CONTINGENCY PLANNING

1. As agreed at your meeting on 1 April I have considered with colleagues in the office, and with the Police and the Army, the possible steps which Dr Paisley and his supporters might now take in the light of their hints that they still have further action in store.

2. We have confined ourselves to looking at the situation between now and the local authority elections in May. Once these elections are over, Paisley will hope that he has enough evidence to show that he does indeed represent Protestant Ulster, and, the legitimacy of his cause thus demonstrated, he could well try to take on the Government (strikes, provisional government, etc). But in the run up to the election Paisley seems likely to

   a. concentrate on things which he believes will earn him votes

   b. avoid offending the law in any outrageous way (he may think minor breaches of the law are justified)

   c. continue to seek to pose a challenge to authority (or, alternatively, to the Catholic community), probably falling short of outright confrontation with the security forces.

3. During the later part of the period there will be the usual election meetings, posters and advertisements. The "Carson Trail" rallies therefore seem unlikely to be repeated as such.
4. The Ulster Declaration will also need to be rounded off. Paisley intends to extend the signing of the Declaration to Great Britain (as did Carson with the Covenant) but we have not yet found out how the Covenant was rounded off, and how by implication the Declaration may be rounded off. Possibilities include petitioning the Queen, a petition to Parliament, gaining entry to Stormont or Belfast City Hall for some triumphant ceremony.

5. Paisley may also persist with activities shown already this year:

a. hillside demonstrations (perhaps once more?)

b. counter demonstration to Republican parades (Easter, Hunger Strike, etc) - a tactic used in the past and threatened on 5 April

c. firing of flares - flares were fired at 30 locations across Northern Ireland between 2200 and 2400 on 1 April: this may have been DUP inspired, and the idea of flares/Beacons/bonfires could be cheap and attractive to Paisley

d. disruption of any North/South meetings eg involving Irish Ministers, the opening of the Eglinton/Dublin air link, etc

e. rallies in Great Britain.

6. The probable moves not tried so far this year are:

f. provoke his own arrest and martyrdom as Carson planned (but in the case of Paisley only for a minor offence otherwise he might miss the elections)

g. symbolic takeover of a government building, probably Stormont or Belfast City Hall (few other
buildings have any real symbolic value) - this was hinted at during the speeches at the 28 March rally, but seems a more probable development after the elections than before.

h. one day industrial stoppages - there might be the industrial muscle to halt work at Ballylumford, at Harland and Wolff or in Larne Harbour, but an all out stoppage carries with it a threat that it will not succeed and one day stoppages seem to offer better opportunities to Paisley at this stage: one day stoppages could be confined to the three areas already mentioned, or might extend to much wider attempts at brief economic immobilisation.

i. boycott goods from the Republic and coinage (this has been tried before but boycotting the coinage is now almost irrelevant: a boycott of Southern goods also seems likely to be mainly symbolic.

j. some display of flags or emblems - a small forest of flags could be erected by a comparatively small number of supporters.

k. a vigil or picket at Stormont (or Downing Street or Parliament) - easy to start but not to maintain.

l. revealing a 'secret' document on the talks or on the security situation - a probable development if Paisley can find usable material.

7. We have identified a number of other possible actions, but they all seem more likely to be used after a 'successful' election campaign rather than in support of it:

i. hillside demonstrations with firearms.

ii. a Carrickmore-type takeover.
iii. the setting up of a provisional government.

iv. disrupting Parliament (eg from the gallery).

v. blocking border roads.

vi. blocking ports with fishing vessels.

vii. gun running - either symbolic or for real.

viii. drilling of supporters.

ix. some demonstration of support from members of the security forces.

x. temporary takeover of Downtown Radio.

xi. disruption of the railway to the South.

xii. withholding taxes, rates etc.

8. The list tabulates the ideas in paragraphs 3 - 6, with comments.

9. Many of the threats cannot or should not be countered. Our ability to counter those that matter (eg one day stoppages) depends on getting good advance warning.

I M BURNS

6 April 1981