### NATIONAL ARCHIVES

## IRELAND



Reference Code: Creation Date(s): Extent and medium: Creator(s): Access Conditions: Copyright: 2008/148/717 19 December 1978 10 pages Department of the Taoiseach Open National Archives, Ireland. May only be reproduced with the written permission of the Director of the National Archives.

Uimhir.....

#### Report of Meeting between members of the Government and Representatives of the SDLP

1. The Taoiseach, accompanied by the Tanaiste, the Minister for Tourism and Transport and the Minister for Foreign Affairs met a deputation from the SDLP in his office in Leinster House at 5.00 p.m. on Friday, the 15th December, 1978. The members of the SDLP delegation were Messrs. J. Hume, A. Currie, Mrs. B. Rodgers, Messrs. S. Mallon, M. Canavan, H. Logue and P. O Donoghue. Officials present were Messrs. D. Neligan and S. O hUiginn, Department of Foreign Affairs and Messrs W. Kirwan and F. Murray, Department of the Taoiseach. The Taoiseach welcomed the delegation and asked Mr. Hume to open the meeting.

Mr. Hume at first apoligised for the absence of Mr. G. Fitt, M. P., 2. Party Leader, who had been unable to get a suitable air connection to Dublin that day. Mr. Hume went on to refer to the policy adopted following his Party's recent annual conference and to the statement issued on the 6th December which announced the launching of a New Ireland Campaign "designed to harness the support of everyone in Britain, Ireland or elsewhere who have a positive interest in a peaceful harmanious and lasting settlement to the Irish problem". He said they were particularly anxious to change British public opinion. After five years he was of the view that there was no way that the Unionists would come to meaningful discussions while they have their present constitutional guarantees. The British Government had given in to Unionists demands for extra seats at Westminister, the Conservative Party had spoken of reviewing the Local Government system while at the same time the constitutional guarantees or "steel wall" remained. They were anxious that these guarantees should be withdrawn and a consequential change made in British policy. That policy had failed to date. It had provided no peace and under it there had been no coming together of both sections in Ireland or in Northern Ireland. The British should, Mr Hume said, declare themselves in favour of bringing both sides together. If the British gave such a commitment it would lead to a solution in which all sections of the people of Ireland could come together in agreement, harmony, unity and independence. The SDLP believe, Mr. Hume said that the furtherance of this policy could not wait until the British general election campaign would be launched. Their new Ireland campaign the ultimate purpose of which was the unity of the country by agreement should not however be seen as a campaign for conquest of one section by another. The campaign, in the main, would be directed at British public opinion. "If we in the North say it, if you say it, if our international friends say it, if the press say it, it will be difficult to resist it", Mr. Hume stated. This would be an effective way also to challenge the activities of violent groups. An effective campaign, Mr. Hume maintained, would produce results. His Party were at one with the Government in their objectives.

3. The <u>Taoiseach</u> inquired as to how such a campaign might be mounted. He went on to say that there had been something of a malaise in regard to Northern Ireland activity because of the general election which had been predicted for October last. Recent voting in Westminister had in his view shortened considerably the life of the current Parliament there. If the British Prime Minister could have held out

-2-

2

Uimhir.....

on incomes policy he would have been able to hold his position for much longer. Withdrawal of industrial sanctions was a very relevant factor. It was likely now that the British Prime Minister would have to go to the country at an earlier date than envisaged heretofore. He would have to produce a new industrial relations policy and at the same time sort out the problems posed by the Left Wing of the Labour Party. Against this background how would it be possible to induce new thinking in regard to Northern Ireland in so far as the British Prime Minister and his Government were concerned?

4. <u>Mr. Hume</u> said by way of reply that silence in so far as Northern Ireland is concerned is seen by the British Government as a "walk over". The time to advance the new policy was now. What his Party were discussing was changing a policy that had failed. Mr. Enoch Powell had said recently that he would get whatever he wants (i.e. restoration of local Unionist power). Accordingly, promotion of the new strategy was a matter of urgency.

5. The Taoiseach said that the Government here would exercise whatever influence they could on the situation. However, he pointed out that Governments don't as a matter of convention, interfere in other country's general elections. The Minister for Foreign Affairs confirmed that this was the practice in the European Community. He referred also to his forthcoming meeting with Mr. Mason in January and expressed the view that the Government here also felt that it was timely that there should be a positive development in so far as the British Government were concerned in regard to Northern Ireland. He had conveyed this view to the Northern Ireland Secretary of State when he met him in Dublin on the occasion of the recent soccer international. At his next meeting with Mr. Mason in January he would raise what Mr. Hume had said. Bipartisanship, as a policy at Westminister, had become an excuse for silence. We for our part were waiting for a general election to take place in Britain as we felt that it was unlikely that there would be any significant move towards resolving the situation in Northern Ireland until after that event. By convention in the community we could not raise the Northern Ireland issue in the course of a British general election campaign.

6. <u>Mr. Hume</u> criticised the attitude of British political parties in relation to Northern Ireland. He referred to the fact that they don't discuss the problem at their Party Conference. He was of the view that there was a strong possibility of U.S. support being forthcoming for the type of campaign he envisaged. In this regard at the end of the day he would recommend that the problem should be taken back to the United Nations is this was necessary.

7. The <u>Minister for Foreign Affairs</u> referred to the help received in the U.S. from the 'four horsemen'' He was anxious to renew their support and was also concerned

-3-

Uimhir.....

at the H-Block propaganda currently prevalent in the U.S. <u>Mr. Hume</u> said that the "horsemen" were disposed to come forth when we on this side felt that the time would be right. Apart from the "four horsemen" there are a considerable number of Governors upon whom they could call for support at the appropriate time. The <u>Taoiseach</u> mentioned that some of the Irish organisations in the U.S. were not very reliable. <u>Mr. Hume</u> accepted this. He went on th say that the SDLP proposed to make an onslaught on newspaper editors with a view to getting them to express an interest in the Northern Ireland problem.

8. <u>Mr. Currie</u>, in referring to the Northern Ireland Secretary of State, said that he (Mr. Mason) saw his role as one of keeping the lid on Northern Ireland. If Labour are returned to government after the next general election they will see from whoever is appointed to the job of Secretary of State for Northern Ireland whether there will be any move on Northern policy. He went on to say that meetings with the U.K. political parties were currently being arranged. If the media in the U.K. are questioning the failure of the policy of 50 years the SDLP have something to suggest, he said. He would hope in this way to get a dialogue going on Northern Ireland. At a meeting he had attended in Wolverhampton on the previous Saturday there had been general acceptance of the fact that Northern Ireland policy to-date had been a failure.

#### asked

9. The <u>Taoiseach</u>/whether the SDLP would anticipate influencing the forthcoming British General Election by making Northern Ireland an issue with the electorate. <u>Mr</u>. <u>Hume</u> confirmed that this was the case. However, they would approach the matter not on an anti Labour Party or anti Conservative Party basis. His aim would be to organise all the Irish forces in one direction. He suggested that if the Government here came out strongly, if the SDLP emphasised Northern Ireland, if the British press say it and if the message is carried through by prominent people in the U.S. we would be "in a position to hit out and hit out hard".

10. <u>Mr. Canavan</u> made the point that the people in Northern Ireland were suffering politically and also in the security sense. The police were being utilized more and more in the context of security operations in place of the army. This was to enable the U.K. to fulfil its NATO commitments. However, the RUC and the UDR continued to labour under difficulties. There were Loyalist groupings in these forces who would assume real power, as they had before, in the context of a weakening British commitment. The SDLP were appreciative of the help received from here in the Strasbourg case. The RUC, <u>Mr. Canavan</u> said, are still ill-treating suspects. The UDR conviction rate was the worst for any regiment in the British Army. He suggested that the things that were going wrong should be publicised. He would like the political aspects of a solution to the Northern Ireland problem to be emphasised. There were areas which could be subjects for private and public protest as appropriate. He referred to the letter which Senator Kennedy had issued to the Northern Ireland Secretary of State. The British should be made concentrate on solving the Northern problem

(7474)114199. 5,000. 11-76. F.P.- G28.

1 ...

Uimhir.....

-4-

other than by way of military means. The Irish Government have clout with the British Government because of the policy of co-operation in security matters. He asked that the Irish Government should examine the security position generally.

11. The <u>Taoiseach</u> in referring to integration and Ulsterisation said he had raised such matters with Mr. Callaghan on the occasion of each of his meetings. Mr. Callaghan had assured him at all times that there was no policy whereby Northern Ireland and the U.K. would become more integrated. Notwithstanding this there had been certain instances where closer integration had occurred. Mr. Canavan , went on to say that the British Government needed the co-operation of the Irish Government in cases of serious outbreaks of violence. He asked that the Government here should make the British Government concentrate more on a political solution rather than a security solution to the Northern Ireland Problem. In referring to the Boyle case he expressed the view that a Government note might be sent in such a case protesting at the action of the army in gunning down an innocent youth.

12. Mr. Mallon referred to the policy of advocating a power sharing administration in Northern Ireland and said that this, in his view, was a faily easy option for the South. It kept the problem in the North. One of the results of their recent policy review was that the SDLP were no longer seeking a solution to the overall problem in a six county set up. The granting of the extra seats had gone against the whole thrust of their policies. The Northern Ireland Secretary of State in his meeting with the SDLP had excluded any relationship to the Irish dimension. In fact, he had gone to great pains to say that the Irish Government had not role in the solution of the Northern Ireland problem. Alienation is now such in Northern Ireland because of the security situation, Mr. Mallon said, that the SDLP could not get a mandate for power sharing if it were put before the people in an election. The minority felt they had been booted around. The alienation which had taken place was along the lines anticipated. The SDLP accordingly were in a vulnerable position. The present vacuum had posed problems for their Party and also for the Government here. He felt strongly that they would have to see their policy all the way through - British withdrawal would have to be highlighted. To date it has been spoken of in fairly euphoric terms but from here on they would have to be explicit about the polciy. The Northern Ireland Secretary of State had misrepresented the SDLP position and also the Irish Government's position. In Mr. Mallon's view the SDLP could not wait until after the British General election to advance their policy. They had two elections to fight next year and it was up to the Party to make its position clear. If all the elected representatives in the South were unanimous in support of the SDLP line they would be in a strong position. They would propose to seek this support. Cross-border co-operation had become a euphuism for the Irish dimension. Political content was needed in this area to give it real meaning. Mr. Mallon went on to say that all sides could not allow a situation to develop where only the Provos were putting forward a policy of withdrawal. He asked that the Minister for Foreign Affairs highlight the Irish dimension at his next meeting with the Northern Ireland Secretary of State. The Minister mentioned that at his meetings with Mr. Mason no attempt had been made to downgrade the Irish dimension.

-5-

Uimhir.....

13. <u>Mr. Hume</u> made reference to the reduction in the level of violence. If this pattern continues the British will say that "we said we would sort it out". He saw it as a matter of urgency to press on with existing policies. The <u>Tánaiste</u> inquired as to whether this meant that the SDLP were abandoning power sharing. <u>Mr. Hume</u> confirmed in reply that they were not seeking power sharing in a British Context. "We are not <u>abandoning it publicly</u>", he said. British policy had provided a wall between the different sections in Northern Ireland. On this <u>Mr. Mallon</u> said that their position was being whittled away over the years. Firstly they had power sharing with an Irish dimension. Then there was power sharing with no Irish dimension. Later there was no power sharing and no Irish dimension. - a state of political vacuum. He confirmed that they were not seeking power sharing in an Northern Ireland context.

Mr. P. O Donoghue in referring to the security situation mentioned that 14. people in his area were being arrested by security forces who consisted in the main of a UDR contingent accompanied by one constable. As the UDR were a local based force this meant that a situation arose where neighbours were raiding neighbours. Private correspondence was read and personal belongings veted in the course of such raids. Mr. O Donoghue was of the view that Northern Ireland was slowly being integrated with Great Britain. He referred to the legislation currently going through Westminister which would increase the number of Northern Ireland M. P.s. The next stage of this Bill had been promised for January. Mr. Powell had made a recent statement to the effect that he would get a second tier of local government introduced. On past performance he was never too far wide of the mark. The discrimination which existed in Northern Ireland was at local level and not at Stormont level. Hence the apprehension of the SDLP at the restoration of local government on the lines envisaged by Mr. Powell. In the SDLP's view the position of the minority community was being eroded and they were coming to the Government to elaborate on their policy and to say that they felt now that an extra effort was required. Mr. Hugh Logue continuing said that his Party's attitude had emerged from their experience over the past five years. They had been through Sunningdale, the Convention and now the political vacuum. There was total intransigence on the Unionist side. In their view the only way the Unionists could be moved would be through the removal of their constitutional guarantees. He said that the SDLP were now launching a programme that will take a number of years to accomplish and in this he drew an analogy with the development of the Civil Rights Movement of ten years ago. The Irish Government had influence and authority, Mr. Logue said. He advocated that the Government should spell out what unity meant. That would bring the subject to the center of the table. He expressed the view that the setting up of the Fianna Fail back-up group on Northern Ireland was important.

15. <u>The Tanaiste</u> in referring to the SDLP policy and its presentation by the different members of the delegation said that they had been honest about the fact that this policy was important to them as a Party about to become involved in two election campaigns. He appreciated that the SDLP were endeavouring to influence British public opinion. In so far as the Government were concerned, approaches to either the British Government or the Conservative opposition would at this time most likely

/... (7474)114199. 5,000. 11-76. F.P.—G28.

-6-

Uimhir.....

lead to "a kick for touch" in both quarters. It would be extremely difficult to mount effective pressure on the British Government at present because of the voting position at Westminister. <u>Mr. Hume</u> agreed that the present British Government will not do anything radical. However, he said, if there is a powerful reaction to the type of campaign envisaged by the SDLP among the public at large parliamentary candidates will be made aware of this and the ground will be all the more ready after the British general election for a further followup. <u>Mr. Mallon</u> in a reference to the Northern Ireland Secretary of State said that Mr. Mason protrayshimself as a success in the security and economic spheres. He asked that the Irish Government point out he is in reality worsening the position. If he were the Northern Ireland Secretary of State, <u>Mr. Mallon</u> said, he would want both the SDLP and the Irish Government to keep quiet about the Northern Ireland situation.

16. The Minister for Foreign Affairs in a reference to power sharing and the present situation in the North asked if the SDLP had any evidence of the likely success for their new policy. Mr. Hume in reply said that the final settlement must be by way of agreement. Sunningdale might have evolved into an agreed Ireland if it had been allowed to work. The Minister also suggested that if the SDLP elaborate on their presen line it will used against them in the forthcoming elections. Mr. Mallon expressed the view that they were perfectly sure they would not convince Unionists as long as they had the steel wall of the British guarantees behind them. While this position exists they will not move. Mr. Hume that they were going to work for the objectives set out in their recent policy statement. Mr. Currie also made the point that policy to date had been a failure. The basis of existing British policy, he said, was also a failure. There were so many political economic and solial problems in Northern Ireland. Indeed the suspension of Stormont and all that followed were ample evidence of that failure. Continued constitutional guarantees to the Unionists were also a failure. However, there were very few indications that this had been recognised by either Labour or Tory leaders. The situation in relation to the media was different. Here there was some questioning of policy up to now and current policy. Mr. Hugh Logue expressed the view that the problem would not be solved by "screwing down the caldron" ! In so far as the British Government were concerned they could see Northern Ireland kept out of the news and new factories such as deLorrean brought in they would be satisfied.

17. The Minister for Tourism and Transport with reference to the system of Local Government in Northern Ireland agreed with the views expressed by the SDLP that a change here on the lines discussed would be catastrophric. Effective power had been vested at local authority level in the past. He said that it was desirable to get to the stage where unionists would become uneasy about their situation. He referred to the concept of unity as set out in the Government's policy and expressed the view that the unionist population had no reason to believe that Government policy was other than that set out in the policy document. The unionist population as a whole had been brainwashed into thinking that they were the power in Northern Ireland, whereas in effect an elitist group of "country gentlemen" had control there in the past. He

1 ...

(7474)114199. 5,000. 11-76. F.P.-G28.

\_7\_

Uimhir.....

expressed the view that any foreseeing or thinking unionist would realise that an accommodation would have to be reached with the other section of the population living on this island and would ask himself how the best arrangement would be made. The objective must be the Minister said, to seek to influence both the British Government and opposition parties that the Northern Ireland situation would be better if we had unity.

The Tanaiste enquired if it was the immediate objective of the SDLP to get 18. the British political parties to question the relevance today of existing policy. Mr. Hume confirmed that this was the case. He suggested that the questioning stage should come first and then he alternative should be put forward. It would be necessary to counter the argument that the unionists were in some way going to be taken over. Loyalist paramilitary groups were inactive at present because they had come to the conclusion that the killing of Catholics was not very productive. He expressed reservations about the value of talks with representatives of the UDA. Mr. Mallon went on to say that the Provos had made republicanism a bad name. They would have to avoid the slur of being in the Provo camp. In Northern Ireland at present many people are confused. People were looking at the SDLP as some kind of west-British party. Even the Taoiseach's speeches on Northern Ireland were regarded as something of a ritual. An exception to this was the "This Week" interview in January last. What the Taoiseach had said on that occasion was/that a united Ireland does not mean lower standards of living, a fall-off in social welfare payments and benefits etc. They must be presented with a realistic option to counter the erroneous image of Rome rule, lower standards of living etc.

19. The <u>Minister for Foreign Affairs</u> referring to the Northern Ireland Secretary of State said that Mr. Mason had two themes – security and what he was doing for the North. He said that it was a matter for the SDLP to consider whether they might come at Mr. Mason direct. The Government here could not do this. Government policy here had two stages. Firstly, to seek support from the British Government for unity. The Government had said this repeatedly. The Minister pointed out that in this regard support for unity must mean a phased and ordered withdrawal. He was not however asking for the British Army to withdraw at this time. There remained the question as to how best to present the case and the security element fits into this package. The Minister was conscious of the fact that the more the authorities here co-operated with the security forces in Northern Ireland the more we are enabling Mr. Mason to say that everything is all right.

20. <u>The Tanaiste</u> indicated at this point that he would have to leave the meeting because of urgent official business arising out of the announcement of the Government's decision in relation to EMS earlier that day. <u>The Taoiseach had withdrawn from the meeting earlier for a meeting with political journalists on the EMS question</u>. The <u>Tanaiste</u> the delegation of the exchange controls which would be imposed with effect from Monday the 18th of December. He indicated that at that time there was no definite information on whether there would be a reciprocal move on the British side. He envisaged that trade would not be interfered with overall but that there might be some disruption at the beginning. Searches for currency were not envisaged on any large scale basis. Spot searches from time to time would take place in the ordinary way.

what the British Govt. do not want to hear. Mrs. Rodgers said that the Unionists would have to be brainwashed so that they would come to realise -8-

Uimhir.....

In reply to a question as to the future parity of the Irish and British Pounds, the Tanaiste said that if the British Government does what it has said it would do there will be no great difficulty. However, if the British pound started to drop there would be a divergence in the two currencies which would give rise to some problems but not insuperable ones. He drew an analogy with the situation vis-a-vis the Canadian/U.S. dollar. However if there was a substantial divergence, circulation of currency would have to be restricted. In reply to a question from Mr. Hugh Logue, the Tanaiste said that it was likely that there would be very little differences under the new arrangements about which he gave details to the SDLP. Mr. Austin Currie referred to the statement in the Taoiseach's announcement in the Dail on that day in regard to partition, "It will add a further dimension to partition, although the ultimate benefits of membership of the system could outweigh the problems "7, the content of which he noted. Mr. Seamus Mallon with regard to this reference said that he did not take Mr. Roy Bradford's recent statement seriously and he felt that many in Northern Ireland would consider it likewise. The Minister for Tourism and Transport agreed that entry to EMS would not create any real barrier to eventual unity. The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that EMS was a measure of our confidence in our economy. The Unionists were being held back in this respect by the British Government. He thought it was better to say now that EMS would add a further dimension to partition and to disprove it at a later stage. Mr. Logue said that the Government should beam its own economic progress. If the Irish pound does well this will be evidence in itself of the success of the move, he said.

21. <u>Mr. Canavan</u> referred again to the matter of security co-operation which he suggested gave the Irish Government the moral right to insist that the security policies pursued in Northern Ireland were run on proper lines. The <u>Minister for Foreign Affairs</u> accepted this viewpoint. How we dealt with security co-operation was to some extent a presentational matter, he Acid.

The meeting went on to discuss economic co-operation. Mrs. B. Rodgers 22. referred to the poor quality or non-availability of RTE reception in Northern Ireland. She specifically mentioned the Carlingford area. The Minister for Toursim and Transpor said that, in his capacity as Minister for Posts and Telegraphs, he had taken steps to rectify the situation. Mr. Logue made reference to the various cross-border studies and what he termed as the studies of the studies. He said that Unionist politicians had gone along with these studies and he felt that there were now being left out on a limb because of failure to make sufficient progress on the matter of implementing the recommendations. In the case of the Derry-Donegal study there was disillusion with the position all round. Twelve months had elapsed since the Consultant's recommendation were received and he asked what had happened in that time. The Minister for Foreign Affairs briefed him on the progress in so far as the Irish Government was concerned. He mentioned the additional allocation for road development, the new Letterkenny telephone exchange, developments at Greencastle Port and the current assessment of the suggested Derry-Dublin air-link. He told the meeting that agreement had been reached in relation to the appointment of Consultants for the proposed study of the Erne Catchment

-9-

Uimhir.....

Area and that a contract in this regard would be signed within a matter of days. He also told the meeting of the joint study which is being carried out on various aspects of infrastructure in the case of the Newry/Dundalk area. The Minister for Tourism and Transport gave additional information on the considerable co-operation which has taken place in the tourism area. He also referred to the proposed road haulage agreement which is currently the subject of negotiation between his Department and the Department of Transport in London. The Minister told the SDLP delegation that in spite of pressure from our own hauliers to restrict the very favourable conditions and full access enjoyed by Northern Ireland hauliers we would continue our efforts to maintain the liberal arrangements between North and South in the context of these negotiations. The Minister also referred to the threatened closure of the CIE rail freight service to Derry. While this matter was under consideration by CIE no final decision would be taken pending full examination of all the relevant factors and consultation with him. He would ensure that due weight was given to the political factors in the final decision. The Minister referred to the meeting of the Northern Ireland Tourist Board which had been held in Dublin and expressed regret that that body had been unable to open an office in Dublin.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs spoke of co-operation in the industrial 23. sphere and gave the meeting an account of his recent discussions with the Chief Executives of semi-state bodies on the theme of extending and enhancing North/South economic cooperation. The meeting had been a very useful one and he was hopeful that the various semi-state bodies would play an important part in furthering Government policy in this Mr. Hugh Logue made reference to certain machinery requirements of Bord na area. Mona which are currently imported and which he suggested might be provided by Harland and Wolfe. He made reference to contacts at official level in this connection. In regard to the Derry-Donegal study, the Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that implementation of the recommendations on the Northern side was not moving as fast Mr. Hume made reference to a major grant for development of as at that end. telecommunications in Northern Ireland which had been announced the night before in Brussels. On the recommendations of the Derry-Donegal study in general Mr. Logue felt that the things that were happening were going to take place in any event and he complained at the lack of momentum.

24. The Minister for Foreign Affairs in summing up the meeting indicated that there was obviously no difference on the overall political front between the SDLP and the Government here. In so far as the Unionists were concerned the Government will continue to beam at them through economic success here. While he did not wish to be euphoric about this the responses the Government were getting from Unionists sources were reasonably satisfactory. He felt that in some quarters they were anxious to share in the European scene. While the State here would return 15 members to the European Parliament, Northern Ireland with approximately half the population of this part of the country would only return 3 members. This, of course was because of the connection with the United Kingdom. The Minister suggested that the SDLP might develop this argument in the months ahead. The Minister said he would raise with the Northern Ireland Secretary of State the Government's attitude to the Irish dimension when he met him in January next. The Secretary of State was not beloved of any section of the

Uimhir.....

#### -10-

population in Northern Ireland. He felt he had no imagination and could only speak on security and what he was doing in the economic sphere.

25. <u>Mr. Mallon</u> referred to the problem which the SDLP have media wise. They found themselves in the position of not being in power and at the same time not being in opposition. This is why they asked that the Government here should give them whatever assistance they could. The Minister for Foreign Affairs told the meeting of his forthcoming meeting with Lobby correspondents (January). He would of course avail of this occasion to further Government policy. The Fianna Fáil back up group were working very well and had produced a number of reports at sub-committee level. The Minister envisaged that the Taoiseach's Ard Fheis speech will focus largely on Northern Ireland. This would be delivered on the 24th February next. When he met Mr. Mason at the end of January the Minister said he would in addition talk to him on the H Blocks, the remand issue, and the Ulsterisation policy. He envisaged that his meeting with Mr. Mason would be the starting point for talks on broader terms than had been the practice so far. Referring to the position in the U.S. the Minister affirmed that the Government would not leave that ground to anybody else.

26. <u>Mr. Canavan</u> again referred to the British secutiy authorities and particularly to their action or lack of action in the Boyle case. He wanted to see the British security authorities "pulled into the street publicly" in instances such as that. The <u>Minister for Foreign Affairs</u> in response said that Government had raised such matters with the British authorities. By way of reaction we get the usual assurances. He recognised that these may well be a doubtful value. He asked the SDLP where they had hard information on abuses or complaints of this kind they should "shovel it our way". The better the case presented to the British authorities the better the response would be. The Minister asked if the SDLP had any up-to-date information on the treatment of prisoners in the H Blocks. He referred in particular to recent reports of forceable hair cuts, shaving etc. <u>Mr Logue</u> confirmed that prisoners were being taken forcefully and were being held against their will for hair cut, washing etc. This was degrading behaviour as also was the practice of strip searching.

27. At the conclusion of the meeting a draft communique was prepared, a copy of which is attached. <u>Mr. S. Mallon</u> of the SDLP asked to be put on record that he was not satisfied with the terms of the communique. In his view the SDLP as a party expected a much stronger statement. He felt that the communique did nothing for the campaign recently launched by the SDLP. He said that in dissenting from the statement he was doing so not because of what it actually said but for what it did not say.

28. The meeting concluded at 7.30 p.m. approx. Copies to Messrs. D. Nelligan and S. O hUiginn of the Department of Foreign Affairs.

19th December, 1978

(7474)114199. 5,000. 11-76. F.P.-G28.