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MINISTER'S MEETING WITH LEON FUERTH, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER TO V-P GORE, WASHINGTON, SEPTEMBER 22, 2000

1. On our side the attendance was the same as at the earlier meeting with Berger (Minister, Ambassador, Secretary General, Secretary Ó Ceallaigh. Declan Kelly and Tom Russell). Leslie Davidson, Special Adviser for European Affairs, was with Fuerth, who is expected to be Head of the National Security Council in a Gore Administration. The Minister opened the meeting by giving a similar presentation on the achievements of the Agreement and on Patten.

2. Fuerth queried if US policies had in fact much of an effect on the process. The Minister paid tribute to US involvement, particularly the President and Vice-President, and underlined the very effective role that the US had played and continued to play. The US was an honest broker who provided a neutral ground for the parties, listened to all sides and helped them to go beyond their differences. There would be a need for similar US involvement by the next Administration.

3. Fuerth pointed out that the Republican Platform had called for "full implementation" of Patten. Would it be helpful if the VP were to do likewise? The Minister encouraged such a statement. He explained that Patten was very much a "middle ground" report. It sought to bring about a consensual police force. Patten recognised that, in a divided society, strong accountability structures were required for the police. However much individual officers were well-intentioned, in terms of history and practice, the RUC had alienated moderate nationalism.

4. Fuerth said that the British Ambassador had been to see him the day before and had argued that the policing Bill as it now stood was empowered to bring about effective change. There were some outstanding issues but the search for compromise was underway. Why then was "full" implementation necessary. The Minister replied that the British themselves had made clear that they were for the full implementation of Patten. The issue was how to achieve that full implementation. Our view was that the present draft legislation fell short.

5. Trimble had mentioned to Fuerth the question of reform of the Special Branch. He was concerned that this might affect security requirements. Having explained to Fuerth what was involved, the Minister reaffirmed

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that all essential elements that would enable nationalists to join the new service should be put in place. Suspicion of the police must be a thing of the past.

6. Turning to EU issues, Fuerth asked about our attitude to enlargement. The Minister situated the expansion of the EU in the context of Amsterdam and of some aspects left over from that treaty that needed to be sorted out. That work was underway. The aim was to have an open process for the applicant countries.

7. Fuerth wanted to know if our economy was tightly bound to that of Britain. The Minister explained that, while Britain continued to be an important trading partner, over the past decades our trade with other countries had greatly increased so that we were now economically much less dependent on Britain. We were in the single European currency; Britain was not

8. Fuerth asked what would our position be on Serbia if Milosovic lost the elections and the situation deteriorated. The Minister situated our likely reaction in the European context, referring to some common actions that might be taken, short of intervention.

T Russell
September 22, 2000

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Ms Shelley

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PSM
SE Dalton
SE Gallagher
Dr Maxwell.

MEETING OF THE MINISTER WITH SENATORS KENNEDY AND DODD
CAPITOL HILL, SEPTEMBER 21, 2000

~~HF. 25C~~

Mrs Smyth
Fanfare
2/10/2000

1. The meeting took place in Senator Kennedy's Office on Capitol Hill. Senator Leahy joined the meeting briefly at the end of the discussion and participated in the brief encounter with the press. Along with the Minister, the Ambassador, Secretary General and Secretary Ó Ceallaigh participated on our side.

2. Senator Kennedy opened with some references to the skirmishes that might take place on Capitol Hill in the run-up to the elections. If there is a great deal of confrontation, it might help Bush to portray Washington as needing reform. On the other hand, some confrontation might give an edge to the atmosphere and sharpen the differences between the parties in a helpful way for Democrats. He complained that, in many instances, the Democratic Senators were inclined to be subjected to peremptory treatment by the Republican leadership.

3. He had met with Mallon and Trimble last week. Mallon had said that Patten was the key to moving forward with the agenda of the Agreement. This would not be achieved with the way the legislation was "coming out now". On the other hand, Trimble had argued that the symbols issue might not be a problem if it was dealt with "decently". Senator Dodd had retained a strong pessimistic sentiment from Mallon. Mallon had argued for a stronger push on Blair. Police Reform could not be subordinated to issues surrounding Trimble's survival. If police reform failed and Trimble was still there what would have been achieved?

4. The Minister cautioned about expecting Blair to solve all issues. Blair had been behind the last-minute withdrawal of the amendment outlining the use of the name at the Committee Stage of the Policing Bill in the House of Commons in early summer. Unfortunately the British tended to see things in a Trimble context and respond to his concerns, which were not always long-term. There was a lot in Patten to give comfort to unionists. It was sometimes forgotten that Patten advocated continuity in the reform. The RUC was not being disbanded.

5. Pressed by Kennedy as to the key difficulties, the Minister said that we felt that the British had to grasp the symbols nettle. It was unimaginable

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that a nationalist would be part of a police service that retained the symbols of the former RUC. On substantive issues we felt that negotiation still could achieve a lot.

6. There were two misjudgements in the British approach.

- One was that Sinn Féin would never back a new police force. This was incorrect. Sinn Féin have every interest in seeing a community-wide police force being respected. Such a force would deal with the vigilante problem in their areas, for instance. (Moreover, a police force which Sinn Féin would join, would be the clearest signal yet for unionists that the war was over)

- Secondly, they feel that we see policing as a quasi-joint sovereignty issue. This is completely inaccurate. We are non-doctrinaire in our approach. We want to see a pragmatic solution and are prepared to work with them to achieve that.

7. Senator Kennedy asked what he and Senator Dodd might do. They had considered approaching the President to suggest a line of action to him. What should they be telling him? Would we like to propose some ideas to them? The Minister said that we would certainly have some suggestions and there was agreement that we would follow up on this (through the Embassy?). At this stage, Senator Leahy joined the meeting which broke up almost at once for a photo call and a few general words with the press.

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September 21, 2000

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MINISTER'S MEETING WITH SECRETARY OF STATE ALBRIGHT, WASHINGTON, 20 SEPTEMBER 2000.

Summary

The atmosphere was cordial and relaxed and despite the heavy pressures on the Secretary of State's timetable, which had initially dictated a thirty minute meeting, it lasted almost fifty minutes. The Minister was accompanied by Ambassador O'Huiginn, the Secretary General, Secretary Ó Ceallaigh, Assistant Secretary Townsend, Declan Kelly, Breffni O'Reilly and the undersigned. The Secretary of State was accompanied by Assistant Secretary Richard Boucher (Spokesman), Principal D/Assistant Secretary Charles Ries, Alex Wolff and Frank Kerber, Ireland Desk Officer.

The discussion focused, as expected, on Northern Ireland and particularly the policing bill, Ireland's Security Council candidature and disarmament issues, including the New Agenda. The Secretary of State responded to the Minister's presentation of our Security Council candidature by expressing her admiration of Ireland's peace-keeping record and evoking the issue of the UN scale of assessments. The meeting touched briefly on economic issues, with Mrs Albright expressing "disappointment" at the EU Commission's action on the Foreign Sales Corporations issue and congratulating Ireland on adopting legislation on Intellectual Property Rights. In response to the Minister's hope that she would visit Ireland, the Secretary of State confirmed her interest in such a visit, but offered no indication of a possible date and concluded with, perhaps, a hint of pessimism "the difficulty is timing".

Northern Ireland - Patten.

1. The Minister prefaced his presentation of policing issues by pointing to the progress made in the implementation of the GFA and the recognition of the mutual benefits it had brought. Road-blocks in the implementation process were to be expected. Police reform had the potential to pose problems given the historical and other reasons which had resulted in minimal nationalist participation in the RUC, a force seen as upholding not only the law but also the state. The question was how to create an institution of state which took account of differing perceptions of the constitutional issue and Patten had provided the response. The report should not be seen as reflecting nationalist views. It was drawn up by a group of distinguished experts, appointed by the British Government, and aimed at replacing an authoritarian hierarchical system with a community based police force. The effective implementation of Patten should not be subordinated to

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short-term strategic concerns. It would ensure the support of all sides of the community for the police force and was fundamental to the peace process; it constituted a touchstone for the moderate nationalist community. The resolution on the symbolic issues - on which there were clear recommendations from Patten - must allow a young nationalist to join the police force. The Irish Government was clear as to what was required and believed that the problems were resolvable in the context of ongoing discussions between the two governments.

2. SoS Albright responded reflectively to what she called "the clearest presentation of the issues which I have heard ". The police was the arm of government closest to ordinary people. She felt that Trimble "going down the tubes" would not be good and that his recent meeting with the President had been useful. She agreed with the Minister that it was important to remember the progress which had been made in a process which bore comparison with the Middle East Peace Process. On the Irish issue, the people's vote on both sides had been a legitimisation factor. Minister Cowen pointed to the importance of the US continuing to contribute to a supportive atmosphere. It was necessary to focus on the risk that three or four issues might prevent a resolution on Patten which would allow young people to join the police force, which was a transition rather than a new body. Clear scheduling of change in the police would give confidence to the nationalist community.

3. SoS Albright referred to the need for balance within the parameters fixed by the Irish and British Governments and the importance of confidence building measures on the ground, including arms inspections. The Minister said there were still differences between the two governments on the details of legislation to implement Patten. It would be unfortunate if the British Government favoured one tradition - unionist - rather than the other. The process worked best when the two governments were ad idem. Issues could not be viewed in isolation nor could a link be made between arms decommissioning and the Executive. Confidence could be built by decommissioning and demilitarisation. Such action would help eliminate dissident activity by showing that political effort was effective. The security apparatus was hesitant to accept demilitarisation measures. On the nationalist side there was a need to see movement on demilitarisation, otherwise republican elements opposed to the political process would be reinforced. CBMs should continue and, in the Irish Government's view, should not be made subject to other things happening; at the same time it was clear that they were inevitably affected by the prevailing climate.

4. In response to the Secretary of State's query on the place of Patten in the equation,

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the Minister recalled that the IRA statement post Hillsborough had foreseen the inspection of arms dumps in the context of action on demilitarisation and Patten. SoS Albright assured the Minister of continuing US interest in the issue, whatever the outcome of the forthcoming elections. The Minister expressed the Irish Government's interest in the Secretary of State's views and appreciation of Washington's continuing interest.

5. Pursuing a point made by the Secretary of State on the brilliant performance of Irish economy, the Minister referred to the contributing elements, including foreign direct investment. The consequences of rapid growth were not only economic - the returning diaspora, full employment and a dramatic drop in the debt servicing ration - but also a powerful effect on unionist opinion. Despite the fall of the Euro, there was even some irritation in Northern Ireland with British hesitation about joining the monetary system.

Disarmament

6. The Minister initiated discussion of disarmament issues by recalling the visit to Dublin earlier this year of the US Under Secretary for Arms Control, John Holum, and Ireland's role in helping to produce an agreed outcome of the NPT Review Conference. The New Agenda coalition aimed at getting beyond a dialogue of the deaf and hoped to act as a constructive force, a facilitator. Minister Cowen said that the final document of the NPT Review Conference would form the basis for a resolution at UNGA aimed at getting UN approval for the outcome of the Review Conference . Election to the Security Council might allow Ireland to advance that objective further.

7. The Secretary of State agreed that Ireland had played a helpful role at the NPT Review Conference. The US was concerned to ensure that disarmament discussion was "kept in the parts of the system set up for it". They would be comfortable with an UNGA resolution which did not go beyond the NPT guidelines, beyond that there was "a risk of certain issues catching fire". Following the decision on the National Missile Defence (NMD) system, SoS Albright hoped that the UN would not take up the issue of the ABM Treaty.

8. The Minister indicated Ireland's desire to progress the disarmament debate wherever possible while recognising that some issues were bilateral in nature. In this context he welcomed President Clinton's Georgetown speech postponing a decision on NMD. The Political Director pointed out that Ireland would be affected by anything which affected the ABM Treaty while not being a party to it. SoS Albright stressed the attention which she was devoting to the ABM Treaty, "a hot button issue" where it was "important to have friends with us". Neither it nor

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the related defence issue would go away and the debate would not be helped by the UN becoming an "anti-American forum". The Secretary of State subsequently returned to her concern about disarmarment questions being treated in the "wrong body" and pointed to the issue of fissile material as a particular concern.

Security Council Candidature

9. Turning to UN concerns the Minister said that the assessment question involved relatively small amounts of money - a point he had made recently to EU colleagues when he had urged the Presidency to contribute to resolving the issue. SoS Albright expressed appreciation of his understanding of the risk of Congress restricting US involvement with and contribution to the UN in the event of failure to achieve a satisfactory outcome on the scale of assessments. The Minister gave a comprehensive presentation on Ireland's candidature for the Security Council referring to our record on key issues and the circumstances which had led us to seek membership. SoS Albright spoke warmly of Ireland's contribution to the UN where "we like working with you" and was particularly conscious of our peace-keeping role as she had, she said, visited every peace-keeping operation.

Economic Issues.

10. In concluding the meeting, the Secretary of State referred briefly to US disappointment at the Commission's action in rejecting the draft US law on FSCs as inadequate. She indicated that the issue was being discussed by the President that day with the Italian Prime Minister (Amato and FM Dini were also in Washington). The Minister expressed his hope that the dispute could be contained and resolved at a later stage. In response to Mrs Albright's congratulations on the passing of Irish legislation on Intellectual Property Rights, the Minister said he hoped that its quality explained the delay - even if it did not justify it.

Clare O'Flaherty
Counsellor
25 September 2000

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MINISTER'S MEETING WITH SANDY BERGER, HEAD OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, WASHINGTON, SEPTEMBER 20, 2000

1. Tony Blinken, Special Assistant for Europe and Dick Norland, Irish desk were with Berger. The Ambassador, Secretary General, Secretary Ó Ceallaigh, Declan Kelly and Tom Russell were with the Minister.

2. After the initial exchanges, the Minister outlined for Berger some of the achievements of the Agreement to date. The marching season had gone reasonably well. Violence was down. There had been a lot of good work in the institutions. The Assembly and the Executive were working. A further meeting of the NSMC would be held next week. All of this helped the psychology and agenda of the Agreement to take hold. Even though unionists were hesitant to acknowledge the beneficial effects of the GFA, they were participating quite fulsomely in the process of government.

3. On the implementation of Patten, the Irish Government had a pragmatic non-doctrinaire approach. In the end of the day, we wanted to see implementation that would enable nationalists to join the new force unhesitatingly. We wanted to bring about a moderate settlement. Patten provides us with the ability to achieve that compromise and move forward. It provides for a new beginning but also for continuity - it did not demand the disbandment of the RUC, as many had requested. There was no effort to besmirch or taint the RUC but rather to introduce accountability.

4. On symbolic issues - flag, badge, etc - Patten was unambiguous. The symbols of the new police service should be neutral, neither of the Irish nor British states. The simple fact of the matter was that if nationalists saw a Union Jack flying over a police station, they would not join. On substantive issues, the Irish Government is prepared to be creative, (although one of the issues surrounding the legislation was that unionists wanted constructive ambiguity whereas nationalists were pushing for clarity). We were trying to arrive at a solution which would be a signal to all sides not just of change but, in fact, of greater security for all, including for unionists.

5. As regards Mr Trimble's situation, we would do everything possible, on the right side of the Agreement, to help his position, but how could we envisage sacrificing the long-term strategy for Northern Ireland to the short-term gain of anyone, including Mr Trimble?

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6. Berger agreed that it was important to focus on the broader process. Unfortunately Trimble and Mallon had almost developed a habit of complaining. We needed to turn the corner away from a situation where everything was in negotiation. It needed to be said clearly that there was a peace dividend for the economy and for society as a whole . We needed to work towards a situation where the Agreement is not made hostage to every dispute. He had made this point to Adams. Any disputes about differences should take place within the institutions.

7. He wanted to know to what extent we were engaged with London at the moment. The Minister mentioned that we had recently raised our concerns with the British about issues being developed without prior consultation. The recent proposals on flags was one such example. Our objective was to manage these issues - not any kind of quasi-joint sovereignty motive. We wanted to work with the British on the Bill which is now at Committee stage in the House of Lords and we would continue to propose amendments.

8. Berger asked about "the chances of the IRA continuing with de Chastelain". The Minister explained the broader context of the CBM approach which had been agreed as part of the deal to reinstate the institutions. Theoretically there is not a formal link between the CBM and other issues but in practice we needed to be able to show that there was progress. A lack of progress might give scope for the hardliners to seek to undermine Adams. The CBM must be dealt with but it would be assisted by progress on security reduction.

T Russell
September 22, 2000

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