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1-MAR 1991
CENT SEC

ASST. / Rev 75/3
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FROM: J G PILLING
DUS(L)
1 March 1991

1 MR *Wright* 5/3 } to see &
2 *Maj. Stob* } return,
esp X!

cc: PS/PUS (L&B) - B
Mr Alston - B
Mr Hamilton - B 5/3
Mr Cooke - B
Mr Dodds - B
Mr D J R Hill - B
Mr McNeill - B
Mr Archer, RID FCO - B
HMA, Dublin - B

MA
4/3

Mr Thomas

LUNCH WITH MR DERMOT GALLAGHER

It is worth recording some parts of my conversation with Mr Gallagher over lunch in Dublin on Wednesday 27 February.

2. In relation to the initiative, Mr Gallagher's predisposition was to behave as if it was behind us. He did lay some emphasis on the content of the post-IGC Irish paper and commented that many within the machine in Dublin would never have believed it possible for the Government to go so far. Even that could be interpreted as an early rehearsal for the Irish position in the event of a pause. He was keen to interpret Unionist behaviour as conditioned by the prospects for an early General Election in the UK. He saw it as unimaginable for Mr Major not to seek to gain benefit from a post-War effect and unwise to wait beyond June lest that effect began to be eroded by the problems of peace. He was not anxious to hear the message that Mr Brooke was still working hard for substantive talks.

3. Mr Gallagher concentrated rather more on non-IGC issues and signalled the Irish intention to turn with renewed enthusiasm to an agenda that had been neglected because of the dominance of political development:

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- we had disappointed expectations by our approach to implementing the Agreement from the first day and might now be persuaded to do better

X - there would be a renewed emphasis on public appointments

X! - the DFA were receiving reports that Masonic rather than Orange lodges now had undue influence on appointments in Northern Ireland

X - it was perhaps understandable in the circumstances that the DFA had been approached by the Knights of St Columbanus who were interested in exercising influence over public appointments in Northern Ireland via the DFA (but, Mr Gallagher seemed to indicate, the Knights would have no encouragement)

X

- he hoped, and believed that we did, that the tone of conferences could be improved and that they could be made generally more constructive.

4. Mr Gallagher showed keen interest in the possibility of a Major/Haughey summit. He expressed admiration for Mr Major's careful selection of words in the aftermath of the attack on Downing Street and during his visit to Northern Ireland. He believed that the Prime Minister had very carefully avoided boxing himself in.

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5. As a result of recent security incidents, Mr Gallagher judged that the possibility of a Provisional ceasefire had moved well down the political agenda but stressed it had not disappeared altogether. He did not believe that the high command of PIRA could truthfully disclaim responsibility for either recent attack in London or its timing.

SIGNED

J G PILLING
1 March 1991
OAB 6447

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