actions where insufficient warning was given of a bombing operation and significant loss of life occurred as a consequence. They identify the victims of such incidents as the bomb explosion in **Coleraine** (12/6/73) when six people were killed because a telephone warning was too late and too imprecise. They also signify victims of cross fire such as **Margaret McCorry** (20/12/71) who was shot in an IRA attack on a British Army unit in Ardoyne This category also covers Security Force occasioned fatalities where such fatalities arose from Public Order operations where the Security Forces were engaged primarily in crowd control and were not targeting specific individuals. Consequently they include such groups as those killed by plastic/rubber bullet discharges. The deaths in **Derry** on what is commonly called '**Bloody Sunday**' are not considered **contingent** and are included in the **volitional** category. The deaths of those shot while engaged in 'joy riding" are not designated as **contingent** since there is considerable evidence from trials and inquests that the forces involved acted on the assumption that they were engaged in **counter subversive** measures and consequently fired aimed shots intended to kill.

Those labelled **fortuitous** include self induced deaths arising from premature explosions or accidental discharge of weapons. They also include deaths arising from traffic accidents which were the consequence of non directive rioting. Making that distinction about directiveness indicates how difficult it is to be definitive about such matters. Some road deaths of civilians were occasioned by blockades set up to ambush Security Force personnel. Such have been classed as contingent. In a similar context of ambiguity there were many cases where a specifically targeted victim was in the company of another who was not a target, but was nevertheless killed, either deliberately or by chance. I have chosen to consider such deaths as volitional. It will be obvious that all the attributions in this classification are based on judgements derived from the inferred purpose or rationale of the incident. As such they must be considered as subjective and the totals should be regarded as indicative rather than definitive.

Table 4 Fatalities Designated By Imputed Outcome

Causality	Fatalities	% Of Total
Volitional	3058	84. 41%
Contingent	500	13. 80%
Fortuitous	65	1. 79%

3 Agents and Agencies

In the middle of July, 1969, when this stipulated cycle of violence began, the protagonists were on the one hand, the Royal Ulster Constabulary and its auxiliary, the B Specials, and on the other individuals engaged in riotous assemblies which were emerging more or less spontaneously throughout those areas of Northern Ireland where the rival communities interfaced with each other. Units of the British Army although garrisoned in barracks in different locations throughout Northern Ireland were not at that time engaged in the maintenance of civil order nor in any overt counter subversive activities. The two paramilitary organizations (the term was not in popular parlance in 1969) which had a notional existence were the Irish Republican Army pledged to assert the Republican tradition of the Second Dail, and the Ulster Volunteer Force committed to maintaining the constitutional position of Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom. Both were at that point essentially paper organizations and do not appear to have played any institutional or directive role in those initial fatal incidents.

Within a matter of months the situation had changed. The British Army was deployed both in a peace keeping and a peace enforcement role. The Special Constabulary had been stood down to be replaced by the Ulster Defense Regiment as an auxiliary to the British Army and a regenerated IRA was in the process of a structural split into two distinct entities known as the Provisional IRA and the Official IRA The UVF was reorganizing itself and a more populist mass organization, the Ulster Defense Association was emerging as a militaristic grouping.

Those shifts and changes were to continue throughout the subsequent thirty years and were common to all the contending agencies. It is true that within the authorized security arms there was only one organizational change thereafter, when the Ulster Defense Regiment was disbanded and replaced by the Royal Irish Rangers (RIR) but throughout the period there were constant shifts between the roles of the police and the roles of the army. On both the Republican side and the Loyalist side there were constant splits with the consequent emergence of new combative entities frequently employing acronyms designed as much to confuse as to enlighten. It would appear however that most of these purported new groups had no independent existence but were invoked merely as cover by the more established groups who for tactical or propaganda reasons would from time to time employ noms de guerre when acknowledging a particular action. It is accordingly difficult to be clear about the number of paramilitary groups which were autonomous in the sense that they had their own command structure and their own materiel and which actually engaged in militaristic activities causing unlawful death. The classifications employed below identify the organizations which over a prolonged period claimed responsibility for fatalities inflicted. This cannot be taken as evidence that they were free standing.

Security Forces British Army (**BA**), Royal Ulster Constabulary (including the Reserve Force and the B Special Constables) (**RUC**), Ulster Defense Regiment (subsequently subsumed into the Royal Irish Regiment)(**UDR**)

The police forces in Great Britain (**ENG. CONST.**) and the Police and Army in the Republic of Ireland (**ISF**) must also be included in this grouping

Republican Forces Provisional Irish Republican Army (**PROV**), Official Irish Republican Army (**OFF**), Irish National Liberation Army (**INLA**), Irish Peoples Liberation Organization, (**IPLO**), Irish Peoples Liberation Organization – Belfast Brigade (**IPLO BB**), Saor Eire, The Real IRA (**RIRA**).

Loyalist Forces Ulster Volunteer Force (**UVF**), Ulster Defense Association (employing the term Ulster Freedom Fighters) (**UDA**), Loyalist Volunteer Force (**LVF**), Red Hand Commando (**RHC**), Red Hand Defenders (**RHD**). (The independent existence of the latter bodies is queried by authoritative sources)

Although it is possible to offer minimal totals for the number of fatalities inflicted by each of the individual organizations, the totals in relation to the two paramilitary clusters are not a true reflection of the polarities of the conflict. To the totals of those sub groups must be added a significant number where although it is possible to claim that they originated in one of the two contending communities and that the deaths represented politically motivated acts, it is not possible to attribute them to a specific organization. This inability arises in part from the organizations' deliberate concealment of their involvement and in part from the inability of the policing authorities to generate sufficient evidence to warrant charges and in part to the likelihood that many of these non attributable killings were the consequence of local unstructured groups carrying out opportunistic killings without authorization or sanction from a higher command. The high percentage of non specific loyalist killings would tend to support this view as it would appear that the command structures within the Loyalist paramilitary groups were looser than those within the Republican groups.

Just as it is necessary to identify these **Non Specific (NSL) (NSR)** agencies as a separate grouping it also seems appropriate to distinguish those fatalities where effectively the agents were the victims, i.e. those where the deceased contributed to their own death, wittingly or unwittingly. The vast majority in this group are those paramilitary activists who were were killed by the premature detonation of explosives they were handling or by the accidental discharge of weapons in their possession. Less than ten per cent of the total in this group were those who died while engaged on hunger strike. All the individuals who deliberately or by mischance brought about their own deaths are here classified under the term - **Personally Culpable**

There are two other clusters of responsible agencies which have been distinguished in this classification. The first relates to those killings carried out by members of the Security Forces acting without authority, either precedent or subsequent, which consequently constituted unlawful killings. These have been designated as **Irregular**. Also falling into this category are those killings carried out by groups composed of individuals with dual affiliation to a loyalist paramilitary group and an arm of the Security Forces.

In making these attributions the evidence relied upon has in the main been that provided through judicial processes such as inquests, trial judgements and public enquiries. In some instances where there has been corroborating evidence the claims of paramilitary groups have been regarded as reliable although such claims need to be viewed with some scepticism. In some cases such agencies made erroneous claims of responsibility in order to enhance their prestige while in other cases the error arose from a failure of internal communications. Attributions made in "**Lost Lives**" have been accepted where they cite "reliable sources" but not where the judgement was made on the balance of probabilities.

Finally there are a number of deaths about which it is not possible with any assurance to make any judgement about the responsible source. These amount to less than five per cent of the overall total and are listed under **NonClassified**

The summations for each discrete group are given below. A further table indicates the total when these elements are grouped into clusters representing the main ideological and organizational forces in the conflict identified above as **Security Forces, Republican and Loyalist**

Table 5 Fatalities Attributable To Specific Agencies

Agency	Fatalities	% Of Total
Prov	1677	46.29%
UVF	380	10.49%
NSL	358	9.85%
BA	302	8.34%
UDA	243	6.71%
Personally Culpable	155	4.28%
INLA	123	3.39%
NSR	108	3.01%
RUC	54	1.49%
Not Classified	53	1.46%
Off	49	1.35%
RIRA	29	0.80%
IPLO	24	0.66%
RHC	17	0.47%
Irregular	14	0.39%
LVF	13	0.36%
UDR	8	0.22%
RHD	7	0.19%
ISF	5	0.14%
Saor Eire	2	0.06%
Eng Const	1	0.003%
IPLO BB	1	0.03%

Table 6 Fatalities Attributable To Grouped Agencies

Agency Group	Fatalities	% Of Total
Republican	2013	55.71%
Loyalist	1018	28.02%
Security Forces	378	10.46%
Other	214	5.92%

4 The Deceased:

4.1 Risk Factors

To this point this study has been concerned with the characteristics and motives of the protagonists in this conflict. The tragic dimension of the conflict is vested in the victims and the circumstances in which they died. In the earlier references to the issue of causality it was pointed out that a significant number of these deaths fell into the category of contingent events while a lesser number were judged to be fortuitous. Those two groups together account for about fourteen percent of the total and by definition they suggest incidents in which the victims were totally unfortunate chance victims of circumstances. For the majority of victims however there were conditions which to some degree put them at a higher level of risk than was the general norm in Northern Ireland. (It should be noted that with the exception of one year the road fatality figures for Northern Ireland were always higher than the politically related deaths). These conditions can be identified as sex, religious affiliation, location of work or home, membership of the security forces, membership of paramilitary organization, certain occupational groups, and individuals with particular behaviour patterns which left them susceptible to pressures from coercive forces, whether legitimate or illegitimate. . Since the sectarian campaign rationale accounted for nearly twenty five per cent of the total fatalities it is reasonable to infer that religious affiliation was the dominant risk factor in the circumstances of their deaths. That question will be addressed in the section dealing with religious affiliations, just as the impact of location will be examined under a separate heading. That will demonstrate that the level of violence was very unevenly distributed across Northern Ireland.

It is clear however that the single highest risk factor for an individual was his or her sex. A total of 3252 males were killed as against 371 females. That should hardly be considered surprising in a society where there is a significant degree of role differentiation between men and women. The great majority of the membership of both the **Security Forces** and the **Paramilitary** organizations were men, and inevitably the great bulk of the fatality victims in these agencies were men. The corollary was that by and large men were the perpetrators of most of the killings and to the degree that they targeted specific victims they tended to choose male victims. On a number of occasions, but not always (see below - page 22),when a male householder was murdered, a female occupant of the house was spared. Leaving aside the characteristics of sex, religion and location other risk determinants have been grouped under the term **Role/Status** which has been used to designate any of the other risk conditions noted above such as membership of the **Security Forces** or **Paramilitary** units, involvement in political activities and certain occupational categories which had a high risk factor.

Attempting to do this presents at least two methodological problems. Some of the victims filled dual roles. There were situations where a UDR member was also a member of a Loyalist paramilitary group: a security guard was a member of a Republican paramilitary group and an ex-serviceman was also a prison warder. **James Stronge** (d. 21/1/81) was a member of the RUC reserve and as a former member of the Northern Ireland Assembly, a political activist who could have been included in that category. Despite this duality no individual has been allocated more than one status designation. In the case of **Security Force** members and **Paramilitary** members, that membership has been taken as the designated role. The one exception to this has been in the case of members of **Paramilitary** organizations who were killed by their own organization on the grounds that they were informers. They have been categorized as a specific group. With regard to civilians the role listed has been chosen on the grounds that it was probably the factor which constituted the higher risk factor.

There is a further consideration that although all members of the Security Forces and of paramilitary groups have been accorded that identifying role, not all died as a consequence of purposive actions taken against them as combatant personnel. Some were victims of the dire chance to which so many civilians were exposed. Thus **Samuel Trainor** (20/3/72) who was a member of the UDR and is included in the **UDR** category employed here, was engaged in his civilian occupation of refuse collector when he was killed in a bomb explosion in central

Belfast which claimed six other lives. As will be seen many other members of the local security forces were killed while off duty but had been deliberately targeted, and so their deaths are not to be seen as chance events. **James Downey (22/7/72)** who is included here as a member of the **Provisional IRA** was, according to the inquest evidence probably drunk and uninvolved at the time when he was caught in the cross fire between British Army personnel and IRA and was killed. The tendency towards legitimating and validating imputed purposes on all sides of the conflict is evidenced in the anniversary notices of his death which appeared a year later and which referred to him having been "killed in action when defending the Markets against sectarian attacks"

While it is evident that several meanings are being applied to the term 'role' here, it must also be re emphasized that the purpose of the classification is not to provide an occupational profile of the victims. Occupation has been identified only where it appears that there was a direct causal association between the occupation of the victim and the killing of the victim. It seems reasonable to make this connection in the case of members of the judiciary who were assassinated. Equally it is worth highlighting the risks incurred by taxi drivers who were lured to their deaths by bogus calls. Another significant grouping in this context were the number of retailers, including those in the drinks sector, who were killed probably because the accessibility of their premises to their executioners made them vulnerable opportunistic targets. . Because of the range of classifications employed an explanatory note is offered for all those outside the scope of the security forces and the members of the paramilitary units which can be considered self explanatory. .

Explanatory note on role classifications.

Ex Servicemen were in the main former U. D. R personnel but also include former RUC and RUC R. personnel as well as former British Army service men. Because of the nature of UDR service which included part time as well as full time engagements, it had a high turn over of personnel and consequently in many country areas a high proportion of middle aged men would have seen service in the UDR. Interestingly this category highlights the difficulty of double attribution noted above. A high profile Provisional IRA fatality Paddy McAdurey, listed under that role would have otherwise been classified as an ex serviceman fatality.

Retail includes all those small 'corner shop' keepers dealing in stationery, groceries and household goods, as well as the publicans and barmen, or petrol pump attendants whose premises were wide open to any would be death squads and who as a consequence were identified and killed as easy targets in the course of the sectarian conflicts.

Alleged informers and **alleged paramilitary informers** have been treated as two separate categories. Both groups were victims of the punitive strategies employed by the paramilitary units. In neither set of cases is it necessary or indeed possible to say whether the allegations made against them had any substance since the source of the allegations were the illegal organizations which conducted their inquisitions and in many cases applied torture to secure substantiating evidence. The two groups do seem to have one common feature in that many of the individuals in them seem to have been under some pressure from the Security Forces because of suspected previous criminal activity.

The threat of court actions highlights the role the courts played during this period. At times there seemed to be a tension between their role in the battle against subversion and destabilization, and their role in preserving the principle of the Rule of Law. Inevitably court processes focused attention on the individuals who administered the justice system either as judges or as advocates. Their prominence and activity led to some of them being identified as targets of the paramilitary organizations and consequently killed. Their numbers are listed under the heading **legal/judicial**.

Those victims designated under the heading '**criminality**' were what might be characterized as petty criminals or as the Security Forces came to label them ironically 'Ordinary Decent Criminals. ' Such individuals were in the main killed by members of the Security Forces while they were engaging in such crimes as car stealing and post office robberies, and such deaths represent the points where the dual strategic roles of the Security Forces countering

subversion and maintaining public order intersected. It was impossible for the soldiers or police on the ground to judge whether when confronted with the report of a stolen car, they were dealing with what were called 'joyriders' or subversives. This listing also includes victims of paramilitary operations who were killed on the grounds that they were engaging in anti social behaviour within their own community. Such killings were characteristic of the enforcement policies pursued by the paramilitaries.

Prominent figures within the commercial and industrial life of the region came under threat from Republican organizations from time to time. Some were targeted in pursuit of the policy of economic sabotage, and the rationale seems to have been to discourage economic investment in the region. Others were specifically identified and killed because their business involved them in providing infrastructural support to the Security Forces. The most obvious examples were building contractors who had undertaken building work at Security Force installations. .

The group identified within the **political** role designation includes not only elected members of legislatures and local government assemblies such as **Ian Gow** (30/7/90), **Robert Bradford** (14/11/81) and **Paddy Wilson** (25/6/73) but also those who though not holding elective office at the time of their death were prominently engaged in political activity and were publicly identified as spokesmen for a political interest. Such a victim was **John Turnley** (4/6/80). Also included in this category are those such as **Lord Mountbatten** and **Christopher Ewart Biggs** who although not politicians had a particular relationship with the British monarchy. Although many victims of the retaliatory killings identified under the '**punitive**' category were probably targeted because of their proclaimed political loyalties they are not included in this category which essentially is confined to those who were recognizably active in public life

A final category which should be distinguished are those individuals who were employed as **security guards** at the entrance to shops and public houses. That work put them in the front line when the premises they were guarding came under attack and a number of them were killed as a consequence.

It is obvious that during the thirty years of strife considerably more non-combatants than combatants were killed. It is clear however from the foregoing analysis that many of those deaths were not just chance happenings or the whims of fate. Occupational roles influenced the risk factors. Religious affiliation and location were also risk factors. It is to these we now turn.

Table 7 Specific High Risk Fatalities Designated By Role*

Status	Fatalities	% Of Total
Other Non-combatant	1720	47. 58%
BA	513	14. 19%
RUC	304	8. 41%
Prov.	269	7. 44%
UDR	207	5. 73%
Ex serviceman	68	1. 88%
Retail	68	1. 88%
Uda	62	1. 72%
Alleged Informer	53	1. 47%
UVF	51	1. 41%
Criminality	44	1. 22%
Inla	39	1. 08%
PM informer	32	0. 89%
Off	30	0. 83%
Prison Officer	29	0. 80%
Taxi man	25	0. 69%
Politician	24	0. 66%
Businessman	23	0. 64%
Security	20	0. 55%
Guard/Army (R. o I.)	13	0. 36%
Legal/judicial	8	0. 22%
Iplo	8	0. 22%
Eng. Constab.	5	0. 14%
Lvf	2	0. 06%
RHD	1	0. 03%
RIRA	1	0. 03%

*The decision to classify separately members of **Paramilitary** organizations who were killed by their own organization, on the grounds of being informers, means that the totals of some of the **Paramilitary** fatalities listed above are under stated. Of the 32 **PM informers** noted above, 24 belonged to Republican organizations and 8 to Loyalist organizations.

4.2 Religious Affiliation.

To many outside observers the Northern Ireland troubles appeared to be a twentieth century extension of the religious wars of the early seventeenth century. Such a perception was undoubtedly simplistic but a scrutiny of the strategic rationales offered above indicate that nearly a quarter of the victims who were killed died as a consequence of sectarian strife

between the two communities. Many of the other deaths had a sectarian dimension to them, a consideration highlighted by the very high proportion of the locally recruited Security Forces who were drawn from the Protestant community or the nearly total number of Republican paramilitary fatalities designated as Catholics. It is consequently legitimate to examine the religious affiliation of the victims especially in relation to the risk factor. That judgement however is only of significance for those victims who can be considered to have belonged to the greater Northern Ireland community. Religious affiliation does not seem to have been a disposing factor in the deaths of those victims who did not belong to that community although there is some evidence in a few instances that erroneous judgements about an 'outsider's' religion led to their killing. (It is however interesting to note, that judging from burial details and names, a high proportion of British Army fatalities seem to have been Roman Catholics of Irish extraction.) It must be stressed at this point that the attribution of religious affiliation should be seen in community terms rather than in personal terms. Just as the sectarian dimension acknowledged above had little to do with theological issues but was rather construed as a surrogate label of ethnicity or political inclination, so also must it be stressed that the attributions recorded here carry no implication about the religious beliefs or the devotional practices of the individuals included in the classification. The study '**Lost Lives**' points out for instance that one victim publicly acknowledged as a Catholic was listed in his army pay book as an agnostic. The mother of the three Quinn children (12/7/98) was recorded as saying that she was bringing up the three boys as Protestants. In the public perception they were seen as belonging to the Catholic community and in that sense they have been included in that cohort in the listing given below.

Table 8 Religious Affiliation Of 2885 Victims Normally Resident In Northern Ireland

Religion	Fatalities	% Of NI Residents
Catholic	1586	54. 97%
Protestant	1299	45. 02%

4.3 Location

Just as sex, religion and occupation were factors influencing the risk element in everyday life in Northern Ireland during those thirty years, so also was place of residence or place of work. The study "**Northern Ireland's Troubles**" looked at the spatial dimensions of this in relation to a number of specific areas. This study has attempted to identify the total fatality list in terms of politically constituted locations. The locations employed for those killed within Northern Ireland are the **Westminster constituencies**. At the beginning of the period under review there were only twelve such constituencies but these were subsequently increased to seventeen and eventually to eighteen. As well as identifying quite specific geographical areas with distinct environments and topographies and having roughly equivalent populations, these units will enable the researcher to establish linkages between levels of violence and the politico-social complexions of the area. The geographical distinctions made in relation to those killed outside Northern Ireland are much more generalised. Three regional distinctions were made i.e. **The Republic of Ireland, Gt. Britain** and **continental Europe**. In total twenty one areas are identified and the numbers killed within them are set out below. The degree to which the conflict impacted beyond the boundaries of Northern Ireland is reflected in the fact that nearly seven per cent of the deaths occurred outside Northern Ireland. The other striking feature is the disparity of the killing rates between different regions within Northern Ireland. North and West Belfast bore the brunt of the violence while areas such as North Down and Strangford experienced remarkably little violence.

Table 9 Distribution Of Fatalities Across 21 Geographic Areas

Location	Fatalities	% Of Total
West Belfast	663	18.30%
North Belfast	619	17.09%
Newry & Armagh	432	11.92%
Foyle	251	6.93%
Fermanagh & South Tyrone	229	6.32%
South Belfast	189	5.22%
Upper Bann	152	4.20%
West Tyrone	140	3.86%
East Belfast	139	3.84%
Great Britain	123	3.39%
Republic Of Ireland	115	3.17%
Mid Ulster	105	2.90%
South Down	93	2.57%
East Londonderry	82	2.26%
Lagan Valley	82	2.26%
South Antrim	71	1.96%
North Antrim	41	1.13%
East Antrim	38	1.05%
Strangford	25	0.69%
EU	21	0.58%
North Down	13	0.36%

Table 10 Fatality Totals & Voting Patterns (2001) in Northern Ireland Westminster Constituencies

Westminster Constituency	Total electorate	% Poll	% Pro Union Vote	% Anti Union Vote	Other	Total Fatality	Ranking Order
Antrim East	60,897	59. 12	87. 12	9. 84	3. 03	38	16
Antrim North	74,4511	66. 11	73. 37	26. 62		41	15
Antrim South	70,651	62. 50	78. 49	21. 50		71	14
Belfast East	58,455	63. 00	93. 72	6. 08	. 19	139	9
Belfast North	60,941	67. 17	52. 75	46. 79	. 32	619	2
Belfast South	59,436	63. 85	53. 12	38. 75	8. 12	189	6
Belfast West	59,617	68. 74	12. 64	86. 83	. 52	663	1
L'Derry East	60,276	66. 14	63. 58	36. 41		82	13
Down North	63,212	58. 83	94. 53	4. 27	1. 19	13	18
Down South	73,519	70. 83	33. 91	66. 08		93	11
Fermanagh/Strath Tyone	51,974	77. 99	47. 19	52. 80		229	5
Foyle	70,934	68. 90	23. 22	76. 77		251	4
Lagan Valley	72,671	63. 22	86. 53	13. 46		82	12
Newry/Armagh	72,446	76. 75	31. 69	68. 30		432	3
Strangford	72,192	59. 92	91. 73	8. 26		25	17
Tyrone West	60,739	79. 90	30. 44	69. 55		140	8-
Ulster Mid	61,390	81. 34	31. 13	68. 86		105	10
Upper Bann	72,574	70. 32	62. 95	37. 04		152	7

A Personal Perspective

The purpose of this study as indicated in the introduction has been to conduct a quantitative analysis of the deaths occasioned by the Northern Ireland Troubles in the years between 1969 and 2001. As such it has been focused upon categories and numerical data and has ignored the humane. It is however impossible to engage in a review such as this without being touched by the sense of human suffering which underlies the ironies and brutalities and ambiguities revealed in the study. Because of that it seems fitting before concluding this section dealing with the victims to restore the humane dimension by illustrating some of the personal tragedies which are the weft and warp of this study. Since it would be impossible to review all and since any selection process must to some degree be invidious I have decided to isolate and note those victims who were related to each other within the first degree of kinship. In the Epilogue I also make reference to those victims who were known to me.

5 The Familial Dimension

5.

It has already been noted that since this conflict was not a conventional war with front lines and strategic targets, the violence was immediately manifest in local neighbourhoods, and particularly in those areas such as West Belfast, North Belfast, the city of Derry and South Armagh which as we have seen experienced the highest incidence of killings. The risks of death in such places were high on the streets, in the home, the community centre and the shops- the very places where family members tend to be together and consequently it is not surprising that so many family members died together. In all there would appear to have been a total of **92** families which experienced plural deaths within the nuclear family unit. That figure would be much greater if consideration was taken of the families which experienced multiple deaths within the extended family group but these have been excluded from this scrutiny. Within the **92** families under review there was a total of **200** fatalities. . In the case of **45** of these families, the multiple killings occurred on the same occasion, but in **47** instances families had to experience the pain of being informed of a sudden death on two and sometimes three separate occasions.

When the circumstances of each family group are examined it emerges that in the case of nineteen families, children (minors and adults) were killed in the company of one or both parents, and these instances entailed **45** deaths. A further group identifies the **23** instances in which a married couple were killed together, thus totaling **46** deaths. Finally there were **44** sets of siblings killed and this group accounted for **93** individual deaths. Since five of these victims appeared in several of these family sets, these totals cannot be aggregated. A reference to some of the individual circumstances in each of these groups will not only suggest the scale of loss experienced by the bereaved, but will also illustrate the polymorphous nature of the violence.

5.1 Siblings

The deaths under review in this section are typical of the overall picture. People were killed at their work as were **Myles and Tony O'Reilly** who died when their restaurant near Lisburn was blown up by Loyalists (9/3/76). **Brendan and Sean Byrne** were shot dead in the public house they owned near Ballymena because it had remained open during the UWC strike (21/5/74). **Marie McGrattan and Frances Donnelly**, two sisters, were killed with one another by the UVF while working in their family business in Belfast (2/10/75). **Stephen and Kenneth Lynn** were renovating a house in North Belfast when they were shot by the IRA (13/11/91). **Thomas and Robert Dobson** were at work in their family egg packing business in Dungannon when they were killed by the IRA (15/5/76). The two brothers **Reginald and Walter Chapman** were returning from work when, with eight of their fellow workers, they were shot by Republicans in the 'Kingsmill Massacre' (5/1/76).

Other sets of siblings were killed while engaged in social activity. **Malcolm and Peter Orr** had gone out for the night together when they were abducted and killed (5/7/72). The British

Army privates, **John and Joseph McCaig** were lured to their deaths from a public house in Belfast the night they were killed (9/3/71). The **McErlane brothers, John and Thomas**, were playing cards with work mates when they were shot dead in North Belfast by a UVF unit (23/5/75). In some cases the activity was not so humdrum. **Michael and David Devine** were part of an IRA active service unit when together they were ambushed and shot in Strabane by members of the SAS (23/2/85). **Maura Meehan** and **Dorothy Malone** were two sisters who were in the Provisional IRA who were apparently shot dead by British Army soldiers (28/10/71) while driving around streets alerting residents to the presence of those soldiers.

Some of the victims were in the privacy of their own homes when they came under attack. **Rory and Gerard Cairns** were at their home in Armagh when they were shot dead (29/10/93) as were the three **Reavey brothers, John, Brian and Anthony** in their own house in South Armagh when they came under attack and were killed (4/1/76). The **Reaveys** were one of six families who suffered the loss of a set of three siblings. The others were the **Maguires** whose three children, **Joanne, Andrew and John** were killed in a car crash occasioned by an attack on a British Army patrol in West Belfast (10/8/76). The **Quinn children, Richard, Mark and Jason** died in an arson attack on their home in Ballymoney (10/8/76) and **Michael and Seamus McKenna** and their sister **Marion Bowen** were killed when a bomb exploded at a house they were renovating near Dungannon (17/4/75).

The experiences of the **Graham** family in Co. Fermanagh and the **McKearney** family in Co. Tyrone were somewhat different from these families in that their bereavements occurred on different occasions. . Three brothers of the **Graham family Thomas** (5/6/81), **Cecil** (11/11/81) and **James** (1/2/85) who were all members of the UDR were each 'killed by the IRA in unconnected incidents. Of the three **McKearney** brothers who died, **Sean** was killed along with another IRA member when a bomb they were transporting exploded prematurely (13/5/74)-**Kevin** was shot dead by the UVF while working in a butcher's shop(3/1/92) and **Patrick** was killed by an SAS unit at Loughgall (8/5/87) Although these were the worst of such cases there were a number of other instances where siblings were killed in unrelated incidents. **Sean Madden** was brushing his shop front in North Belfast when he was shot by a UDA sniper (11/6/72). Just two months later his brother **Thomas** was the opportunistic victim of a UDA assassination squad (13/8/72). **Paddy Crossan** was shot by the UVF when the bus he was driving had halted at a stop (2/2/73). His brother **Francis** was abducted by a UVF squad two years later and killed (25/11/75). **John Rudman** (14/9/71) and his bother **Thomas** (30/9/72) were both members of the British Army who were killed by the IRA in two different locations. When an IRA bomb prematurely exploded in Newry (22/8/72) **Oliver Rowntree** an IRA volunteer was one of the nine people killed. Two years later his twin brother, **Colman**, a member of the Official IRA was shot dead by the British Army.

5. 2 Spouses

The situations examined immediately above were dissimilar from the experiences of the 23 families which suffered the loss of husband and wife. In each of these cases the two victims died together but in all other respects they were typical of the range of purpose and perpetrating agencies already noted. In some cases they were the non specific target of sectarian attacks such as **Edward** and **Sarah Keenan** (4/12/71) killed in the bomb attack on McGurk's Bar. In others such as with **Clifford** and **Linda Houghton** they were the random victims of attacks upon security force members or else killed because of mistaken identity for an intended target. This was the fate of **Robert** and **Maureen Hanna** (23/7/88) who were killed with their son **David** in a landmine explosion which was directed at a member of the judiciary. In other instances the couple were specifically targeted and murdered. **Thomas** and **Emily Bullock** were shot together (21/9/72). **Thomas Bullock** was a serving UDR member. **James** and **Gertrude Devlin** were killed together at their home in Tyrone (7/5/74) in a sectarian attack. **Catherine Mahon** and her husband **Gerard** were together in their home in West Belfast when they were killed by the IRA (8/9/85) on the allegation that they were informers.

5. 3 Parental/filial

The **Hanna** family noted above were one of the five families in which two parents and their children were killed in the same incident. The other instances of this were the **Houghtons** also noted above who were killed with their two children in the M6 bomb attack and **John and Anna O'Brien** who died with their two children, **Jacqueline and Anne Marie** in the Dublin bombing (17/5/74) **William and Elisabeth Herron** died with their daughter, **Doreen** when their shop in Dromore was the object of an IRA incendiary attack (7/4/76). The **Dempseys, Joseph and Jeannette** also died in an arson attack on their home in North Belfast along with their daughter, **Bridget** (17/8/76). In most of these instances, as was the case in the other categories, parent and offspring were involved in routine domestic activities when they were killed. They were watching TV or doing the shopping or working together. **William McKee** and his son **James** were in Tullyvallen Orange Hall when they were killed with three others in a gun attack (1/9/75). **William Gordon** a UDR man was taking his daughter **Lesley** to school when they were killed by a booby trap bomb in the car (8/2/78). **Mrs. Philomena McGurk** was working with her daughter **Marie** in the family pub when it was destroyed and they were killed (4/12/71). **Mrs. Mary Grimes** was with her daughter, **Averil Monahan** and **Averil's** daughter, **Maura**, shopping in Omagh when they were caught and died in the Omagh bomb blast (15/8/98).

Other parental/filial deaths occurred in less routine circumstances. **Thomas McCool** died with his two daughters, **Carol and Bernadette** when a premature explosion of a bomb in his custody occurred. **Margaret Hearst** a member of the UDR was killed in Armagh (8/10/77). Two years later her father, **Ross**, also a UDR member was killed. A similar tragedy befell the **Baggley** family when **William**, a member of the RUC was killed (29/1/74) and two years later his daughter **Linda**, also in the RUC was killed (2/6/76).

As with the **Graham** family of Fermanagh and the **McKearney** family of Tyrone (above) the **Trainor** family in Portadown experienced tragedy on three separate occasions. **Mrs. Dorothy Trainor** was shot in Portadown by the UVF (1/4/75) and her sons **Ronald** (15/12/75) and **Thomas** subsequently suffered the same fate (8/3/78). A somewhat parallel train of incidents befell the **Crawford** family in Belfast. **Mrs. Martha Crawford** (29/3/73) was shot dead in IRA crossfire and three years later two of her sons, **Paul** (12/4/75) and **Patrick** (10/8/75) were killed in the course of factional disputes between Republican groups.

It can be seen that although the focus in the preceding section has been upon the personal, it has also highlighted the capricious manner in which certain families found themselves bereaved on repeat occasions by the actions of disparate groups. **James Bonnar** was killed by the British Army (25/6/72). Some months later his father, **Edward**, was shot by the IRA (2/10/72). **Anthony Braniff** was killed in Ardoyne by the IRA (27/9/81) but his brother **David** was killed by the UVF eight years on (18/3/89). **William Skey** a member of the UDA was killed by that organization (25/10/90). The following year his brother, **Robert** was killed by a

bomb planted in the Maze prison by the IRA (24/11/91). **Raymond Devlin** was shot by the IRA (23/4/82). Six years later his brother **Damien** was killed along with two others when the pub in which they were drinking was bombed by the UVF (15/5/88). **Francis Bradley** was killed by a UVF bomb explosion (19/6/75) and his sister **Isabelle Leyland** died when caught in a burst of IRA gunfire (22/8/92). **Robert Warnock** was shot dead in a confrontation with an RUC unit (13/9/72). Just a month later his brother **William** was killed in an encounter with a British Army unit engaged in riot control (16/10/72). **Ronald Dodd** was a member of the RUC killed in an IRA ambush near Toomebridge (27/10/71). Four years later his son **Mark**, a UVF member, was killed with three others in a premature bomb explosion.

These individual cases cited here as illustrative of a particular group of victims-families exposed to plural bereavement - typify the general characteristics of this strife. Some were deliberate targets, some were chance victims; some were engaged in high risk activities; others were pursuing the most routine of tasks. Some were killed by hostile agencies, some were adherents of the forces that killed them. As with all the deaths, these were a tragic waste but more poignantly noted because of the double or triple blow to the affected families.

6 Correlations

The earlier sections offered raw figures totaled under a number of different categories. Although they appear starkly sinister they offer only a blurred outline of the demarcation lines within the conflict. A more revealing profile emerges by correlating some of the categories to each other. It has seemed best to start with the agents and their purposes – the who and the why of the matter and suggest how they impacted and then to look at the victims – the whom – and the circumstances which surrounded their deaths. To promote clarity when examining the role of the agencies the procedure employed above, of grouping them into three clustered elements has been retained. Similarly when noting issues related to role all those considered to have been Non-combatants i.e. not members of the Security Forces or Paramilitary Organizations have been grouped into one set.

Table 11 The Rationale Of The Purposive Fatalities* Inflicted By Each Agency Group

Rationale	Republican	Loyalist	State Forces	Other
Public Order			93	
Counter Insurgency			254	5
General Subversion	46	15		23
Security Force Target	1121	3		6
Economic Sabotage	163	3		1
Sectarian	221	745	3	5
Punitive	427	226	11	6
Adventitious	12	7	10	104
Not Classified	10	15		23

*This total of 3558 excludes the 65 fatalities classified as **Fortuitous**

Table 12 The Character Of The Punitive Fatalities Inflicted By Each Agency Group

Punitive	Republican	Loyalist	State Forces	Other
Enforcement	62	69		
Factionalism	61	26	1	1
Internal Security	76	26		1
Intimidation	67	4	1	
Reprisal	26	4	2	
Retaliatory	73	96	6	4
Victimisation	61		1	

Table 13 The Religious Affiliation Of Northern Ireland Citizens Killed By Each Agency Group

Agency Group	Catholic	Protestant
State Forces	317	45
Republican	383	986
Loyalist	744	212
Other	142	56

Table 14 The Status Of Victims Killed By Each Agency Group

Status Group	Republican	Loyalist	State Forces	Other
Loyalist PM	30	44	13	30
Non-combatant	904	931	203	50
Republican PM	47	27	145	128
Security Forces	1033	15	17	6

Table 15 Grouped Status Of Victims Killed In Each Location

Location	Republican PM	Loyalist PM	Security Forces	Non-combatant
East Antrim	2	5	3	28
East Belfast	10	17	12	100
East Londonderry	1	6	33	42
EU	3		11	7
Fermanagh & South Tyrone	21		116	92
Foyle	35		111	105
Great Britain	6		49	68
Lagan Valley	13	8	16	45
Mid Ulster	20		35	50
Newry & Armagh	39		218	175
North Antrim	3	2	16	20
North Belfast	34	39	96	450
North Down		1	2	10
Republic Of Ireland	21	2	16	76
South Antrim	7		7	57
South Belfast	15	15	31	128
South Down	9	2	51	31
Strangford	2	1	3	19
Upper Bann	9	3	41	99
West Belfast	81	16	150	416
West Tyrone	16		54	70

Table 16 Religious Affiliation Of N. I. Victims Killed In Each Location.

Location	Catholic	Protestant
East Antrim	20	17
East Belfast	71	59
East Londonderry	21	47
Fermanagh & South Tyrone	72	120
Foyle	120	56
Lagan Valley	35	37
Mid Ulster	48	54
Newry & Armagh	151	167
North Antrim	14	26
North Belfast	310	252
North Down	4	9
South Antrim	37	30
South Belfast	96	85
South Down	33	31
Strangford	6	19
Upper Bann	73	70
West Belfast	401	150
West Tyrone	51	62

Table 17 Rationale Of Fatalities Inflicted In Each Location

Location	Adventitious	Counter Insurgency	Economic Sabotage	General Subversion	Not Classified	Public Order	Punitive	Secarian	Security Force Target	Total
East Antrim	2	1	2	1	1	3	5	20	3	38
East Belfast	7	4	1	13	5	6	36	57	10	139
East Londonderry	5	1	7	2	1	1	9	18	38	82
EU		3					3		15	21
Fermanagh & South Tyrone	12	16	1	1	1	2	19	34	143	229
Foyle	17	37	11	7	2	11	24	16	126	251
Great Britain	5	1	26	4			29	1	57	123
Lagan Valley	12	1	7	1		1	13	31	16	82
Mid Ulster	4	13	3	4		2	23	15	41	105
Newry & Armagh	24	30	10	4		7	67	64	226	432
North Antrim		3	5				11	9	13	41
North Belfast	25	45	6	13	13	22	96	310	89	619
North Down				1			6	6		13
Republic Of Ireland	6	6	1	18			79	1	4	115
South Antrim	2	1	1	8	3		9	42	5	71
South Belfast	7	6	14	5	5	1	48	79	24	189
South Down	6	3	1	1	1		6	20	55	93
Strangford	2		12	1		1	3	4	2	25
Upper Bann	2	8	5	1	4	3	25	60	44	152
West Belfast	30	70	24	14	11	34	138	180	162	663
West Tyrone	6	10	34	1	1	2	21	8	57	140
Total	174	259	171	100	48	96	670	975	1130	3623

Table 18 Rationale Of Fatalities Falling Within Discrete Quinquennia

Rationale	1969-1973	1974-1978	1979-1983	1984-1988	1989-1993	1994-1999	2000-2001
Adventitious	66	59	27	12	6	4	
Counter Insurg	116	48	29	38	25	2	
Economic Sab	72	49	14		6	30	
General	56	19	14	4	4	3	
Not Classified	16	20	7	1	3	1	
Public Order	58	10	21	5	1	1	
Punitive	82	196	97	90	114	76	15
Sectarian	206	427	58	60	153	66	5
Security Force	306	255	248	183	123	13	1

Epilogue - A Personal Observation

It seems appropriate to me as I conclude this study to refer to my own immediate experience of the sense of tragedy embedded in these dehumanized figures. Nineteen of these dead were known to me, some quite intimately and closely, and others at a more casual level. Immediate family members of another twelve were also known to me at the level which demanded personal condolences. Of those known to me directly, four had been in primary school with me, two in the same class. These were **Joe Blaney** (16/12/72) and **Michael Hanratty** (22/11/74). The two others **Tony and Myles O'Reiley** although junior to me in school had been in the Holy Cross church choir with me as well as living in the same neighbourhood. A further group of four, **Bernard Watt** (6/2/71), **Paddy McAdorey** (9/8/71), **Gerald McDade** (21/12/71) and **Patrick Martin** (16/5/81) had been pupils I taught at a secondary school in North Belfast. **Gerry Kelly** (11/11/72) and **Irene Andrews** (25/6/73) had been close neighbours as had **James Coyle** (5/6/76) at an earlier period. **Frank Corr** (26/7/72) and **Terry Toolan** (14/12/72) had been prominent members of Ardoyne Kickhams football club to which I belonged as indeed had **Michael Hanratty** (see above). **Paddy Crossan** (2/2/73) was actively involved with voluntary activities in the Holy Cross parish. **James Donnelly** (17/3/76) was a teacher and known to me socially as a professional colleague. **Miriam Daly** (26/6/80), **John Turnley** (4/6/80), **Maire Drumm** (28/10/76), **Liam McMillan** (28/4/75) and **Paddy Wilson** were all political activists with whom I had varying degrees of contact throughout the sixties and early seventies. **Rory Conaghan** (16/9/74) and **James Devlin** (7/5/74) were known to me at a personal and social level.

It might be noted that fourteen of this group either lived in or were killed in North Belfast and more precisely, twelve of these were from the Ardoyne district in which I lived. It is certain that any resident of an area such as North or West Belfast or Derry would have been acquainted with a similar cluster of victims killed over that thirty year period, and it was that intimacy and immediacy which lent the period its particular horror. Although I have spent a considerable period of time noting and recording the circumstantial features surrounding the killing of so many individuals I sense the tragedy and the futility of it most potently in my recall of these friends and acquaintances and it is to them then that I dedicate this study - and any beneficial outcomes emerging from it.

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