## NATIONAL ARCHIVES

## IRELAND



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## NEWS RELEASE

## RELEASE TIME :

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Thosday 12th Novomber, 1974.

SPEECH BY THE RT. HON. JOHN D. TAYLOR, FORMER MINISTER OF STATE FOR HOME AFFAIRS AND UNIONIST ASSEMBLY MEMBER FOR FERMANAGH AND SOUTH TYROME AT KILLYMAN, CO. TYRCNE.

I believe that a most dangerous political vacuum now exists in Ulster due to the refusal of the London Government, supported by the Alliance and U.P.N.I. Parties, to hold the Convention Elections this Autumn. Only the terrorists benefited from such a vacuum and the London Government together with the Alliance and U.P.N.I. Parties would in the end have to answer to the Ulster Public for the continued violence until the Convention Elections were held. It was a sad reflection upon both those parties that they requested a delay in these elections solely on the basis of party political advantage it was time that politicians placed peace in Ulster before Party advantage and he called upon the Alliance and U.P.N.I. Parties to withdraw their opposition to early elections so that the vacuum could be ended.

The underlying community sitution in Ulster was one of continuing decline in that bitterness and violence were becoming more acceptable. The polarisation and the policy of isolation and withdrawl by the S.D.L.P. were helping to create a climate in which the prospect of civil strife had increased. Party politickens and in particular the S.D.L.P., failed to appreciate how close civil strife was and the results of such strife. I congratulate those Assembly Nembers who had managed to desist from daily bulletins of gibe and petty comment about their opponents and had instead worked quietly but with greater effect in their constituencies. I suggest that all politicians should measure their statements more carefully in the months ahead due to the inherent ingredients for community violence.

It may be difficult to avoid civil war in the latter part of 1975 for that reason all parties should make the effort to evolve a lasting peace from the Convention Negotiations. For the loyalists, who were now clearly identified as the major political grouping in Ulster, there was the knowledge that there could only be a democratic structure of Government at Stormont if they had the consent of the minority community or alternatively removed the

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Republican agitators from Ulster soil. Whilst loyalists had to face up to that stark reality it was also essential that the S.D.L.P. did not press party policies too far as they could result in Loyalist deciding upon the second alternative with dreadful results for all Ulster people and in particular the Roman Catholic Community which would be removed from major areas of Belfast. For example the S.D.L.P. had a moral responsibility to the entire Ulster people to support the Police and encourage their supporters to join the various Police Forces. The alternative policy was one which increased the liklihood of community division followed by civil strife. It helped to create the ageny of Cyprus.

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Economists and commentators of some considerable standing were now beginning to realise that a Negotiated Independence for Ulster could be the formula for a lasting and peaceful political solution. Official Unionists should not allow the favourable arguments for Independence to distract them from their first priority which was to maintain the Union between Ulster and Great Britain. In other words Independence was not on the political agenda for Official Unionists at this time. Official Unionists would attend the Convention to develop a settlement which (1) Maintained the Union; (2) Dismissed the idea of a Council of Ireland; and (3) involved the elected representatives of the minority in policy making committees within Ministries but not in Executive Government. It was this last objective which had to be negotiated in such a way as to make it possible for the minority community to give consent to the new form of Government but avoided the participation of those, who opposed the separation of North from South, in Executive Government.

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