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FROM: D A L COOKE  
SIL  
14 NOVEMBER 1991

cc PS/PUS (L&B) - B  
PS/Mr Fell - B  
Mr Ledlie - B  
Mr Thomas - B  
Mr A P Wilson - B  
Mr Bell - B  
Mr Alston - B  
Mr Hamilton 15/xi - B  
Mr Archer, RID - B  
HMA Dublin - B

MR LEACH - B

BRINGING TERRORISM TO AN END: PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING ON  
21 NOVEMBER

At PUS's meeting yesterday it was agreed that we should aim to circulate in advance of this meeting an early version of the component of the Summit briefing dealing with cross border security co-operation. I know that you have this work in hand. In the meantime, I am attaching a rough draft of a possible covering letter to No 10, since it was suggested at the meeting that such a letter could be used as a vehicle for setting the security briefing in context by sketching out our broader aims and objectives for the Summit. The attached draft is, as will be clear, very much indebted to the material circulated by Mr Archer on 12 November. Please feel free, when submitting it to the Secretary of State, to adapt it as necessary to the specific purposes of preparation for the meeting on 21 November.

(SIGNED)

D A L COOKE  
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14 NOVEMBER 1991  
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**DRAFT LETTER**

**FILE NUMBER**

**ADDRESSEE'S REFERENCE**

TO: J S Wall Esq Private Secretary 10 Downing Street LONDON	ENCLOSURES:	COPIES TO BE SENT TO
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FOR SIGNATURE BY: MR PAWSON

**BRINGING TERRORISM TO AN END**

My Secretary of State thought that the Prime Minister and others attending the meeting on 21 November on this subject might find it helpful to see in advance of that meeting an early version of possible briefing for the Prime Minister on cross border security co-operation between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland for the meeting which he is due to have with the Taoiseach before Maastricht. I enclose such a brief. We shall, of course, be revising this to take account of the discussion on 21 November.

The brief on security co-operation for the Summit with Mr Haughey will form part of the usual briefing covering the full Summit agenda. I will not try to anticipate the detail of that briefing

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in this letter. It may, however, be helpful, as context for the security co-operation brief, if I sketch out briefly the likely Irish and British objectives for the meeting between the Prime Minister and Mr Haughey.

We envisage that Mr Haughey will want to use the meeting for his own political purposes. It offers him the opportunity of getting back to business as usual in the run up to Maastricht and of seeking to demonstrate that he has put his domestic political difficulties, temporarily at least, behind him. He needs any successes he can chalk up and will want, in what he says to the press after the Prime Minister's visit to Dublin, to give a picture of a successful meeting.

Mr Haughey's immediate priorities are likely to be:

(i) to go over the Maastricht agenda in order to establish the British position, to set out Irish priorities, and to examine objectives together.

(ii) To get as much out of the meeting as possible on Northern Ireland. The Taoiseach may again push his ideas for an alternative agenda or imposed solution, although these are likely to remain general rather than specific. The Irish want the two Governments to ensure that there is continuing momentum on political development, but probably

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do not expect it to be possible to launch any new political initiatives before the British General Election.

(iii) To press the importance of winning community confidence - and especially that of the nationalist minority - in the security forces and criminal justice system in Northern Ireland. Mr Haughey may mention specific concerns about eg use of lethal force ("shoot to kill"), and police accompaniment of army patrols.

So far as British objectives are concerned, we will want to exploit any tactical advantage open to us from the Taoiseach's need for a successful outcome. He hinted in talks during his visit to Downing Street in June that if he understood our objectives he might give us some support in the EC. We could remind him of this.

Among our specific priorities for the Summit will be:

(i) to take the Taoiseach through our objectives at Maastricht and to seek Irish support.

(ii) To re-assert the validity of the three-stranded approach to political development in Northern Ireland, to reassure the Irish that we are not abandoning this

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analysis, and to get their agreement to the best way of carrying forward further political dialogue.

(iii) To seek further Irish co-operation in the security field and agreement that any post conference statement should include renewed commitment by both sides to improve effective co-operation.

(iv) To point to examples of effective bi-lateral co-operation on socio-economic questions, and to make the most of progress in specific areas to help further to consolidate bi-lateral relations.

(v) To register our concerns about loopholes in Irish extradition legislation in the light of the Supreme Court's judgement of 15 November in the cases of Sloan, Magee and McKee.

As you will see from the attached draft brief, we envisage that one possible way of following up discussion at the Summit on security co-operation would be to seek to persuade the Irish that a high level group of British and Irish officials should, within a specified timescale, be tasked to examine the cross-border security policy framework with a view to preparing the ground for particular operational improvements. Tactically we think it would be preferable not to confront Mr Haughey at the Summit with an

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outright request there and then for particular changes. But, as the brief seeks to bring out, it should be possible at the Summit to develop the case for particular changes with a view to tasking the official group to pursue and report on follow-up action.

For the reasons rehearsed in the summer, it is important that any such group should not be converted by the Irish into new machinery for reviewing the Anglo-Irish Agreement or examining the totality of Anglo-Irish relations. This would clearly pre-empt, and gravely jeopardise, the prospects for further political development progress on the three-stranded analysis. As the briefing makes clear, however, a possible quid pro quo for the Irish would be to agree that any such group should be able to include within its consideration the impact of security force operations on the local communities affected.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries of those who will be attending the Prime Minister's meeting on 21 November.

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