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*K*  
*Pat 15/11 P/A M.*  
*You will be P 15/11 P/A 19/93*  
*interested 14/11*

FROM: D J R HILL  
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT TEAM  
13 JANUARY 1993

cc: PS/Mr Hanley (L&B)  
PS/PUS (L&B)  
PS/Mr Fell  
Mr Thomas  
Mr Bell  
Mr Williams  
Mr Watkins  
Mr Wood (L&B)  
Mr Cooke  
Mr Maccabe  
Mr Dodds  
Mr Stephens  
Mr Quinn  
Mr Caine  
Mr Archer RID  
HMA Dublin

1. *cc Mr Mc Lythe*
  2. *Mr Marshall.*
- HS*  
*13.*

*386/1*

*Jan 1993*  
*P/A*  
*Culture + Identity*  
*Speech*

PS/SECRETARY OF STATE (L&B)  
MEETING WITH DUP MPs, 14 JANUARY

Objectives

1. The meeting is being held at the DUP's request to discuss the "Culture and Identity" speech of 16 December (copy at flag A in the attached folder). In delivering their views on this the DUP MPs will no doubt rehearse their views on security (perhaps redeploying the argument that the Government's political/constitutional strategy is undermining constitutional Unionism, encouraging Republican terrorism and driving Loyalist terrorists to take matters into their own hands).
2. The Secretary of State will wish to take receipt of and to respond to the MPs' points on these issues and, if possible, promote a more general discussion on the prospects for political development.

Background

3. Dr Paisley's initial reaction to the Coleraine speech, which was reflected by his colleagues, is faithfully recorded in Mr Maccabe's minute of 16 December (copy at flag B).

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4. Mrs Collins' submission of 6 January (flag C) discussed the DUP's security agenda (as expressed in Dr Paisley's Party Conference speech) and recommended a brief, general line to take which the Secretary of State agreed to deploy at the forthcoming meeting if the opportunity arose. Since then we have also received Peter Robinson's own up-to-date statement of the DUP's security proposals (flag D) in which he alleges that the Government's political/constitutional strategy constitutes an encouragement for the Provisional IRA, a point he made in the immediate aftermath of the Coleraine speech.

5. As regards political development, there have been generally reassuring conversations between PAB and, respectively, Nigel Dodds, Ian Paisley Jnr and Gregory Campbell; and Peter Robinson has sent some coded but positive signals. His recent security paper (while emphasising that the obverse is also true) says that "movement on constitutional matters" need not await peace. His comments on the domestic political situation in Dublin and the attitude of the new Irish Government to Articles 2 and 3 have carefully avoided any requirement that there should be a unilateral commitment to amend Articles 2 and 3 before fresh dialogue could take place. And in general debates (eg his interview on the "Analysis" programme) he has made some quite forward statements about possible future North/South "arrangements" (under a British/Irish umbrella): "I think ... you will find that there perhaps would be a much longer and larger agenda than in the Nordic Council". The unknown quantity at present is Dr Paisley who may be in no mood to pursue talks involving the Irish Government, especially given his concern about the Government's position on the constitutional status of Northern Ireland (as expressed in the Coleraine speech) and on security matters. He indicated at the end of last year that he would not have agreed to the Talks statement of 10 November if he had understood that the Irish Government was to be involved in the proposed "informal consultations".

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Handling the meeting

6. This is unlikely to be an easy meeting, especially with Mr McCrea present to accentuate Dr Paisley's tendency to treat constitutional and security issues in an impassioned manner.
7. The Secretary of State may conclude that it would be better to defer any attempt to discuss political development. He might, however, seek to set up a meeting to discuss the prospects for further talks once he has had a preliminary exchange with the new Irish Government.

The Coleraine speech

8. I attach below (as Annex A) some key points to make about the political/constitutional issues raised by DUP reactions to this speech.
9. I also attach (Annex B) a note provided by Central Secretariat on the mechanics of the proposals to allow dual language street names, a practical aspect of the speech which was mentioned by Dr Paisley on the day and has subsequently been investigated by Nigel Dodds.

Security issues

10. The Secretary of State is familiar with the DUP's security agenda and can draw on Mrs Collins's submission of 6 January and in particular the points in the Prime Minister's letter of 16 March 1992 enclosed with it.

Political Development

11. As I suggest in paragraph 7 above, it would be prudent for the Secretary of State to mention his intention to meet the new Irish Foreign Minister in the near future; and desirable to fix a further meeting with Dr Paisley (? and Mr Robinson) to discuss the way

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forward. If the opportunity arises to go further, the Secretary of State might draw on the checklist of points to make and supporting arguments at Annex C.

12. The latter pick up some of the concerns expressed by Dr Paisley in his Party Conference speech (see especially page 6 of the speech, copy at flag E in the folder of support papers).

Miscellaneous

13. It is possible that Mr McCrea will hark back to his complaint that he was not notified of the Secretary of State's visit to his constituency on Christmas Eve. A note and line to take circulated by Mr Lindsay is at Annex D.

Attendance

14. I assume Mr Hanley will wish to be present. Mr Thomas, Mr Maccabe and I would also be available to attend.

SIGNED David Hill

D J R HILL

Political Development Team

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ANNEX A

COLERAINE SPEECH, 16 DECEMBER

Points to make

1. This did not represent or signal any change whatsoever in the Government's consistent commitment to the "constitutional guarantee", as expressed in Section 1 of the Northern Ireland Constitution Act.

2. It was not a further step on the road towards enforced Irish unity. Nor was the Anglo-Irish Agreement such a step. (Indeed, Article 1 of the Agreement reinforces the constitutional guarantee by binding the Irish Government to accept that any change in the status of Northern Ireland would only come about with the consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland - and the preamble to the Agreement defined that status by distinguishing between those who favour a United Ireland achieved through peaceful means and by consent and those who wanted no change in the status of Northern Ireland.)

3. The British Government is not neutral as between Republican terrorist objectives and Unionist objectives. As befits the Government of a free, open democracy, it defends the right of every citizen to express his or her political views by peaceful means; and asserts the equal weight of every citizen and the equal validity of every view. But it warmly acknowledges the wishes of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland to remain part of the United Kingdom and will not cease vigorously to defend their rights as UK citizens unless and until a majority express a different view.

4. The speech was not a coded offer to Sinn Fein of political advantage in return for a ceasefire. It meant exactly what it said. A total and complete renunciation of violence lasting sufficiently long to convince even sceptical observers that there had been a genuine change of heart is the absolute minimum

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requirement for any engagement by Sinn Fein in political talks involving HMG. And in such talks, were they ever to take place, Sinn Fein would have no more clout than any other party in proportion to its electoral strength. [The DUP may press on whether HMG believe there needs to be a complete Republican casefire before Sinn Fein could be involved in talks. The Secretary of State might seek to avoid commenting on hypothetical situations. The speech (para 22) calls on "the Provisional movement" to "renounce unequivocally the use and threat of violence and demonstrate over a sufficient period that its renunciation is for real". If there were a split between "Sinn Fein" and "PIRA" it might in principle be possible to determine that "Sinn Fein" had thoroughly renounced the use or threat of violence even though PIRA terrorism continued; but it might take quite a long time to convince the "sceptical observer".]

5. The speech was in part a carefully - judged attempt to show that I comprehend the factors which influence some extremist Republicans to resort to violence and to demonstrate that some (eg social and economic factors) are being addressed as part of our overall strategy; the impact of others (eg security factors) would inevitably be much reduced in the event that terrorism ended; and that in such an event any valid political concerns could at least be addressed through the normal constitutional political process.

6. You may not like me talking indirectly to terrorists in this way but I have a duty to defeat terrorism by every means at my disposal and sapping their morale and causing them to question the value of continuing the "armed struggle" is a weapon I could not in all conscience refuse to use.

7. The evidence I have is that the speech did discomfit the Republican leadership. Adams' response was delayed, then deferred and when it finally appeared it was patently feeble and unconvincing.

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8. [If anything, it is the interpretations which you and other Unionist spokesmen have put on the speech which have inflamed certain Loyalists and encouraged Sinn Fein to think that there was more for them in the speech than a straight forward reading would suggest.]

- part of process towards more open, tolerant society
- aim to remove prohibition on Irish streetnames contained in 1949 Act; and therefore to remove a legitimate cause of grievance

Defensive Points

- cost of dual streetnames negligible
- no plans for bilingualism
- dual streetnames will not be obligatory: question will be for district councils to decide. As such open to test of reasonableness
- where dual signs are decided on, one streetname will have to be in English

Background

1. Under S 19 of Public Health and Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act (NI) 1949 streetnames in any language other than English are prohibited. Ministers' decision is merely to remove this prohibition and to allow district councils to decide whether, in addition to the English streetname, an Irish version should be erected. DOE(NI) will identify a suitable legislative vehicle, probably in the course of 1993 - possibly after the May district council elections to avoid

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IRISH LANGUAGE : STREETNAMES

LINE TO TAKE

2. Streetnames are a district council function. The question part of process towards more open, tolerant society
- to require any particular procedure to frame council
- aim to remove prohibition on Irish streetnames contained in 1949 Act; and therefore to remove a legitimate cause of grievance

Defensive Points

3. Cost is expected to be negligible. If councils decide to
- dual signs, they will have to do so within their
- rate-borne budget. Average total cost (material, labour)
- cost of dual streetnames negligible
- measures to facilitate the promotion of the Irish language
- no plans for bilingualism including Irish-medium primary
- school costs but excluding costs of teaching Irish or
- dual streetnames will not be obligatory: question will be
- for district councils to decide. As such open to test of
- reasonableness
- where dual signs are decided on, one streetname will have
- to be in English

Background

1. Under S 19 of Public Health and Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act (NI) 1949 streetnames in any language other than English are prohibited.
5. Ministers' decision is merely to remove this prohibition and to allow district councils to decide whether, in addition to the English streetname, an Irish version should be erected. DOE(NI) will identify a suitable legislative vehicle, probably in the course of 1993 - possibly after the May district council elections to avoid



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embroiling it in those. Unlikely therefore to take effect before end-1993. The amending legislation will be the subject of consultation in draft in the normal way.

2. Streetnames are a district council function. The question of dual streetnames will be so too. Ministers do not plan to require any particular procedure to frame council decisions - entirely a local matter. Decisions will be open to judicial review and the test of reasonableness.
3. Cost is expected to be negligible. If councils decide to erect Irish signs, they will have to do so within their rate-borne budget. Average total cost (material, labour) for a dual-language sign could be £60-90. In total, measures to facilitate the promotion of the Irish language in 1991-92 was £1.2m (including Irish-medium primary school costs but excluding costs of teaching Irish or through Irish in English language schools). Grant expenditure on promoting Welsh totalled £6.8m. In 1992/93 £12.2m is planned to be spent in Scotland where the proportion claiming Scots Gaelic is about quarter the NI equivalent.
4. There are no plans to make NI into a bilingual society (as speech made clear). Other points mentioned at Coleraine, eg, Government readiness to accept Irish Language letters but to reply only in English, are not new.
5. Broadcasting in Irish is a matter for BBC and UTV. The latter plans/both plan slightly expanded services. No grant is paid - cf £9.5m from Scottish Office in 1992/93 to ITC to establish a Gaelic TV Fund.
6. Lord Chancellor has decided in principle to amend 1737 Act barring languages other than English in courts, but this has not been announced. LCD is still considering modalities.

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7. Ministers have not yet decided whether to sign the Council of Europe Convention on Regional or Minority Languages - on account of ethnic minority languages in GB. Decision on Irish is justified in its own terms - better not said in terms to DUP.

The Government is keen to proceed with the proposals for further talks on the basis of the terms of the 1985 Belfast Agreement.

It is important that both sides appreciate the position and the reasons for the Government's position. Further talks should be pursued.

I intend to establish contact with the DUP and begin to explain the position of the new Irish Government. Welcome your assessment/advice.

4. Look forward to a further meeting with you once that has been done, to discuss the proposals for further talks.

(Defensive)

Justifications for talks

1. Talks offer a real chance of achieving your priority aims - an alternative to the Anglo-Irish Agreement and the amendment of Articles 2 and 3.

2. I should be surprised if the new Irish Government were as inflexible as its predecessor. (They may have been inhibited throughout the talks last year by the prospect of an election.) Now is not the time to take your eye off the ball.

"SDLP intransigence"

The SDLP reservations on the Strand 1 sub-committee report of 1st June, as I understand it, remain conditional on possible

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ANNEX C

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

Points to make

1. The Government is keen to explore the prospects for further dialogue, within the terms of the 26 March 1991 statement.
  2. Believe I understand your basic negotiating position and the issues you would like to see addressed before further talks could be launched.
  3. I intend to establish contact with Mr Spring and begin to explore the position of the new Irish Government. (Welcome your assessment/advice.)
  4. Look forward to a further meeting with you once that has been done, to discuss the prospects for further talks.
- Justification for talks

1. Talks offer a real prospect of achieving your priority aims - an alternative to the Anglo-Irish Agreement and the amendment of Articles 2 and 3.
2. I should be surprised if the new Irish Government were as inflexible as its predecessor. (They may have been inhibited throughout the talks last year by the prospect of an election.) Now is not the time to take your eye off the ball.

"SDLP intransigence"

The SDLP reservations on the Strand 1 sub-Committee report of 10 June, as I understand it, remain conditional on possible

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developments in the other two strands of discussion. In any event no agreement can be reached unless all the participants support it and the SDLP accept that the outcome must be acceptable to [a majority of] the people of Northern Ireland. Your position is therefore fully protected.

#### North/South institutions

There was a considerable divergence of view during the previous Talks, but I regret that we never really reached the point pinning down some of the concepts which were being floated. I have a feeling that a careful and rational exploration of relevant practical considerations would reveal far more common ground between the participants than would seem likely from a cursory glance.

#### Format of future talks

I regret if the reference to negotiations taking place in "bars" caused any offence. I was giving a judgement that the most productive way of moving forward was likely to be through relatively informal meetings, within a structured process, such as occurred during the last few weeks of the previous talks. I would like to talk to you at a later stage about our thinking on that.

However informal the meetings, it would of course continue to be the case that the Irish Government would not be directly involved in any discussion of possible future arrangements for the government of Northern Ireland.

members of the security forces who were also constituents of his. As security spokesman of the DUP, he wished to be accorded the same rights and privileges as the security spokesman of the DUP, who was always in evidence when Ministers were present in the Fermanagh and South Tyrone constituency. He also had a general grievance about the Honours system (mainly for members of the Alliance Party, he said) and the NIC.

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ANNEX D

CHRISTMAS EVE VISIT - REVEREND WILLIAM MCCREA MP

Mr McCrea telephoned on 31 December to register a complaint about the Secretary of State's Christmas Eve visit. He complained that:

- a. he had not been told of the visit in advance;
- b. he understood the Secretary of State had met the UUP Chairman of Strabane District Council (Eddie Turner) while in Castlederg.

2. On the second point I assured Mr McCrea that the Secretary of State had not met Mr Turner in the course of the Christmas Eve visit. I also assured him that an attempt had been made to contact him on the day of the visit (he had previously been informed in general terms). A telephone call was made to his home at 9.00 am and Mrs McCrea informed me that her husband had gone to Belfast for another appointment. Her only means of contact was a mobile phone and I considered it unsafe to disclose details of the Secretary of State's movements in those circumstances.

3. I also explained to Mr McCrea that it was our normal policy not to advise MPs of Ministers' visits to police or army establishments. He disagreed, saying that he had heard reports of the visit to various locations including the RIR at Rockwood, from members of the security forces who were also constituents of his. As security spokesman of the DUP, he wished to be accorded the same rights and privileges as the security spokesman of the UUP, who was always in evidence when Ministers were present in the Fermanagh and South Tyrone constituency. He also had a general gripe about the Honours system (mainly for members of the Alliance Party, he said) and the NIO.

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4. When I contacted Mr McCrea's office today, I was told that while he was not happy about the situation, he would probably not pursue it further. There is always the possibility that he may mention it when he meets the Secretary of State next week with the other DUP MPs or if he should meet other Ministers. A line to take is attached.

Signed

W K LINDSAY  
Private Secretary

LINE TO TAKE

Where possible, Private Office will notify an MP if the Secretary of State is going to undertake a visit in their constituency. This is subject to necessary safeguards in relation to security. As a general rule, visits to Army bases or police establishments by the Secretary of State are not notified to MPs.

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MEETING WITH DUP MPs, 14 JANUARY

Supporting Papers

- A - Coleraine speech, 16 December
- B - Dr Paisley's immediate reaction (Mr Maccabe's minute of 16 December)
- C - Mrs Collins' submission of 6 January
- D - Mr Robinson's statement of the DUP's security agenda
- E - Dr Paisley's Party Conference speech, 28 November.