

# CONFIDENTIAL

NOTE OF IPCC MEETING HELD ON 7 APRIL 1975 IN STORMONT CASTLE.

Present: Mr M Cudlipp - NIO  
Mr D Wyatt - NIO  
Mr J Allan - NIO  
Mr T Roberts - NIO  
Mr E Montgomery - Central Secretariat  
Mr R Ramsay - Central Secretariat  
Brigadier P Campbell - HQNI  
Mr D McDine - HQNI  
Mr K Newman - RUC  
Mr W McGookin - RUC  
Mr D Hill - NIO

1. This meeting was a continuation of the meeting on 2 April at which information policy in a ceasefire situation was discussed.

2. Brigadier Campbell pointed out that paragraph 14 of the minutes was inaccurate and should be rewritten thus:

"Brigadier Campbell thought that account should be taken of information from terrorist sources which indicate what para-military groups intend to do in the propaganda field."

3. He continued that as a result of last week's meeting the Army had put down its ideas on ceasefire strategy but was not yet in a position to circulate them. They felt that there was a clear lack of strategy in the run-up to the Convention. If there was a return to war a basis for a more vigorous campaign against PIRA would be needed. This could be provided by the paper on 'Undermining the IRA's Will to Fight'.

4. Mr Cudlipp pointed out that the situation had changed since that paper was drawn up. All matters affecting policy were now referred to the NIO and he felt it would be difficult to produce a detailed set of rules to be distributed to the Army or any other outside agency dealing with all eventualities.

5. Brigadier Campbell thought nevertheless that a paper outlining broad guidelines would be possible. It would show what action could be taken in the event of a serious outbreak of violence. The Army's view on policy in a ceasefire situation was that the return to normality should be stressed; the other side's propaganda should be rebutted; and people should be reminded of what the breakdown of the ceasefire would mean. As far as possible views of ordinary people - who wanted a return to normality - should be promulgated.

CONFIDENTIAL

6. Mr Allan wondered whether the NIO could put over the views of ordinary people effectively and Mr Montgomery suggested opinion polls as a way of achieving this.
7. Mr Cudlipp continued that a strategy of flexible response was needed. Prior thinking should have been done for an event such as the Ross Street shooting.
8. There then followed a discussion on the problem of 'sub judice', in particular where it was appropriate to comment and where not. Mr Newman explained that if legal proceedings had actually begun the matter was strictly sub judice and no comment could be made; if however, proceedings were only in the offing comments could be made. In the Grew case it had been felt necessary to make a statement as soon as possible. Sometimes personal statements could be made by those involved in the case, for example, by police officers who were the subject of allegations of ill-treatment. The matter of 'sub judice' should be studied by legal experts.
9. Mr Wyatt thought that co-ordinating a response in delicate situations was difficult. Rapid communication between all parties involved was essential and even with rapid communication one could not be sure of getting the right response.
10. Mr Allan continued that it was necessary to be very cautious on a day-to-day basis not to excite the easily aroused emotions of the other side. Sometimes silence was the best policy. Many extremist groups were trying to demolish the ceasefire and it was necessary to calm people in both communities.
11. It was finally agreed that a sub-committee consisting of Mr Cudlipp, Mr Wyatt, Brigadier Campbell and Mr McDine should draft a paper on the basis of previous work outlining in very broad terms the strategic objectives being pursued.

Note: Following the meeting Mr Webster also agreed to serve on the Sub-Committee, which meets to discuss a preliminary draft on Tuesday April 15 at 11 am. at HQNI Lisburn.

*DB Hill*  
D A HILL

9 APRIL 1975

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