

NATIONAL ARCHIVES

IRELAND



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IMMEDIATE FOR THURSDAY
26/9/79

TO HQ FROM PMUN NEWYORK
FOR SECRETARY FROM DORR

Mr. Smith

CODED MESSAGE
IMMEDIATE PRIORITY
CONFIDENTIAL
DATE <u>27/9/79</u> 0930
INT. <u>Admit</u>

COMCEN PLEASE COPY TO FOLLOWING

A/SEC POWER
A/SEC HEASLIP
A/SEC NELIGAN
A/SEC MSLA

AND TO MRS MCDONAGH POLITICAL (WHO WILL CIRCULATE FURTHER AS APPROPRIATE)

Mr. Siew

To see in particular re guns.

Please copy paras 12-15 on 42/4/10

Mr. O'Higgins

MMM

copy on 31/1

MINISTERS BILATERAL MEETINGS IN NEWYORK - USA, YUGOSLAVIA, IRAQ, VENEZUELA 25TH SEPTEMBER.

1. MINISTER HAD BILATERAL MEETINGS IN NEW YORK ON 25TH SEPTEMBER WITH US SECRETARY OF STATE VANCE AND WITH FOREIGN MINISTERS OF YUGOSLAVIA, IRAQ AND VENEZUELA. HE LATER MET SINGAPORE FOREIGN MINISTER AT DINNER GIVEN BY AMBASSADOR FOR MEMBERS OF ASEAN GROUP. HE ALSO GREETED MORE BRIEFLY AT THE ASSEMBLY SEVERAL OTHER FOREIGN MINISTERS INCLUDING AUSTRIA AND TURKEY
2. FOLLOWING IS BRIEF SUMMARY OF MAIN POINTS AT BILATERAL TALKS. PENDING MORE DETAILED REPORT IN DUE COURSE.

12. VANCE SAID THAT CARRINGTON'S SUGGESTION TO HIM HAD BEEN TO AGREE TO SEEL A SMALL AMOUNT OF ARMS TO REESTABLISH THE PRINCIPLE THAT THE US DOES NOT PLACE POLICE AND TERRORISTS ON THE SAME FOTTING OR TRY TO MAINTAIN NEUTRALITY BETWEEN THEM. THEN THE UK WOULD CEASE TO LOOK FOR FURTHER PURCHASES OF ARMS FOR THE RUC SINCE THEY COULD VERY WELL BE GOT ELSEWHERE.

13. THE MINISTER COMMENTING ON THIS LAST POINT, WELCOMED CARRINGTONS INTEREST BUT AVOID ENDORSING THE PROPOSAL, SAYING (JOKINGLY) THAT HE WOULD PREFER A 3-WAY DISCUSSION ON SUCH ISSUES INVOLVING HIMSELF, CARRINGTON AND VANCE,. MORE GENERALLY HE STRESSED THE NEED TO KEEP A CLEAR DISTINCTION BETWEEN RESPONSIBLE IRISH AMERICAN LEADERS AND PEOPLE SUCH AS BIAGGI AND MCMANUS. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO ISOLATE THE LATTER AND NOT TO HAND THEM A READY-MADE ISSUE WHICH THE COULD EXPLOIT TO SHOW THEIR OWN RELEVANCE.

14. THE RUC AS SUCH IS NOT A MAJOR ISSUE IN IRELAND AT PRESENT. WE ARE INCREASING COOPERATION BETWEEN THE GARDAI AND THE RUC AND EVERYONE RECOGNISES THAT THE RUC SHOULD BE ARMED. WE CANNOT, OF COURSE, IGNORE THAT THERE ARE STILL SOME ELEMENTS IN THE RUC RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SITUATION WHICH PREVAILED AT CASTLEREAGH. THESE ARE AN ISOLATED GROUP BUT THEY SHOULD BE REMOVED.

WE ARE NOT ATTACKING THE RUC BUT THE DANGER IS THAT THE REQUEST TO PURCHASE GUNS, HANDS TO THE PROVO SUPPORTERS HERE A READY -MADE SYMBOLIC ISSUE WHICH CAN BE EXPLOITED. WE DOUBTED WHETHER RUC REALLY NEEDED THESE ARMS AND THEIR PURCHASE HAD BECOME AN ISSUE AND COULD BECOME A BIGGER ISSUE.

15. VANCE ACCEPTED THAT THE US AUTHORITIES WOULD HAVE TO WRESTLE WITH THE PROBLEM OVER THE NEXT FEW MONTHS AND EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE ACCOUNT WHICH THE MINISTER GAVE OF THE SITUATION AS HE SAW IT.

? FOREIGN MINISTER OF IRAQ

16. THE IRAQI MINISTER OUTLINED THE PRINCIPLES WHICH GUIDE THEIR APPROACH TO FOREIGN RELATIONS, STEERING THEIR WISH, WITHOUT PRESSING TOO MUCH, TO DEVELOP CONTACTS AND FRIENDSHIPS WITH OTHER SMALL COUNTRIES WHO HAVE "SIMILAR GOOD INTENTIONS". SUCH CONTACTS HAD ALREADY BEGUN WITH IRELAND AND COULD BE INCREASED IN TRADE, CULTURAL MATTERS AND ANY OTHER FIELD. THE AREA AND EXTENT WOULD BE LEFT TO US.

17. THE MINISTER RECALLED OUR OWN APPROACH, SUBJECT TO THE LIMITS ON OUR RESOURCES IN PERSONNEL ETC., AND REFERRED TO VARIOUS CONTACTS OF IRISH MINISTERS WITH IRAQ. HE ALSO EXPLAINED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NEW NATIONAL AGENCY WHICH WOULD ALLOW US MORE EASILY TO MAKE STATE LEVEL CONTACTS AND HE EXPLAINED OUR ECONOMIC POSITION, OUR NEED FOR GROWTH AND OUR DEPENDENCE ON ENERGY.

18. THE IRAQI MINISTER SAID THAT WITH SOME EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, IRAQ HAD FOUND THAT THEY DEVELOPED GOOD UNDERSTANDING BUT HAD PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES IN CARRYING THROUGH AGREEMENTS BECAUSE OF DIFFERENCES IN POLITICAL AND GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURES. BETWEEN IRAQ AND COUNTRIES WHERE THE MATTERS IN QUESTION WERE NOT DEALT WITH BY STATE ENTERPRISES. THE IRAQI APPROACH IN GENERAL WAS TO SIGN AN ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION AGREEMENT SETTING OUT GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND SPECIFYING FIELDS OF COOPERATION TO SERVE AS A LEGAL FRAMEWORK, WITHIN WHICH DETAILED EXCHANGES COULD BE PURSUED. HE REFERRED ALSO TO IRAQ'S GOOD RELATIONS WITH MANY EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, TO FORTHCOMING VISITS WHICH HE WOULD BE MAKING TO EUROPE, AND TO THE EURO-ARAB DIALOGUE (NOTING THAT THE EUROPEAN SIDE PREFERRED TO KEEP OUT OF POLITICAL ISSUES). IRAQ FAVOURED INCREASED ARAB/EUROPEAN COOPERATION.

19. THE TWO MINISTERS EXCHANGED INVITATIONS FOR OFFICIAL VISITS AND AGREED THAT FOLLOWING UP ON THESE INVITATIONS (SO FAR AS VISITS WOULD BE FEASIBLE) SHOULD BE THROUGH THE RESPECTIVE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES IN NEW YORK. THE MINISTER ALSO NOTED THAT WE HAVE AGREED TO OPEN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS ON A NON-RESIDENT BASIS ALTHOUGH WE HAVE NOT YET APPOINTED AN AMBASSADOR.

C. FOREIGN MINISTER OF VENEZUELA

20. THE VENEZUELAN MINISTER MENTIONED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT HAD JUST TAKEN OVER OFFICE. HE SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THAT BOTH GOVERNMENTS HAD BEEN CONSIDERING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS FOR SOME TIME. HE WANTED TO INVITE MINISTER OKENNEDY TO VENEZUELAS " ON ONE OF HIS TRIPS TO THE GENERAL ARE".

21. MINISTER OKENNEDY WELCOMED THIS INVITATION WHILE SAYING THAT BECAUSE OF HIS TIMETABLE IT WOULD PROBABLY HAVE TO BE EARLY

EXT YEAR.
HE OUTLINED OUR GENERAL ECONOMIC POSITION AND STRESSED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NEW NATIONAL ENTERPRISE AGENCY AS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR GOVERNMENT TO GOVERNMENT CONTACT WHICH HE THOUGH COULD BE FOLLOWED THROUGH IN VARIOUS CHANNELS - GOVERNMENTAL, DIPLOMATIC, THE NEW AGENCY AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR. HE ALSO REFERRED TO OUR SEMI-STATE BODIES AND THE POSSIBILITIES OF COOPERATION DRAWING ON THE EXPERTISE WE HAVE DEVELOPED IN VARIOUS AREAS. HE MENTIONED ALSO THE INTEREST OF THE NINE IN DEVELOPING CLOSER CONTACTS WITH LATIN AMERICA. HE ALSO INVITED THE VENEZUELAN MINISTER TO VISIT IRELAND

22. IT WAS EVIDENT THAT THE VENEZUELAN SIDES INTEREST IN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS IS FOCUSED ON THE IDEA OF RESIDENT EMBASSIES RATHER THAN DOUBLE ACCREDITATIONS AND BOTH SIDES AGREED THAT THIS WHOLE QUESTION COULD VERY USEFULLY BE DISCUSSED FURTHER DURING ADMINISTERIAL VISIT WHICH WAS TENTATIVELY ENVISAGED FOR EARLY 1980.

D. FOREIGN MINISTER OF YUGOSLAVIA

HAVANA NON-ALIGNED

23. THE YUGOSLAVIAN FOREIGN MINISTER THOUGH THE SUMMIT HAD BEEN A SUCCESS THOUGH MANY PROBLEMS REMAINED. THE IMPROVEMENT HAD REASSERTED ITS BASIC PRINCIPLES DESPITE THE EFFORTS OF SOME 15 COUNTRIES TO IMPOSE "REVISIONISM". THEY SPOKE IN MEANINGLESS TERM OF MAKING THE MOVEMENT "MORE REVOLUTIONARY". WHAT WOULD THIS MEAN - MORE CONFRONTATIONAL?)

24. IT WAS TRUE THAT MANY COUNTRIES WERE FRUSTRATED AND SPOKE IN WAYS WHICH IDENTIFIED THE WEST AS AN ENEMY. UNFORTUNATELY, THE RESPONSE FROM THE WEST IN GENERAL DOES NOT SEEM TO BE POSITIVE OR QUICK ENOUGH.

25. AS TO THE REPORTED DECISION TO LEAVE THE CAMBODIAN SEAT VACANT, HE SAID THIS WAS NOT A DECISION (WHICH WOULD HAVE REQUIRED CONSENSUS) BUT RATHER THE CONSEQUENCE OF A FAILURE TO DECIDE POSITIVELY IN FAVOUR OF EITHER REGIME OR IN FAVOUR OF A "VACANT SEAT" APPROACH.

26. MINISTER OKENNEDY SPOKE OF CURRENT WORK IN THE NORTH/SOUTH AREA AND SAID THE EEC IS VERY CONSCIOUS OF ITS RESPONSIBILITIES BUT SEES A PROBLEM AS TO HOW TO RESPOND ADEQUATELY AND SIMULTANEOUSLY TO ALL DEMANDS -- ASEAN, LATIN AMERICA, MEDITERRANEAN, LEAST DEVELOPED ETC. CERTAINLY THE EEC EFFORTS ARE NOT MATCHED BY THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WHICH SPEAK OF SUPPORT FOR "LIBERATION" BUT WILL NOT MEET THE NEED TO BUILD UP EMERGING COUNTRIES AFTER LIBERATION.

YUGOSLAVIA EEC RELATIONS

27. THE YUGOSLAVIAN MINISTER SAID THEY FELT THE MATTER IS MOVING TOO SLOWLY. THE QUESTION IS NOT JUST AN ECONOMIC ONE BUT HAS IMPORTANT POLITICAL ASPECTS AND THERE IS A CONSTANT DEBATE IN YUGOSLAVIA ABOUT THE REAL VALUE OF RELATIONS WITH THE EEC. HE WOULD LIKE TO MAKE A SPECIAL EFFORT TO FINISH THE NEGOTIATIONS BY THE END OF THE YEAR. THEIR FEELING, SO FAR, HOWEVER, WAS THAT THERE HAD BEEN TOO MANY FAVOURABLE STATEMENTS AND TOO FEW CONCRETE RESULTS.

CSCE

28. THE YUGOSLAVIAN MINISTER SAID THEY HAVE EXPLORED THE IDEA OF HAVING THE MADRID MEETING AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL. THE VIEW OF SEVERAL OTHER COUNTRIES WAS THAT A DECISION ON THIS SHOULD DEPEND ON THE LIKELY OUTCOME OF THE MEETING. YUGOSLAVIA FOR ITS PART, WANTED TO REVERSE THE ORDER AND SAY THAT THE OUTCOME HAD TO BE OF SUCH A KIND THAT THE MEETING SHOULD BE AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL, IE. THEY SHOULD CONCENTRATE ON MAKING THE OUTCOME SO SUBSTANTIVE THAT IT WOULD BE IN EFFECT BE NATURAL TO HAVE THE MEETING AT POLITICAL LEVEL. THE MINISTER AGREED BROADLY WHILE NOTING THAT WE HAD NOT YET TAKEN A FINAL DECISION AS TO THE LEVEL.

NORTHERN IRELAND

29. THE MINISTER OUTLINED THE SITUATION AS HE HAD DONE TO OTHER MINISTERS (SEE ABOVE) STRESSING THAT THE IMPROVEMENT OF COOPERATION ON SECURITY BEYOND THE EXISTING HIGH LEVEL WAS ONLY ONE ELEMENT. IT WAS NECESSARY TO GET AT THE CAUSES OF THE PROBLEM WHICH A SMALL GROUP WAS EXPLOITING. WITH NO JUSTIFIED CLAIM TO BE, AS THEY SAW THEMSELVES, A "LIBERATION MOVEMENT". THE STRUGGLE NOW IN IRELAND IS FOR RECONCILIATION AND NOT AGAINST BRITAIN. THE IRA WILL NOT RECOGNISE THAT. HAVING OUTLINED THE PROBLEM IN GENERAL TERMS, THE MINISTER STRESSED THE GREAT POTENTIAL THAT EXISTS ON OUR ISLAND IF THIS LONG STANDING PROBLEM COULD BE SOLVED.

BILATERAL RELATIONS

30. BOTH MINISTERS NOTED THAT THESE WERE GOOD.

NOTE RE FURTHER CIRCULATION OF PRESENT TELEX

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31. I FEEL AMBASSADOR WASHINGTON WOULD WELCOME IMMEDIATE REPEAT TO IM AT LEAST OF VANCE SECTION OF ABOVE. I PREFER NOT TO TRY TO SEND IT TO HIM DIRECT FROM HERE.

END END END