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European Political Co-operation

Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the Ten, Luxembourg, 26/27 April 1982

Steering Note

1. At the meeting of the Political Committee on 22/23 April, the Presidency indicated that a number of political topics would be discussed by Ministers at their lunch on Tuesday, 27 April. However, it is possible that one or more topics could arise at other times en marge of the Foreign Affairs Council on 26/27 April 1982 in bilateral discussions. The following are the topics indicated by the Presidency:-

- The Falkland Islands problem
 - review of latest developments in Falkland crisis;
 - question of Presidency approach to third countries to seek support for position of the Ten and non-circumvention of measures already taken by the Community;
 - UK request for a factual statement on export credits to Argentina;
- The Middle East
 - text on Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai; Ten statement or press guidelines for use by the Presidency;
 - visit of Mr. Tindemans to the Middle East;
- The European Parliament mission to Pakistan: refusal to grant entry to Mr. Israel;
- Themes to be discussed at informal Ministerial meeting at Villers-le-Temple on 8/9 May 1982.

*Speech normally
for information
26/4
AB*

Falkland Island Problem

2. The UK Foreign Secretary, Mr. Pym, will probably be asked to report on the latest developments, particularly on his recent visit to Washington and the negotiations through Mr. Haig. Partners will also be interested to ascertain whether there is a likelihood of an early use of force by the UK naval task force in the South Atlantic. There could also be discussion on the position of the Ten in the event of the UK taking further military action (imposition of an air exclusion zone, action to re-occupy South Georgia, attacks on Argentine vessels or planes or action to re-occupy the Falkland Islands themselves). Virtually all partners will want to encourage the UK to use peaceful means but the UK may seek to explore the degree to which it might be able to obtain Ten support for some form of military action in the event of breakdown of the Haig mediation effort.

3. The Presidency is likely to report on the discussions at the Political Committee on 22/23 April on the question of a proposed approach by the Presidency to a number of third countries seeking their support for the position and action taken by the Ten. Partners have been asked to submit suggestions on the list of countries that could be approached in the event of Ministers giving their agreement to the proposal. The Minister will be asked whether he is in a position to lift the Irish reserve on the text presented by the Presidency at the meeting of the Political Committee. All other partners have indicated that they can accept the text. Separate notes on this issue are attached.

4. The UK has asked her Community partners bilaterally to agree to a factual statement that "in present circumstances in Argentina there will not in practice be any new offers of officially supported export credits from any member State of the European Community". It seems likely that most partners will be willing to go along with this request which falls short of a formal Ten/Community decision on export credits. The important feature of the UK request is not so much the economic effect of the statement but what political impact it may have in Argentina. For Ireland, our attitude to the UK request is subject to the same political considerations as our attitude to the proposed Presidency approach to third countries.

The Middle East

5. The Presidency may report that, following discussion at the Political Committee on 22/23 April, two Middle East texts were prepared: one on Lebanon following last week's bombings by Israel (this likely to be agreed by COREU and published before Ministers meet); the other on Israel's withdrawal from Sinai which Ministers will be asked to approve. The text on the Sinai agreed at official level contains a useful

re-affirmation of the Ten's position on the need for further progress towards a Middle East peace settlement on the basis of the central principles of the Venice Declaration of June 1980. Ministers will also be asked to indicate whether the text should be issued as a formal statement by the Ten or instead serve as agreed guidelines for use by the Presidency in talking to the press after the meeting. Because of the useful reaffirmation of the Ten's position, it is suggested that the Minister might express a preference for a formal statement.

6. Mr. Tindemans, in his capacity as President-in-Office of the Ten, intends to visit four Middle East countries shortly (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Israel and Egypt). At the Political Committee on 22/23 April it was underlined that Mr. Tindemans would not undertake any new initiative, but rather establish contact and seek information on the general attitude of the countries he will visit, towards future prospects in the Middle East. The UK Foreign Secretary, Mr. Pym, will also be making shortly, bilateral visits to Syria and Jordan. Ministers are likely to be asked to endorse Mr. Tindemans' visit to the area.

European Parliament mission to Pakistan

7. Mr. Tindemans promised the European Parliament last week that he would raise with his colleagues the refusal of the Pakistani authorities to allow Mr. Israel (French-European Progressive Democrat) entry to Pakistan as part of a three-person delegation of the Political Affairs Committee of the European Parliament sent to meet the Afghan resistance leaders to obtain information on the situation of Afghan refugees in Afghanistan/Pakistan border region. Apparently, Pakistan, an Islamic nation, objected to Mr. Israel because of his name, his religion (Jewish), and his outspoken support for Israel in the Arab-Israeli conflict. In particular, Pakistan says that public opinion would be hostile to Mr. Israel because of inflamed feelings over the recent shooting in the Al-Agsa mosque by a US-born Israeli soldier. The European Parliament reacted angrily to the Pakistani action and adopted a resolution which, inter alia, calls on the Community to review its relations with Pakistan. Pakistan receives substantial aid from the Community. Mr. Tindemans may propose a joint protest by the Ten to Pakistan. The UK, at official level, was not enthusiastic about action by the Ten on the grounds that it is open to any country to refuse entry to non-citizens. The UK representative said that the UK did not protest when the US refused a visa to Mr. Paisley, also a member of the European Parliament. The UK has sought to make common cause with Islamic countries on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and its cautious attitude on the Mr. Israel affair is likely to reflect concern that this solidarity with Pakistan and other Islamic countries could be affected by a tough reaction by the Ten. Other partners, however, including France, Germany, the Netherlands and Denmark are likely to support action by the Ten. On the face of it, the reported Pakistani attitude to Mr. Israel is highly objectionable and the Minister may wish to support those who

favour a protest by the Ten to Pakistan.

Informal meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Ten

8. During each six-month Presidency, Foreign Ministers of the Ten together with the President of the Commission meet informally over a weekend at a secluded venue for the purpose of reflecting together confidentially on current and long-term issues facing the Community and the Ten in political co-operation. The Ministers meet without advisors, other than an interpreter. Strictly speaking there is no obligation to take decisions or to discuss matters of detail but the informal meetings often lead to conclusions or to a consensus upon which further work at official level is based. The informal meeting during the Belgian Presidency will take place on 8/9 May 1982 at Villers -le-Temple, about 89 kilometres East of Brussels.

9. At the Political Committee on 22/23 April, delegations indicated that the following themes might be raised at the informal meeting:-

- Transatlantic Relations (improving consultations with the US);
- The Middle East (the future of European activity on promoting a Middle East settlement);
- the Falkland Islands crisis;
- The Genscher/Colombo initiative on European Union (possibly further guidelines for work underway at official level on economic, institutional, security, cultural and legal issues);
- Europe's role in the current international situation (this is an Italian suggestion).

Mr. Tindemans is expected, on 26/27 April to suggest these themes to his colleagues. It is possible that Ministers may identify a few other additional topics.

Falkland Islands Dispute

Proposed Demarche to certain Third Countries

Recommendation

- (I) We are isolated on this issue. The other eight countries view the British request as a reasonable and logical step by the TEN and the Community, to try to ensure that the measures which they have taken collectively are not evaded or their impact dissipated: Commercial common sense is also a factor - it is only prudent to try to ensure that other countries do not exploit the situation caused by a blockage of trade with Argentina to the disadvantage of the community.
- (II) The other eight countries may doubt if the approaches will bring positive results, nonetheless they will go along - in "the spirit of community solidarity".
- (III) The UK is explicitly making the issue one of community solidarity - not of support for the UK. This is evident from the speaking note left behind him by Ambassador Figg.
- (IV) The substance of what the Presidency is to do in the event of agreement has been watered down considerably. It now amounts to (a) drawing the attention of certain countries to the measures taken by the TEN and explaining the reasons why - in terms of seeking implementation of Security Council Resolution 502, support for the Haig mission and promotion of a peaceful outcome to the crisis; (b) in the case of the OECD countries, asking for support for the political position of the TEN (not just that of the UK). In addition these countries will be asked not to allow circumvention of the measures taken by the TEN and the Community and in consequence to take appropriate measures themselves.
- (V) Against this background it is likely that at the meeting on Monday, other partners, and not just Britain, will press the Minister to agree to the consensus and thus to go along with a proposal which they see as a corollary of the collective decision taken by the TEN and the Community on April 10.

- (VI) A refusal by Ireland to agree will block a consensus. Consequently it is likely that the UK will ask the other 8 to make the approaches unilaterally. The others may be reluctant to do so and they will resent the fact that our refusal to agree to the consensus will have had the effect of putting pressure on them to act individually. Action by the Presidency - especially since the chances of success are not high would be largely a pro-forma gesture. A series of approaches, however, raises the profile of each country which does so.
- (VII) Alternatively, the UK may suggest that the Presidency speak on behalf of the majority of the TEN. This was in effect done in the case of the sanctions against the USSR when Greece was isolated. The others might well agree to this procedure which would have the effect of making our isolation all the greater. (If this were to become public it could be quite damaging to Irish prestige particularly in the US where the tide of public opinion is running strongly against the Argentine action and where support for the UK as the injured party is coming from surprising quarters).
- (VIII) The consequences of a negative stance by Ireland in terms of Anglo-Irish relations, are unlikely to be helpful.
- (IX) Finally, on the farm price question - a negative stance will be likely to increase rather than reduce British intransigence.
- (X) If, on the contrary, Ireland were to take a positive approach and agree to go along with the consensus, the following advantages can be pointed to -
- a) we have made our reluctance plain at official level among the TEN.
 - b) We have done so bilaterally to the British at Political level.
 - c) The implied link with the UK intransigence on the Farm Price issue has been made.

(d) In agreeing, the point might be further emphasised subtly, so as to enlist the support of the other eight in putting additional pressure on the UK to accede to a positive and early outcome to the Farm Price issue.

(XI) In sum, therefore it is recommended that the balance of advantage for Ireland lies with:

- agreeing to go along with the consensus and thus
- enabling the Presidency demarche to proceed on the lines of the text drawn up ad referendum by the Presidency on the basis of the discussions in the political committee. *

XII A suggested line to take and speaking points in relation to

- (a) A positive position and
- (b) A negative position are attached separately.

Political Division
Department of Foreign Affairs

25 April, 1982

* An unofficial translation of this paper is attached.

Falkland Islands Dispute

Demarche to Third Countries

Suggested Line to take: Speaking Points.

A. If it is agreed to accede to the UK request.

1. We have certain reservations about the prudence and propriety of the Ten urging third countries in effect to apply sanctions against Argentina, particularly in the absence of a juridical basis for doing so - e.g. a new Security Council Resolution.

2. Moreover, the actions taken to date in a spirit of community solidarity have given rise to domestic criticism in Ireland, where the farming community, in particular, contrast the solidarity displayed by the Ten in relation to the UK's predicament in the case of the Falklands, with what is viewed as a conspicuous lack of solidarity by the UK in relation to the farm price issue. This is a question of great political importance for my government.

3. Consequently, it would make the position of my Government easier - and enable us to accede to the British request if:

First - The approach to be made to third countries should not be presented as a demand that they apply sanctions. The differentiated approach suggested in the Presidency Paper, in our view meets this point adequately. It is also the kind of approach which is realistic in circumstances where the Ten are operating in the absence of a Security Council "cover".

Secondly It would be helpful to my government if our British colleague (Francis Pym) could give some indication that an early and positive outcome may be expected to the Farm Price issue, an immediate question; or at least bear this aspect in mind in the discussions on this issue.

B. If it is decided to maintain our opposition;

The argument might be made that:

- 1. We doubt if this is a good idea. -
We understand that the British have already approached all the countries concerned (presumably without much success). For the Presidency to do so is not likely to be more successful since they must be well aware of the Ten's stance.
- 2. No matter how we water down our approach, it is likely to be seen as an effort to press others to take sanctions against Argentina - in a situation where (as the Japanese have already pointed out, they may argue that they cannot do so in the absence of the new Security Council Resolution).
- 3. A conspicuous failure to secure the support sought could be counterproductive and diminish the impact already made by the solidarity displayed by the Ten.
- 4. Public opinion in Ireland is uneasy about these measures - particularly in the event of active conflict. The farm lobby is especially unsympathetic for reasons which would be obvious.

Political Division
Department of Foreign Affairs

25 April, 1982.