The sub-committee heard yesterday from the families of the victims of many of the incidents referred to in the report. Today we will hear from other witnesses to assist in our consideration of the report. The order in which the sub-committee will take witnesses is set out in the schedule, which is being circulated.

Senator J. Walsh: I apologise for being late. I raised an issue yesterday regarding identifying witnesses. If we are not going to name people or ask questions-----

Chairman: I will not accept this query in public. We will go into private session. If necessary, I will ask all the witnesses to withdraw and we will then discuss the matter.

Senator J. Walsh: I have one question. Can those who should not be mentioned be numbered so that when members ask questions, we will all know about whom we are talking? At least then there will be clarity in the replies. I asked a question
yesterday and it transpired that the information I was given was incorrect. I am asking that this be done in the interests of clarity.

**Chairman:** There is no problem in numbering people or specifying a page or, for example, the second mention in a particular paragraph on a page. However, I ask members not to name individuals.

**Senator J. Walsh:** Can the clerk produce a numbered list of the people members and witnesses are instructed not to name and distribute it to all of us? This will permit clarity in the answers and questions we are putting to people.

**Chairman:** We will try to do that. In the meantime, individuals should be referred to as the "person in that paragraph", "the second person", "the fourth person" and so forth. We are again joined by representatives from Justice for the Forgotten. I welcome Ms Margaret Urwin, secretary of Justice for the Forgotten, Mr. Cormac Ó Dúlacháin, SC, counsel for Justice for the Forgotten, and Mr. Kevin O'Loughlan, chairman of Justice for the Forgotten.

We have already received a very comprehensive written submission from Justice for the Forgotten for which we are very grateful. The delegation will be aware of the committee's procedures from previous appearances before it. I remind witnesses of the committee's terms of reference, which are to consider Mr. Justice Barron's report into the bombing of Kay's Tavern in Dundalk for the purpose of making recommendations in respect of legislative or administrative provisions. As a result of the Supreme Court decision in the Abbeylara case, we are prevented from making any findings or expressions of culpability against individuals who are not Members of the Houses of the Oireachtas.

I invite members of the delegation to make a few remarks. Does Mr. O'Loughlan wish to make some opening remarks?

**Mr. Kevin O'Loughlan:** I thank the Chairman. I am chairperson of Justice for the Forgotten, which represents the families of those who died in the Dublin-Monaghan bombings of 1974 and those who died in the Dublin bombings of 1972 and 1973. We are here today to support the families affected by the atrocities into which the committee is inquiring. The evidence shows that the Dublin and Monaghan bombings of 1974 and the Dublin bombings of 1972 and 1973 are linked to the murders being investigated by the committee. We are here to support the families affected by these murders and give them as much help as possible. I will now ask Mr. Cormac Ó Dúlacháin to present a more detailed submission.

**Mr. Cormac Ó Dúlacháin, SC:** We have appeared before this committee on a number of occasions and it is useful to summarise why we came to be here. In December 1999, the Taoiseach, in consultation with other party leaders, agreed to the establishment of a commission of inquiry into the Dublin and Monaghan
The commission of inquiry was established soon afterwards. It was expressly stated in December 1999 that the purpose of what was to become known as the Barron inquiries was to establish whether there was any foundation to the concerns that had been voiced from the early 1990s. The purpose of the Barron inquiries was not to reach final conclusions. Rather, it was to establish fundamentally whether there were valid concerns which required significant public scrutiny.

In the past number of years, what has emerged from the Barron reports collectively is a body of evidence that has been extremely powerful in underlying the existence of very serious issues and that there is evidence of collusion from the early to the mid-1970s. This evidence emerged from the Barron reports and very powerfully through testimony given to this committee yesterday and on other occasions. What is to follow this body of evidence? Is it simply enough that it is collected and collated or is it time to subject it to detailed scrutiny and inquire further into the matter?

If one compares the information possessed by this committee with the information presented by Judge Peter Corry to the Irish and British Governments following his limited inquiries, it is very clear that the body of evidence available to the Irish Government through this process is ten times more detailed and powerful than the evidence collected by Judge Corry, which grounded the decision by both Governments to establish a number of formal inquiries. It is dangerous to compartmentalise the inquiry into the Dublin and Monaghan bombings and the various other inquiries which have taken place and to assert that the conclusion in the report into the Dublin and Monaghan bombings was X and the conclusion in the report into the Dublin bombings of 1972 was Y. We need to examine them collectively.

Given the publication of the report into the Dundalk bombings and the appendices and sub-reports into various other outrages, a number of questions come to mind. A critical question which goes to the heart of collusion is who knew what was happening in the period between 1974, in particular, and 1976 and 1977. The question arises as to whether what was going on was known at a very low level or whether it was known to the institutions and those in charge of them.

From looking at 1974, we know that detailed information as to the identity of loyalists was communicated from RUC Special Branch to the Garda Síochána. As early as 1974, the identity of those involved in atrocities was known. As the various reports have emerged, we have seen that names given to the Garda Síochána in 1974 subsequently reappeared in connection with events in Silverbridge, the Miami Showband and other atrocities. The identity of individual perpetrators was known as early as 1974. We know that their identity was not a local matter but was known at divisional headquarters in Portadown and at RUC headquarters. We know from the Holroyd notebooks that the identity of these people was known to military intelligence. We know the structures within military intelligence that all that fed into military headquarters in Lisburn. We know from the Wallace documents that these
individuals were being listed and collated and that associations were being identified. If one takes the individuals as being unrelated to the security forces and takes them purely as subversives, the identity of this network or organisation of subversives in Armagh was well known by 1974.

Due to the fact that there has been no means of questioning anybody about it, what has not emerged through the Barron inquiries is what intelligence was gathered in connection with these people from 1974 onwards. We know that from June 1974 onwards, both the Garda Síochána and the RUC knew that this group was capable of horrendous acts. It was capable of planting no-warning bombs in Dublin and Monaghan and planning events involving mass murder with no question of warnings. We know that from the summer of 1974, the security forces in Northern Ireland knew that a powerful and dangerous group operated in their midst and yet we have no evidence or indication that anything was done to curtail, restrict or limit the free range of movement or the freedom to act of these individuals. While it is often said there is no evidence to convict, we continuously saw throughout the 1970s and 1980s the security forces adopt practices designed to curtail, limit and obstruct groups and organisations in carrying out actions. The question for the security forces is not simply related to having evidence to convict, but of how resources were applied and what was done to obstruct and defeat those who sought to carry out unlawful acts. That network of intelligence was in place by the summer of 1974 and we begin to see what emerged in 1975 and 1976. If we take on one side the atrocities that have been the subject of these reports and witnesses before this committee, one counts the number of serious criminal investigations that they gave rise to and the context in which they were carried out, one will find that senior police officers were involved in the Miami Showband investigation. One will find that senior police officers across a number of divisions were involved in the investigation concerning the Reaveys and the O'Dowds. One will find that atrocities attracted huge public focus, not only because of the atrocities themselves but of the counter atrocities they gave rise to.

If one reflects on the time and looks back at the newspapers, Dáil reports and British parliament reports, one continuously finds major expressions of political concern about what was happening in Armagh. In that context, we are expected to believe the detail about individuals and that their membership of the UDR and RUC reserve remained unknown to the powers that be. In some way, all of this never crossed the desk of senior commanders, whether it was civilian intelligence, RUC intelligence or military intelligence. All of this was supposedly immune from CID investigation or forensic officers. The experience of some inquiries made reveals that there were two very different cultures within the RUC. One was that of CID, criminal investigation, formal investigative officers who in many incidents were collecting information. The other was that of RUC special branch which either controlled that information or controlled the course and direction of inquiries.

When one takes all of the inquiries that were ongoing and the political concerns expressed, one has to come to the conclusion that people at a very high level knew
what was going on, yet we find the most minimal accountability. If one tries to trace
who was arrested, lifted or detained, one finds people on minor changes and
discovers subsequently that they were given character references when they
appeared in court on these charges, that the prosecutors and prosecuting officers
indicated that these people were believed to have no known associations, when all
the other contemporaneous evidence was pointing in the other direction. Records of
previous convictions were not referred to. Ultimately, it is not brought to an end by
police or security action.

Matters changed in the late 1970s when this group centred around Glenanne began
to disintegrate or fragment. The only period in which it really came into focus was in
1979 when a particular RUC officer began to speak out about his involvement.
What do we find? We discover that centrally involved in a number of these events
were policemen who were members of a special patrol group, a special unit set up
to tackle the very thing in which they were involved. It was a specialist unit with its
own command structure, its own assistant chief constable as head and linked
straight to RUC headquarters. There is a huge question mark when one finds that a
special anti-terrorist unit - that was the nature of the special patrol group - and its
members were involved and associated with people whom we now know were
terrorists and involved in a range of atrocities which directly led to other atrocities
such as the Kingsmill massacre. It was brought home to me in one long meeting we
had with John Weir in Paris a number of years ago when we asked where it was
going to stop. When was the tit-for-tat retaliation and the madness going to stop?
He said it had stopped one evening when, as a further retaliation, they sat down to
plan an attack on a primary school. At some stage someone said "No". At some
stage the spiral stopped.

One comes back to our main concern which started with the Dublin-Monaghan
bombings as to whether there was collusion. We end up with the benefit of four
Barron reports that put the Dublin-Monaghan bombings evidently at the start of a
trail of evidence that identifies a period in which we believe there was significant
state collusion which was not limited to what might be referred to as foot soldiers,
bad apples, or the occasional wayward RUC officer or UDR member.

That brings us back to the question of where we go from here. We made a number
of complaints to the European Court of Human Rights arising from what we believe
was the failure of the United Kingdom to co-operate with various inquiries. Both
complaints were ruled inadmissible under the rules of the court, particularly the time
limit provisions, which require that complaints be lodged within a period of six
months of the grounds of complaint being evident; it is not always six months from
the event or atrocity being complained of. We complained about the lack of co-
operation with inquests, the Óireachtas committee and the Barron inquiry. The
context in which the court ruled against the admissibility of the complaints was, in
part, that one could not complain about the British Government not co-operating
with an inquest if it took 30 years for the State or the relatives to ask for that inquest
to be resumed. One cannot expect a formal level of co-operation from a
government if the inquiries established are non-statutory and without legal powers, in the nature of the Barron inquiry. It was very much a case of the European Court telling us not to look to the convention if both the victims' families and the Government had failed to bring these matters to a head much earlier.

That effectively brings us to what should be done at this stage. We have constantly campaigned for a public inquiry on the basis that the evidence needs to be gathered, sifted and tested publicly. We have admitted all along, however, that there are limitations and difficulties. We find it ironic that a public inquiry has been established to inquire into the murders of two RUC officers who served during this period when the police force and others in structures whom we believe were involved in collusion do not seem to be amenable to a formal inquiry. Having been constantly told that one cannot compel co-operation, it would be interesting to know whether the inquiry under Judge Smithwick into the murder of Breen and Buchanan is being recognised by the British Government and whether it is obtaining co-operation from the PSNI.

I am aware of the controversy surrounding the formal and statutory inquiries in the North following the Cory report but it is important to find out the extent to which those inquiries are receiving co-operation from the security authorities. For us, the evidence of collusion is now so compelling and powerful that there is an obligation on the Oireachtas to take up the issue and state the matter must be fully inquired into in order that the full nature and extent of what occurred in those years can be established.
Ms Margaret Urwin: I intend to highlight points from the written report we submitted which we consider particularly important. Our report was divided into sections dealing with direct collusion, indirect collusion and the Garda investigations. I concur with Mr. Ó Dúlacháin that on the completion of the fourth Barron report we can confidently make links between four attacks in the South in the two year period from May 1974 to March 1976: the Dublin-Monaghan bombings of May 1974, the shooting of Mr. John Francis Greene in January 1975, the Dundalk bombing of December 1975 and the Castleblaney bombing of March 1976. In three cases bombs were placed without warnings. These cross-Border attacks claimed the lives of 38 people.

We have a body of evidence from the first and fourth Barron reports, the evidence of John Weir and the Wallace letters of 1975, as well as the memo and loyalist inventory of Wallace and the notebooks of Fred Holroyd. These are very important documents because they are contemporaneous sources, not something dreamed up at a later date. These records were written down during the period. The research carried out by the Pat Finucane Centre, as well as the papers obtained by the centre were particularly useful. We also obtained papers from and conducted research in the National Archives of the United Kingdom. This body of evidence points to the Glennane gang as the perpetrator of these atrocities. As Mr. Ó Dúlacháin stated, the gang comprised members of the British security forces, the RUC, the UDR and British Intelligence, together with loyalist paramilitaries. They operated from a safe base in County Armagh, the farmhouse of a member of the RUC reserve. The gang now can also be definitively linked to attacks north of the Border, including the attack on Donnelly's Bar, Silverbridge on the same night as the bombing in Dundalk, the Miami Showband murders, the murders of the Reavey and O'Dowd families and many more.

The committee heard such compelling evidence from all of the witnesses present...
yesterday that members could be left in no doubt that collusion was rife during this period. The ballistic evidence, as charted by Mr. Justice Barron in the fourth report, is very compelling, as it links the weapons used in many of the attacks and further links them directly to members of the security forces.

In the Wallace letters of 1975 many of the suspects are named. He directly states many were involved in the Dublin and Monaghan bombings. The same names crop up again in the incidents at Dundalk, Castleblaney and Silverbridge, as well as in the case of the Miami Showband. In the Wallace letter of August 1975 he gives his source for this information as one of Craig's people. Craig Smelley was the head of MI6 in Northern Ireland. In his letter of September 1975 to a former colleague, Tony Stoughten, he names this group as the Protestant Task Force or the Protestant Action Force and states he was told that most of the loyalist sectarian killings which took place in Tyrone and Armagh in 1975, including the Irish showband murders, were carried out by the Protestant Task Force, PTF. He states there are also rumours that the group is linked to the special duties team at Lisburn. Lisburn was the location of the British Army headquarters and the special duties team was a special team of British soldiers involved in undercover work. His memorandum of 28 June 1974 to the GSO of Intelligence with an attached list of 66 loyalist paramilitaries is very important in that it includes the name of the RUC reserve who owned the farm at Glenanne and he had written RUC beside it. According to Mr. Justice Barron, this gentleman joined the RUC reserve in September 1974 but the list suggests he may well have been a member before that date. The important point to be made is that it proves beyond a reasonable doubt that this man's involvement with loyalist paramilitaries was known to the authorities in Northern Ireland as early as June 1974.

Another very important aspect is the information given to the Pat Finucane Centre and the families of the victims at Donnelly's Bar, Silverbridge, when they met the investigating officer who had investigated the atrocity. He told them that one RUC officer and two UDR members had been involved, as well as UVF members. He further told them that "permutations" of this group had also been involved in the Dublin and Monaghan bombings, the bombing of Kay's Tavern, Dundalk, the murder of the Reavey brothers and Sean Farmer and Colm McCartney at Altnamacken, County Armagh when returning from a GAA match in August 1975. The modus operandi was the same as that used in the shooting of the Miami Showband, a VCP. Then the people were murdered. That must be followed up because it involved a senior RUC officer, probably PSNI eventually, and he retired as a superintendent. He was not, therefore, just a constable in the RUC.

In regard to the allegation that four members of the RUC in Portadown were members of the UVF, Mr. Justice Barron mentioned in his report that he received this information from the Department of Foreign Affairs. He goes on to say that it is no longer available in any of the files of the Garda Síochána or the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform and, further, that the information did not provide any names. We find this most unusual. During our research, we located papers in
the national archives of the UK dealing with this very matter. This information was passed by the Irish ambassador to the Minister of State at the Northern Ireland Office on 20 August 1975. He was worried because the source of this information was considered to be very delicate and, for that reason, he decided against passing it direct to the Chief Constable of the RUC. He said that the knowledge of this was being restricted to the Ministers for Justice, Equality and Law Reform and Foreign Affairs and that, therefore, there should definitely be a file in the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform. It also seems that the names would have been provided. The British ambassador wanted further details but Mr. Seán Donlon, who was the senior official in the Department of Foreign Affairs, said that both Ministers had decided they could not pass on any more details at present, in case they would compromise the source. If these names were available to the sub-committee, it would be very helpful to it in its deliberations.

With regard to the Castleblaney bombing, it was stated yesterday that John Weir had said that this was carried out by the same RUC officer who was mentioned yesterday and the UDR corporal. John Weir told us in a telephone conversation that he believes it was carried out solely by these two men, one UDR and one RUC, just as they had carried out the bombing of the McArdle’s Bar in Crossmaglen on 29 November 1974 - that is one that has not come up - where one man was killed; he died almost a year later. He said one would have driven the bomb car and the other the getaway car. He had also heard that they were stopped on the way out of Castleblaney at a checkpoint where the Keady and Newtonhamilton roads meet and that the UDR officer had his gun under his seat. He said that if they had been stopped by the Garda, instead of being waved on, he would have shot them.

Justice for the Forgotten believes that the intended target in Castleblayney may well have been the Derry to Dublin Ulsterbus, which was due to arrive and park at the exact spot where the bomb exploded at 8.15 p.m. The bus was delayed slightly because of the Garda checkpoint and arrived approximately two minutes after the bomb exploded. Apparently, the bus was very punctual and one could set one’s clock by it. Sadly, one man, Patrick Moane, died. If, however, the bus had arrived on time, there could have been absolute carnage and a huge death toll. This belief is supported by the fact that the bomb car was parked with the boot facing out onto the street. As on previous occasions, this car was stolen in the Shankill Road area and, once again and as stated at previous hearings of the sub-committee, the owner reported the theft to Tenant Street RUC station. This example shows that this continued to be the modus operandi for obtaining cars to be used in bomb explosions, particularly in the Republic.

The shooting of John Francis Greene was dealt with in the first Barron report. Regarding the linkages of weapons, Mr. Justice Barron talks about a .38 Star pistol which was used to murder John Francis Greene. This weapon originally belonged to a UDR member from Loughgall who had connections with the UVF in the Shankill Road dating back as far 1966, when the modern UVF came into being. This weapon had been used in two earlier incidents, both in March 1973. It was then
fitted with a new barrel and used in the murder of Greene in January 1975. It was again used to murder Mrs. Dorothy Traynor in Portadown in April 1975 and was found, along with an arsenal of weapons and ammunition, at a place called Ballynewry, near Portadown, in August 1979 at the home of a UDR member. The car belonging to one of the prime suspects for the murder of Dorothy Traynor was found at the scene of the Miami Showband murders.

I will move on quickly to indirect collusion and definitions thereof. We feel that Mr. Justice Barron sets a very high bar in his definition of collusion. At its hearings into the second Barron report on 26 January 2005, Cormac Ó Dúlacháin told the sub-committee:

"It is very clear in a legal sense and in international law that providing cover constitutes an act of collusion. If one provides protection, obscures people from prosecution or fails to disclose information, one is acting as a participant in the overall event."

In his report on the murder of Pat Finucane, Judge Peter Cory stated that collusion includes the pretence of ignorance or unawareness of something one ought morally or officially or legally to oppose and to fail to take action against a known wrongdoing or misbehaviour. Judge Peter Smithwick, in his opening statement at the public tribunal of inquiry set up to inquire into an allegation of collusion into the murders of RUC officers Breen and Buchanan, said that the issue of collusion would be examined in the broadest sense of the word. He said that while it generally means the commission of an act, he was of the view that it should also be considered in terms of an omission or a failure to act.

We have provided several examples of indirect collusion, but I will just mention two. The issue of the Dundalk bomb car, and its theft and ownership, is a crucial element that has arisen from this Barron report. When Detective Sergeant Owen Corrigan appeared before the sub-committee in connection with hearings on the Ludlow report, he stated that the purpose of the visit of Superintendent Courtney and himself to Belfast on 15 February 1979 arose because he had received information regarding the bombing in Dundalk, specifically on the make and colour of the car used, the identity of a person and the location at which that person resided in Belfast. Arrangements were made and they travelled to Belfast and met with Mr. Bill Mooney, a senior CID officer, in the city. Superintendent Corrigan said that when they met him he seemed anxious about their visit, undertaking to help them in everything. He said that a member of the RUC was able to confirm the information that he had but during the course of their visit, Mooney told them that there would be no more investigation and that no co-operation would be forthcoming. He then left the police station. Detective Sergeant Corrigan made reference to the fact that the RUC Special Branch took precedence over CID and dictated what should and should not be done.

I understand Mr. Corrigan will be appearing today and he should be asked to clarify
if he believes that they were refused co-operation on the instructions of RUC Special Branch. Deeply worrying questions arise from this incident. It is further compounded by the fact that Mr. Justice Barron has not been able to procure a copy of the statement given to the RUC by the owner of the bomb car. He reported that the statement is missing from both the Garda witness statement file and from the Garda investigation report. Although he sought a copy of this statement from the PSNI through the Garda Síochána, no copy of the statement has been forthcoming. We suggest this is most unusual and unacceptable because in all the previous cases involving car procurement for bomb attacks, statements of the car owners have been made available to the Garda. The Garda must also be asked whether a statement was made available and, if so, has it misplaced it.

The location and manner of the procurement of bomb cars are critical facts. In a number of bombings the cars used have been hijacked from the same Belfast street in the same manner with a direction that the owner report the theft at a specified time to the same police station. We are unable to make this comparison about Dundalk because the relevant information has not been disclosed.

In the case of the Miami Showband murders where we already have absolute evidence of direct collusion, with three serving members of the UDR having been convicted and two other serving members having blown themselves up at the scene, there is further indirect evidence in that a white Ford Escort, registration number 4933 LZ, was found at the scene of the attack. This car belonged to a gentleman from Portadown. During the first trial, that is the trial of Crozier and McDowell, this man was called to give evidence and he gave evidence that his car had been stolen while he was asleep. It seemed to be accepted by the prosecution that he was an innocent man whose car had been taken from outside his house.

However, the RUC special branch was well aware that this gentleman was no innocent whose car had simply been stolen at random. We know this from one of the notebooks of Captain Fred Holroyd, a military intelligence officer for Portadown, who linked this man with suspect T and another suspect for the attack on Donnelly’s Bar, Silverbridge. He linked him with the chief suspect or at least the one who was identified in Dublin in Parnell Street as the driver of the Parnell Street car. He linked him with two other suspects, one for the Monaghan bombing and suspect C for the Dundalk bombing.

Captain Holroyd linked this man with three brothers in training. He said this man was training with these three brothers who were all members of the UVF in Portadown. He also linked him with one of the UDR members who was killed by his own bomb at the scene of the Miami Showband murders. Captain Holroyd also states in his notebook that this man was one of two prime suspects for the murder of Ms Dorothy Traynor in Portadown on 1 April 1975. He further states that he had received a photograph and a file on this man from Drew Coid who was the special branch sergeant in Portadown and that he was ordering complete surveillance on him.
Mr. Justice Barron in his conclusions seems almost Jesuitical in his arguments on collusion. He accepts that collusion occurs between members of the British security forces and loyalist paramilitaries. He also accepts that collusion was occurring around the time of the Dundalk bombing and that the inquiry would be shutting its eyes to reality if it accepted that such collaboration was limited to the cases in which collusion has been proved. Nevertheless, he goes on to state that he cannot prove that Dundalk itself involved collusion. This is despite the fact that he accepts that Dundalk and Silverbridge were co-ordinated attacks and we have absolute proof that collusion occurred in the case of Silverbridge.

Mr. John Weir in an e-mail to Justice for the Forgotten earlier this month said that Dundalk would have been planned at a high level to take place on the same evening as Silverbridge. He said that the RUC officer at the farm, the UDR corporal and a loyalist paramilitary would have been aware of the attack. He also claimed that the explosives used in all the bombings were supplied by a UDR captain who was working for British intelligence. In a further recent e-mail he stated to us that the explosives for Dundalk probably came through Glenanne. It must be accepted that the co-ordinated attacks on Dundalk and Silverbridge involved a conspiracy. We do not need proof that senior members of the British security forces planned or planted the bomb in Dundalk in order to state confidently that collusion occurred. If security force members are proved to have carried out one attack, then they are equally culpable for the second attack.

It is important to remember that all the Barron inquiries have been frustrated by the absence of any real co-operation from the UK security forces. There has been no independent examination or assessment of the information that intelligence agencies had in the 1970s or have now. The information supplied is but a fragment of a much larger picture.

I was going to deal with recrystallised ammonium nitrate but I will not because of the time constraints, at any rate the committee members have the detail of it.

I will move on to final aspect, which is the Garda investigation. Mr. Justice Barron highlights the fact that almost the exact same wording is used by the Garda officer in writing up the report on the Dundalk investigation as that used by the officer in writing up the report on the Monaghan bombing 18 months earlier. This is a cause of grave concern as it is strongly suggestive of merely going through the motions. The exact wording is to be found on page 50 of this Barron report, the fourth one. The first sentence reads: "It will be appreciated that investigations were greatly hampered by reason of the fact that no direct enquiries could be made in the area where the crime originated." The impression being given here once again is that there was little formal co-operation or dealings between the Northern security forces and the Garda in December 1975 to January 1976. This is a total misrepresentation of the facts.
The committee will be aware, as was mentioned, that a meeting had taken place at the highest level in September 1974 in Baldonnel of Mr. Patrick Cooney, the then Minister for Justice, Mr. Merlyn Rees, the then Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, the then Garda Commissioner, the then Chief Constable of the RUC and many other senior officials from both Governments to formalise structures between the two Governments and police forces on cross-Border security co-operation. This meeting led to the establishment of four technical panels, which was mentioned by Mr. Justice Barron in his first report. Significantly in regard to what the committee is now examining, at that meeting both Assistant Commissioner Garvey and Chief Constable Jamie Flanagan agreed that the exchange of information between the special branch in Newry and Dundalk could not be better.

Mr. Cooney told the sub-committee on 28 January 2004 that the Irish Government felt it necessary to put in place formal structures to demonstrate there was a will to co-operate in the fight against terrorism. The reality was that the Irish Government was yielding to sustained pressure from the British since the beginning of 1974 to do this. Mr. Cooney went on to say that following that meeting, as the years went on, they were refined and provided for consultation at all levels right up to Commissioner and the head of the RUC. The panels were set up and suffice to say they were co-chaired by senior officers from both forces. The two officers from the Garda who co-chaired these technical panels were Assistant Commissioner Edmund Garvey and the then chief superintendent Laurence Wren who later became Commissioner.

One of those on the RUC side, Detective Chief Constable Bailey reported in April 1975 to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Northern Ireland Office that he was very satisfied with the work of the panels and reported he had a direct line with his opposite number in Dublin, namely, Assistant Commissioner Garvey. He said that progress had been particularly encouraging regarding intelligence. By July 1975, the Garda was in a position to use various police data banks in the North because this was stated by Mr. Cooney to Lord Harris at a meeting on 2 July 1975.

In September 1975, a meeting was held to discuss arrangements to help the Garda to improve radio communications by mounting X-ray radios in Garda vehicles and at static locations. Previously, the Garda had accepted the loan of a number of X-ray sets provided by the British army. The installation of direct telephone links between the Garda and the RUC was discussed and secure speech equipment known as Goliath had been set up, providing improved communication along the Border.
Chairman: We have received and read the submission. Time is passing and we would appreciate it if Ms Urwin could summarise.

Ms Urwin: I will try to wrap up. I am almost finished. We were surprised that some information was not included in the Barron report. It was inexplicably excluded. Justice for the Forgotten sourced two important photographs from the archives of The Irish Times, one of which was taken at the scene of the bombing in Dundalk and another taken at the scene in Castleblaney. The Dundalk picture was taken on the night of the bombing and the Castleblaney picture was probably taken the day after the explosion. Both photographs depict members of the Garda Síochána examining fragments of the bomb mechanisms.

We invited Lieutenant Colonel Nigel Wilde to provide us with technical opinions on the photographs in his capacity as an ordnance and photographic expert. The two important points about the photographs are that police officers were handling significant evidence without wearing gloves; and the presence of parts of a TPU, a timing and power unit for the bomb, which were not passed on as forensic evidence to either Dr. Donovan or Mr. Hall. According to Mr. Justice Barron, the remains of the TPU at Dundalk were found by Inspector McCabe and handed over to Detective Garda Thomas Foley of the Garda Technical Bureau, who examined them for fingerprints with negative results. However, if they had been handled, the fingerprints would have been obliterated.

I will not speak further about that but I will briefly mention the Dublin Airport bombing. Mr. Justice Barron does not make any link between the bombing and an earlier incident at Dublin Airport in which the son of a leading UVF member was detained. Two young loyalists were arrested at Dublin Airport on 10 September 1975 and charged with loitering with intent to commit a felony. They were held and questioned in the Bridewell Garda station and brought to court.
A source gave us the information that he was living on St. Lawrence Road in Clontarf at the time. He was on the run from the North and using an alias. He was arrested in what he described as a sweep of the general area in the aftermath of the murder of Garda Michael Reynolds in St. Anne's Park in Raheny on 11 September 1975. He was in the Bridewell station for questioning at the same time as the two loyalists and was asked for his opinion on what they might have been doing at the airport. He told gardaí that he believed they were probably going to blow up the airport and may have been on a scouting mission. He further claims that a couple of days after the Dublin Airport bombing, he was walking along the Clontarf Road when two detectives pulled up in a car beside him and one told him that he had been right.

The UDA claimed responsibility for the bombing but Mr. Justice Barron stated that there was intelligence information suggesting that members of the UVF might have been involved. One of the two loyalists is included in the list of lost lives. He was murdered by the IRA in June 1988. He was shown to have been a member of the UVF and had been given four life sentences on the evidence of supergrass, Joe Bennett, but had been released on appeal. We are not in a position to say whether there was a link between the two events, but the question is whether gardaí made a link and did they seek to have the loyalists questioned in the aftermath.

I will not deal with the Barronrath Bridge issue, but I will mention the case for a public tribunal of inquiry. Previously, we have found the sub-committee to be impervious to calls for public inquiries to be established in the cases examined by Mr. Justice Barron. Despite the recommendation that the UK Government set up a public inquiry in its jurisdiction into the Dublin and Monaghan bombings, we know with absolute certainty that it will not set up any such inquiry.

We believe that because the sub-committee now has stronger evidence of collusion, it is vital that it take the opportunity to recommend the establishment of a public tribunal of inquiry into all aspects of the atrocities committed in this period of the 1970s through cross-Border incursions into the State. The Government should establish the inquiry and call on the British Government to co-operate fully. The exact mechanism through which this might be done has already been devised for the Smithwick inquiry. One need only look to the opening statement of Mr. Justice Peter Smithwick in the Breen and Buchanan tribunal of inquiry set up under the 1921 Act to see how this might be done.

We will leave the sub-committee's members with the words of Deputy McDowell, the current Tánaiste and then Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, to Dáil Éireann on 23 March 2005 when he established the tribunal into the Breen and Buchanan murders. He stated:

"I must tell the House that I considered going down the road of a commission of inquiry but I found it did not match up to the criteria laid down by Judge Cory. The form of public inquiry proposed and its proposed terms of reference constitute the most open, potentially expansive and powerful form of inquiry available under our
law here or anywhere else to ensure that the full truth emerges. We owe it to the families of the late Chief Superintendent Breen and Superintendent Buchanan, the people of Northern Ireland and the people of this State, given the concerns raised about organs of this State."

The following day in the Seanad, he stated:

"Regardless of the identities of the victims, the families should not be placed in some hierarchy of sympathy. Everybody is equally entitled to whatever rights can be vindicated under the Constitution and to the greatest extent possible, by an inquiry of this kind."

If the murders of the two RUC officers deserve such an inquiry because of a single allegation of Garda collusion, which they certainly do, the victims of these atrocities, where there is greater evidence of collusion by the British security forces, deserve no less.

Chairman: I thank Ms Urwin.

Deputy F. McGrath: In the interests of time and procedure, I will ask questions that our guests should bank, as they will be addressed to both Ms Urwin and Mr. Ó Dúlacháin. I welcome Justice for the Forgotten and commend it on its excellent research, work and support for the families and survivors that have suffered due to the different incidents.

Ms Urwin stated that collusion was rife, but when people speak about it, many are under the impression that it occurred because the security forces wanted to take out a military force on the other side. However, upon reading page 2, paragraph 3 of our guest's significant report, there is a broader political agenda for collusion. I refer to Mr. Colin Wallace's letters, in which he states that the sectarian killings that took place at the end of 1974 were designed to destroy Mr. Merlyn Rees's attempts to negotiate a ceasefire and that targets were identified by both sides by intelligence and the special branch. That is very serious and significant information. Is Mr. Ó Dúlacháin suggesting that collusion was a broader issue involving more than just military or conflict factors? Was a broader political agenda at work?

My second question relates to section 5. Ms Urwin referred to the Patrick Livingstone incident and the case of the two young people with paramilitary connections who were caught when obviously casing Dublin Airport. Are the witnesses suggesting this is another incident that was not investigated properly by the gardaí involved, given that they met the gentlemen later and commented on it?

With regard to collusion, Mr. Ó Dúlacháin makes the point that ten times more powerful evidence is available now compared to what was available when we began the debate about the Dublin and Monaghan bombings. Can he provide one
practical, sensible example that sums up all the evidence from Justice for the Forgotten?

With regard to whether collusion was low level or whether it was known to the higher authorities, is Justice for the Forgotten suggesting it goes right to the top? Mr. Ó Dúlacháin raised fundamental questions on the identity of known subversives in Armagh in 1974, who formed a powerful and dangerous group. If they were so well known, why does Mr. Ó Dúlacháin believe nothing happened on the ground with regard to them? We have heard of the obstruction by the security forces with regard to evidence. Can he provide an example of this?

Ms Urwin referred to direct collusion with regard to the Miami Showband killings and she referred specifically to a white Ford Escort car. She stated that special branch knew about the car owner, who was linked to other bombings. Is Ms Urwin suggesting that, at best, this is appalling police work and, at worst, state-sanctioned murder? Does she agree with this interpretation? When one considers the evidence and the summary of the report, which is very comprehensive, I am amazed nothing has happened in regard to these issues.

The members of the special patrol group in County Armagh were involved in murder and mayhem. The only reason they stopped was because they were contemplating an attack on a primary school. This was more than a military agenda. Do the witnesses agree that the agenda was to terrorise the whole Northern minority community? Do they agree it was not just a case of trying to attack violent republicans?

On the broader issue of public inquiries, are Justice for the Forgotten and the families suggesting we cannot demand a public inquiry of the British authorities if we are not prepared to hold a public inquiry in our jurisdiction?

Ms Urwin raised the important question of the .38 Star pistol which belonged to the UDR member who was also involved in the UVF. This pistol had a long history in both security and loyalist circles. Is Ms Urwin suggesting not enough attention is being paid to the information on this pistol, which jumps out when one reads the report?

Mr. Ó Dúlacháin stated that the Irish Government was yielding or conceding to the British Government of the time. Will he expand on that? Is he suggesting the Irish authorities rolled over under pressure from the British?

What is Mr. Ó Dúlacháin's point with regard to the Dundalk and Castleblaney photographs? Is he suggesting gross incompetence or something more sinister with regard to the photograph of the garda holding the part of the bomb and timer?

In conclusion, is Justice for the Forgotten's bottom line that collusion took place but the only measure which will resolve the issue is a full public inquiry?

**Chairman:** I am not sure if that was questioning or a speech but I am sure Mr. Ó
Mr. Ó Dúlacháin: I will take some of the points. First, it has been long a subject of political commentary in relation to the period of 1973, 1974 and 1975 whether there were internal political differences within the broader British establishment as to policy in Northern Ireland. It comes through some of the historical papers that there are internal tensions - that there are elements within the security forces and the broader intelligence services and political establishment as to whether Sunningdale was an appropriate policy to adopt. There is believed to have been resistance to Sunningdale and attempts to undermine Sunningdale. Therefore, when one goes on to December 1974 and the attempt to re-establish a ceasefire, similarly, there is a belief that certain elements of the security agencies may have been quite willing to provoke violence to unseat or unsettle ceasefires. That has remained a matter of political comment and political speculation. Beyond that, anything that unseated a potential ceasefire did suit an alternative political agenda.

Second, in terms of identifying the specific indicators of collusion, they go from specific court cases where people are, we believe, represented as having no known association and no previous criminal record in cases where that simply is not so. From that local type of matter, you then end up at the other end in 1980, when the trials take place in relation to the Rock Bar, and one reads the transcript of the sentencing in relation to the Rock Bar. The sentencing transcript reads very much as "This is an isolated rotten apple situation", and, therefore, the sentence is given down on that basis.

Read in isolation, it is capable of appearing very reasonable and rational until one realises that the sentencing judge has over the previous two months sat on a number of other trials of special patrol group officers. Therefore, when one takes the context of what was known to that particular court, the actual sentencing statement and rationale for the sentence handed down in the Rock Bar trial just does not stand up. It becomes incompatible to what is known to have been on the
court record in the broadest sense, rather than simply in that trial. That indicates a
level of cover-up at that stage involving the highest officers of state, because that
was the matter that was dealt with at that time.
Does Ms Urwin want to list some other instances?

Ms Urwin: I think Deputy McGrath’s first question was about the first Colin Wallace
letter. He asked was it more than just a military thing. I think it has long been known
that the British were fighting a propaganda war as well. Was it not said to Lord
Widgery when he was conducting the Bloody Sunday inquiry that we are not just
fighting a military war here, we are fighting a propaganda war? Also, according to
John Weir, there was an element of keeping the pot boiling, which is how he
described it. In that way one would get a group to carry out an atrocity to force a
retaliation from another. For example, we heard yesterday from the O’Dowd and the
Reavey families and the following night there was the retaliation in the form of the
Kingsmill massacre. John Weir certainly believes that there was an attempt to keep
the pot boiling, as he describes it.
What was the second question asked by Deputy Finian McGrath? I have the
answer but I cannot remember the question.

Deputy F. McGrath: It related to section 5 - Patrick Livingstone and Dublin Airport.

Ms Urwin: We do not know the answer to that because we are not in a position to
know. We were told by a source. We know that it happened because we have been
able to find it in newspaper reports which we have provided to the committee. We
know the episode took place. We do not have any way of knowing whether they
were linked or whether the Garda believes they were linked. Our source told us that
a special branch officer said to him after the bombing, "You were right", but that is
all we know. As Judge Barron does not mention it at all in his report, we have no
way of knowing. We are not in a position to know that.

The Deputy asked another question about the star pistol. I have just taken one
weapon. The Pat Finucane Centre will probably deal with all of the weapons and
the links between them in more detail. I mentioned that one specifically for the
particular reason that it is linked to the guy who owned the car at the Miami and it is
also linked to the murder of Dorothy Trainor, as well as that of John Francis Greene.

The Deputy asked what I said in regard to the photographs. Again, I am not in a
position to say anything really, except that this is what happened and that it is visual
evidence that this evidence was handled in this particularly unprofessional manner
and also that it was not sent with some other material to the forensic laboratory.
Why that was the case is a different question. I do not know the answer to that. All
we can say is that we have discovered that this happened.
Deputy Finian McGrath also asked about whether the Irish Government had rolled
over in terms of agreeing co-operation. The main focus of the British Government
from the beginning of 1974 was to obtain co-operation on cross-Border security
between the Garda and the RUC. Even more so, what they really wanted was co-
operation between the Garda and the British Army because it was effectively the
civil force, particularly in Border areas and more particularly in south Armagh. That
is what they were looking for.

It would appear that the Irish Government was reluctant to get involved in this but
eventually agreed. It had been intended to go ahead earlier but it was delayed until
September. I have no idea why it was delayed. I am not saying the Irish
Government rolled over but it certainly agreed to this co-operation. We know this
from all the papers released from the National Archives in the UK. It would appear
that all of the information was one-way. Questions were never asked about cross-
Border incursions from the North into the South. All of the minutes detail questions
and, more importantly, concerns arising about cross-Border incursions from the
South into the North.

Deputy Hoctor: Deputy Finian McGrath covered many of the areas on which I
wished to touch. I welcome Justice for the Forgotten, Margaret, Kevin, Cormac and
the families. Reference was made to research undertaken in the National Archives
in the UK. How accessible were the records and how much other information which
is known about was not available? There is much detail in the Wallace letters and
John Weir's evidence. I am interested to know the extent of the research that has
been done in co-operation with the Pat Finucane Centre. Is information available
that it is not possible to get one's hands on?

My second question relates to the gang that has been named as the perpetrators of
the atrocities. To what extent did that gang get co-operation south of the Border. I
refer in particular to the bombing incidents south of the Border in Dublin, Monaghan
and Castleblaney. Did these people cross the Border, come to Dublin to plant the
bomb and go away again, or did they have people working for them down here in
the guise of other agencies of the State? I am interested to know if there is any
evidence in this regard.

On the issue of collusion and the Garda Síochána, to what extent was the Garda
aware of the membership of the RUC and the various paramilitary groups that have
clearly been outlined here? Do we know the extent to which the Garda was aware
of the dual and perhaps triple roles played by people in that regard? Do we have
any evidence that the Garda was involved in collusion?

Ms Urwin referred to the European Court and the fact that it sent her back to get the
Government's co-operation and to make further inquiries, in other words to get the
domestic situation sorted before going back to the European Court. In Ms Urwin's
opinion, how much will the element of time militate against the full pursuit of justice
and the full facts in the cases we are following?

In the inquiries that have taken place, including our work as a committee, all we are
seeking is justice for the families. Will Ms Urwin define what would constitute
justice? Would it mean that people would be charged at this stage or whenever the final conclusions are made or are apologies being sought? Various different levels of outcomes are anticipated and expected by the families and the people who are represented.

**Ms Urwin:** The first question Deputy Hoctor asked was about the extent of the research we have done. Justice for the Forgotten has been travelling every January to London for the past four or five years to look at the newly released papers under the 30-year rule. We have found a considerable amount of material relating to Irish affairs. The British are great at keeping records and everything is written down. The Tánaiste and Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform told the committee that at a certain stage in meetings the pens are put down but I say to him that as soon as he is gone out the door the pens are up again and they are writing furiously because absolutely everything is recorded by the British.

They are very good at releasing a lot of their material. Obviously a lot of material is withheld but at least with the British one knows what is being withheld. It is stated when a file is closed and how long that will be the case or whether it will be closed indefinitely. One has the file number and usually the title of the file and one is pretty clear about what is being withheld. Under freedom of information orders, one can also apply for what has been withheld. We know that many files have been withheld for 1974 and 1975 and we keep those under constant review. We have already put in a freedom of information request and we will see how we get on with that.

We interviewed Colin Wallace on several occasions and also Fred Holroyd and John Weir. As the committee can see, they have all given us a lot of information. In terms of the archives here, I am afraid we find very little useful information in what is released here.

The Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform set up an academic group to look at what might be released in terms of the matter of security in Northern Ireland and The Irish Times recommended yesterday that files be released up as far as 1956. We are seeking files up to 1976 and while one appreciates that, naturally enough, not everything relating to security in Northern Ireland can be released, we would have hoped that certain files could have been released and that at least we might discover what is being withheld or how many files are being withheld. The most useful source of information here would be the Army intelligence files, the G2 files.

Deputy Hoctor also asked whether these people got assistance here. We have no way whatsoever of knowing that. We do not know about Dublin. I would say in Border areas they did not need any assistance. The only evidence we have of such collusion is in respect of the Littlejohn brothers' operation here - that was an earlier period which the committee looked at in the second Barron report - and, of course, the case of Garda Crinnion collaborating with John Wyman, who was a British agent. We have no evidence of any other collaboration at this time.

What else did Deputy Hoctor ask?
Deputy Hoctor: How aware was the Garda of the dual, if not triple, membership of RUC members in the underworld? Were gardaí aware of that through their own interactions and were they themselves responsible for some of it?

Ms Urwin: I think that Detective Sergeant Owen Corrigan, when he appeared at the Ludlow hearings, said that there were rumours or it had come to his attention that there were allegations about members of the security forces being associated with loyalists in the 1970s. Of course, the committee has this information that was given, which I referred to during my presentation, in relation to the four RUC members, namely, the allegation that they were members of the UVF in Portadown. Certainly, gardaí at a senior level were aware of that, but again it does not appear to have gone any further because, in fairness, I suppose they would have had to give names for that or certainly the British were not going to follow it up without further information.

Deputy Hoctor: How will time militate against the final findings?
Mr. Ó Dúlacháin: Time will always present a difficulty, but it is in the nature of conflict situations that one ends up many years later invoking investigations of various kinds and we see that in various parts of the world. It goes back to the fact that there is a great deal of information available about these events. The manner in which the Pat Finucane Centre has been able to link various forensic reports is indicative of the type of information that does exist.

In terms of the personal type of information that is available, from our own National Library and National Archive going right back to the Fenian police files more than 150 years ago, we know the detail that was being recorded. That same system of intelligence has been in place, and has been in place in Northern Ireland. We know that for every name on a Wallace list, there is a detailed file. We know they were kept in registries. We know they were divided into two sections - effectively, the Protestant registry and the Catholic registry. Those registries have not been destroyed but they have never been opened up.

The type of information that is indicative and that leads to questions in relation to conclusion still exists. There are difficulties regarding people no longer being alive and about recollections, but they, of themselves, are not insurmountable in that respect.

I would add that we may get a further and deeper insight once the McEntee report, which I believe is due to be delivered to Government at the end of October, becomes public and available to this committee. We will see further what digging can be done when the resources are applied. In so far as time and access to materials are concerned, it is more a question of will rather than of limitations.

Deputy Hoctor: What of the question regarding the outcome? Does Mr. Ó Dúlacháin see, at the end of all of this, people being charged, or just apologies and
clear identification of people who were the perpetrators?

Mr. Ó Dúlacháin: There are a number of different outcomes and what any one individual wants can differ from family to family and between people within families. Where it comes in respect of the Dublin and Monaghan bombings is that, to this date, there has been no formal acceptance by the Irish Government that collusion was a factor in those bombings and, in fact, the institutions of the State went out of their way, for a number of years from 1992, to effectively deny or repudiate such allegations, or to throw cold water on them. Therefore, there is a question of whether a state, on behalf of its people, acknowledges, recognises or sets the record straight.

As regards the United Kingdom, collusion has never been an unacceptable policy. It is one of the standard tools in which political affairs across the world have been managed. What seems to be unacceptable is to admit that it has been applied as a policy and, to date, the various victims have been denied an admission of truth, an admission that there is a state involvement or a state culpability. It is ultimately about the truth and the admission, as opposed to whether there are convictions or apportionment of individual or personal responsibility.

Senator J. Walsh: Of all of the information they have accumulated on all the events during the period in question, what is our guests view on the continuation of those two gangs, in particular, operating with impunity and the fact that that could happen without some political acquiescence at least, if not direction?

Ms Urwin: I think we have shown very clearly that it really could not have. I think, effectively, it was one gang. The particular gang we are talking about was one gang. Sure, they divided up if they wanted to do - to put it colloquially - a double whammy. They would divide up and, as the RUC superintendent said, permutations of the gang would do one attack and other permutations of it would do another.

Following up on something Deputy Hoctor asked about collusion from here, there is no evidence of collusion, but in a sense we must ask ourselves why did all the Garda investigations fail so abysmally and why was it, in relation to Dundalk, that nothing happened until Superintendent Courtney was appointed as the Border superintendent in, I think, 1976. He then started to investigate it, but why was nothing done in obviously what would be, even from a lay person's point of view, the vital time immediately after any crime has been committed? One would say that the vital time is immediately after a crime has been committed and it was allowed to lie until Superintendent Courtney made efforts when he was appointed in 1976. That is a serious question. Why did all of the Garda investigations fail so abysmally? What was the reason for that?

Chairman: Senator Jim Walsh stated that there were two gangs in Portadown and Glennane. Are they both the same?

Ms Urwin: Yes. The Portadown gang was mainly the UVF loyalist parliamentary element.
Chairman: The other was the UDR-RUC element.

Ms Urwin: Yes, but they were operating together in Glennane.
Chairman: I thank Ms Urwin. I appreciate her attendance and her assistance. We have problems with time and traffic has caused problems. The representatives of the Pat Finucane Centre, therefore, have agreed to defer their presentation until next Wednesday, 4 October, because the Dáil is sitting at 2.30 p.m. and we must hear from other witnesses.

We will now hear from two former gardaí, former Superintendent John Courtney and former Detective Sergeant Owen Corrigan next. I welcome both men, who previously appeared before the sub-committee when it dealt with a different report by Mr. Justice Barron. They were very helpful, particularly regarding their visit to Belfast during the investigations into the Dundalk bombing, which was revealing to us and to the nation at large.

I am grateful to both witnesses for attending and assisting us with the fourth Barron report on the Dundalk bombing. They are aware of the sub-committee's procedures. While members have privilege, they do not have the same privilege. The sub-committee, as a result of the Supreme Court case regarding the Abbeylara incident, is prevented from making any findings or expressions of culpability against individuals who are not Members of the Houses of the Oireachtas. No individuals are to be named.

I do not know whether the witnesses had an opportunity to read the report. Does Mr. Courtney have any comment to make?

Mr. John Courtney: No, I have nothing to add to my report on both investigations at the time.