CONFIDENTIAL COVERING SECRET

FROM: MRS J O SEAR, ESTABLISHMENT DIVISION. 8 AUGUST 1991

PS/Secretary of State (L) \ & 9 PS/Paymaster General (L) 2 of 9 PS/Dr Mawhinney (L) 3 of 9 PS/Mr Needham (L) 4 of a PS/Mr Hanley (L) 5 of 9 PS/PUS (L) 6 of 9

cc Mr Chesterton $7 \circ 9$ Mr Masefield p to 8 File 9 of 9

PROTECTIVE SECURITY

You will all be aware of the creation of the Central Unit at the end of last year. Since its inception the Unit has been examining the range of protective security measures for those assessed to be significant risk when measured against PIRA's aims and targeting methods.

2. After careful consideration, the Central Unit have recommended and the Cabinet Office sub-committee on Irish Terrorism (Policy and Operations) (TCO(PI)) have agreed, on revised standard protective security measures to be provided at public expense at the homes of those assessed to be at threat level 3. They centre around improved external lighting; garage facilities for cars, plus the installation of a UVIED and intruder detection system to private cars, together with other measures on the house.

3. Full background to the research conducted by the Unit, and details of the measures which will be provided for everyone assessed to be at level 3 after 1 August are set out in the attached paper which was circulated to members of TCO(PI) on 2 August.

4. I recommend that you draw this paper to the attention of your "principal" for his information.

MRS J O SEAR Departmental Security Officer 8 August 1991 OAB 6559



COVERING SECRET CONFIDENTIAL

AJH/ESTABS/3464



SECRET

THE CENTRAL UNIT

HOME OFFICE HORSEFERRY HOUSE DEAN RYLE STREET LONDON SWIP 2AW

TELEPHONE: 071 217-8302

猪猪猪猪猪

FAX: 071 217-8069

3

David Ball Esq Cabinet Office 70 Whitehall LONDON SW1A 2AS 1 August 1991 207 Den David, 7 193 t.S. M. e.s. ite No.

CENTRAL UNIT PAPER ON THE PROVISION OF TECHNICAL PROTECTION FOR PRIVATE HOMES

At its meeting on 30 July, TCO(PI) invited the Home Office to prepare a revised version of the Central Unit paper presented there so as to incorporate the changes made in the light of the comments of the Secretary of the Cabinet.

I attach a suitably amended copy of that paper for circulation to the Sub-Committee. The new package of measures will be applied to all new principals assessed at threat level 3 with effect from today, Thursday 1 August.

Jours since

BRIAN BLACKWELL Head of the Central Unit

SECRET





WPPSAA (91) 1

THE PROVISION AT PUBLIC EXPENSE OF TECHNICAL PROTECTION FOR THE PRIVATE HOMES OF PUBLIC FIGURES IN GREAT BRITAIN ASSESSED TO BE AT SIGNIFICANT RISK FROM IRISH REPUBLICAN TERRORISM


Introduction

In November 1990 the Central Unit was created within the Home office to provide one central source of protective security advice and assistance for public figures at threat in Great Britain (excluding Royalty). The Unit has been examining critically the current range of technical protection measures (as illustrated in Annex B of the now superceded Cabinet Office

procedures - copy attached at Annex A), to compare them with the measures actually being installed, and by examining in the light of experience the most likely forms of attack from different groups (eg PIRA, Scottish and Welsh nationalists, Animal Rights activists and the like) to modify where necessary the protective security response so that it is appropriate to the most likely forms of attack in the case of each organisation.

Ante Saan yand by FILL LOAInet 1004000000 AG SAALT BORDE IN

2. This paper deals only with the most prevalent and dangerous terrorist threat to public figures in Great Britain, that from PIRA. It describes the nature of that threat, draws out from that the most likely forms of PIRA attack against public figures and concludes by recommending the most appropriate technical protection measures that should be provided at public expense.





Land Roberts

The Nature of the Threat from PIRA

3. The most recent assessment of PIRA's aims, targeting and methods within Great Britain is contained in the Cabinet Joint Intelligence Committee Paper JIC (91) (IA) 77 dated 28 February 1991 and discussed in the official group dealing with security in Whitehall and Westminster.


4. That paper demonstrates that improvised explosive devices (IEDs) of various kinds remain the most likely form of attack against public figures in Great Britain, and that, of these, the under vehicle IED (UVIED) is the most prevalent. From 1 January 1988 to 1 March 1991 there were 9 IED attacks by PIRA in Great

Finch S cha home aborted Sir at at 41 and 0 shooting possible grounds 0 σ σ -

Britain: six UVIED attacks; two external IED attacks* on the homes of public figures; and one postal bomb.

5. Close quarter shooting attacks were used in Great Britain more frequently by PIRA in 1990 than ever previously. There were three attacks and one possible aborted attack. Two of the attacks were against soldiers in public, at Lichfield in June

* One of those attacks was a victim-initiated booby trap in the vicinity of Sir Anthony Farrar-Hockley's home which appears to have been an adapted UVIED improvised by the terrorists when they discovered that the family car was securely garaged.



dated he S Cabinet N 00 February Joint

rt

arge

tin

ġ

and

1990 and at Finchley in September 1990. Another one was the shooting at home of Sir Peter Terry in September 1990. The possible aborted attack was the sighting of two armed men in the grounds of Sir Charles Tidbury's home in Hampshire in September 1990.

SECRET


法 游游游 派 派 派

With one or two minor exceptions all other PIRA attacks to 6. date in GB since January 1988 have been directed against barracks, government buildings, "Establishment" institutions and the railway system. They have been by short to medium delay IEDs with the exception of the mortar attack against Downing Street in February 1991.

Types of Attack on individuals at home not used in Great Britain in recent years.

7. Detective Inspective R Leeming of the Metropolitan Police Special Branch (MPSB) compiled the following data in his M.Phil thesis for Exeter University. It lists the types of attack which have been used by PIRA against individuals at their homes in Northern Ireland within the last three years but have not been used against public figures in Great Britain since at least 1 January 1980:

- car bomb outside house; a.
- incendiary outside house; b.
- rocket attack on house; с.




- d. shooting at or via front door;
- e. shooting at or via other doors; and
- f. shooting adjacent to house.

Frequency of forms of attack

· 推 新 新 新 新 新 新 新 新 新

8. The Northern Ireland statistics for 1987-89 combined with the statistics for Great Britain for the longer period of 1980-89 produce a list of the forms of PIRA attack in both Great Britain and Northern Ireland in descending order of frequency as follows:

- a. attack away from home address;
- b. under car IED;
- c. bomb outside house within 5 metres of house;
- d. postal bomb attack;
- e. car bomb outside house;
- f. bomb outside house: hidden booby trap;
- g. shooting adjacent to house;
- h. shooting at or via doors other than front door;
- i. shooting at or via front door;
- j. shooting through glazing at close range; and
- k. rocket attack on house or incendiary outside house
 - of equal frequency.






The high frequency of attacks away from home is based wholly on the large number of ambush attacks and close quarter assassinations carried out in Northern Ireland against members of the security forces and in sectarian attacks. It can be regarded in Great Britain as being of much lower probability because of the more alien environment in which the PIRA terrorist perceives himself to operate against public figures here.

Priority ranking of protective needs

9. A factor common to all forms of attack both within Northern Ireland and in Great Britain is that they are all mounted from <u>outside</u> the house. This has important implications for the protective security measures required at the homes of public figures. While it is always possible that PIRA will change the modus operandi or emphasis of their attacks on public figures, protection against <u>intrusion into the house</u> should not be a high priority in the technical protection of private homes against PIRA terrorism.

10. Analysis of PIRA attacks in Great Britain from 1 Jan 1988 to date indicates that the forms of technical protection required in order of priority when a public figure is assessed to be at a significant level of threat from PIRA terrorism are:





(2) CC (3) PI

11

- a. deterrence from approaching the vicinity of the house;
- b. protection of vehicles against UVIEDs;
- c. protection against blast from within 5 metres of the house;
- d. protection from postal bomb attack;
- e. protection from shooting at or via doors; and
- f. protection from shooting through glazing at close range.

Recommended Technical Protection Measures

11. It is recognised that no two private homes are alike and

that in order to make a proper assessment of the specific requirements at each home a survey should be conducted by a security expert. The latter may, as a result, identify unique problems that can only be overcome by adapting or extending protective security measures beyond the usual standards. Nevertheless, based on the preceding analysis it is recommended that the standard protective security measures provided at public expense at the homes of public figures assessed to be at significant (level 3) three from the PIRA in GB should be:

- a. To fit external lighting:
 - (1) passive infra-red (PIR) activated high intensity lighting on each elevation;



(2) courtesy lights over doors; and

建器器器器

2

ບາ

metres

0 H

the

N

••

ity


0

H

the

house;

- (3) PIR activated light covering any external parking area, with a warning light in the house to remain illuminated once activated.
- b. Where there is no garage, to examine other garaging options such as renting a nearby garage or obtaining permission to park in a nearby secure area if available.
- c. To fit the TALOS magnetic UVIED and intruder detection system to private cars.
 - d. To fit good quality locks and secure hinges to any garage doors (where not already fitted).
 - e. To fit a video doorphone.
 - f. To fit anti-shatter film and blast net curtains.
 - g. To seal door letter flaps and install an external post box.
 - h. To fit opaque external doors (where not already fitted).



法法法法 网络萨萨萨 新

Intrude Constru Works o Use by 1

σдυ

- i. To fit good quality locks on external doors and accessible windows (where not already fitted).
- j. To fit good quality door chains (where not already fitted).
- k. To provide personal alarm buttons (PABs) including one radio PAB if required, all connected to an externally mounted alarm bell and to a monitoring centre (by radio link where or when possible).

Technical protection measures which fully counter blast are not

practical: deterrence from approach together with anti-shatter film and blast net curtains should provide a limited degree of protection. Technical protection against letter bombs is not practical and emphasis is being given to education about countering this threat. The correlation between the forms of technical protection required and the protective security measures recommended is given at <u>Annex B</u>.

12. It is recommended that the following measures; some or all of which are provided under current practice, shall not be routinely provided at public expense for level 3 principals in future.



fitted) .

K

- ernal doors and
- a. Intruder detection system.
- b. Construction of a garage.
- c. Works on outbuildings (unless in regular and frequent use by the Principal).

SECRET

d. Anti-climb measures.


13. These recommendations have been considered by the Working Party on Protective Security Advice and Assistance and were agreed at its meeting on 11 June 1991.


<u>Conclusion</u>

14. The Sub-Committee on Irish Terrorism (Policy and Operations) (TCO(PI)), is invited to:

a. agree that the technical protection measures recommended at paragraph 11 above, which have been discussed and agreed by the Working Party on Protective Security Advice and Assistance, should in future be provided at public expense to public figures assessed to be at significant threat of attack from PIRA;

b. Submit the proposed measures to TO for its approval.





建建筑建筑组织 新

PIRA

15. The Sub-Committee is also invited to note that a similar analytical approach to the more extensive protective security measures including on-site police protection provided at the homes of those few public figures assessed to be at high threat (level 2) is in hand but awaits the outcome of the thematic inspection of the policing aspects of this protection currently being carried out by HMIC assisted by the Central Unit, and of subsequent discussion by WPPSAA.

THE CENTRAL UNIT

HOME OFFICE


JULY 1991



1.	l August 1998	Bomb attack, Inglis Barracks, North London (1 dead, 8 injured) L/Cpl. Robbins)	PIR
2.	December 1988	Battersea	
3.	20 February 1989	Bomb attack, Tern Hill Barracks, Shrewsbury (No casualties)	PIRA
4.	11 March 1989	Shot fired into pub in Aldershot. People slightly injured.	PIR
5.	22 September 1989	Bomb attack, Royal Marines School of Music, Deal <u>(11 dead,</u> 21 injured) Dean Pavey, Trevor Davie, Mark Jones, Mick Ball, Dave McMillan, Robert Simmonds, Tim Reeves, Mark Petch, John Cleatheroe, Richard Five, - Nolan.	PIRA
6.	10 October 1989	Significant arms find on Hampstead Heath	PIRA
7.	15 November 1989	Semtex bomb discovered in Kensington, London, outside the home of Sir David Ramsbotham - Commander of UK Field Army.	PIRA
8.	18 November 1989	Car bomb in Colchester, Essex (Staff Sgt Andrew Mudd lost both legs).	PIRA


.

PIRA INCIDENTS IN GB SINCE 1988 (NO INLA INCIDENTS IN THIS PERIOD)



9.	21 December 1989	Liam O'Dhuibhir and Damien McComb arrested after find of explosives in NEWGATE, WALES.	PI
		Subsequently convicted on charges of conspiracy to cause explosions and sentenced to 30 years.	
10.	20 February 1990	Car bomb exploded in Leicester destroying an army van and injuring 3 people (1 civilian).	PI
11.	25 February 1990	Postal bomb exploded in an Army Recruitment centre in Halifax. Extensive damage caused but no injuries.	PI
12.	14 May 1990	Army Education Centre at Eltham, London bombed 6 injuries.	PI
13.	16 May 1990	Sgt Charles Chapman killed by car bomb in Wembley Army Recruitment office.	PI
14.	22 May 1990	Kevin Barry O'Donnell arrested when 2 rifles were found in his car in North London.	PI
15.	1 June 1990	Pte. William Davies shot dead at railway station in Lichfield. 2 other young soldiers from Prince of Wales Own were injured.	PI
16.	9 June 1990	Bomb at Honourable Artillery CO HQ (London). 17 students attending a party were injured.	PI

Wintney



17.	12 June 1990	Bomb at f near Basi
18.	21 June 1990	Bomb at R No injuri
19.	25 June 1990	Carlton C 7 injurie
20.	6 July 1991	A small b Barclays
21.	20 July 1990	Stock Exc No injuri
22.	6 August 1990	Ian Gow M near East
23.	6 August 1990	A car bo Lord Arms without e
24.	6 August 1990	31b bomb Sir Antho
25.	10 September 1990	Bomb expl Derby.

```
ormer house of Lord McAlpine, Hartley Wintney
ngstoke.
AF Stanmore Park (North London).
                                                    PIRA
es.
lub bomb.
                                                    PIRA
s (1 serious).
omb exploded in a rubbish bin outside
                                                    PIRA?
Bank on the Strand.
change bombed.
                                                    PIRA
es.
IP murdered by UCBT at his home in Hawkham
                                                    PIRA
bourne.
mb, thought to have been intended for
                                                    PIRA
trong, fell off the car of an American woman
exploding.
found attached to hose pipe at the home of
                                                    PIRA
ny Farrar Hockley former CLF NI (Moulsford Oxon).
oded on the roof of an Army Careers office in
                                                    PIRA
```



26.	26 September 1990	2 arm Tidbu
27.	17 September 1990	C/Sgt attac
28.	18 September 1990	Sir P and h home
29.	27 September 1990	Bomb Resea was d
30.	2 October 1990	2 per McAul (from to mu
31.	15 October 1990	2 men John exclu
32.	11 November 1990	9 peo 50lbs targe Willi (an I to car Thoma

med men disturbed in the garden of Sir Charles oury at Wickham, Hants.

gt Bernard Cox was seriously injured in a gun ack on an Army Careers Office in Finchley.


Peter Terry (former Governor of Gibraltar) his wife were injured in a gun attack on their e in Milford near Stafford.

o discovered at Royal Overseas League where earch Institute on Conflict of Terrorism Conference due to occur.

ersons arrested at Stonehenge. Pearse Gerard ley (from Strabane) and Nessan Quinlain om Limerick) subsequently charged with conspiracy ourder Sir Charles Tidbury.

en and 1 woman arrested at Lee Bay near Ilfracombe. N Paterson (2nd cousin of Pearse McAbley) subsequently Luded from GB.

ople arrested in a series of raids in Kilburn. os of Semtex, tilt switches, a primed bomb, leting information and automatic weapons seized. iam McKane, Siobhan McKane and Martin Doherty Irish citizen) subsequently charged with conspiracy ause explosions. Colum O'Neill, Michael Brennan, as Brennan and Daniel Breslin excluded from GB.



33.	24 January 1991	Police r fired in
		explosio base clo
34.	7 February 1991	Mortar A 2 minor
35.	18 February 1991	Bomb att No injur
36.	18 February 1991	Bomb att 1 death.
37.	4 April 1991	A holdal Preston
38.	5 April 1991	In the e in separ

D rom Br 0 dsuo ennan, GB. racy

recovered a Kalashnakov rifle after a man nto a car at Cannock Chase. A minor on took place at the shooting range of TA ose by.

Attack on War Cabinet at Downing Street. PIRA injuries.


tack at Paddington Railway Station. PIRA ries.

tack on Victoria Station. 36 Injuries.

ll with 20+ incendiary devices was found on Station smouldering.

early hours 11 incendiary devices exploded rate shops in the Arndale Shopping Mall in Manchester.

PIRA



CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX A


DELINES FOR PROTECTIVE MEASURES AT THE PRIVATE HOMES OF THOSE CONSIDERED .0 BE AT SIGNIFICANT RISK

Measure

- 1. Bring door and window locks to approved PSA standards.
- 2. Install front door chain and door phone entry system.
- 3. Seal existing letter flap and provide PSA external lockable letter containers.
- 4. Insall new doors where existing doors deemed inappropriate.
- 5. Provide external lighting.
- 6. Provide commercial intruder alarm and personal attack system.
- 7. If required, relocate telephone to safe position.
- 8. Install commercial alarm system in private car.
- 9. Provide illuminated mirror for inspecting underside of car.

NOTE

This list of standard measures is for guidance only and the package may be considerably modified to reflect the requirements of a particular residence. It is not possible to specify the cost of these measures because the recommendations will vary considerably depending on factors such as the nature of the property, the quality of existing physical security and the likes and dislikes of the Principals.





ANNEX B

CORRELATION BETWEEN THE FORMS OF TECHNICAL PROTECTION REQUIRED AND THE PROTECTIVE SECURITY MEASURES RECOMMENDED

REQUIRED PROTECTION (Para 10)	COUNTER MEASURES (Para 11)
Deterrence from Approaching House	PIR Activated External Lighting External Alarm Bell
Protection against UVIEDs	PIR Activated Lighting and Internal/Warning light TALOS Garage Locks and Secure Hinges
Protection against Blast	Anti-Shatter Film Blast Net Curtains [see also deterrence from approaching house]
Protection against Postal Bomb	Seal Letter Flap. External Post Box. [Advice on recognition and handling of suspect packages]
Protection against Shooting via Door	Video Door Phone Opaque external doors Door Chains
Protection from Shooting through Glazing	Blast Net Curtains [Advice on closing curtains at dusk]

In addition, door locks and window locks are provided to deter opportunistic entry to the house and PABs are provided to summon assistance and operate the external scare alarm in the event of an incident.

