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Date: 12 April, 1996

To: Press Office
Room 21 WPW

ca: Mr R Heaton-Jones (WOAD)
Mr J Murphy (SOAEFD)
Mr R McClurg (DANI)

Mr. Murray 13/4/96
To see please. Is there anything we need to do in respect of para. 3 over leaf? b. Connor 18/4/96

My's Connor - aware of this and our input to the MAFF paper! 19/4/96

TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF CHERNOBYL BRIEFING PACK

1. Please find attached a copy of the above.
2. Also attached are copies of minutes which will give you background information about how and why the briefing pack was produced.
3. As the pack addresses the whole of the UK, as opposed to England alone, the attachments are also being copied to each of the Agriculture Departments who may wish to copy them to their relevant Press Offices.
4. May I draw your attention to the minute from Mr Griffin of DTI of 10 April in which he states that the pack should be used simply to deal with enquiries and should not be handed out.
5. If you have any queries please do not hesitate to contact me. Thank you.

Paul Riley

Paul Riley
Radiological Safety Division





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Your ref
Date 10 April 1996

Dear Nev

TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF CHERNOBYL BRIEFING PACK

Please find attached a copy of the above, along with a list of the relevant departmental contact points. I should be grateful if you and the copy recipients could arrange for the pack to be copied to your press offices. On this point, I should clarify that it has been decided the pack should not be handed out. It should be used simply to deal with any enquiries. Obviously, it is for individual departments to decide what use they make of their own material.

My thanks to you and the other contributors for all your efforts and I hope that I have not done anyone a disservice in my attempt to standardise the format of the text.

Regards

Richard

RICHARD GRIFFIN
Nuclear Industries Directorate 3b

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LIST OF BRIEFS FOR 10th ANNIVERSARY OF CHERNOBYL

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4. G8 Nuclear Safety and Security Summit (FCO).
5. Danger Posed by the Sarcophagus Over Unit 4 at Chernobyl (DTI).
6. UK Safety Record/Standards (DTI).
7. Health Effects of the Chernobyl Accident (DoH).
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10. Third Party Liability/Compensation for Victims (DTI).
11. Civil Nuclear Emergency Planning in the UK (DTI).
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13. Environmental Effects of the Chernobyl Accident in the UK (DoE).
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15. Environmental Effects of the Accident in the Vicinity of Chernobyl (DoE).
16. International Activity to Deal With the Environmental Effects of the Chernobyl Accident (DoE).
17. Overall UK Contribution to Post-Chernobyl Remedial Measures (DTI).

**Department of Trade and Industry
Nuclear Industries Directorate 3b
10 April 1996**

UK and International Assistance Activity to Prevent a Repeat of the Chernobyl Accident

Lead Department: Department of Trade and Industry

Response:

- The Chernobyl accident alerted the West to design/operational deficiencies of Soviet-designed reactors. Only with the break-up of the Soviet Union (1991) did it become possible to launch large scale programmes of Western assistance.
- The G7 Munich Summit (1992) launched a multilateral action programme for urgent improvements to the higher risk plants and the strengthening of regulatory regimes. In total, bilateral and multilateral grant assistance worth over 970 million ECU (around £756 million) has been committed to the CEE/FSU to improve nuclear safety. These projects have included safety studies and support to the regulatory bodies as well as training and exchange programmes for operators and the provision of hardware for safety upgrades at the plants themselves.
- The programme also included the establishment at the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) of the Nuclear Safety Account. The UK contribution to the Account so far is £18.25 million, with the most recent payment of £5 million being made in March 1996. The Account, which is funding projects in Bulgaria, Lithuania and Russia, is currently finalising a package for Ukraine (Chernobyl). Over £80 million, including £10 million of the UK's contribution, has been earmarked to support the G7/Ukraine Memorandum of Understanding on Chernobyl.
- The majority of UK assistance is channelled through the European Union (PHARE and TACIS) programmes which have provided 477.5 million ECU (about £340 million) for nuclear safety improvements since 1990. (The UK contributes around 16% of the EU budget). Since 1992, there has been an increasing focus on practical, on-site assistance at nuclear power plants in Russia and Ukraine.
- Bilaterally, the UK has so far committed over £4.8 million for technical cooperation on nuclear safety. This includes over £2 million for collaboration between AEA Technology and the Russian Research and Development Institute for Power Engineering, as well as support, mainly in the area of emergency planning, for Bulgaria, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Ukraine.
- Western aid cannot solve all of the safety problems in these countries. Lasting improvements to nuclear safety depend on progress with energy sector reforms and in particular on market pricing for electricity which, with economic structures for prompt payment of plant operators, would provide revenue for safety upgrading and for investment in newer, safer plant. The UK's Know How Fund is helping Ukraine in this area.
- The Government would like to see the higher risk reactors brought to an acceptable level of safety or closed down as soon as practicable within the framework of appropriate energy strategies for bringing alternative generating capacity on stream. We are working towards this end with our international partners.

Risk of Another Chernobyl Type Accident

Lead Department: Department of Trade and Industry

Response:

- There are currently fifteen RBMK (Chernobyl type) nuclear reactors in operation, two in Ukraine, two in Lithuania and eleven in Russia. There are no RBMK plants outside the former Soviet Union.
- Since the accident at Chernobyl, the RBMKs have undergone specific safety improvements designed to prevent any repeat of the accident. These changes include:
 - a new fast reacting shutdown system replacing some of the old control rods. The control rod design has also been modified;
 - the positive void coefficient which contributed to the Chernobyl accident has also been reduced by increasing the fuel enrichment from 2% to 2.4%;
 - technical specifications have been changed to avoid operation in power regimes which could lead to accident conditions.
- Largely as a result of these improvements, the international RBMK Consortium (managed by AEA Technology and funded by the European Union, Sweden, Finland and Canada) concluded in June 1994 that it is unlikely there could be a repeat of the Chernobyl accident. The Consortium, which is carrying out further, more detailed analysis, includes Russian and Western specialists.
- The other Soviet-designed reactor type regarded as higher risk by Western experts is the VVER 440 model 230 pressurised water reactor. There are currently eleven VVER 440/230 reactors in operation, in Russia, Bulgaria, the Slovak Republic and Armenia.
- The risk of another Chernobyl-type accident have been reduced by the Western assistance effort which has been largely focused on the two higher risk reactor types. This assistance has been channelled through the International Atomic Energy Agency, the European Union programmes, the Nuclear Safety Account projects in Bulgaria, Lithuania, Russia and Ukraine and the many bilateral programmes.

G7/Ukraine MoU on Chernobyl Closure (including energy sector reform)

Lead Department: Department of Trade and Industry

Response:

- Although ten years have elapsed since the Chernobyl accident, only after the break up of the Soviet Union in 1991 did it become possible for the West to offer major programmes of nuclear safety assistance to the newly independent republics. Chernobyl was not targeted for such assistance since Ukraine had planned to close the plant at the end of 1993. However, in October 1993, the Ukrainian Parliament reversed its previous decision to close Chernobyl. In turn, this led to G7 Heads of Government proposing, at the Naples Summit in July 1994, an Action Plan for the Ukrainian energy sector.
- Following intensive G7/EU discussions with Ukraine, President Kuchma promised to close Chernobyl by the year 2000 provided Western support was made available to compensate. A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on closure of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant was signed on 20 December 1995 by Canada (on behalf of the G7) and Ukraine.
- The MoU sets out a framework for a comprehensive programme of measures to support the closure of Chernobyl, by the year 2000, in the context of wider energy sector reform. It includes projects at Chernobyl to upgrade safety in the short term and to prepare for decommissioning. It also provides for power sector restructuring and investment in energy alternatives including safer nuclear power plants. Cooperation to develop solutions to the problem of the Unit 4 shelter and a social support plan for the Chernobyl work force is also included.
- The programme envisaged under the MoU is underpinned by some \$500 million in grant assistance and \$2.3 billion in projected investments by the International Financial Institutions (including 400 million ECU in EURATOM loans offered by the EU at the Corfu Summit in June 1994). All investments will need to meet the requirements of the funding agencies concerned. In particular, Western loans for replacement capacity will have to meet least cost as well as safety and environmental criteria.
- The main part of the UK's contribution to this effort is being channelled through the EU's TACIS programme (100 million ECU promised at the Corfu Summit - the UK contributes around 16% of the EU budget). In addition, £10 million of the UK's £18.25 million contribution to the Nuclear Safety Account at the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) will be used specifically for Chernobyl projects. The UK's Know How Fund is also providing assistance in support of Ukraine's energy sector restructuring programme. So far, around £3 million has been committed.

G8 Nuclear Safety and Security Summit

Lead Department: Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Response:

- Nuclear safety in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the former Soviet Union (FSU) has been on the agenda of each G7 Economic Summit since 1992. At the 1995 Halifax Summit, President Yeltsin invited G7 Heads of Government to Moscow for a summit meeting specifically devoted to nuclear safety and security issues. This is to be held on 19-20 April.
- As well as the safety of civil nuclear reactors, it is expected that the Summit will consider progress in establishing effective regimes for nuclear liability, the importance of energy sector strategies in support of nuclear safety and issues connected with radioactive waste management. In the area of nuclear materials security, the topics to be covered are likely to include measures to combat illicit trafficking in nuclear materials, nuclear material control, accountancy and physical protection; and the management of fissile materials no longer required for defence purposes.
- The Summit will examine nuclear safety and security problems specific to the CEE/FSU, but will not focus exclusively on this area. Its main purpose is to assess the progress made to date on improving nuclear safety and security globally and to indicate future direction of action in this area.
- The timing of the Summit was not fixed with the 10th Anniversary of Chernobyl in mind. However, in view of the uniqueness of the circumstances surrounding Chernobyl, President Kuchma of Ukraine has been invited to attend part of the Summit discussions on civil nuclear safety.
- The Government believes that the Summit represents a unique opportunity to reinforce at the highest international level the importance of the partnership between East and West in resolving nuclear safety and security problems not just in the CEE/FSU, but throughout the world.

Danger Posed by the Sarcophagus Over Unit 4 at Chernobyl

Lead Department: Department of Trade and Industry

Response:

- Between May and November 1986, the damaged reactor was hastily entombed in protective concrete walls 1 metre thick. These included a perimeter wall enclosing the turbine and reactor blocks as well as internal dividing walls between Units 3 and 4 and a protective cover over the turbine and reactor blocks. An internal re-circulating ventilation/cooling system was also installed.
- In 1992, the Ukrainians solicited ideas, through an international competition, for the conversion of Unit 4 into a "safe ecological condition". Although 394 entries were received, no clear winner emerged. It was subsequently decided that a feasibility study into the design of a second shelter should be undertaken.
- This study, funded by the European Union (EU), concluded that the existing sarcophagus could collapse under certain seismic conditions (e.g. a Force 6 or 7 earthquake - the Chernobyl region expects an earthquake of Force 7 once every 10,000 years and Force 6 once every 100 years). It recommended the construction of a replacement shelter.
- A recent study by German and Russian experts concluded that the lid over the defunct Unit 4 is not likely to collapse and that even if it were to slide down to the reactor floor, any radioactive dust emissions would be limited to the site itself. There would be no practical effect on the inhabitants of Slavutich, the nearest town.
- The recently agreed G7/Ukraine Memorandum of Understanding on the closure of Chernobyl includes a commitment to continue to cooperate in the development of a cost effective and environmentally sound approach to the shelter for Chernobyl unit 4, including the definition, as soon as possible, of technical and cost options as the basis for reviewing financial requirements. Ultimately, however, it will be for Ukraine to decide on the steps needed to strengthen or replace the current sarcophagus.
- In this context, the EU is funding work to define safety objectives and design criteria for the stabilisation of the existing shelter and the definition of safety objectives, design criteria and terms of reference for the construction of a new encasement. This work is expected to be completed by November 1996.

UK Safety Record/Standards

Lead Department: Department of Trade and Industry

Response:

- The UK's civil nuclear sector has an excellent safety record. Both for the Government and for all those involved in the nuclear industry, safety is and will continue to be, the highest priority.
- Through the licensing regime, the nuclear industry's independent regulator, the Health and Safety Executive's Nuclear Installations Inspectorate, has extensive powers to ensure that operators apply high safety standards in the design, construction and operation of nuclear installations. These include rigorous monitoring and assessment of plant and the power to close an installation if not satisfied with its safety.
- The same rigorous safety regime will continue to apply to all licensed nuclear sites regardless of whether they are publicly or privately owned. There is no question of safety standards at nuclear power stations being put at risk due to commercial pressures following privatisation in the nuclear industry.
- The Government agree with the advice of the Health and Safety Commission that the existing system of nuclear regulation provides a transparent, rigorous and robust system for ensuring high levels of safety and reduces, to a very low level, the risk of an accident which could have consequences on the general public.
- The Government are content that the Health and Safety Executive's Nuclear Installations Inspectorate possesses all the expertise and experience necessary to ensure that the high standards of safety at UK nuclear sites continue to be applied by both public and private sector operators.

Health Effects of the Chernobyl Accident

Lead Department: Department of Health

Response:

- At Chernobyl at least 237 people suffered from acute radiation sickness, more than 400 were admitted to hospital for observation and 31 died in the first weeks after the accident. Many valuable medical lessons have been learned, particularly the need to decontaminate casualties as skin burns can complicate the therapy.
- There are major difficulties in tracing the relocated populations, establishing the doses and monitoring individual health status. No increases in the incidence of leukaemia have been registered. It is far too early for any reliable morbidity or mortality data to be published.
- Significant social problems have arisen in the large number of people who have been relocated without a realistic possibility of returning to their homes or homelands in the foreseeable future. The displacement of over 400,000 people would present a massive humanitarian problem for any country.
- There is an increased incidence of thyroid cancer in children in the Gomel region of Belarus, the Bryansk area of Russia and parts of Ukraine all close to the accident site. The very severe nature of the Chernobyl accident led to a large release of radionuclides, which passed upwards and downwind without warning and without the possibility of implementing immediate countermeasures (such as sheltering, evacuation, administration of stable iodine, or bans on foodstuffs). Details on the use of stable iodine prophylaxis are scanty. Many reports suggest, if given at all, it was days or weeks after initial exposure.
- The scale of the childhood thyroid cancer incidence presents long term treatment difficulties. Supplies of thyroid hormone replacement are not guaranteed and so in some cases only partial thyroidectomies are being performed to retain some function.
- In the unlikely event of an accident at a UK nuclear installation, a wide range of radionuclides could be released to the environment. Stable iodine only protects the thyroid against uptake of radioiodine. Therefore, on the advice of the National Radiological Protection Board, emergency plans rely primarily on evacuation and sheltering. Stable iodine prophylaxis should be used in conjunction with one of these countermeasures.

Specific Activity to Deal With the Health Effects of the Chernobyl Accident

Lead Department: Department of Health

Response:

- Main emphasis of UK aid policy in relation to the affected areas of Belarus, the Ukraine and in Russia has been to deliver assistance through the work of the international agencies, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the World Health Organisation (WHO) and programmes being managed under the aegis of the European Union (EU). The UK Government channels substantial funds into the work of such agencies which are best placed to coordinate and prioritise the work that needs to be done in the areas of treatment and epidemiological and other scientific research.
- In particular, there is extensive UK involvement in the WHO and EU initiatives aimed at investigating the thyroid cancer problem in the affected countries.
- Assistance for doctors dealing with health problems in the affected states was provided by the Department of Health in collaboration with WHO and the British Council. Experts in thyroid haematological and epidemiological fields spent two months in the UK studying environmental epidemiological methods and visiting various UK centres of excellence in their respective fields.
- The National Radiological Protection Board has been involved with the International Chernobyl project, has given training in epidemiological and cytogenetic methods to Belarussian, Russian and Ukrainian scientists, through EU coordinated support programmes, and provided technical assistance to WHO in the publishing of reports and organisational support to their Chernobyl conference in November 1995. Technical collaboration has been undertaken on environmental radiation measurements and methods for assessing the effectiveness of countermeasures, including the difficult area of social consequences arising from implementation of such measures.

UK Radiological Assessments of the Impact of the Chernobyl Accident on Health

Lead Department: National Radiological Protection Board

Response:

- The radioactive cloud from Chernobyl passed over the UK during the weekend of 2-4th May 1986. Doses received from inhalation of, and direct exposure to, the cloud were very low.
- There was very little deposition of radioactivity onto the ground from the cloud, except in areas where there was heavy rainfall (North Wales, Cumbria and South-West Scotland). Deposition levels in the UK were among the lowest of European Union countries (with the exception of Spain and Portugal). Doses from external radiation from the ground were low.
- The main potential exposure pathway was consumption of contaminated food and water. Widespread monitoring was instituted and precautionary controls were placed on lamb and undiluted rainwater. Limited restrictions on lamb are still in place.
- NRPB published assessments of the doses expected to be received in different parts of the UK. Subsequently many measurements were made on members of the public. These showed that the actual doses received were somewhat lower than the early assessments had predicted.
- The average dose from natural background radiation in the UK is 2 millisieverts per year. The average dose received in the first year from Chernobyl contamination was about 0.04 millisieverts; less than this was received in subsequent years. Since 1990, the dose received in the UK from Chernobyl contamination has been virtually nil. Although in radiological terms there is no safe limit, the risk of radiation damage diminishes with reduced exposure and therefore, certain doses may be considered acceptable. In situations where the dose to individuals can be controlled, the exposures should be kept as low as reasonably practicable. In accident situations higher doses may be acceptable as restrictions to peoples lifestyles may not be tolerated.
- Because most people eat food produced from many sources, average doses to people in areas of relatively high deposition were not very much higher than those in the rest of the UK.
- Compared with doses to populations in other European Union countries, average doses to the UK were among the lowest. The Chernobyl accident has had, and will have, no perceptible influence on the health of the UK population.

Third Party Liability / Compensation for victims

Lead Department: Department of Trade and Industry

Response:

- UK is a signatory to two conventions (the Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy and the Brussels Convention Supplementary to the Paris Convention) covering most of Western Europe. These provide an international framework for addressing liability and compensation issues.
- The Conventions impose strict liability on, and provide for clear legal channelling to, the operators of nuclear sites. In the unlikely event of a major accident in a signatory state, prompt compensation could be paid as it would be clear who was legally responsible and there would be no need for the victims to prove fault.
- The UK, together with its Brussels and Paris partners, actively participates in the Vienna negotiations towards an improved international liability and compensation regime. It is important to us that any liability regime should be able to encompass all states that have nuclear installations.
- Recently, many countries in Central and Eastern Europe have adhered to the Vienna Convention and have consequently adopted, or are adopting, appropriate domestic legislation to channel liability to the facility operators. Russia and some other states, including Ukraine have embarked on the development of domestic nuclear liability legislation.
- A clear liability position is important in encouraging Western firms to participate in bidding for contracts to carry out essential works on old Soviet reactors. The expertise contained within these companies is invaluable in building new safety structures that will prevent further accidents.

Civil Nuclear Emergency Planning in the UK

Lead Department (England and Wales): Department of Trade and Industry

Response:

- There are well tried and tested plans for dealing with an emergency at a civil nuclear site in the UK. Exercises are regularly held involving the operator, the emergency services, regulatory and expert bodies, and relevant Government departments.
- Prudence dictates that emergency planning is necessary, although it is highly unlikely that an accident would occur which might affect the public. UK nuclear installations are designed, constructed and operated to very high standards.
- DTI is the lead Government department for an emergency at a civil nuclear installation in England or Wales. It would:
 - co-ordinate the overall Government response;
 - keep Parliament and Ministers informed;
 - co-ordinate the provision of information and advice at national level; and
 - alert our international partners.
- Advice and guidance on civil nuclear emergency planning is issued through the Nuclear Emergency Planning Liaison Group. DTI chairs this Group which brings together representatives of all the relevant local and national organisations.
- After privatisation of parts of the nuclear industry, the preparation, testing and continual review of emergency arrangements will continue to be a requirement on all nuclear operators.
- Details of civil nuclear emergency arrangements are set out in a HSE booklet published in 1994, entitled "Arrangements for responding to nuclear emergencies".

Improvements in Emergency Planning for Overseas Incidents (RIMNET)

Lead Department: Department of the Environment

Response:

- The Government's National Response Plan for dealing with overseas nuclear accidents was set up following the Chernobyl accident in 1986. The Plan is described in the HMSO booklet "The National Response Plan and Radioactive Incident Monitoring Network (RIMNET). Phase 2"
- The Plan involves response activities by various Government departments, regulatory authorities and expert bodies, including the National Radiological Protection Board (NRPB) and Meteorological Office.
- The overall aims of the National Response Plan are to establish the accident's effects, if any, on the UK, to identify any actions necessary to safeguard public health and to keep the public informed.
- As the lead department, the Department of the Environment (DoE):
 - coordinates the overall central Government response;
 - keeps Parliament and Ministers informed; and
 - issues information and advice at the national level.
- It does this through two centres operating from a DoE headquarters building in London:
 - a Technical Coordination Centre where technical assessments of the accident's implications for the UK are collated and evaluated; and
 - an Information and Briefing Centre run by the DoE Press Office which would be responsible for the issue of information and advice bulletins.
- A key element of the National Response Plan is the operation of RIMNET, which is a nationwide radiation monitoring and nuclear emergency response system, with computer communication facilities. These provide:
 - facilities for predicting the spread and deposition of radioactivity;
 - 92 fixed monitoring/alert stations spread throughout the UK;
 - a national computer databank which can be used to assemble and evaluate other radiological monitoring data;
 - facilities to support the operation of Government response centres; and
 - communications systems for the distribution of information and advice

Environmental Effects of the Chernobyl Accident in the UK

Lead Department: Department of the Environment

Response:

- The areas which received the greatest amount of radioactive deposition were the northwest of England, north Wales and southern Scotland due to heavy rainfall "wash-out" as the discharge plume reached Britain.
- A study undertaken to investigate the behaviour of the radioactive material from the accident found a significant increase of Caesium-137 in soil in the above areas.
- These increases were not sufficient to cause any health hazard from direct or inhalation radiation exposure. It was considered, however, that potential impacts via the food chain justified precautions being taken under the Food and Environment Protection Act (1985).
- Radioactivity in drinking water has remained well below World Health Organisation safety limits at all times since the accident.
- The Department of the Environment commissioned whole body monitoring programmes in several areas of the UK. These showed that average radiation doses received by members of the public as a result of the Chernobyl accident were a fraction of those typically received from natural radiation sources and did not represent a health hazard.

Effects of the Chernobyl Accident on Agriculture; Livestock Restrictions, Farmers' Compensation

Lead Department: Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food

Response:

- Government places the highest priority on ensuring safety of food supplies.
- Government committed to lifting restrictions as quickly as possible, consistent with the need to protect consumers and maintain the reputation of British lamb.
- "Mark and Release" and compensation arrangements allow sheep producers to continue normal farming practices with minimum disruption. To date UK compensation payments total over £12 million.
- Sheep restrictions have been removed from over 94% of holdings in the UK initially affected by controls, leaving about 122,000 hectares of land still subject to controls.
- Latest derestrictions were announced in January 1996.
- Monitoring and research efforts are continuing to enable further lifting of the restrictions.
- Experience gained by the Agricultural departments in responding to the Chernobyl incident will be invaluable in addressing any future accident originating either overseas or in the UK.

Environmental Effects of the Accident in the Vicinity of Chernobyl

Lead Department: Department of the Environment

Response:

- In the vicinity of the plant, 1500 square kilometres of farm land has been rendered non-productive for some time to come.
- Hundreds of hectares of contaminated topsoil have had to be removed and disposed of.
- 405 hectares of pine forest close to the plant were killed by the initial radioactive discharge plume.
- A 30 kilometre radius exclusion zone was set up around the plant from which the population was evacuated.
- It is expected that some parts of the exclusion zone will be suitable for human activity in the medium term.
- However, a 10 kilometre radius zone around the plant will remain a radiobiological reservation for the foreseeable future due to contaminated objects in the area.
- Wide areas of Ukraine, Belarus and the Russian Federation were surface contaminated by Caesium-137. The main areas were to the north (approx. 28,000 square kilometres), to the west (approx. 38,000 square kilometres) and to the south (approx. 4,200 square kilometres) of the exclusion zone. The majority of this area had a contamination level of 37 to 555 kilobecquerels per square metre. Some areas (mainly to the north) had levels of 555 to > 1480 kilobecquerels per square metre. For comparison, a survey by AEA Technology showed that the level of Caesium-137 surface deposition in England in 1987, from nuclear weapons testing and Chernobyl fallout, was in the range of 1.9 to 9.5 kilobecquerels per square metre.

UK and International Activity to Deal With the Environmental Effects of the Chernobyl Accident

Lead Department: Department of the Environment

Response:

- The UK has contributed to international initiatives coordinated by the International Atomic Energy Agency, the World Health Organisation and the European Commission for the remediation of environmental contamination and the safe disposal of radioactive waste in the affected areas around Chernobyl.
- In addition, the UK has made available bilateral funding through the Environmental Know How Fund (EKHF) to provide direct technical assistance by British experts. EKHF projects have included:
 - (1) Post-Chernobyl Land Remediation Feasibility Study (Ukraine) - EKHF funding: £217,375 - work carried out by a consortium of AEA Technology, Currie and Brown and the Design Group Partnership;
 - (2) Post-Chernobyl clean-up initial appraisal visit (Belarus) - EKHF funding: £9,000 - work carried out by Currie and Brown; and
 - (3) Effects of the Chernobyl accident on food production and distribution in the Kiev region (Ukraine) - EKHF funding: £435,600 - work carried out by WS Atkins.

Overall UK Contribution to Post-Chernobyl Remedial Measures

Lead Department: Department of Trade and Industry

Response:

- UK was the first country to react to the 1986 UN General Assembly Resolution on Chernobyl. UK projects costing more than £650,000 have already been completed on measures to counteract the environmental effects of the accident.
- Assistance for doctors dealing with health problems in the affected states was provided by the Department of Health in collaboration with World Health Organisation (WHO) and the British Council. Experts in thyroid haematological and epidemiological fields spent two months in the UK studying environmental epidemiological methods and visiting various UK centres of excellence in their respective fields.
- The National Radiological Protection Board has been involved with the International Chernobyl project, has given training in epidemiological and cytogenetic methods to Belarussian, Russian and Ukrainian scientists, through European Union (EU) coordinated support programmes, and provided technical assistance to the WHO in the publishing of reports and organisational support to their Chernobyl conference in November 1995. Technical collaboration has been undertaken on environmental radiation measurements and methods for assessing the effectiveness of countermeasures, including the difficult area of social consequences arising from implementation of such measures.
- Main emphasis of UK aid policy in relation to the affected areas of Belarus, the Ukraine and in Russia has been to deliver assistance through the work of the international agencies, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the WHO and programmes being managed under the aegis of the EU. The UK Government channels substantial funds into the work of these agencies which are best placed to coordinate and prioritise the work that needs to be done. The WHO has contributed US\$ 21.6 million, the World Meteorological Organisation US\$ 332,128 and the International Red Cross US\$ 3,244,661 million.

CHERNOBYL TENTH ANNIVERSARY: DEPARTMENTAL CONTACTS

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