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1. Any new settlement must aim at changing the situation in the North so to begin to achieve at last sufficient consensus within the area to permit the introduction of acceptable policing arrangements. If this can be done, and to the extent that it is done, the British Army can be phased out and normal police functions which depend on public consent and acquiescence can be resumed. At that stage however, it will be essential to ensure that the force or forces which will carry out these functions are not themselves a source of contention.

2. This will probably require as a minimum a clean break with the present R.U.C. (including a change of name) because any force which is substantially identical with the old R.U.C. has little hope of ever winning the confidence of the Catholic minority in view of all that has passed. This will be very difficult for Unionists to accept, however feeling as they do, that they have already lost one bulwark with the ending of the B Specials.

3. The attached annex outlines some possibilities in this area.
1. It might help somewhat if the distinction which can be made between the normal police function and that of internal security (in so far as it involves the police) were given institutional form in the organisation of any new force. This would mean setting up at least two separate forces - one to deal with relatively uncontentious matters (such as traffic law enforcement, ordinary crime, etc.) and the other to deal with internal security, riot control, etc. This is a distinction made in many continental countries where the latter role is carried out by a quasi-military gendarmerie. The aim would be to increase the acceptability of the former force by diverting contentious functions to the latter. The corollary of course, would be the direction of popular resentment to the latter (evident too in some cases on the continent).

2. The police reform in Northern Ireland in 1970/71 following the Hunt Report went some way towards this in that it envisaged a disarmed R.U.C. as a basic police force and the armed U.D.R. as something analogous to gendarmerie. It could be said that this reform failed for two reasons

(i) no parallel reform had been carried out in political institutions so as to create a basis for the consensus needed to support a reformed police structure;

(ii) the "reformed" R.U.C. were, in any case, substantially identifiable with the "old" R.U.C.

Other Alternatives

3. Change limited to that outlined in paragraphs 2 and 3 would be predicated on the hope that a substantial degree of consensus can be established at Six County level to provide the popular acceptance necessary as a basis for police work. This will be difficult to achieve in any case and it might be better not to impose on any consensus which does begin to emerge the extra weight of support for the police function. The alternatives are to have police matters dealt with

(A) at a level transcending that of the region (Westminster or Council of Ireland);
(B) at the community level;
(C) at the local (town or district) level.
4. (A) above would mean that control and responsibility for the police force would not be dependent on the fragile regional consensus. But it would still have the disadvantage that in practice the police force would be seen from the point of view of organisation as a single Northern Ireland police force which, as such, would be subject to attack by those opposed to the settlement.

5. (B) would be almost impossible to organise except as part of a whole political settlement which institutionalised communal differences. Such a settlement would raise many grave problems for other reasons. Beyond this, to try to give each community its own police force now could well be seen as a step towards inter-communal warfare in which the respective police forces would adopt a military role.

6. (C) above - that is a whole series of separate and clearly distinct police forces (perhaps with different uniforms) - would seem to have most advantages. The organisation of each force should be on a geographical base to avoid the problems raised by (B) above and preferably the area covered by each force should be as small as possible. (In some countries on the continent each commune - about the size of a parish - is responsible for its own local police. In some parts of America a local Sheriffs Office, with an elected Sheriff, takes the place of a police department). The small local police department might, if necessary, be responsible to local Watch Committees as in parts of Britain, but this would not be essential.

Minority participation

7. It must be frankly recognised that any police force established will face the dilemma that, on the one hand it cannot work effectively unless a substantial proportion of its members are Catholic and, on the other, those Catholics who do participate may well be a target for attack by extremists, (as was the case with the U.D.R., which Catholics were urged to join at the outset but which they have gradually abandoned). The hope would be that this dilemma can be resolved in part by the break-up of the single
police force into a series of separate and obviously different forces as suggested above, and in part by the greater acceptability of the new political institutions in the North.

8. Summary

It is suggested above that

(i) when and if the British Army can be phased out and the emphasis on internal security lessens the effort to return to the normal police function will require as a minimum a clear break with the present R.U.C.;

(ii) this will attract strong opposition from Unionists;

(iii) the best means of dealing with the whole difficult problem of policing the North may lie in the direction of a series of local police forces.

The theory and practice of police work is a very specialised area however, and the proposals above may require further consideration later. This should not be confined to the existing practice in Britain and Ireland but should consider other approaches elsewhere to this problem and perhaps attempt to obtain expert advice in regard to it.