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Reference Code:	2021/46/151
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Summary of the report of
the Deputy Chief Constable
of Cambridgeshire John
Stevens, into allegations of
collusion between members
of the Security Forces and
Loyalist Paramilitaries.

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Summary of the Report of the
Deputy Chief Constable of Cambridgeshire, John STEVENS
into Allegations of Collusion between
Members of the Security Forces and Loyalist Paramilitaries

INTRODUCTION

1. On the 15th September, 1989, the Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, in consultation with the Chief Constable of Cambridgeshire, appointed me to carry out an in-depth investigation into allegations of collusion between members of the Security Forces and loyalist paramilitaries. My appointment was made immediately following the disappearance of a montage of photographs from a locked display cabinet at Dunmurry Police Station. For some weeks prior to the disappearance of the photographs, a number of allegations of collusion had been made against the Security Forces. My terms of reference included investigating: the Dunmurry Police Station incident; the alleged disappearance of photo-montages from Ballykinler Army Camp; the alleged leak of information associated with the murder of Mr. John Anthony Loughlin MAGINN; and following consultation with the Chief Constable, any associated matters which came to light during the course of the Enquiry. I was also requested to make relevant recommendations regarding these matters.

2. The Enquiry set up its office so that it could operate independently, but throughout the seven months of the investigation, the Royal Ulster Constabulary and the Army have facilitated its work whenever requested to do so. The Special Branch and the Criminal Investigation Department of the Royal Ulster Constabulary and the Royal Military Police, provided considerable assistance during the investigations and operations mounted at the request of the Enquiry. These operations will be dealt with later in this summary.

3. Co-operation has been given by the Royal Ulster Constabulary and the Army, both Regular and Ulster Defence Regiment. Enquiry officers have visited Police Stations, Army Barracks and Prison Establishments throughout Northern Ireland and have received full co-operation.

METHODOLOGY

4. The Enquiry began from the position that it would be independent, impartial and entirely thorough. It has maintained that position. It was clear from the outset that in order to have any chance of discovering the truth in relation to the allegations of collusion, the investigations would need to be wide ranging and detailed. Written statements have been taken from over 1,900 witnesses and suspects; 2,000 investigative enquiries undertaken and almost 2,000 man hours expended on interviews with detained persons. Over 2,600 documents of all types, have been

recovered from loyalist paramilitary organisations, some of them are Security Forces documents, many of these being photocopies of the same item. Written material prepared by the paramilitaries themselves has also been recovered. Other documents openly available to the public, such as Election pamphlets, civilian maps, Electoral Registers and newspaper cuttings have also been used for intelligence purposes. Notes of surveillance carried out by terrorists have also been seized, detailing a variety of potential targets and the places they frequent. Each one of these documents has been analysed and examined in order to discover its origin.

5. Many of the allegations centred upon the availability amongst loyalist terrorist groups, of Security Force documents. The most well known of these were the so-called photo-montages, used to brief members of the Security Forces. There is a clear necessity to distribute information, amongst and between the Security Forces, but this creates an inevitable dilemma between the effective dissemination of such information and the maintenance of proper security in respect of it.

6. Considerable numbers of montages have been produced in Northern Ireland over the past 20 years. Until 1988 it was not the practice of the Army, who in co-operation with the Royal Ulster Constabulary, produce the photo-montages, to keep records of production and distribution. It is

therefore not possible to give an accurate assesment of the numbers involved, although such records are now being kept. The Royal Ulster Constabulary produce and distribute, within the Security Forces, photographs of suspects in a different format to that used by the Army. Fewer photographs are used in the police bulletins than are reproduced in photo-montages.

7. It is entirely right that elements of the Security Forces have a need to exchange copies of terrorist recognition documents for intelligence and operational purposes. But these exchanges and the lack of any mechanism for accounting for the movement of such material, have contributed to the difficulties in tracing those responsible for passing on information illegally. It could not, for example, be assumed that a document found in the possession of a terrorist organisation which was headed 'Royal Ulster Constabulary', 'Army' or 'Prison Service', was leaked directly from that particular element of the Security Forces.

8. The combination of large numbers of documents, widely distributed within the Security Forces, increased the risk of official intelligence material becoming readily available to the paramilitaries. It should be borne in mind that there are more than 12,000 Police Officers, both regular and reservist, in the Royal Ulster Constabulary and more than 16,000 military personnel in Northern Ireland, all of whom

have a need to be properly briefed in relation to the terrorist threat.

9. It should also be pointed out at this stage that terrorist recognition information documents such as photo-montages are classified under the lowest security rating. During the Enquiry no documents of any higher security classification have been recovered, or indeed come to notice, as having been in the hands of any terrorist organisation.

10. There is no doubt that since September of 1989, when media reports of "Leaks of Information" were at their height, the steps taken to improve the security of information, have had a significant effect in reducing the opportunity for recognition material to find its way to paramilitaries. In the difficult situation that exists within Northern Ireland, it must be accepted that any system will be vulnerable to some extent either to terrorist infiltration or to pressures that may be applied to individuals. However, at the time of the Report no evidence of any recent leak of contemporary information has come to light. The latest date of any document traced to the possession of loyalist paramilitaries by the Enquiry is June, 1988.

THE ENQUIRY

11. It is clear from the evidence and detailed analysis of the Security Force documents recovered during the Enquiry, that

the passing of information to paramilitaries by members of the Security Forces is restricted to a small number of individuals and is neither widespread nor institutionalised.

12. All lines of enquiry were pursued in a determined effort to discover the truth, wherever the evidence led. Whilst this was done in the knowledge of the unique situation facing the Security Forces, the Enquiry Team nevertheless applied the same principles of thoroughness and impartiality used in their own Forces.

13. My own operational background, in New Scotland Yard, Hampshire and lately Cambridgeshire has involved all elements of criminal investigation. I was privileged to be able to select my Enquiry Officers from some of the most experienced detectives in the United Kingdom. Senior detective officers from four English Forces were personally chosen by me for their outstanding abilities as investigators. They had all undertaken many major enquiries as Senior Investigating Officers and were able to pick from their own Forces their most able detective officers, who were willing to undertake this long and demanding investigation. In addition to their proven operational experience, these officers had particular specialist skills in the field of criminal intelligence, forensic science and computers.

14. The Enquiry was served by a secure computer system using the Home Office Large Major Enquiry System (H.O.L.M.E.S.) format. It will be recalled that this system was introduced after the so-called 'Yorkshire Ripper Case'. It allows for massive amounts of information to be processed on computer, so that every detail is cross-referenced and that no valuable evidence is overlooked.

15. This computer system broke new ground in its application to this Enquiry, by servicing a Major Incident Room on the mainland, directly linked to a similar room in Northern Ireland. This enabled all data collected by the Enquiry to be stored on a main frame computer based in England, whilst remaining fully accessible through a secure link to the Enquiry team in Northern Ireland. One of the practical advantages of this system was demonstrated following the severe accidental fire at the Enquiry's original offices at Seapark in January, 1990.

16. This Enquiry has been the largest external investigation in Northern Ireland and the most extensive of its type ever undertaken in the United Kingdom. The data base itself contains some 96,000 cross references, which indicates the wide ranging scope of the investigation.

17. Immediately following my appointment there were a number of reports in the media, particularly the newspapers, of photo-montages produced by the Security Forces, having been

sent to them anonymously. Often these documents were accompanied by short unsigned notes to the effect that they had been sent to show how readily available such documents were. Others were produced in public by prominent members of the community. Rigorous enquiries ascertained their origins, with a view to discovering how they had been passed on to unauthorised persons. Nearly all of them fell into the restricted security classification.

18. It is considered that these documents were sent to the media by a variety of persons for differing reasons. The majority were sent by people, including serving or retired Army personnel, to highlight a lack of security or embarrass the Authorities. In one case, a soldier who had previously served in Northern Ireland was found to have sent a montage to a national newspaper. He was traced, admitted the offence and later pleaded guilty at Belfast Magistrates' Court, to offences under the Official Secrets Act, 1911.

19. Certain documents sent to a national newspaper form part of the evidence in relation to a current prosecution and therefore cannot be commented upon further. What this line of enquiry did confirm was a serious lack of accounting and deficient identification marking in relation to the production and distribution of such documents. This severely hampered efforts to discover the origins of the documents and created difficulties in tracing those criminally responsible for passing them on. Comprehensive

investigations and forensic examination into other documents traced to the possession of loyalist terrorist organisations were also undertaken.

20. The Enquiry recovered many of the original documents that had been used either by the paramilitaries or sent to the media. An analysis of them, together with evidence and information available to the Enquiry from other sources, provided a clearer picture of the true situation in relation to collusion.

21. Ninety-four people have been arrested in connection with the Enquiry and a total of fifty-nine of them have been charged or reported for offences under the Prevention of Terrorism, Official Secrets and Firearms Acts. The majority of these cases await trial and therefore it would be improper to deal in detail with any of them. All the operational enquiries were carried out on the basis of existing evidence and information. It places the Enquiry in the privileged position of being able to establish the degree of collusion between members of the Security Forces and the loyalist terrorist organisations.

22. Where evidence of criminal offences was found, those responsible were arrested and taken before the Courts. Where evidence or information emerged to support an allegation of collusion, every effort was made to establish both the extent and effect of its existence. A number of

cases remain under investigation by the Enquiry Team; they are referred to later in this summary. The investigation of these cases has contributed significantly to the understanding of the situation in relation to collusion.

23. During an operation on the 8th and 9th October, 1989, twenty-eight members of the Ulster Defence Regiment were arrested under the provisions of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, Official Secrets Act and the Criminal Law Act. In addition to evidence of criminal offences, a number of issues were raised relating to administrative matters within the Ulster Defence Regiment. Recommendations have been made dealing with these points. Seven of those arrested have since been convicted of offences under the Firearms Order and one man awaits trial on more serious charges. Nine of the others were reported to the Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland, who decided to take no further action. Immediately following on from the operation, two other Ulster Defence Regiment soldiers were arrested and now await trial in connection with the disappearance of two photo-montages from Dunmurry Police Station. There is no evidence to connect Royal Ulster Constabulary officers with the matter.

24. Evidence and information has been obtained which shows that certain members of the Ulster Defence Regiment have been involved in collusion with loyalist paramilitaries. It would however be wrong to conclude that there is a

significant proportion of Ulster Defence Regiment soldiers who are involved with paramilitaries. This is not the case. Improvements can be made in procedures for reporting and recording of allegations of crime against Army personnel and appropriate recommendations have been made.

25. The Vetting/Screening system employed in relation to the recruitment to the Ulster Defence Regiment, was deficient in a number of areas. Individuals who had been adversely vetted by the Royal Ulster Constabulary Vetting Section, had nevertheless been recruited. A small number of these went on to commit terrorist-related and criminal offences whilst serving with the Regiment. It is apparent that very many potential recruits for the Security Forces, particularly the Ulster Defence Regiment, live in strong loyalist areas. This is noticeably so in Belfast. The pressures likely to be put on young men and women in these areas by paramilitaries must be recognised in recruitment policy. This, of course, does not mean that such men and women should be excluded from membership, but merely that more account should be taken of such pressures.

26. These matters were brought to the attention of the Army and it is right to say that they had already recognised many of the issues and had begun to implement improvements. A lack of manpower in the Army's screening section was identified and there has now been an increase in staff. Improvements need to be made in arrangements for liaison

with the Royal Ulster Constabulary to prevent unsuitable applicants being accepted and soldiers being retained, when it would be wrong to do so. The final decision must rest with the Army but if an adverse Royal Ulster Constabulary report is ignored explanations should be given at a senior officer level. A number of recommendations have been made in this Report concerning these matters and many have already been implemented by the military.

27. It is clear that official information, originally produced by the Royal Ulster Constabulary, the Army and the Prison Service, has passed, illicitly, into the hands of the loyalist paramilitary groups. Documents and information from documents, have been traced to the possession of these paramilitaries. They have been used by them to enhance their own intelligence systems and as an aid to the targeting of persons suspected of being Republican terrorists.

28. The serious lack of controls and adequate accounting procedures relating to the distribution of Security Force documents, coupled with the age of the documents themselves has, in many cases, prevented the tracing of those responsible for the actual leak of information. The use of photocopying by both the Royal Ulster Constabulary and the Army in respect of terrorist recognition documents is widespread. Similarly, photocopying facilities are available to the paramilitaries, who have used them to

proliferate the actual number of Security Force documents in their possession. Many duplicates of restricted documents have been recovered during the course of the Enquiry. It is however clear that the number of documents which have been obtained by the paramilitaries is small compared with the total number of such documents produced.

29. It should also be borne in mind that the original documents recovered during the Enquiry are from the period covering the mid 1970's up to 1988. (Many original documents have been dissected to create single photographs; approximately one hundred actual documents have been recovered). Throughout that time, the Security Forces, particularly the Army, produced huge numbers of documents for use in terrorist recognition but no records exist to establish the number. Recommendations have been made in relation to the systems for both production and distribution of such documents in the future.

30. The Enquiry Team were also able to look at the information and intelligence systems of the Security Forces, both documentary and those held on computer. In addition, the accountability of those managing and using the system and the physical security of material produced was considered.

31. The development of information to the status of intelligence and the use of both documentary and electronically transmitted information, is clearly of vital importance in

combating a terrorist threat. The Royal Ulster Constabulary has the primary responsibility for the command and control of the collection, collation, development, evaluation and dissemination of all terrorist related intelligence. Therefore, their interface with the Army and others handling intelligence at all levels is crucial in dealing with terrorism effectively. The co-ordination between these elements of the Security Forces in the field of information gathering and intelligence handling has been examined and recommendations have been made.

32. Whilst no evidence has been found of paramilitaries having direct access to either the Royal Ulster Constabulary or the Army's vehicle index computers, information from these computers has been found. In addition to copies of computer print-outs, handwritten lists apparently compiled from unauthorised listening into Security Forces' radio transmissions, have been discovered amongst documents seized during the Enquiry. They also indicate that a limited number of persons, with a legitimate access to vehicle index computers, have passed on details to unauthorised persons. This criminal behaviour is fortunately not widespread, but lack of adequate monitoring has prevented the identification of those responsible. The potential abuse, for terrorist purposes, of information obtained from computer systems, particularly those which contained details of motor vehicles, is a cause for concern and recommendations have been made to improve the security of such information. The

use of terrorist recognition information documents by the Security Force and the security of them has also been commented upon.

33. The operational work carried out by the Enquiry required a considerable element of forensic support. The demands upon the forensic facilities available to the Royal Ulster Constabulary confirmed what had already been recognised by the Force: That is, that a radical review of the Royal Ulster Constabulary Fingerprint Bureau is an urgent necessity. It is apparent that at the present time they are unable to respond as effectively as they should when confronted with a series of complex and protracted enquiries. The Bureau suffers from a lack of resources in terms of manpower, accommodation and the provision of clear management information. A specialised unit of fingerprint experts, examining and searching for finger marks from terrorist type offences only, is seen as one way in which the system can be improved.

34. A number of recommendations are made in respect of administrative and managerial matters, all of which are presently detracting from the Fingerprint Bureau's performance.

35. The Northern Ireland Forensic Science Laboratory, like the Royal Ulster Constabulary Fingerprint Bureau, is not short of enthusiasm or commitment but an ever increasing workload

and expectation exposes its inadequacy in terms of resources. This is particularly acute in its Document Section, which was unable to deal with the very large number of submissions to it, that the Enquiry had intended to make. Introduction of a Serious Crime Unit, staffed from the three disciplines, Fingerprints, Forensic Science and Photography would provide an effective, co-ordinated approach. The principle already has the support of the Chief Constable and the Director of the Northern Ireland Forensic Science Laboratory and is firmly recommended.

36. It should be made clear however that both the Fingerprint Bureau and the Document Section of the Laboratory provided excellent support to the Enquiry. There is no doubt, given adequate resources, they will be able to meet the demands placed on them. It would be appropriate at this point to also record appreciation of the work carried out by the Metropolitan Police Fingerprint Department and the Documents Section of the Home Office Forensic Science Service at Birmingham. Both of them have provided very considerable assistance to the investigations.

37. It will be recalled that during the early days of the Enquiry, the Irish News published a story regarding the so-called Inner Circle of the Royal Ulster Constabulary. No corroboration of these allegations has been found and unfortunately, the newspaper, following two initial interviews with the Enquiry, has not been prepared to assist

further. The allegations were made in general terms, without sufficient information to identify individuals. These allegations have nevertheless been thoroughly investigated but no evidence was found to support the allegations. The documents alleged to have been shown to the representative of the Irish News have not been produced to the Enquiry and none has been recovered during the investigations. In the absence of any corroborative evidence, the allegations cannot be substantiated.

38. Much speculation has been reported in the media concerning the so called "failure" of the Enquiry to charge any Royal Ulster Constabulary officers with offences relating to collusion. No evidence has been discovered to substantiate any such charges. During the enquiries into the disappearance of the photo-montages from Dunmurry Police Station, two hundred and thirteen Royal Ulster Constabulary officers were interviewed by the Enquiry team. Throughout the whole investigation, police officers have been questioned whenever it has been necessary.

39. This same approach has been applied to investigations which involve members of the Armed Forces. A particular example relates to the enquiries into a number of missing montages from the Ballykinler Army Camp. Fifty-one Ulster Defence Regiment soldiers were interviewed in that case but no evidence of collusion was revealed. This case is now regarded as one of simple theft. However, no person has

been identified as responsible for the offence. It should be noted that none of the stolen montages has come to light since the report of their disappearance.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

40. It is emphasised that in an Enquiry of this nature, covering such a wide range of subjects, inevitably involving the security of the State and matters falling under the sub-judice rules, that some aspects of the report, which is a substantial document, must remain confidential. However, I believe that the public interest demands that as much as is possible of the substance of my report is disclosed. That is the objective of this summary, so that the people of Northern Ireland can be assured that all possible steps have been taken to investigate the allegations of collusion and that appropriate recommendations have been made.
41. I should like to reiterate at this point that the detailed analysis of the Security Force documents recovered during the Enquiry and the evidence secured, makes it clear that the passing of information to paramilitaries by Security Force members has been restricted to a small number of individuals. It is neither widespread nor institutionalised.
42. The vast amount of information, evidence and intelligence which has been gathered together by the Enquiry over more

than six months, has placed it in the privileged position of being able to draw definite conclusions based on firm evidence. As a result of these conclusions, a large number of recommendations have been made for consideration by the Chief Constable. The majority of these recommendations are summarised at the end of this paper; only those which cannot be disclosed for security reasons, or may be affected by the sub-judice rules have been excluded.

43. One recommendation is for the formation of a specialist Police unit to concentrate upon terrorist investigation: An Anti-Terrorist Squad. This unit would deal with terrorist crime from both sides of the sectarian divide. This approach would, it is contended, make better use of the expertise already available within the Royal Ulster Constabulary. Although there are logistical and geographical difficulties to be overcome, serious consideration of this proposal is recommended. The central reporting of terrorist-related document finds is also recommended.

44. Although the number of original documents leaked from the Security Force sources is comparatively small, the use of photocopying equipment freely available in the public domain, has meant that large numbers of copy documents have been made by terrorists. There have been examples of the copying of such documents, where many copies of the same item were posted to various addresses and displayed in the

streets, with the clear intention of implying that a large number of individual documents were freely available.

45. Security Forces' documents and copies of them have been found in many of the seizures of documentation made by the Enquiry. A complex network of intelligence of all types, was uncovered, involving the supply and exchange of information between loyalist paramilitary groups, with the Ulster Defence Association at the centre.
46. A large number of montages and similar documents have been produced over the years without there being full recognition of their value to terrorist groups and there were inadequate security procedures. Thus the ingredients were present to allow a small number of persons to abuse positions of trust, with little possibility of discovery. The Royal Ulster Constabulary has recognised the very real dangers and have adopted a policy of warning any persons identified in such documents, if evidence emerges to show that they have passed into unauthorised hands.
47. The ease with which these small number of individuals have been able to avoid discovery is perhaps the most significant factor in the illegal trafficking of Security Force documents. It is important that a firm and unequivocal stance, such as that made by the Chief Constable in his public statement of the 21st September, 1989, be taken, demonstrating the true security significance of such

information. Such a stance assists in preventing the otherwise uncommitted sympathisers from straying into illegality.

48. There is therefore a clear need for accounting systems, providing comprehensive records of the production and distribution of every document in the terrorist information system. Such a system must ensure that those responsible for passing restricted information can be traced and held criminally responsible. The physical security of such material, and the accountability of those using and managing the system, must be prime considerations. A re-assessment of security classifications of intelligence material is required, as is a common approach to the subject by all sections of the Security Forces.

49. It is recognised that the Security Forces in Northern Ireland face a uniquely difficult situation. However, a way must be found which will both satisfy the need for the Security Forces to be properly informed and effectively protect restricted information, without seriously detracting from operational effectiveness.

50. There will be a requirement for a number of Enquiry officers to remain in Northern Ireland for a limited period. At the time of writing the Report, a number of cases are still under investigation. Cases already submitted to the Director of Public Prosecutions and others of which he is

aware, remain under consideration. It is inevitable that such a detailed and wide-ranging Enquiry would require certain aspects to be finalised. The results of forensic examination of a number of exhibits are also awaited. There are therefore matters falling under the Enquiry's terms of reference which cannot, for investigative and legal reasons, be discussed here. The results of these enquiries, together with any other matters which come to light, will be reported to the Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary.

51. It must be acknowledged, that in the present climate, leakages of information from the Security Forces may never be completely eliminated. However, if the measures recommended are introduced, there is every hope that any future collusion between the Security Forces and paramilitary terrorist groups will be eradicated. Substantial improvements can be made by introducing:-

- (a) Accounting and supervisory functions to intelligence computer systems.
- (b) Procedures to restrict the production of intelligence documentation to those which are operational and necessary.
- (c) Strict controls relating to the dissemination and handling of that documentation.
- (d) Higher standards of recruitment to and retention within the Ulster Defence Regiment.

RECOMMENDATIONS

(SUMMARY)

Information and Intelligence Systems

Recommended to:-

1. Review criteria guidelines for issue of recognition information.
2. Review criteria guidelines for suspects inclusion on recognition information.
3. Review security classification of recognition information.
4. Research methods to uniquely identify documents.
5. Make document production and distribution traceable.
6. Restrict circulation of recognition information to operational needs.
7. Ensure that documents are marked "Unauthorized distribution or publication is criminal or disciplinary offence".
8. Ensure accountability of production and dissemination of recognition information.
9. Ensure a nominated person is responsible for document security.
10. Provide more secure display cabinets and storage facilities in Police Stations.

11. Ensure prevention of unauthorised copying.
12. Restrict access to display areas.
13. Apply similar criteria to computers and documentary systems.
14. Ensure information is weeded regularly.
15. Provide access levels to accommodate legitimate requirements only.
16. Enhance security of communication systems.
17. Raise awareness of technology that facilitates illicit monitoring of radio transmissions.
18. Provide supervision of radio transmissions.

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19. Form an Anti-Terrorist Branch.
20. Implement central reporting of terrorist related documentation finds.
21. Implement central registration of specified correspondence.
22. Implement a system to identify user access to computer records.
23. Introduce a system of identification features on photocopied material.
24. Review of security and supervision of photocopiers.

25. Review of physical security of terrorist recognition documents.
26. Review of security classification of terrorist recognition documents.
27. Review of system of distribution of terrorist recognition documents.
28. Notify Army of all incidents involving military personnel.
29. Establish closer liaison with Military Authorities to ensure all incidents involving Service Personnel are recorded.
30. Implement more involvement by Royal Ulster Constabulary in Vetting procedures.
31. Appoint a senior officer to have an overview of relevant document finds.
32. To notify Document Section, Northern Ireland Forensic Science Laboratory of all appropriate document finds.
33. Catalogue documents for comparison and linking purposes.
34. Ensure that all forensic applications are utilised and links established.
35. Review staffing of Document Section.
36. Obtain dehumidification chamber.
37. Maintain separate statistics for terrorist scenes visited, marks developed and identified.

38. Review management to control provision of elimination fingerprints.
39. Review quality control for photography of scenes of crime marks.
40. Implement comparison of Fingerprint Bureau files with case papers held on division.
41. Emphasise print to mark and mark to mark searching.
42. Review of functions not requiring fingerprint expertise.
43. Implement separate secure facilities for photographic negatives.
44. Give high priority to Fingerprint Branch staffing levels and standards.
45. Form a Serious Crime Unit, incorporating Fingerprints, Forensic Science and Photography.
46. Introduce Automatic Fingerprint Identification Systems.
47. Review grade of officer in charge of Fingerprint Bureau.
48. Review Fingerprint Bureau accommodation.
49. Review measurement of fingerprint expertise.

Army

- 50. Clarify interpretation of adverse vetting reports.
- 51. Redefine the responsibilities of the Royal Ulster Constabulary and Army in respect of the Ulster Defence Regiment application process.
- 52. Include Royal Ulster Constabulary representative on Application Committee for Ulster Defence Regiment.
- 53. Consider applicants' personal qualities and antecedents.
- 54. Recognise fundamental principle of Army's authority to select recruits.
- 55. Create inter-organisational Appeal process on recruitment disagreements.
- 56. Review of vetting/screening specifications.
- 57. Ensure the Ulster Defence Regiment's recruitment standards, other than educational, are comparable with that of the Royal Ulster Constabulary.
- 58. Monitor Army personnel involved in security or criminal matters.
- 59. Consider location of home address of applicants.
- 60. Recognise warning signs exhibited by personnel regarding security matters and make regular counselling available.

61. Require a declaration regarding non-membership of paramilitary organisations.
62. Agree on definition of paramilitary organisation.
63. Require disclosure of family membership of paramilitary organisations.
64. Introduce security interview of applicants.
65. Introduce interview of applicants' referees.
66. Introduce central reporting of all complaints.
67. Introduce guidelines as to the classification of criminal complaints.
68. Report all criminal allegations to the Royal Ulster Constabulary.
69. Introduce a monitoring role for the Royal Military Police (Special Investigation Branch) in respect of all complaints to identify criminal allegations.
70. Appoint a Royal Military Police (Special Investigation Branch) Liaison Officer to facilitate the above recommendations.
71. Control of production and use of terrorist recognition information in close co-operation with the Royal Ulster Constabulary, who have primary responsibility.
72. Introduce accounting procedures in terrorist recognition information production and issue.

- 73. Introduce controls on issue of updated information.
- 74. Archive records.
- 75. Introduce identification marking of documents.
- 76. Prohibit dissection of documents.
- 77. Ensure Ulster Defence Regiment duty rosters are accurate.
- 78. Provide storage facilities for documentation and equipment at places of duty.
- 79. Review security of classified documents.
- 80. Review personal protection weapon training and security.
- 81. Prohibit use of unofficial notebooks.
- 82. Introduce official notebooks for Army personnel.
- 83. Implement a retention period of official notebooks.