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Reference Code:	2016/52/31
Creation Dates:	14 March 1986
Extent and medium:	19 pages
Creator(s):	Department of the Taoiseach
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CONFIDENTIAL

14 March 1986

Seamus Mallon and the UDR

Dear Assistant Secretary

I attach a ^msubmission on the UDR from Seamus Mallon. Kevin McNamara MP will ask the House of Commons Select Committee on Monday next (17 March) to accept it and to examine the role of the UDR.

McNamara thinks the Tory majority on the Committee will vote against such a discussion in which case Mallon may go public on the submission next Wednesday, March 19.

The document was drafted by Hugo Arnold of the IIP. It is noteworthy that the general tone is reformist and only makes a passing reference to disbandment in par. 22: "Unless the UDR is disbanded, as recommended in the Kilbrandon Report, it is crucial that the regiment, in order to gain acceptance . . . should be closely monitored". In par. 12 he calls for "safeguards" and in par. 9 for a structure "to control the regiment satisfactorily".

Obviously some people will see this initiative as further provocation to the Unionists but others might see it as a legitimate means of alerting British opinion to the shortcomings of a regiment of the British Army.

Yours sincerely

Ted Smyth

Mr Eamon O Tuathail
Assistant Secretary
Department of Foreign Affairs
Dublin 2

Enc

**SUBMISSION FROM SEAMUS MALLON MP TO THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE
ARMED FORCES BILL REGARDING THE ROLE OF THE ULSTER DEFENCE
REGIMENT.**

12th March 1986.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

- PAGE 1. Written submission.
- PAGE 8. Appendix I. Origins of the Ulster Defence Regiment.
- PAGE 9. Appendix II. Numbers joining and leaving the UDR on an annual basis.
- PAGE 10. Appendix III. The strength and composition of the Security Forces in Northern Ireland, with a graph showing the change over time.
- PAGE 12. Appendix IV. A table showing the number of serious offences of which members of the UDR have been convicted.
- PAGE 13. Appendix V. Number of complaints received against members of the UDR, by battalion for the year 1985.
- PAGE 14. Appendix VI. Copy of a leaflet available in Northern Ireland outlining the procedures to be followed when making a complaint against a member of the Forces.
- PAGE 15. Appendix VII. Written reply from the Secretary for Defence concerning new training procedures introduced following the Anglo-Irish Agreement.
- Page 16. Appendix VIII. Press cuttings.

The case for discussing the role of the Ulster Defence Regiment

Why the Select Committee on the Armed Forces Bill should:

1. Look into the role of the Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR).
2. Accept an oral submission on the subject from Seamus Mallon M.P.

Why the Select Committee on the Armed Forces Bill should look into the role of the Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR).

1. The Ulster Defence Regiment was set up by Parliament following a recommendation of the Advisory Committee on Police in Northern Ireland, October 1969, (cmdnd 535) chaired by Lord Hunt, (see appendix I for details). The UDR has been the subject of considerable controversy in Northern Ireland, but Parliament has not, by and large informed itself of the nature of this controversy nor has it attempted to provide a remedy for it. Because the UDR differs in many respects from the regular British Army, this committee should consider its problems separately.
2. The Committee will be aware of the fact that Parliament recently voted overwhelmingly to support the Anglo-Irish Agreement. The Committee may be less well apprised of the level of genuine concern amongst the minority population in Northern Ireland about the Security Forces in general, and the UDR in particular. Should this Committee fail to examine an area of such central concern to the minority community, it would be failing in its duty to Parliament insofar as it has supported that agreement.
3. The UDR is the largest infantry regiment in the British Army. On 30th November 1985 the UDR had a total strength of 6,440 persons, of whom 2,689 persons were full-time and 3,751 were part-time. The UDR forms a sizeable and quite distinct section of the Army.
4. The regiment is divided into nine battalions, one of which is the largest battalion in the British Army. The 7/10 Battalion UDR operating in Belfast which has a strength of about 1360. The specific composition of the Regiment means that it has problems which are unique to it.

Seamus Mallon M.P.
REF: HA/1/T/603

5. The UDR operates in support of the civil power, mainly providing patrols in rural areas and operating roadblocks. Its duties are similar to those of the regular British Army, except that it is rarely involved in crowd control, bomb disposal or other specialist duties. Although the ordinary duties of the UDR are similar to those of the regular army, there are important differences between the two forces.

6. The UDR does not operate outside Northern Ireland except for short training periods in the United Kingdom.

7. UDR operatives live in their own homes. They lack both the safety and the discipline of barracks.

8. UDR operatives work in their own localities. This does offer local knowledge but it also makes them prey to the prejudices of their own community. The UDR is between 95% and 98% Protestant,* this factor fuels nationalist beliefs that the UDR is anti-Catholic in its outlook and operation. Working and living in their own localities makes UDR operatives potentially more vulnerable to attack than other forces, particularly when off duty. This vulnerability may explain, to some extent the numbers entering and leaving the Regiment over the years (see appendix II).

9. As can be seen from above, the UDR is not structured nor does it operate the same way as other regiments in the British Army. I believe that the structure under which it operates is not sufficient to control the regiment satisfactorily. Until it is, many of my constituents will continue to fear and distrust the UDR, and will avoid all possible contact with it.

10. It has been argued that it is necessary for a regiment of the British Army to be drawn from the local community in order to make the regular army more available for NATO commitments. This does not mean that there is no need to look at the question of the existence, composition and mode of operation of the UDR. On the contrary, if the regular BA soldiers are being replaced by

* The Secretary of State for Defence said on 24th January 1986 that "2% to 3% of the UDR stated that their religion was Roman Catholic. In 1985 4.9% of those who applied to join the regiment and 4.2% of those accepted for service during the year declared their religion as Roman Catholic.

Seamus Mallon M.P.
REF: HA/1/T/603

the UDR, as seems to be the case (see appendix III) then this committee needs to look even more urgently at this unique regiment.

11. Because almost all of its members live in the community, and a large number of them (3,751 on 30th November 1985) are part-time, the UDR cannot be subject to the same discipline as a regular member of the army. Those members who are part-time have on occasion it would seem, (see below for details), made use of their training and access to equipment to inflict suffering on other members of their community.

12. The UDR operates in a sectarian environment where there are stresses and strains and pressures which do not occur for the majority of the population of these islands. In my opinion, this situation requires more safeguards than exist for regular members of the British Army, particularly given the fact that the regiment has such a high proportion of Protestant members. How can members of the community trust and have faith in the security forces if, as is the case, the UDR is perceived as being sectarian? How can the people I represent trust them, and how can I persuade them to trust the UDR if this committee allows no means of attempting to examine the problem?

12a. There are a number of examples which show what I mean when I describe the UDR as sectarian. (i) The UDR has had a proven involvement in loyalist paramilitary groupings, for example the Miami show band murders, and the case of the Skankill Butchers both involved members of the UDR. (ii) Membership of the Orange Order and the Black Perceptory, an example of which is the charging of two members of the UDR following marching in Portadown in the summer of 1985. (iii) Open involvement in Unionist politics. There are for example members of the UDR who have been members of Armagh District Council. (iv) There were members of the UDR involved in the manning of barricades during the unionist day of action on 3rd March of this year. (v) UDR involvement in acts of intimidation, details of which I would intend supplying the committee during an oral presentation. (vi) Open hostility against members of the catholic community at vehicle check points, there have been a number of convictions for this behavior. (vii) Finally, open hostility towards members of the catholic community while patrolling towns such as Armagh, details of which are a matter of record.

13. The procedure for complaints, (see appendix VI) in my

Seamus Mallon M.P.
REF: HA/1/T/603

opinion, gives little encouragement to members of the minority community to do what, as a citizen is their duty, namely the reporting of incidents involving harassment and intimidation. The procedure, coupled with an inherent distrust of the Security Forces by the minority community presents a particular set of problems (see appendix VIII). This situation may account for the low level of complaints received during 1985 (see appendix V). In practice a lot of the complaints that should be made, are not in fact criminal in terms of the law. As a result the RUC will not deal with them. This involves dealing with the UDR directly, in the hope that they might investigate the complaint under service law. In practice, this means that most members of the catholic community will be reluctant to report a complaint unless it is criminal in nature.

14. There are two areas of concern which I would like to bring to the attention of the committee in order to impress upon them the seriousness of the case for examining the UDR. These are (a) the problem of high criminality rates among the UDR and (b) the question of the high proportion of civilian casualties among fatalities caused by the UDR.

(a) High Criminality Rates Among the UDR:

15. There is evidence to suggest that for certain areas of crime, the percentage of persons in the UDR convicted for some of those crimes, forms a higher proportion than for other sections of the community.

Chargings

16. It would appear that chargings of serious crimes, (cases involving the use of firearms and assault) amount to 2.6% of the average for the British Army and UDR, 1.7% of the RUC and RUCR compared with a 0.7% charging rate among the civilian population.

Convictions

17. In the case of convictions there is evidence to suggest that convictions for murder, manslaughter and assault among members of the UDR are substantially higher than convictions for scheduled offences among the Northern Ireland population (1.3% for the UDR and 0.6% for the Northern Ireland population).

18. To December 1985 eight soliders serving with the UDR had been convicted of murder, six of manslaughter and some eighty of

Seamus Mallon M.P.
REF: HA/1/T/603

assault see (appendix IX).

19. The data that is available would seem to suggest that members of the UDR form a high proportion of those charged or convicted of scheduled offences and other serious crimes such as murder manslaughter etc., (see appendix IV). In turn this would suggest that there may be a case for the claim by some members of the nationalist community, that members of the UDR use their position to further unlawful aims.

(b) The Question of the High Proportion of Civilian Casualties Among Fatalities Caused by the UDR.

20. While the UDR is continually praised for the work it does in supporting the RUC, the statistics relating to its accuracy and effectiveness are less than encouraging. The UDR to date, has been responsible for 0.2% of fatal casualties, however of that percentage 80% have been civilians. This makes it second only to Loyalist Paramilitaries in having the highest percentage of civilian casualties as a total of those killed by the agency.

21. While the figures on criminality rates are tentative due to the lack of data available,* the implications are serious enough to warrant further investigation. The Government regularly refuses detailed information on the classification and outcome of trials concerning the Army serving in Northern Ireland. This committee could elicit further details on this and other areas concerning the UDR.

22. Until the UDR is disbanded, as recommended in the Kilbrandon Report, it is crucial that the regiment, in order to gain acceptance into some parts of the community, and for the more effective carrying out of its duties, should be closely monitored. This factor has to some extent, been recognised following the Anglo-Irish Agreement when there were some changes in training procedures, see appendix VII. This committee is in a position to provide the House with informed comment and information to ensure that any changes that take place are for the better.

* (This data has been computed on the basis of information obtained through the Solicitor General, Parliamentary questions and research carried out by the Irish Information Partnership.

Seamus Mallon M.P.
REF: HA/1/T/603

23. Specifically, it is necessary to rid the suspicion that exists, that there is and has in the past been a soft approach to crimes committed by the UDR.

24. To establish what exactly are the facts and the figures pertaining to the UDR. This is a unique opportunity to examine and discuss on the basis of facts, in addition to the valuable contribution that would come from verbal submissions, what the problems and fears of people are, rather than what they are supposed to be or might be.

Why the Select Committee on the Armed Forces Bill Should Accept an Oral Submission From Seamus Mallon MP.

25. As a representative of the community that has been most affected by the UDR, I am deeply concerned that the UDR is a major source of alienation for nationalist people. As a politician, who operates on the basis of constitutional politics, I feel it is necessary that the people I represent should feel secure that the political system which they support is seen to seek out the facts about an issue which affects their daily lives and about which there is a great deal of suspicion. I am only too aware of the problems for democracy when there is insufficient informed political control exercised over the forces responsible for maintaining law and order.

26. The Nationalist community sees the UDR as being made up of men and women, most of whom are Protestant, who enjoy a position of power. The UDR is sometimes seen as abusing that power with alleged harassment and intimidation of the Nationalist community. Alleged harassment only becomes noticeable to the outsider when it manifests itself in the form of a chargeable offence. An oral submission would allow you to assess to some degree, the UDR's impact on the community which is not otherwise easily measurable. The degree of intimidation and degradation experienced by some people could be described to the committee verbally.

27. I should like to impress upon you the concern that the SDLP feels over the possible risk and the danger that the UDR may inject into a situation where we are trying to persuade people that constitutional nationalism, along the lines of the Anglo-Irish Agreement is the only safe way forward.

Seamus Mallon M.P.
REF: HA/1/T/603

Conclusions.

28. It is a fact that suspicion and mistrust of the UDR does exist amongst some sections of the community in Northern Ireland. The reasons for that suspicion are complicated. However, there would seem to be little doubt that the problem as it exists, pertains to Northern Ireland only, and is unique in the sense that the problems do not exist in any other regiment in the British Army to the same extent or in the same way.

29. The Committee should be particularly concerned to examine such problematic features of the UDR as its high (in relation to the civilian population and other forces) criminality rates, the fact that it draws so few of its recruits from the Catholic population, the fact that so many of the people killed by UDR operatives in the line of duty have been civilians and the fact that the UDR is highly unpopular with the Catholic population.

30. The UDR was a major area of concern to nationalists in the period leading up to the Anglo-Irish Agreement, and is major bone of contention amongst the nationalist population. If this committee were to look into the role of the UDR, it would be looking into an important aspect of relations between the nationalist community and the security forces in Northern Ireland, which is central to the Anglo-Irish Agreement.

31. I am in the somewhat unenviable position of having a great deal of knowledge and experience of the UDR. There is little doubt that the UDR, although part of the British Army, is also an entity in itself. Discipline, one of the areas this committee has been set up to look at, is at the heart of much of the resentment felt by the Catholic community towards the UDR. I recently entered Parliament having won a seat from a unionist. I also won it at the expense of the Sinn Fein vote. It is recognised that I have a critical view of the UDR and I would now like an opportunity to make my case on that issue, on behalf of the people who elected me to do just that.

Seamus Mallon M.P.
REF: HA/1/T/603

APPENDIX I

Origins of the Ulster Defence Regiment.

The UDR was set up on the recommendation of The Report of the Advisory Committee on Police in Northern Ireland, October 1969, Cmd 535. chaired by Lord Hunt.

In the report the following recommendations were made,

- (a) A locally recruited part-time force, under the command of the G.O.C., Northern Ireland, should be raised as soon as possible for such duties as may be laid upon it. We consider that its strength need not be as high as that of the Ulster Special Constabulary and suggest that 4,000 should be sufficient.
- (b) The nature, establishment and equipment....should be decided by Her Majesty's Government at Westminster, in consultation with the Government of Northern Ireland.
- (c) The policy for the use of force should be decided by the G.O.C., Northern Ireland in close consultation with Government of Northern Ireland.
- (d) The new force together with the police volunteer reserve, should replace the Ulster Special Constabulary.

IRISH INFORMATION PARTNERSHIP:

TABLE SHOWING THE NUMBER OF OPERATIVES BY RANK, WHO HAVE JOINED THE ULSTER DEFENCE REGIMENT AND ITS RESERVE, AND THOSE WHO HAVE RESIGNED IN EACH YEAR SINCE ITS INCEPTION.

YEAR	INTAKE		OUTFLOW	
	OFFICERS	OTHER RANKS	OFFICERS	OTHER RANKS
1975/76	59	1,634	38	1,214
1976/77	37	1,691	36	1,191
1977/78	55	1,931	54	1,301
1978/79	64	1,731	43	1,515
1979/80	34	1,331	40	1,236
1980/81	39	1,509	38	1,105
1981/82	26	1,211	51	1,207
1982/83	26	1,488	47	1,114
1983/84	36	966	30	1,076
TOTAL	376	13,492	377	10,959

SOURCE: HANSARD: COMMONS: 12/10/84: WRITTEN ANSWER NO. 35

IRISH INFORMATION PARTNERSHIP: AGENDA: CATEGORY B: SECTION TWO:
 QUANTITATIVE INFORMATION: VIOLENCE, TERRORISM, MILITARY,
 PARAMILITARY, SECURITY AND POLICE AFFAIRS.

TABLE B9: STRENGTH OF BRITISH SECURITY FORCES IN NORTHERN IRELAND
 AND STRENGTH OF POLICE, 1969-1985.

YEAR	(1)	RUC FULL-TIME	RUC RESERVISTS FULL-TIME	RUC RESERVISTS PART-TIME	TOTAL RUC	UDR PART-TIME	UDR FULL-TIME	TOTAL UDR	TOTAL "ULSTERISED" SECURITY FORCES	BRITISH ARMY (3)	TERRITORIAL ARMY	TOTAL SECURITY FORCES
1969	(2)(3)	3,061	0	0	3,061				3,061			
1969		3,044	0	0	3,044				3,044	2,693	NA	5,737
1970		3,809	0	436	4,245	2,243	49	2,292	6,537	7,952	NA	14,489
1971		4,086	0	1,284	5,370	3,880	234	4,114	9,484	7,662	NA	17,146
1972		4,257	153	1,981	6,391	8,117	645	8,762	15,153	14,258	NA	29,411
1973		4,391	290	2,224	6,905	7,444	833	8,277	15,182	17,183	NA	32,365
1974		4,564	510	3,350	8,424	6,934	890	7,824	16,248	15,848	NA	32,096
1975		4,902	661	4,158	9,721	6,227	1,427	7,654	17,375	14,550	NA	31,925
1976		5,253	870	3,827	9,950	6,214	1,524	7,738	17,688	14,441	2,773	34,902
1977		5,692	1,002	3,684	10,378	5,951	1,693	7,644	18,022	14,245	2,905	35,172
1978		6,110	1,188	3,417	10,715	5,670	2,192	7,862	18,577	14,147	2,875	35,599
1979		6,642	1,305	3,209	11,156	5,154	2,469	7,623	18,779	13,124	2,892	34,795
1980		6,943	1,685	3,067	11,695	5,179	2,554	7,733	19,428	12,976	3,016	35,420
1981		7,334	2,060	2,810	12,204	4,741	2,738	7,479	19,683	11,271	3,174	34,128
1982		7,718	2,174	2,666	12,558	4,391	2,739	7,130	19,688	11,040	3,203	33,931
1983		8,003	2,295	2,198	12,496	4,342	2,793	7,135	19,631	9,516	3,466	32,613
1984		8,127	2,532	1,987	12,646	4,094	2,683	6,777	19,423	9,110	3,479	32,012
1985 (4)		8,205	2,643	1,813	12,661	3,742	2,691	6,433	19,094	8,669	3,876	31,639

NOTES:

- (1) AS AT DEC 31 EACH YEAR, UNLESS OTHERWISE STATED.
 (2) AS AT JUNE 30, 1969.
 (3) EXCLUDING TERRITORIAL ARMY.
 (4) AT JUNE 30, 1985 FOR RUC, NOV 30, 1985 FOR OTHERS.
 * EXCLUDING B-SPECIALS

SOURCE:

- NIO AND PARLIAMENTARY QUESTIONS.
 HANSARD: COMMONS: 1/18/84: WRITTEN ANSWER NO. 9.
 HANSARD: COMMONS: 7/25/84: WRITTEN ANSWERS NOS. 26 & 27.
 HANSARD: COMMONS: 2/ 8/84: COL. 713.
 HANSARD: COMMONS: 2/ 8/84: WRITTEN REPLY NO. 90.
 HANSARD: COMMONS: 12/11/84: COL. 416.
 HANSARD: COMMONS: WRITTEN REPLY No 8: 7/24/85
 HANSARD: COMMONS: WRITTEN REPLY No 5: 7/24/85
 HANSARD: COMMONS: WRITTEN REPLY No 14: 01/24/86

TABLE B9

IRISH INFORMATION PARTNERSHIP: AGENDA: CATEGORY A: SECTION TWO:
 QUANTITATIVE INFORMATION: LEGAL, JUSTICE AND CIVIL RIGHTS.

TABLE A11: SERVING SOLDIERS CONVICTED OF SERIOUS OFFENCES SINCE
 THE FORMATION OF THE UDR AND NUMBERS CHARGED WITH SERIOUS OFFENCES
 SINCE MAY 1983.

SERVING SOLDIERS CONVICTED OF SERIOUS OFFENCES
 SINCE THE FORMATION OF THE UDR AS AT DECEMBER 1985.

OFFENCE	TO DEC 1984	1985
	NUMBER CONVICTED	
MURDER	8	
MANSLAUGHTER	6	
ASSAULT	80 (1)	
DISCHARGING FIREARMS IN A PUBLIC PLACE:		1
ASSAULT OCCASIONING ACTUAL BODILY HARM:		1
OTHER NON SCHEDULED OFFENCES		1

NUMBERS CHARGED WITH SERIOUS OFFENCES MAY 1983 TO DECEMBER 1984
 NUMBERS FOR WHICH DIRECTIONS HAVE BEEN ISSUED TO PROSECUTE DURING 1985

	TO DEC 1984	1985
MURDER		1 (2)
POSS. OF FIREARM WITHOUT A CERTIFICATE		1
UNLAWFUL DISCHARGE OF A FIREARM IN A PUBLIC PLACE		2
POSSESSION OF FIREARMS	3	
BOMB HOAXES	2	
MAKING PETROL BOMBS	1	
ARSON	1	
DRUNK IN CHARGE OF FIREARMS	1	
ASSAULT OCCASIONING ACTUAL BODILY HARM		5
OTHER NON SCHEDULED		18

(1) THE MAJORITY OF THESE ASSAULTS HAVE CONCERNED DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
 (2) THIS PERSON IS ALSO BEING PROSECUTED FOR 3 OTHER OFFENCES IN THE SAME
 PROCEEDINGS, NAMELY POSS. OF A FIREARM WITH INTENT TO ENDANGER LIFE,
 COLLECTING INFORMATION LIKELY TO BE USEFUL TO TERRORISTS AND ARMED ROBBERY.

SOURCE:
 HANSARD: COMMONS: 12/10/84: WRITTEN ANSWER NO. 45:
 HANSARD: COMMONS: 7/26/85: WRITTEN ANSWER COL 879
 HANSARD: COMMONS: 1/16/86: WRITTEN ANSWER NO. 244.

TABLE A11



THURSDAY 27 FEBRUARY 1986

PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR DEFENCE PROCUREMENT

MR KEVIN McNAMARA (LABOUR) (KINGSTON UPON HULL NORTH)

51 Mr McNamara - To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, how many complaints his Department received of conduct of members of the Ulster Defence Regiment by battalion operating area, indicating which area, for each of the last five years, and indicating how many led to disciplinary action against the member of the Ulster Defence Regiment involved and indicating what action was taken.

A N S W E R

(Mr John Lee)

The information is not available in the form requested. However, available records show that in 1985 the number of complaints received against UDR personnel accused of misconduct of a non-criminal nature, broken down into individual battalions, was as follows:

1/9	UDR:	3
2	UDR:	1
3	UDR:	8
4	UDR:	13
5	UDR:	0
6	UDR:	1
7/10	UDR:	9
8	UDR:	2
11	UDR:	4

Ministry of Defence

Thursday 27th February 1986

CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS

6. The DPP will direct the RUC, on the basis of the available evidence, whether or not a prosecution should take place. The RUC will in turn notify the complainant. If there is a prosecution the complainant may expect to be called to give evidence before the courts.

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

7. If the RUC decide that there is no basis for a criminal investigation or if the DPP directs that there should be no prosecution in the civil courts, the complaint will be forwarded by the RUC to the military authorities for further consideration. Where appropriate, disciplinary proceedings under Service law may be taken even if no criminal offence has been committed. Where cases are referred to the military authorities in this way, the complainant will be notified by them of the outcome.

Headquarters Northern Ireland
November 1985

COMPLAINTS AGAINST MEMBERS OF HM FORCES

1. Members of HM Forces serving in Northern Ireland act in support of the RUC to uphold the law and to maintain the peace. They are trained to be polite and impartial towards members of the public when carrying out these duties. Like any other citizen they are subject to the law of the land and in addition are subject to military discipline. This leaflet explains the procedure for members of the public who consider they have grounds for complaint about the conduct of a member of HM Forces serving in Northern Ireland. The leaflet also explains how complaints are investigated and what action may be taken on them.

2. Before a complaint is made, please think carefully whether the complaint really is against the conduct of Service personnel; it might for example be against a particular law under which they are acting.

MAKING A COMPLAINT

3. A complaint about the conduct of a member of HM Forces should normally be made in the first instance to the RUC. This should be done either by writing to the Chief Constable at RUC Headquarters, 'Brooklyn', Knock Road, Belfast BT5 8LE, or by calling at any police station. Where the complaint is a minor one, it could be addressed to the local Army unit. Alternatively the local Civil Representative will be happy to try to resolve any problem. The local Police Station will be able to provide appropriate telephone numbers and addresses.

4. In order that the complaint can be investigated as fully and as quickly as possible, details of the date, time and place of the incident, together with a brief description of the circumstances and the identities of the Service personnel involved should be provided where possible. A brief statement should also be included indicating in what way it is believed the Service personnel concerned acted improperly.

INVESTIGATION OF COMPLAINT

5. When a complaint is received the RUC will first determine whether an offence against the criminal law may have been committed. If so the police will look further into the complaint and on completion of their enquiries will refer the matter to the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP). Because of the nature of enquiries, the investigation of complaints necessarily can take some time to complete.

MONDAY 16 DECEMBER 1985

MR KEVIN MCNAMARA (LABOUR)(KINGSTON UPON HULL NORTH)

181 Mr McNamara
W

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, if he will publish in the Official Report the new training procedures for the Ulster Defence Regiment.

A N S W E R

(Mr Stanley)

(Pursuant to his answer on 16 December (Vol 89 Col 102);

I regret that the original answer given was incomplete.

The full answer should read:

Training in all branches of the Armed Forces is kept under review in an effort to identify possible improvements and a number of such improvements in the training of the UDR have either recently been set in hand or are about to be introduced, as follows:

- a. The basic training of part-time members of the regiment is to be increased from 9 to 14 days. The extra 5 days will be completed within the recruits' first 3 months of service.
- b. Until now UDR officers, full or part-time, have attended a two week course at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, but from next year selected Permanent Cadre officers will be eligible to attend the six month Standard Military Course taken by potential officers in the Regular Army.
- c. UDR officers and NCOs already attend some courses in Great Britain in company with affiliated regular battalions and it is planned to extend this with a scheme of voluntary attachments of up to 6 weeks to infantry battalions in Great Britain.

d. A number of additional training posts are also being created within the UDR itself. There will be a new post at HQ UDR with specific responsibility for training throughout the Regiment which will be filled by a Lt Col reporting directly to Commander UDR. A senior NCO from the Regular Army will be attached to each UDR battalion to assist with training and also to the Regiment's training centre at Ballykinler. These NCOs will assist both with the additional recruit training mentioned above and with training generally.

Ministry of Defence

19 December 1985