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FROM: JULIE MAPSTONE
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cc - via E-mail

- PS/Secretary of State (B&L)
- PS/Mr Murphy (DFP, B&L)
- PS/Mr Ingram (DED, B&L)
- PS/Mr Worthington (DENI, DHSS&L)
- PS/Lord Dubs (DANI, DOE&L)
- PS/PUS (B&L)
- PS/Sir David Fell
- Mr Thomas
- Mr Steele
- Mr Leach
- Mr Bell
- Mr Watkins
- Mr Stephens
- Mr Wood (B&L)
- Mr Beeton
- Mr Brooker
- Mr Hill
- Mr Lavery
- Mr Maccabe
- Mr Perry
- Mr Priestly
- Ms Bharucha
- Ms Mapstone
- Mr Whysall
- Mr Sanderson, Cab Off (via IPL)
- Mr Dickinson, TAU
- Mr Lamont, RID FCO (via IPL)
- HMA Dublin (via IPL)
- Miss C Byrne, TPU, HO (via IPL)
- Mr N Warner
- Ms Healy
- Messrs Cary, Reid & Poston (via IPL)
- Mrs McNally
- Mr Holmes, No 10 via CPL

Murphy
W.D.R.
W. G. O'K.

1. cc to Mr Alexander *H. B. B.*
 cc to Mr *[redacted]* *C. S. / 6*
 cc to Mr Brown *J. C.*
 17.6

NOTE FOR THE RECORD

Talks: 16 June

No plenaries but an eventful day, although news of the shooting of two policemen in Lurgan at noon cast despondency over the proceedings.

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Stocktake

A morning stocktake with the Secretary of State and Mr Murphy reviewed the situation following the sending of the Aide Memoire to Sinn Fein on Friday evening. John Hume had reported that Adams thought the situation set out in the Aide Memoire was better than anything they'd had before, and senior members of Sinn Fein were meeting to discuss it today. The Irish advised delaying the public statement until after Sinn Fein had had time for its internal discussion and until the officials' meeting with them, hopefully later this week.

There was a suggestion that Adams wished to see the two Governments' decommissioning paper before agreeing to the Aide Memoire. The firm position taken was that the decommissioning issue is separate and must not be allowed to impact on decision-making on the Aide Memoire. It was imperative that the public statement of the Aide Memoire should not be dependent on agreeing the decommissioning paper with the Irish, or with others. A delay of one week in making the public statement was a possibility, however, if the US and Irish Governments thought we were otherwise bouncing Sinn Fein, but it could not be longer. No decision was taken on delaying the statement pending discussion with No. 10.

Secretary of State meets the UUP

Shortly after news of the Lurgan murders broke, the Secretary of State, accompanied by Mr Maccabe and Mr Hill, met Mr Trimble, Mr Donaldson and Mr Empey to discuss the summary of the decommissioning paper they had been sent. In discussion of the murders, the UUP took the view this was a deliberate choice of location - Lurgan being both Mr Trimble's constituency and close to Drumcree - and they were in no doubt it was the work of the IRA

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her than INLA or the CAC, that area of Lurgan being IRA territory (killings later claimed by PIRA).

In discussion of the decommissioning summary (they had not seen the full paper pending agreement with the Irish), Mr Trimble was adamant that the position it described was unacceptable and reverted to positions previously advanced from in discussions with Michael Ancram. Their objection centred on the establishment of a Committee of plenary to advance all aspects of the Mitchell Report. They pointed out they had reluctantly conceded the Committee but only with a liaison role. The present formulation reverted to Dick Spring's 'fourth strand' of June last year, in that, in encompassing "all aspects of the Mitchell Report", it was automatically including confidence-building measures. This was unacceptable because of the link it established in the public mind between confidence-building measures and decommissioning, and the apparent equating of the RUC and Army and paramilitaries. Reg Empey pointed out that the Michael Ancram non-paper had been withdrawn because it was unacceptable on precisely this point. The UUP had agreed to restructure the agenda on Strand 1 to front-load it so that these issues could be dealt with early, in order not to impede progress on decommissioning.

The summary was criticised too for its weakness in expressing the Government's 'hope' for progress on decommissioning alongside progress in the political negotiations. Mr Hill pointed out that they were working to establish a framework of expectation which would lead inexorably to such mutual progress. But Jeffrey Donaldson said that the UUP needed a situation where they could stay in the process if Sinn Fein came in, in the face of walkouts and sustained attack from the DUP and UKUP. For them to sustain such a position, they must have a recognisably substantial and significant commitment to peace on the part of Sinn Fein. Mr Hill pointed out

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the required commitment to work constructively with the Independent Commissioner was a strong point. Mr Trimble however said that the public will focus on two things: the nature of any ceasefire and the delivery up of guns. The killings in Lurgan now meant the reassurance needed would be even greater. Their other complaint was the absence of a mention of the communication cord in the review mechanism. There was a lack of a communication cord at the point where Sinn Fein enter the proceedings - their first plenary. If a communication cord could not be mentioned as such, then it must be clear that sufficient consensus would be required to allow the process to move beyond their first plenary, if the commitment to the Mitchell principles and/or the acceptance of the commitments on decommissioning were not adequate.

Mr Trimble repeated he was prepared to shelve decommissioning if Sinn Fein were not in the process. Unlike the DUP, the UUP accepted the inevitable mutuality of decommissioning. They offered at a later date to take the Secretary of State through their paper put together with the SDLP. The Secretary of State should also see their 15 October paper, the non papers of November and 27 January, and the minute of the meeting with Michael Ancram on the communication cord issue.

They ended by appealing for consideration of their previous suggestion of a separate mechanism for agreeing progress between the key players, outside the procedures of the talks process. The SDLP had tentatively agreed in South Africa to operate outside procedures, but time was needed to try and get agreement from John Hume.

The Secretary of State undertook to consider the points raised.

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Meeting with the Chairmen and David Donoghue

In the afternoon, Quentin Thomas and David Hill met Mr Holkeri, General de Chastelain and staffers, together with David Donoghue.

Discussion focused on the timescale for next week, and looking ahead, for the period up to the summer adjournment. Progress would be determined crucially by the two Governments' joint paper on decommissioning and the timing of its presentation to the parties at plenary. If decommissioning could be settled quickly it would permit entry to substantive talks before September. The necessary adjournment of tomorrow's plenary meant it was essential for a plenary to be held next week. If the decommissioning paper was not agreed by the two Governments, then it may be necessary to adjourn for a longer period.

Mr Thomas asked Mr Donoghue when a response might be expected from the Irish on the paper. It was clear Mr Donoghue was not fully au fait with the situation. He reported they were trying to remodel the paper to some extent. Irish Officials were in touch with Martin Mansergh and were trying to establish an informal mandate, but the interregnum was inevitably proving a problem in achieving a speedy response. At that weekend's meeting with Sinn Fein, officials had taken them through the paper but had not shown it to them. They hoped to finalise the paper and return to HMG by the end of the week with a view to tabling it early next week.

Mr Thomas reminded Mr Donoghue of the length of time the Irish had had the paper. A new draft by the end of this week would still require consideration by HMG, and therefore would be unlikely to be ready for tabling at Tuesday's plenary. Martha Pope asked whether the new Irish Government would want to have a paper tabled

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mediately before taking office. It may be necessary to revisit the proposal to adjourn the talks until the new Irish Government was formed.

There was then detailed discussion of the timetable. Mr Holkeri said that there must be a plenary next Tuesday. Either the proposal was available for discussion, or there would have to be a further adjournment. The earliest date then for reconvening would be June 30th, after the Irish election, but almost immediately there would be a two week gap for twelfth week and the two bank holidays in the subsequent week. The Irish must certainly reach a decision on the paper before Drumcree to anchor the process before the unsettling period of the main marching season. It was crucial to get a text on the table which both Governments think can gain sufficient consensus. Martha Pope reinforced this message: Senator Mitchell thought it was very important to have a paper which both Governments strongly supported. Mr Thomas pointed out that a period of debate and discussion on the paper needed also to be factored in, although the Irish were less keen on this. David Donoghue said they would be anxious about giving parties the opportunity to unravel the text, but a time limited debate would be a possibility. Mr Hill said that if the paper could be tabled next Tuesday, it could be discussed on Tuesday and Wednesday of next week, and the three days of the following week. Mr Holkeri thought that because of the twelfth fortnight, if it could not be voted on by 2 July, it would be better if it were not tabled until 21 July.

In the face of the tight timescale caused by the Irish change of Government and by the twelfth fortnight, Mr Thomas raised the possibility of HMG tabling the paper unilaterally. He undertook to discuss this possibility with Ministers.

(signed)

JULIE MAPSTONE

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HK/Talks