NATIONAL ARCHIVES
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It is of fundamental importance that the movement assume an organisational form that will attract back people of national outlook in the Trade Union movement so that their efforts can be co-ordinated.

The Movement needs (a) A radical social and economic programme.

(2) An organisation of representatives in the Trade Union movement whose function it would be to examine Trade Union Law and structure with a view to making the Trade Unions more revolutionary, and, to draw up directives for Volunteers on the subject of Trade Unionism.

This organisation should be in the form of a "staff", not necessarily a branch of G.H.Q., but under the control and direction of the Chief of Staff.

(3) To make the fullest use of experts to lecture to Republicans on Trade Union, Economic and other subjects.

Due to the failure of our own organisational structure to cope with the changed environment and strategy, the organisational form whereby agitational work has been carried out has been the 'ad-hoc Committee'. This form of organisation suffers from defects; lack of discipline and lack of co-ordination of effort being the principal ones.

Formal committees should be set up to cover various fields and to work for short term limited objectives. These committees will have terms of reference and will be under the direction of the Army Department.

There should be formal committees dealing with housing questions, Free Trade, co-operativism etc. These committees will work with other radical-minded groups such as the Labour Party people, Trade Union people etc. These committees to have an organisational structure to enable them to mobilise the mass of the membership of the Movement in any agitation.

Sinn Fein has failed to develop an active local organisational structure and only marginal success has been achieved in attempting to integrate the efforts of S.F. and the Army and Sinn Fein in educational work. The bulk of educational work is now being carried on with the Army framework and is not effectively reaching S.F. people who are non-army people. The committees mentioned in Paragraph 2 will have as their task the education of Sinn Fein people and Sinn Fein people will be involved on the Committees. It is hoped that the committees in educating the Sinn Fein people at local level will bring about the desired rejuvenation in Sinn Fein. The Army will back up this effort and will see that the "push" comes in Sinn Fein from the bottom or from local area level. Sinn Fein as a body will confine itself to Publicity and Election Work.
4. If the minds of the Irish people are to be influenced in any significant numbers towards national objectives, it is going to be necessary to reform the structure of the Movement in order to reach them. This alteration will be effected through the Committees which have been mentioned in previous paragraphs.

5. The present form of recruit training will be changed. This change will replace the emphasis now placed on arms and battle tactics to a secondary position and be replaced by an emphasis on social and economic objectives. It is felt that a recruit graduating from recruits class finds that there is a lot of unromantic and possibly boring work to be done before he gets a chance to use his military training. This accounts for the high turnover in membership at present: the recruit having seen emphasis laid on military activity is not prepared for the political activity which must come before it.

   The Director of Education will be instructed to re-draft recruits lectures so that the content thereof will reflect more the present goals of the Army. The training will be on the basis of the main task being to back up and consolidate revolutionary action initiated legally, rather than to initiate actions illegally relying on the political organisation to 'explain it away', as has been the case heretofore. Therefore the army shall develop political activity as much as possible and this will be extended legally as far as possible. Extra-legal should follow only on political activity.

6. It will be necessary to train some specialist groups in techniques for the harassment of the military; preferably from areas of likely action so as to make use of local knowledge, the classic guerilla trump card.

ORGANISATIONAL PRINCIPLES.

A. The basic movement will be a political national and social-revolutionary organisation with an open membership and legal existence. Recruitment to be maximised to this alone, on the basis of the appeal of the social and economic programme and the practical local work to those sections of the people who are most damaged by 'the connection'.

B. The basic unit of the Movement to be the local Cumann and where possible in industrial areas the factory Cumann. This to meet monthly and to set up within its membership specialist groups of activists devoted to giving leadership to the local people or to the factory workers on issues affecting their interests.

C. Thus, a local cumann might have a tenants association group, a youth group, a credit union group, a co-op group etc. A factory Cumann would have groups oriented towards the shop floor, the administrative staff, the technical staff etc. These groups would be dynamos generating local and specialised Republican leadership in all areas of the peoples needs. They would equally act as a training ground for revolutionary government; the transition from the gun to politics in the past has omitted this training
procedure and has therefore resulted in the Fianna Fail and Clann na Poblachta processes setting in.

D. These specialised groups would report back to their monthly Cumann meeting, which would be used for co-ordination of local events and educational work in the relationship between the local work and the overall national strategy, so that each Cumann would feel part of a general picture.

E. The groups would have the right to involve non-members in their specialist activity. This would be the basic channel for recruitment.

F. Quarterly regional conferences would enable activity on a national basis to be co-ordinated. Regions with similar problems would be defined, such as the Six Counties and Dublin.

G. An annual national conference would be the policy deciding body. Quarterly executive meetings would hear reports from the quarterly regional conferences and would formulate short-term policy. A national Standing Committee would meet weekly to give rapid decisions in the light of general policy.

H. The Army to retain its own organisational structure and to function within the revolutionary organisation as a backbone. Army recruits to be chosen from the best and most conscious members of the organisation. Under no circumstances should the Army recruit from outside on the basis of the emotional appeal of arms. The Army to give leadership within the organisation by the fact of its being composed of the most advanced elements within it, rather than by weight of numbers.

I. The Army Convention to continue as a policy-making body, but this role to be played down in proportion as the basic policy decisions are seen to be made correctly, openly and in unity by the National Conference. The current position that the Ard Feis is a rubber-stamp for the Convention is an imposition on the many sound people in SF. The role of the Army Convention should evolve towards that of a specialist conference of certain people in the movement for examining technical problems connected with the military aspect of the revolution. The Army Council will continually review this position.

J. The Constitution to be drafted in such a way as to allow for affiliation of friendly organisations, giving the possibility of having a vast and diversified movement under the Republican umbrella. Affiliations to be accepted from Trade Unions, Feiléns Clubs, co-operatives, Wolfe Tone Societies and all such bodies with objectives that do not conflict with the objectives of the Movement. Affiliations to be possible both regionally, locally and nationally.

K. Election contests should be avoided until our people are equipped to give a good account of themselves. This applies to ALL elections. It will be necessary to wait until a basis has been laid in local work to give substantial support in the first attempt. The timing of this decision to be a policy matter and not one of principle.
When our strength is sufficient Dail elections will be contested. Sterling elections should be likewise, the question of the Oath to be considered when necessary.

N.

The elected representatives of the people, North and South, will meet and set up a National Parliament.

N.

M.P.s and T.D.s to meet nationally at a central place (say Athlone) during parliamentary recess and proceed to legislate for the whole country, starting with laws capable of enforcement by social pressure, recognising that a actual State power was not yet in existence. By degrees a dual government XXXXXX situation would be set up, with the Army, Trade Unions and co-ops as the new organs of state power. Eventually a law would be passed, possible relating to the sequestration of foreign property, which would bring the two State structures into head-on conflict. This would be the signal for the completion of the job by military action (e.g. occupying the factory concerned in the name of the Republic).

MILITARY PLAN/OVER.
MILITARY PLAN.

Stages:

1. Anti-agent campaign (start immediately).
2. Large stunt-type operations.
3. Escalation.
4. Final phase (Agricultural and Industrial sabotage to take place at this stage).
5. Opportunity to kidnap prominent British government members should be availed of when it arises (Publicity)

1. (a) This type of operation not to be done publicly but quietly.
   (b) Commence immediately but to be phased in such a way as not to excite maximum retaliation from the enemy.

   The idea is to prepare the way for a campaign, to clear away some of the existing obstacles and to harden our people and organisation to police pressure. To get our people psychologically prepared for future killing.

   The victims of this campaign do not have to be Special Branch but maybe the ordinary policemen who are active as an agent against us.

   THIS STAGE IS ESSENTIAL

2. This type of operation should not commence until the men we have now are fully trained and evaluated according to their individual abilities.

   This type of operation should and must be of a purely "killing" nature designed to inflict as many fatal casualties on the British as possible. It should be confined completely to British Army personnel.

SETTING UP OF SPECIAL UNIT FOR STUNT TYPE OPERATIONS.

A. Unit to be composed of specialised sections from different parts of the country - i.e. Thompson Section from Dublin, Rifle Section from Limerick, Bren section from Dundalk, Engineers from Cork etc.

B. Reasons for this regionalisation:
(1) Avoiding the concentration of an elite in one area will circumvent to a great extent the danger of a split.
(2) Also, by spreading the activities of these special sections
over the entire country, the danger of police observation will be obviated to a great degree.

(iii) Assuming that this unit will consist of roughly 60 men, the withdrawal of these men from their areas for the purpose of an operation would not draw down the attention of the police as would the absence of 60 men from Dublin City.

TRAINING AND ORGANISATION
OF SPECIAL UNIT.

(i) Selection: Selection for membership of Special Unit will be made after an intensive three week course in basic military skills and requirements. Such a course would consist of (a) Footdrill (b) Fitness, (c) Weapons, and, using a points system, 5 points will be apportioned for fitness, 2 each for Footdrill and Weapons.

Footdrill is essential for the development of team-spirit and co-ordination and for the instillation of obedience to orders. Time allotted to this - 14 hours.

Fitness is so much stressed, because it gives a man tremendous self-confidence together with a reliance on himself alone. Time allotted to this - 48 hours.

Weapon training will consist of:

- Rifle - 5 hours.
- Bren - 7 hours.
- Thompson - 6 hours.
- Short Arms - 4 hours.
- Grenade - 4 hours.

It is recommended that a detailed training schedule on the lines laid down be drawn up and given to carefully selected units in the 26-county area. So that the Special Unit may be assembled at the earliest possible moment, it is recommended that the programme be distributed on a staggered system. On completion of two weeks of the programme, Unit "A" will be joined by the pre-selected staff of the Special Unit who will take part in the final week of training, during which they will select the men deemed most suitable for further specialist training. By the end of the three week period with Unit "A", Unit "B" will have reached the third week of its training and will be joined by the Staff. And so on until the selection process is finished.

D. ADVANCED TRAINING FOR SELECTED MEN.

(i) Weapon training and physical training will be performed
in the men’s home areas.

(ii) H.Q. will be responsible for arranging camps etc. at which the various sections may be co-ordinated to produce an efficient unit.

It would be best to divide the 60 man unit into two platoons, one for cover, the other assault. This would make for smaller camps with less difficulty in organisation.

3. ESCALATION:

An increase in scale and frequency of activities outlined in 1 and 2.

(A small outlay of effort in the carrying out of point 1 will show us at relatively little cost in men, what is the real strength of our Northern organisation in terms of determination and, especially, security). Should it happen that the organisation does not stand under pressure, then we will have ascertained this fact without gambling the total organisation. If forced, we can draw back.

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ORGANISATION IN SIX COUNTIES.

Recognising the fact that our campaign will be fought in the Six-County area, we believe that the structure, organisation and control of the army in that area is unsound for campaign conditions the nature of which is envisaged.

Due to the limited area of operation, the density and hostility of population, the vast array of police and other parliamentary and military forces under the control of the enemy, we believe that classic guerilla type operations cannot be successful. Here we must learn from the Cypriots and engage in terror tactics only.

Assuming that terror is to be our weapon, we must create an organisation capable of pushing such a campaign through. Hence, the following recommendations:

A. SECURITY: If we use terror tactics it seems reasonable to assume that the enemy will not flinch against using torture against a captured Republican or suspected terrorist. To believe that police would maintain ordinary interrogation techniques is unrealistic. The use of torture in interrogation will doubtless result in the police gaining information. It is our business that the greatest number of people have protection in the case of a breakdown. The only way to ensure this is by limiting the circle of knowledge of any Volunteer to the absolute minimum.

As it is envisaged that the type of operation to be carried out will be of an anti-personnel and sabotage nature, it is apparent that the basic unit will consist of not more than 4 men. This would mean that anyone breaking down under interrogation can only squeal on 3 men at the worst.
Organisation would therefore take the following form:

Six Cos. Secret small units.
26 Cos. Provision of Shock Units for special operations of a purely military character as outlined in Section 2.

REPLIES TO QUESTIONS RAISED.

COUP d'ETAT. Not possible because:
1. Loyalty of officer-class soldiers, who are drawn principally from the lower-middle and middle classes, to the state.
2. The strength of the F.S. Army and Police will always increase in ratio to the strength of the I.R.A.
3. There is no tradition of coups d'état in this country. Some of the British respect for constitutional institutions has rubbed off.
4. The Church.

COUP d'ETAT. Conditions for:
A. Proper infiltration of Police and Military.
B. Propaganda aimed at undermining loyalty to state.
C. The developing political situation as outlined in Plan may mean that Coup d'Etat in one of its forms may become necessary.

Role of Political Wing. Dealt with in plan.

Economic Resistance. Dealt with in plan.

Effects of Connection S.F. and Army (intelligence wise).

Security in the case of agitation needing extra-legal activity to be taken care of by holding a number of men in reserve in each area for such activity.
The situation which should be aimed at is one in which an area can have a number of such units. In this way it would be possible to have one in action and the others held in reserve.

CONTROL to be vested in one man, e.g. in Belfast:

- Say 32 Units of 4 men in each.
- Say 4 such units based in each postal district in Belfast.
- One man to be in charge of each such district.
- Each such district leader to be responsible to G.H.Q. agent in Belfast.

A courier system to be used by Commander for co-ordination of activity in various areas.

It should be ensured that leaders should only be in control of districts within easy reach of where they live and where they are in complete touch and masters of the situation and can move without arousing suspicion (i.e. in their own area). Units should be organised in factories, jeeps, clubs etc. where the members are in contact daily with one another so that when an operation is planned men do not have to go about chasing one another or holding meetings etc.

Because of the nature of operations, weapons necessary would be:
Small Arms, Grenades and in certain cases Thompsons. The size of the unit will mean that only a small quantity of such equipment will be needed. Thus the following advantages will apply: easy to store, police can only capture small quantity and cannot make great publicity of it. If, for example, an operation necessitates the use of a grenade a man can carry it easily to the scene, he can throw it and then walk away. The same would apply to sabotage equipment - gelignite, molotovs etc. The weapon is carried to the scene and left there.

**ORGANISATION OF UNITS.**

(1) At the initial stage it will be necessary to use known men who can be seen to be capable of being discreet. The present Recruiting Officers to be detailed to hand over lists of recruits to man appointed to organised secret units. Latter to examine lists and to use recruits found suitable for secret units. In this way recruiting officer will consider these people taken from list to have been found unsuitable. Therefore secrecy will be maintained from the very beginning.

**NOTE:** Pure border areas, i.e. in counties in Free State, to be organised in secret units similar to those in Six Counties.
Assassinations.

Open assassinations to be formed in situations such as Divis Street riots. Informers also to be assassinated openly.

Quiet assassinations for police. Silencers, poison darts etc. can be used with effect here.

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Spectacular Kidnaps:

To be used especially to secure hostages in the event of the executions of Republicans.

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Selective Internment: This cannot be guarded against.

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Easter: If North creates another Divis Street.

Retaliatory action to be taken against selected (agent type) R.U.C. men. Military action against the British Army should also be considered.

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FULL TIME men. Unknown men to be maintained in fighting areas to carry out squad type jobs.

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5,000 Grenades. 1,000 shortarms (9 mm or .45 automatic)
1,000,000 of revolver ammo. 200 Automatic Rifles (F.N.)
100,000 rounds Rifle ammo. 300 Bazookas and 3,000 shells.