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04/20/94 18:17

SECURE-FX TRANSMISSION

*had his health*  
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SEEN BY  
22 APR 1994  
TAOISEACH

14

AMBASÁID NA HÉIREANN  
TELEPHONE: (202) 462-3939  
FAX: (202) 232-5993



EMBASSY OF IRELAND  
2234 MASSACHUSETTS AVE., N.W.  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20008

SECURE FAX NO: SF46

*D. O'Riordan*

20 APRIL 1994

*Do see please*

*cc PST  
PSS: F. L. Day  
A. J. J. U. Vign...  
M. Mansergh  
K. Murray  
D. Dalton  
Joint Sec  
Int. Co  
Counsellors AT*

TO HQ FROM WASHINGTON  
FOR G CORR FROM M COLLINS

*JM*  
 $\frac{21}{4}$   
 $\frac{94}{4}$

RE: UNIONISTS' VISIT

1. The Unionists met this morning with the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Apart from some emphasis on security issues there was nothing noteworthy that arose. The Committee was poorly attended. Those present were Congressmen King, Schumer and Oberstar. Despite King's presence, the mood was cordial.
2. This evening, the Unionists met with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Senators present were Biden, Pell, Lugar and Kennedy. Again, the issues touched on were similar to those on which we have reported previously. Perhaps the only surprising element was Molyneaux's confidence on the possibility of peace within a year. There was some brief discussion on the National Democratic Institute, with which you are familiar, and the possible role that it could play in Northern Ireland. Maginnis and Donaldson called on the Institute yesterday morning.
3. The Unionists' meeting with Vice President Gore eventually took place around 6 pm this evening and lasted for about 15 minutes. I understand that Molyneaux met the press afterwards. According to the Vice President's Office, the meeting was "congenial". For his part, the Vice President strongly emphasised US support for the Joint Declaration, as National Security Adviser Lake did at his meeting with the Unionists on Monday.

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- 2 -

4. In a conversation with the British Embassy here, they emphatically dismissed any suggestion that the letter from Major which Molyneaux was carrying - and which is headed "confidential" - contains anything at all of significance. In fact, according to the British, a good portion of this letter is devoted to the situation in Bosnia.

END

AMBASAID NA HEIREANN

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EMBASSY OF IRELAND  
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WASHINGTON, D. C. 20008

FAX NO: 223

DATE: 20 April 1994

TO: Anglo-Irish Division

FOR: Gerry Corr

FROM: Michael Collins

*Handwritten notes:*  
to the President  
[unclear]

*cc PST*  
PSS - K. L. King  
A. J. O'Leary  
M. M. Seargeant  
~~W. Murray~~  
T. Dalton  
J. O'Sullivan  
Amb. La  
C. S. Sullivan AI

TOTAL NUMBER OF PAGES INCLUDING THIS COVERING SHEET: 2  
TRANSMITTED FROM FAX NUMBER: (202) 232 5993

Re: Ulster Unionists Visit

1. I attach a text of a statement which was issued by the White House late yesterday evening regarding Monday's meeting between National Security Adviser Lake and the Unionists. The White House ran the statement past us before issue. We offered a few suggestions which were taken on board. Helpfully the statement reiterates "the firm US belief that the Joint Declaration offers the best framework within which peace and reconciliation can be achieved in Northern Ireland".
2. The latest indications are that Molyneaux and his delegation are likely to get in to meet Vice President Gore some time later this afternoon. It is expected that this meeting will be brief, perhaps about 15 minutes or so. As you are aware, the planned meeting between Gore and the Unionists on Monday had to be postponed due to the fact that the Vice President was travelling outside Washington.

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NSC PRESS OFFC --- EURASIA

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

April 19, 1994

STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY

Yesterday Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Anthony Lake met with James Molyneaux and other leaders of the Ulster Unionist Party of Northern Ireland. Mr. Lake and Mr. Molyneaux discussed recent events and next steps in the effort to bring peace to Northern Ireland.

Mr. Lake underscored the importance of the work of Mr. Molyneaux and other Ulster Unionists to oppose violence -- whatever its source -- and to contribute to a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Northern Ireland. The two discussed the need to encourage all who have yet to do so to renounce violence. Mr. Molyneaux reviewed developments since the issuance of the Joint Declaration and how to move the peace process forward, including the current efforts through bilateral talks to achieve political progress. Mr. Lake reiterated the firm U.S. belief that the Joint Declaration offers the best framework within which peace and reconciliation can be achieved in Northern Ireland. The two agreed to stay in touch on how best to achieve that goal.

# # #



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04/19/94 17:28

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EMBASSY OF IRELAND

223 MASSACHUSETTS AVE. N. W.

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20008

SECURE FAX NO: SF 45

19 APRIL 1994

TO HQ FROM WASHINGTON

FOR G CORR FROM MICHAEL COLLINS

VISIT OF MOLYNEAUX AND UUP TO WASHINGTON

1. Further to Mr Kilkenny's fax regarding this morning's press breakfast, Molyneux and the UUP delegation also had a meeting on Capitol Hill with the Chairman of the Friends of Ireland, Congressman Frank McCloskey. At this meeting, which lasted about 35 minutes, McCloskey specifically asked Molyneux whether the UUP still subscribed to the principles of the Joint Declaration. Molyneux replied that they did.
2. Molyneux suggested that there were very useful all-party discussions taking place in Northern Ireland and was lavish in his praise of Minister Antram. He blamed the Irish Government and the SDLP for problems that had arisen in the Strand I and Strand II talks. He dismissed the prospects of any real discussions with the Irish Government until new institutions were in place in Northern Ireland.
3. McCloskey's office said that Molyneux spoke more favourably about the Taoiseach and Fannaiste than he had done on previous occasions with McCloskey when the subject of the Irish Government arose.
4. McCloskey raised his unhappiness with the security build-up in Crossmaglen and also problems over the years in Coalisland. Maginnis handed over a list of all IRA incidents since the Declaration in December (presumably to indicate that their activities had not been downscaled).

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- 2 -

Meeting with Deputy Secretary of State Tarnoff

5. Molyneaux and his delegation had what was described as a very "good and constructive" meeting with Tarnoff this afternoon. Molyneaux was very strong, according to the State Department, in his support for the Joint Declaration but said that they could not wait indefinitely for one party "to come on board". It was time to move on to all-party talks in Strand I leading to "a very modest form of devolved government" in which all parties could work together side by side. This was important in order to create an environment where the communities could work together to build trust.
6. Molyneaux suggested that the Ancram talks were close to coming up with a concept that "might be acceptable to all" in this context. He emphasised that they did not see this form of modest devolved Government as other than a temporary arrangement spanning a few years during which confidence would be established and which would represent an adequate foundation on which Strands II and III of the talks could then be developed. They were prepared to give "up-front commitments" about how matters might develop after a successful period of modest devolved Government.
7. Molyneaux implied that ninety percent of the day-to-day problems in Northern Ireland were ones which were common to all the people of Northern Ireland - while there were two different traditions, there was one community with common economic and social problems which had to be dealt with together. He emphasised that for the Unionists, dialogue with Dublin was essential but his whole thesis was that before there could be any substantial developments on this front there was a need for the communities to begin to work together in government in Northern Ireland.
8. There was some discussion on Mayhew's "surrender" remarks in New York. Maginnis said that the trouble with it was that "it needed clarification"! There was no question of seeking to have the IRA publicly humiliated - "walking down the streets of Belfast with their hands on their heads" - but if it meant allowing them to retain tons of Middle Eastern supplied weapons, this was not acceptable. There had to be a complete disengagement, including of weaponry.
9. My impression from the State Department was that overall the Unionists conveyed a sense of reasonableness and flexibility, particularly when contrasted with the rather hectoring presentation made by Paisley and his delegation last week.

END

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*Cathy*

14

AMBASAID NA HEIREANN

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EMBASSY OF IRELAND

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WASHINGTON, D. C. 20008

F A X

*cc PSR  
PSS; Friday  
AJS D. Upton  
M Mantel  
F Murray  
D. M. M.  
Amb. Lan  
Counsellors At*

SECURE FAX NO: 44

IMMEDIATE

19 APRIL 1994

TO HQ FROM WASHINGTON  
FOR GERRY CORR FROM NOEL KILKENNY

RE: VISIT OF UUP TO WASHINGTON

1. The UUP delegation, led by Mr Molyneaux, addressed a "Morning Newsmaker" gathering at the National Press Club this morning. These gatherings tend to be poorly attended as compared with the more prestigious NPC luncheons. Aside from the travelling BBC crew and London Times correspondent, only seven other journalists (including Conor O'Clery) and about six observers attended.

2. The only aspect of Mr Molyneaux's unscripted remarks that appeared new was his attempt to indicate a time period from the establishment of a Northern assembly until North-South talks might commence. He said that "we should concentrate on the here and now" and perhaps in 5 to 10 years further development could follow. Asked by Conor O'Clery what the 5 to 10 years referred to, he said that it was important for the structures in Northern Ireland to get established. Then after 4 or 5 years "we could look at how we would relate to the sovereign independent state to the south of us".



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3. Referring to the Joint Declaration he said that the two Governments had avoided the mistakes which led to the Anglo-Irish Agreement in that they had engaged in consultations with the main political parties. After the publication of the Joint Declaration the Unionist Party, as the third largest opposition party in the House of Commons, had scrutinised it as it would any other proposal by a British Government. It had not been required to sign the Declaration nor to defend it. "But we faced up to our responsibility...and gave it a 'fair wind'". Four months on, the primary objective of the Declaration has run its course. It was now time to "proceed to design a form of devolved government acceptable to the four main parties".

4. He rejected the perception that political talks in Northern Ireland are now stalled. He told his audience that while the round-table talks initiated by Peter Brooke in 1991 had been terminated in November 1992, a totally new set of talks under Minister Ancrem had commenced in September 1993 and were continuing.

5. He cautiously predicted that, by this time next year, violence by the "main forces" would be at an end and that the Northern Ireland community (he rejected the concept of two communities) would sit very firmly on whoever tried to get in the way.

6. He was asked by Conor O'Clery if, after a total cessation of violence, he would sit down at the conference table with Sinn Fein. He never clearly answered the question but implied that this would not arise. He said that one of the weaknesses of the Brooke/Mayhew talks was the conference table format. In the future he saw Minister Ancrem continuing his bilateral talks with each of the parties (and by implication with Sinn Fein after a total cessation of violence).

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7. He said that when his party met with the Irish Government under the Brooke talks, they detected a realisation on Dublin's part that difficulties would lie ahead for an Irish Government in areas like "the allocation of funds" but added that he didn't want to go into this.

END

TOTAL NUMBER OF PAGES: (3)


TRANSMITTING OPERATOR: MARY SWEENEY

04/18/94 17:52

SECURE-FX TRANSMISSION

cc PST  
 PSS: F. Kelly  
 (114) A/S P. Vign...  
 M. Marsegl  
 E. Murray  
 T. Dalton

001/003  
 Joint Sec  
 Amb. Len  
 Counsellor  
 AI

*had his health*  
*John*  
  
*19/4/94*

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EMBASSY OF IRELAND  
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 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20008

SECURE FAX NO: 43

18 APRIL 1994

TO HQ FROM WASHINGTON  
 FOR G CORR FROM M COLLINS

RE: VISIT OF UUP TO WASHINGTON

1. Unionist leader, James Molyneaux, accompanied by Messrs Maginnis, Nicholson and Donaldson, arrived in Washington last evening to commence a three-day visit here. They depart for New York early on Thursday morning.
2. Their activities today included a middle-ranking meeting with officials at the State Department, a lunch with the New Republic magazine and a meeting with National Security Adviser Tony Lake. This evening, they are scheduled to attend a reception hosted by the Northern Ireland Bureau and a dinner hosted by the Northern Ireland/US Chamber of Commerce.
3. // A meeting scheduled today with Vice President Gore did not take place due, apparently, to a change in the Vice President's programme which sees him travelling outside Washington. In view of the statement being issued (not likely now before tomorrow) by the White House following the meeting between the Unionists and National Security Advisor Lake there has to be a possibility now that a meeting with Gore may not in fact take place. A meeting with Deputy Secretary of State Tarnoff also had to be postponed until tomorrow afternoon due to the situation in former Yugoslavia.

Meeting with National Security Adviser

4. Molyneaux and his colleagues had a half hour meeting this afternoon with National Security Adviser Lake who was accompanied by Staff Director Nancy Soderberg. According to Soderberg, who also gave the Unionists a tour of the White House, the Unionists seemed well pleased with their visit and how they were received. In terms of substance, Molyneaux emphasised, as he did earlier in the morning at the State

*W. Croghan*  
*per*

- 2 -

Department meeting (see below), that his position on the Joint Declaration had been misinterpreted. Soderberg described him as "fairly upbeat about the Declaration" although he maintained that this "first phase" was now over. This first phase, according to Molyneaux, represented the opportunity presented by the Declaration for the IRA and others to stop violence. This opportunity had now run its course. (While there was little time to discuss this point in detail, the NSC said that implicit in all Lake's comments was the US Government's belief in the continuing relevance and importance of the Joint Declaration).

5. The Unionists spoke about the need for "accountable government" in Northern Ireland and for all the constitutional parties to figure out what the people of Northern Ireland wanted. Maginnis complained at some length about the Adams visa, maintaining that Adams had deceived the US. Lake explained the reasons why the visa decision had been taken insisting that Adams had got a fair dose of the message from the Irish in America that they wanted peace. Maginnis contested this maintaining that Adams had not received any such message while in the United States.
6. Lake wondered whether progress might be possible following the June elections. Molyneaux insisted that elections were a continuing fact of life in Northern Ireland and that they were "not relevant" to the resumption of talks. The important thing, according to the Unionists, was for them not to make short-term decisions which would lead to disillusionment among their followers thus promoting the prospects of greater support for violence.
7. Maginnis lamented the fact that the earlier generation of unionist stock which had come to the United States before the War of Independence, had been overshadowed by subsequent waves of Irish immigration. In a brief reference to the Taoiseach's speech over the weekend, Maginnis also said that it contained some good things but that it got "wobbly" in parts.
8. Lake suggested that the Unionists should let the US know of any way in which they could be helpful.

#### Meeting at the State Department

9. This morning's meeting with the State Department lasted for about forty minutes. Attending from the State Department were Mr John Tefft who is Director for Northern Europe, as well as Messrs Parmly and Schafer who handle Irish issues. The meeting was described as very different in atmosphere from the meeting which Paisley had with the State Department last week. The State Department officials were struck by the "spirit of



- 3 -

- openness" and were quite encouraged by the Unionist presentation. In general, they were found to be in a comparatively jubilant mood, despite the uncertain prospects of a meeting with Vice President Gore.
10. In a meeting of this nature nuances could not, inevitably, be fully explored, but the State Department officials were surprised by the difference between the Unionist public presentations and how they found them in private. Molyneaux was far more "charitable" towards the Joint Declaration than published reports of his views would have suggested. He insisted that he had never declared that the Declaration was "dead". Rather, as he did later at the NSC, it was his view that the Declaration had "run its course" and that at this stage what was needed was a "move to talks" and an end to "waiting for Adams". His point, therefore, was not to dissociate himself from the Joint Declaration but for the process now to move on. In reference to Adams, the UUP felt that Sinn Fein had made a series of misjudgements (e.g. the 72 hour ceasefire) but then had succeeded in shading matters such as to re-engage attention. Molyneaux said "at what point do we say that we have to get on with it?"
  11. Molyneaux said that he was not opposed to Strand II talks. But his point of greatest emphasis was on the need to build trust and confidence. He insisted that the Unionist community had been disappointed on so many fronts (he mentioned Articles 2 and 3) that he feared that without some confidence-building measures there was really no chance of re-engaging in Strand II talks. There must be some "pay-off" for the Unionist community as they had been built up in the past only then to be let down. The State Department felt, however, that while insisting on the need for confidence and trust to be rebuilt, Molyneaux wanted them to know that for the UUP there was nothing "alien" about Strand II.
  12. If there was doom and gloom about the European elections, it was not evident in the Unionists this morning. They were not in the least apprehensive and dismissed the idea that the elections represented a threat to them from Paisley. They presented the elections as Paisley's "last hurrah". In particular, according to the State Department, the UUP "chuckled" at Paisley's representation of himself as an "everyman" of unionism.

END

TOTAL NUMBER OF PAGES: (3)