Chapter 26

‘OUR MAGEE PROBLEM’: STORMONT AND THE SECOND UNIVERSITY

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Had there been no ‘troubles’ in Northern Ireland or had those ‘troubles’ originated and developed in a different way, Magee College probably never would have featured in them. The selection of Coleraine in preference to Derry as the site for the New University of Ulster would be seen today as an administrative event strikingly irrelevant to the outbreak of the civil unrest which had coincided with the opening of that establishment. But by 1968 the ‘passing-over’ of Magee had been written into the script; it had taken its place in nationalist rhetoric as one of a series of ‘betrayals’ and discriminatory acts by a government which, the belief went, had made religious discrimination into a near-ideology. The ‘betrayal’ of Magee, it should be stressed, can in no way be construed as a cause of the ‘troubles’, but there can be little doubt that the circumstances which surrounded the siting of the University at Coleraine conspired to make the occurrence into one of the triggers of the initial unrest. With the passing of a generation since the publication of the Lockwood Committee’s now-infamous Report, and the release of a surprisingly rich corpus of government files on the subject, the time perhaps has come to test the perceived legend against the less-obvious realities.

The parameters of this paper have been determined, like most academic exercises, by constraints of available space and time and so they are narrower than the author ideally would have desired. No attempt has been made to examine the economic state of Londonderry at the time of the events in question, nor to assess the suitability of the City as a university site other than in the terms worked to by the Lockwood Committee. Nor indeed has any attempt been made to establish the level of truth or fantasy in the nationalist belief held then and since that the Stormont Government was engaged in a conspiracy to downgrade the north-western areas of Ulster economically and socially. This is a topic ripe for research on a large scale, and the present paper can measure only the revealed realities of the university issue against the often-uninformed theories of the time. From the
paper's conclusions the author occasionally has drawn inferences as to the government's motives and intentions in the wider sphere of policymaking; these await the validation (or otherwise) of further necessary research and should be taken in the speculative spirit in which they have been made.

From its foundation Magee College was doomed to a controversial and often difficult future. Its original financial underpinning was an 1846 bequest by a Mrs Martha Magee for the endowment of a Presbyterian training college. This came at a time of internecine wrangling amongst Ulster Presbyterians and even deeper wrangling amongst almost everybody else on the subject of the Queen's Colleges. The College eventually opened in Derry in 1865 and in 1881 was recognized by the Royal University. Recognition, however, did not amount to a charter and Magee could not itself offer degrees; its students graduated through the Royal University. When in 1908 legislation reorganized the Irish university structure into Queen's Belfast and the three-collegiate National University of Ireland, Magee was not included in the arrangement. When partition came the College found itself to be the archetypal poor relation, in third-level educational terms, to the chartered and increasingly prosperous The Queen's University of Belfast. Indeed Magee's third-level status was defined for many years by an arrangement whereby students graduating from Trinity College Dublin undertook (from 1909) part of their studies at Magee. By the end of the 1920s the College's financial position was already precarious. Increases in maintenance and general costs were having to be met out of investments which had shrunk in value. None of the half-dozen professors could afford to retire. Nor, had they done so, could replacements easily be found, since salaries were frozen at their 1865 level. Through its graduates association Magee appealed for government assistance, a cry which fell on deaf ears almost for a decade.  

In 1938 the government began an annual grant of £2,500 to Magee, a miserly sum the value of which declined during the war years. With the end of the war the government (which now of course had a sort of responsibility for the future of Magee) established the Acheson Committee to examine the College's development potential. Perhaps sensitive to the fact that its connection with Magee implied 'the use of public funds to support religion', the Committee separated the College's theological department from its arts department. A capital gift of £5,000 was allotted together with a supposedly annual grant of £7,500 (this would later shrink). More imaginatively the Committee tried to put in hand an arrangement between Magee and Queen's similar in some ways to that between Trinity and Magee. It was a move which from its
inception ran into difficulties some of which were practical, but to which no solution ever offered itself. Magee's president at the time of the Acheson Committee, the classicist Thomas Finnigan, was in no rush for the College to assume university status. He felt that 'it was far better to be associated with good universities than to launch out on one's own and perhaps not do it so effectively'.

Legislation in 1953 following from the Acheson Committee's recommendations set up a board of trustees to govern Magee. Representatives of the College Graduates Association, of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church, and of the Honourable The Irish Society shared the board with the Ministry of Finance. The board's chairman was nominated by the Ministry of Finance, on which of course the College depended for its continued existence. Omitted from representation on the board was Magee's Faculty. The Faculty consisted entirely of professors, and together these circumstances created a distance between the governors and the governed at Magee which would have far-reaching consequences when the College eventually competed for university status. In a post-war world in which new universities were springing up everywhere and old colleges were receiving charters, Magee was indeed becoming isolated. Shackled by distinctly odd administrative arrangements and financed by a controlling (and sometimes interfering) government ministry, yet encouraged by student numbers which were increasing, Magee had little choice but to seek its place in the newer degree-awarding world, or possibly perish.

By the summer of 1961 it was becoming clear that the future of higher education in Northern Ireland was a matter which would have to be resolved by the Stormont administration, and within the relatively narrow confines of Northern Ireland's institutional options. Lobbied both by Armagh's County Education Committee and by Magee, the Ministry of Education warned their colleagues at Finance that 'the question...is one which should be gone into carefully as a matter of urgency'. Simultaneously Finance was being reminded by Michael Grant, Vice-Chancellor of Queen's, that the Robbins Committee's terms of reference 'do not explicitly include Northern Ireland'. Grant also echoed suggestions that Stormont should set up its own 'Robbins' committee. Finance responded initially with a rather futile attempt to nudge the matter into the domain of Robbins. Stormont, the Treasury was told, would 'particularly welcome' the Robbins Committee's opinion on 'the future role of Magee'. Unsurprisingly, the Treasury felt that the Robbins Committee was by now too far advanced in its task to include Northern Ireland in its deliberations.
Thus stymied, Stormont contemplated a wait-and-see approach. Robbins might not refer directly to Ulster, but perhaps some of the Committee's findings with regard to the mainland would be of some relevance. In the meantime the administration would attempt to 'obtain some guidance, even informal, from Sir Keith Murray' (Chairman of the University Grants Committee). As regards 'the Magee problem', the Ministry of Education in Belfast doubted that the Robbins findings would be of any real assistance. However, it was the secretary's personal view 'that there is certainly room for a second small university in Northern Ireland and that Derry would be a good centre for it'.

In January 1962 Robert Dunbar and David Holden of Finance put the question of the future of Magee before Sir Keith Murray, particularly in the light of the larger problem 'of whether there was a need for a second university in Northern Ireland'. The discussion was, perhaps from the viewpoint of the Stormont civil servants, irritatingly speculative. Designation as a liberal arts college might well be 'a suitable solution for Magee', but only if the Robbins Committee came out in favour of liberal arts colleges. It was true that the U.G.C. felt that a student population of 3,000 was the bare minimum for a proper university, 'but a Liberal Arts College could be considerably smaller'. But Murray saw no reason why Queen's couldn't simply expand its way out of its current overcrowding problem. It is unclear whether it was Murray or the Stormont representatives who introduced to the discussion the question of whether 'there would be any strong feeling in Northern Ireland if the U.G.C., an English body, was called in to advise on a second university'. However, such feelings, it was felt, would be voiced only by 'the disappointed claimants'.

Nevertheless the main object of the Stormont administrators' meeting with Murray had been achieved. The U.G.C. would, if the Treasury agreed, advise the Northern Ireland government. If it was felt that a second university was indeed needed, then the U.G.C.'s New Universities Sub-Committee would choose a site. A notable aspect of the meeting, though, had been Stormont's attempt to get the U.G.C. to tack on a visit to Magee as part of the Committee's planned quinquenniel visitation to Queen's. Murray felt that 'it would be inappropriate for them to visit possible claimants' and was in favour of considering Queen's' capacity for expansion first, and of leaving firm decisions on a second university until after the publication of the Robbins Report. This wait-and-see approach was to be incorporated into the Stormont Finance Minister's estimates statements in April, a move designed to provide an interim response to growing political pressure from without.

Overt pressure in the form of direct approaches from the Armagh
and Coleraine lobbyists were routinely fobbed off. Michael Grant, however, who doubtless knew better than any the limits of Queen's capacity for expansion, was more incisive in his approach. The U.G.C. on its visit to Queen's, he informed Dunbar, 'referred several times to the desirability, in their view, of there being some body with the task of looking at the needs, and planning the future of, higher education in Northern Ireland'. To forestall any reply invoking Robbins, Grant further pointed out that the U.G.C. had also 'several times referred to points of difference between the situation in Northern Ireland...and the situation in Great Britain...'. Stormont, however, continued to put its faith in the probable adaptability of the Robbins Report — 'our problems are not so large and complex that adaptation will be highly complicated'. Pressure for an Ulster version of the Robbins Committee was, therefore, resisted as premature and possibly unnecessary. Grant received a placatory but quite sincere assurance that 'we shall make better progress if we rely on a Working Party or Parties'.

However, it is clear that a subtle shift in policy had taken place. Dismayed perhaps by the vagueness of Murray's responses at the 24 January meeting, and possibly even more by Grant's revelations of the U.G.C.'s views, Stormont decided to retain as much control as possible of the planning of Ulster's future higher education. The reference to a Working Party in the reply to Grant was the first indication of the form which that 'control' was to take. During the remaining months of 1962 the clerks of the U.G.C. tried with increasing frustration to extract from the Stormont administration the basic statistical data necessary to enable them to advise the N.I. government as Murray had promised the previous January. The information supplied to the U.G.C. seemed deficient both as to accuracy and completeness. By November the U.G.C. staff apparently realized what was happening. In a scathing memorandum the analysts concluded 'that the Committee [i.e. the U.G.C.] would not be prepared to base any recommendations about the future provision of university places in Northern Ireland on the material provided'. The U.G.C. furnished Stormont with the desired conclusion that 'a much wider survey is needed of policies and trends in relation to the whole field of higher education...For these reasons the Committee feel that they are not in a position to offer advice to the Northern Ireland Government'.

More than a week before the U.G.C. staff threw in the sponge, Dunbar was explaining to the Minister of Education his belief that the U.G.C. 'will be less definite on the subject of a second university than we had hoped. It may be therefore that we shall after all have to set up a local committee to consider Higher Education, including the need for a second university, in the light of the Robbins Report'. But even
local committees need guidance, so Dunbar suggested a working party made up of officials from the ministries of Education, Labour, Commerce and Finance. Such a group would ‘set about collecting in advance the sort of information which will be required for such a study’. The working party would examine such matters as: existing educational facilities and proposals for their extension; deficiencies; teachers; schoolchildren who reach their A-Levels; the influx of students from outside Ireland and the exodus of Ulster students abroad. Dunbar hoped that the group might be ready to report by early June 1963.14

By the end of 1962 the City of Londonderry had presented its case for siting a university there. Significantly the Stormont administrators took greater interest in it than they had in the approaches by Armagh and Coleraine the previous spring.15 No ‘major shortage’ of university places was expected for the rest of the decade, though it was noted that the number of A-Level candidates was increasing annually. The minister and his officials in education reached the conclusion ‘that the wisest course for the Government to pursue would be to decide now that if there is to be a second university it should be a development of Magee University College’. A necessary condition would be the acceptance by the College Trustees that, in such an event, ‘changes in the College’s “government” would have to be made in order to divorce the College more decisively from the Presbyterian Church’. There was, however, keen awareness of other local sensitivities. Rather than take on the suggested ‘wisest course’ the officials and the minister settled for the rather disingenuous ruse ‘to expand Magee on a temporary basis to meet the needs of the immediate years ahead, without definitely committing the Government to providing a second university’. It was thought that ‘temporary additional’ teaching accommodation, at a cost of £50,000, might be arranged at Magee for the following autumn, and that the salaries of the Magee staff might at the same time be put on a par with those at Queen’s. While there was agreement on the usefulness of the proposed working party, ‘the general view’ was that an Ulster version of the Robbins Committee ‘might not be needed’.16

Disingenuity continued the following day when Dunbar and Holden again met Keith Murray. They ‘expressed disappointment’ at the U.G.C.’s refusal to advise them and ‘emphasised the difficult position in which the Minister had been placed’. Murray was inclined to favour the setting-up of a committee to look at the possible adaptation of the Robbins Report to Ulster. Such a committee might be formed ‘on the basis of academic not local qualifications’ and ‘might therefore be drawn from Great Britain’. Murray referred blithely to the committee then enquiring into a possible fifth university for Scotland, ‘which is
heavily weighted with Englishmen'. Moreover, he had recently visited Dublin, and consequently thought 'that all universities in the Irish Republic were too small'. It would, therefore, 'be folly to add another one to the tally in the shape of Magee'. His opinion had been reinforced by his visit to Trinity College, where he was informed of the poor examination results of 'the majority of Magee students'. It was borne in upon his listeners that, notwithstanding the precedent of Lampeter, 'Sir Keith was very reluctant to be mixed up with Magee or to give advice on it'. At best he thought it might become a constituent college of Queen's. Without doubt the most awkward moment of the discussion came when Murray wondered whether it would be 'politically acceptable' to deal with universities 'on an all-Ireland basis', with the Northern government contributing to the upkeep of Trinity – 'The difficulties were explained to him'.

Stormont officials had listened with far greater attention the previous day when they met P.S. Ross, the secretary to the Robbins Committee. From him they received 'in confidence the conclusions already reached or likely to be reached by his Committee'. Thenceforth the Stormont Finance Ministry would receive from Ross all Robbins Committee papers and statistical tables, together with the Committee's draft report. The substance of this meeting (the account of which, rather oddly, was not placed in the file until three months later) makes nonsense of the stated conclusion of the officials' meeting with Williams of Education, that same day that no 'final decision' should be taken until the Robbins Report 'was available (about mid-1963)'. Murray a day later 'laid great stress on the importance of waiting for the Robbins Report before trying to form a judgment. The meeting with Ross was of considerable importance in the long term. When asked bluntly if he thought that there should indeed be an 'Ulster Robbins Committee', Ross dismissed the idea of retracing Robbins’ steps, ‘but that we might consider seriously having a small committee which could listen to the views of outside parties and make a report on how “Robbins” should be adapted for Northern Ireland’. Such a committee ‘should work quickly’, especially if the working party would have the necessary statistical data ready.

The Working Party held its first meeting on 4 March 1963. At the beginning it was decided that the group ‘should not disclose its identity and activities to outside bodies’ and that necessary outside bodies should ‘be approached by individual members as officers of their own Departments’. The Party was satisfied that Queen’s projection of 4,500 students by 1968 ‘would cope with university requirements...and an expansion to 6,000 coupled with a limited extension of Magee College would suffice to the late 1970s'. Without mentioning that Ross had
met already with Stormont officials and had agreed to keep them supplied with relevant material, Dunbar sought the Treasury's formal permission for Ross to meet the Working Party; the letter included a request for copies of the Robbins questionnaire. The Treasury was happy to agree.21

Lines occasionally became crossed. The Minister of Finance, Terence O'Neill, in reply to a parliamentary question early in 1963, managed to give the impression that the U.G.C. either had or were about to advise on university expansion in Ulster. The Treasury was compelled to admit, in confidence, to a querulous Robin Chichester-Clark that the U.G.C. had considered the Ulster situation but had declined to give advice.22

By the end of May, however, the Robbins Committee was winding towards its conclusion and, thanks to Ross, its 'likely recommendations' had been made known to the Stormont Finance officials. To nobody's surprise it was decided that the Working Party was 'not sufficiently high-powered' to report on the relevance of Robbins' recommendations to Ulster. It was agreed, therefore, to establish a committee to investigate the needs of higher education in Northern Ireland. Such a committee was to consist of people of an Ulster background who would be familiar with university administration, yet 'not personally involved in higher education in Northern Ireland'. It was felt at first that the committee should have only four members ('one of whom should represent the Roman Catholic interest') and that it should be supported by a larger advisory committee drawn from the higher education sector. A few months previously Holden had hoped that the eventual committee would be chaired by Sir Eric Ashby. Ashby was a member of the U.G.C. and Holden hoped to secure by these means U.C.G. recognition for a possible development of Magee. But by May Stormont was less concerned about U.G.C. endorsement. Sir William Iliff, a former senior civil servant of impeccable Ulster background and then vice-president of the International Bank, was preferred as chairman of the proposed committee.23 For the present the Working Party was to continue, though its long-term future would depend on its relationship with the new committee.24

Having made the basic decision the Stormont officials were concerned that there should be no unnecessary delay. The Robbins Report would not, it was true, be published until October, but a parliamentary debate on university places was imminent. Holden suggested that the Minister of Finance (now Jack Andrews) should mention the fact to the Prime Minister (now Terence O'Neill); this would hopefully 'clear the way for a letter to Iliff'.25 Jack Andrews' letter to Iliff (whom he had known for many years through Iliff's friendship
with his father and through a common interest in sailing) is remarkable in that it didn't issue for a further three weeks, and in that no preliminary informal approach appears to have been made. The only explicit 'nudge' in the letter was a reference to doubts on the future of the Magee-Trinity partnership because of changes at Trinity. Iliff stalled, asked for more details and hinted strongly that he didn't really have the time. Too late Holden and R.H. Kidd headed for London and a dismal meeting with Iliff. Iliff reiterated to the two civil servants that he didn't have time to chair the committee, but made the point also that in the world of international banking time was money. In Belfast Dunbar felt this to be 'something of a blow. Remuneration for this type of cttee never entered my head'. At the end of August Iliff issued a firm refusal and the hunt for a chairman began afresh.\(^5\)

Names were considered which had been shortlisted originally for the Robbins Committee, though it was agreed that no serving member of Robbins or of the U.G.C. should be asked to sit on the proposed Ulster committee. All bodies consulted by Stormont, including the Treasury, were in favour of Ashby. It was felt, however, that 'he would certainly be thought by those who did not know him to be prejudiced in favour of Queen's'. Ideally the chairman should be familiar not only with the art of university-getting but with Northern Ireland also; his 'essential quality' should be an ability to 'size up problems quickly, keep control of a committee and keep the need for a sense of urgency constantly before the committee'. The shortness of time remaining to them was becoming a prominent feature of the administrators' agenda.\(^7\) The name of Sir John Lockwood was mentioned first by the Ministry of Education in London. Lockwood was well known for his extensive experience in establishing universities in West Africa and in the Far East. Moreover he was 'a delightful person, very clear head, gentle ways and conciliatory, but a fine chairman none the less'. Lockwood's name was considered along with those of Charles Wilson (Principal of Glasgow University), J.S. Fulton (Vice-Chancellor of Sussex), and Noel Arran (Provost of King's College, Cambridge). There are no more precise details as to Lockwood's selection as chairman, but a deciding factor may have been the opinion of the N.I. Education Ministry's W.T. Ewing, who was to serve as the committee's secretary. Ewing had been a close observer of Lockwood's performance when Sir John had chaired the Secondary Schools Education Council, and had been most impressed. Ewing had also worked closely with Ashby on the Advisory Council and rated Lockwood's chairmanship abilities on a par with those of Ashby. By the second week in October Lockwood had been written to formally and was expressing deep interest in the proposal.\(^8\)

Since mid-July the administrators had been actively considering the
possible membership of the committee. From a consultative meeting with Mr. Gerrard, the new secretary to the Robbins Committee, the name of Sir Willis Jackson emerged. There was less certainty over who should be the member of 'vice-chancellor calibre', but all were agreed that Professor Tom Wilson (a leading specialist on Ulster economy and society) would make a desirable member. It was agreed on also that there should be a token woman member, though 'it was difficult to fine suitable candidates'. Gerrard advised on the importance of having external assessors even if, as he had found with headmasters, their contributions had been less than valuable. However, somebody familiar with teacher-training colleges was desirable. Gerrard had found that individual members' contributions had reflected more their personal qualities rather than their vocations. A piece of procedural advice which Lockwood later had to ignore was that oral evidence should be confined to two or three witnesses only.29 Late in September, while the choice of Lockwood as chairman was being deliberated on, a shortlist of possible members considered at one time for the Robbins Committee was sent to Stormont; it included the names of Miss A.R. Murray and Peter Venable.30

Selection matters were eased somewhat when Lockwood agreed to be chairman. To Holden's obvious relief Lockwood hoped that an early report (by the summer of 1964) 'would be in line with our thinking'. He was amenable also to the names of Jackson and Murray, and 'seemed to agree with our general line of selection'. Nor did he demur at Holden's stated intention to appoint departmental assessors from the N.I. Ministries of Finance and Education. Even more agreeably there was 'no mention' of 'expenses or remuneration'. Lockwood was 'glad' to know that Ewing was to be the committee secretary.31 The selection strategy was laid out clearly for the Minister of Finance when he was being briefed for the debate on the Queen's Speech in mid-October. Because it was intended that the committee should adapt Robbins' findings rather than repeat the exercise in an Ulster setting, 'we should therefore resist any suggestion that every possible interest in Northern Ireland has to be represented on the Committee'. Three members - a grammer school headmaster, an industrialist, and one other - should be appointed from Northern Ireland, and a further three from Great Britain 'who will bring academic and practical knowledge and experience'. Jackson, who was familiar with existing arrangements for higher technological studies in Belfast, had already been invited along with Murray. Rather optimistically the Minister's advisers hoped thereby to secure the best possible advice 'without being dragged into local politics'.32

In a further discussion with Lockwood on the committee's proposed terms of reference the new chairman 'expressed no strong views'
regarding Northern Ireland representation. He was agreeable that one should be a headmaster and another an industrialist; the third, he felt, might be a 'man in the street', or a businessman. He agreed also that the departmental representation be augmented by Dr. Park who would serve as statistician to the committee. The only note of potential discord came from Willis Jackson who (rather oddly) was present at this discussion. Jackson voiced his fears that the Robbins proposals for higher technical education 'might have a harmful effect...at lower levels' and that 'this could be especially serious' for Northern Ireland. He was less than mollified by Holden's and A.C. Williams' assurance that the new committee would not be expected merely 'to follow Robbins blindly', but would be free to suggest departures from Robbins where his recommendations did not suit Ulster conditions. Jackson would agree to serve only alongside another member 'with expert knowledge of higher technical education'. It was agreed that Jackson himself would make an approach to Peter Venables. In the course of the following week invitations were extended to William Mol, the N.I. 'headmaster' representative, and to the chairman of Harland and Wolff, Denis Rebbeck who, it was felt, 'would be pre-eminently suited to speak for the needs of Northern Ireland industry, particularly in the matter of technically trained employees....' One last decision was made without consulting Lockwood: An eighth member was added to the Ulster 'side' of the committee to forestall any criticism that it was weighted with British mainland members. Delay was caused, unavoidably, by two refusals. J. Young of Belfast (possibly the 'man in the street' as suggested by Lockwood) pleaded total ignorance of the Robbins Committee and its Report. G.B. Newe of the N.I. Council of Social Service had too little time at his disposal. He was, however, sensitive that 'so many of my fellow-Catholics have been slow to serve in this way...[and] if this Minister wants a Catholic on the Committee...may I suggest the names of two good men....' The officials decided to forego Newe's suggestions. Literally at the last moment Major John Glen, a former assistant-secretary at the N.I. Education Ministry, and Brum Henderson, managing director of Ulster Television Ltd., were appointed to the committee. Glen could scarcely have been described as a 'man in the street' in the sense envisioned by Lockwood; but he was very familiar with Ulster educational matters and doubtless provided the Education Ministry with welcome if unexpected representation above and beyond their departmental assessor. Henderson not only fulfilled Lockwood's proposal for a business representative but had, the previous year, introduced an innovative series of television programmes which in the Ministry's eyes had been 'an embryo "University of the Air"'.
Even before the members had been appointed, however, the matter of a second university's possible location had begun to loom large in the official mind. Kidd quietly drew Dunbar's attention to the existence of a U.G.C. sub-committee which was accustomed to advise on the siting of new universities. The Lockwood Committee, he went on, 'should be concerned only with the principles of the problem, not with towns and possible sites'. Control of the broader decision-making as regards the establishment of a second university having been successfully manoeuvred (as we have seen) into the hands of Ulster officials, those same officials then sought to shift the one controversial aspect of the final decision back onto the U.G.C. Dunbar reminded the U.G.C. of the earlier discussions with Sir Keith Murray: '...it was understood between us that...the choice of a site could be entrusted to your New Universities Sub-Committee'. Dunbar referred to the imminent debate on the Queen's Speech (one week from the date of his letter) and pressed the U.G.C. for an assurance that its sub-committee would be prepared to advise on a site. Dunbar was anxious also to ascertain the extent to which British universities were empowered to purchase land compulsorily either directly or via local authorities. He pointed out that neither Queen's nor the Belfast local authorities had any such powers. The U.G.C. in reply spelt out their willingness to assist with a degree of preciseness that bordered on the legalistic:

They [the U.G.C.] agreed that if, as a result of your proposed Committee's recommendations, the Northern Ireland Government decided that a second University was required (a conclusion in which they, the U.G.C., would not, of course, be in any way involved), they would be willing, on the invitation of your Government, to give advice on the choice of a site. In doing so they would wish to work on a list of possible sites given to them by your Government; they would not wish to have to take the initiative themselves in exploring possible sites, or to receive and have to assess applications and deputations from all and sundry. Given such a list of possibilities, they would then be ready to advise (in the light of their general criteria) on the academic and technical considerations involved in the choice.

It was pointed out also that (one case excepted) British universities could not purchase land compulsorily but had to 'rely on the co-operation of local authorities' who would act on their behalf.

In the weeks immediately before and after Christmas 1963 Lockwood and Ewing began to plan the Committee's lines of approach in some
detail. Lockwood obtained the agreement of the Advisory Council for Education that his Committee would examine such teacher-training matters as were outside the Council’s remit – specifically ‘the status of training colleges’. An information leaflet was issued asking for ‘written evidence from interested persons and organisations’, with the possibility of an invitation to give oral evidence at a later date. The timescale envisaged by Ewing for the Committee suggests that time, or the lack of it, was a factor of considerable importance. The Committee’s activities, most of them, would take place in the context of formal meetings or extensions to those meetings. A proposed visit to Londonderry ‘will require the best part of one-and-a-half days at our February meeting; ‘and at our three-day March meeting we shall...have to take a look at the training colleges’:

In the “spare” time available on these two occasions we shall have to look at our written evidence and continue with our general thinking. It seemed to me that if on this occasion we could break the back of the technological side, dispose as best we can of agriculture and make a start with teacher training by looking at the background we might have a reasonable chance of holding to our timetable’.36

To a considerable degree the timetabling of meetings reflected the fact that all members of the Committee (with the possible exception of Glen) had full-time professional careers. Half of them moreover, including the chairman, were based in England. Even the civil servants most closely connected with the Committee had other duties alongside. But it cannot be gainsaid that the members and their advisers were faced with a daunting task and with a timescale scarcely adequate to the purpose.

At the Committee’s first meeting in December 1963 a schedule of fifteen meetings was decided on, three to four weeks apart, and alternately in Belfast and London. The final meeting was anticipated for Belfast for the third week of July. The Committee considered its terms of reference. It was stated categorically that should a second university be thought necessary, the Committee would confine itself to ‘making general observations based on academic, social and other related factors about the requirements for a suitable location’, and leave the choice of a specific site to the government and the U.G.C. The Committee would seek information on the history of Magee and its relationship with Queen’s and Trinity; this was one of twenty-seven items on which details would be pursued. The Committee reserved to itself the right, along with that of meeting delegates from interested
bodies, to seek informal advice from 'suitable people' such as Sir Eric Ashby and staff-members of the Robbins Committee.57

By the time the Committee held its second meeting in January an informal visit to Queen's had taken place and documents had been received which made clear the need for a second university. After a scathing assessment of forward-planning figures supplied by the University the Committee concluded that Queen's apparently was 'planning ahead on the assumption that it would be the only university in Northern Ireland'. The Committee went on to explain why a second university was indeed a necessity. Queen's was hemmed in by a scarcity of nearby sites and over-priced adjacent land. The University had no powers of compulsory purchase and Northern Irish law (unlike that of Great Britain) did not provide for any other body to acquire land compulsorily on the University's behalf. New and necessary halls of residence and refectories, even if land could be acquired for them, inevitably would be situated at an inconvenient distance from the main body of the University; this would exacerbate existing problems regarding transport, communications and parking. Finally, the Committee seemed unhappy with the idea of 'concentrating so many students in one area'.58

The abstract problem of 'if' having been resolved, the Committee began to focus properly on the even more problematic matter of 'where'. By mid-January some twenty-seven persons and organizations had responded to the published plea for evidence: 'These include one crank...and the three training colleges, six L'Derry and Magee bodies, five schoolteachers' association, three Q.U.B. professors as individuals and various organizations of university training college and technical college teachers'. Ewing was disappointed, however, that Armagh had not replied; nor had anything been heard from the Federation of British Industry. He began to fear that the Committee would eventually be criticised for basing its conclusions on evidence from a range of interest groups.59 At the Committee's next meeting late in January the Ministry of Finance representative (Kidd) reminded members of the need to frame their conclusions with 'a general regard...to the economic needs of Northern Ireland'. The Committee in reply simpered its commitment to 'a realistic appraisal of the economic situation', and said that it understood the need for properly-educated technicians 'at the supporting level in industry'. To guard against lapses in attention Dr. Park offered to provide the Committee with advance copies of the government's forthcoming Economic Plan for Northern Ireland.60

In the meantime the Committee pursued its planned approach to Sir Eric Ashby for 'informal advice'. A week before Lockwood's meeting with Ashby on 27 January, Ewing briefed the latter quite fully on the
administrative relationship between Magee and Trinity; by then it had become clear that Ashby's thoughts 'are obviously turning...in that direction'. When they met both Lockwood and Ashby agreed that closure of Magee 'would be difficult...after so many years of existence'. This was the first ominous reference to the possibility that Magee's various administrative archaisms would be a barrier to its becoming the locus of a second university. Though mindful of the practical restrictions on Queen's ability to expand, the two men pondered whether Magee (which 'could not develop with its present form of government') might be brought to relate to Queen's 'in the same way as an associate technical college or technological university'. Such a relationship would justify restricting the arts at Queen's in favour of Magee, which would then become 'a kind of Liberal Arts College specialising in perhaps Economics and some aspects of teacher training'.

Somewhat more important, however, than the speculative meeting with Ashby was the attendance of U.G.C. representatives at the Committee's fourth meeting. Drawing on precedents in Great Britain it was explained to the Committee that in some instances new universities had been established 'largely because the extension of existing institutions would be delayed by the slowness of acquiring sites in a built-up area'. A principal factor, it seemed, in reaching a decision to found a fresh university was the cost of halls of residence. In some cases in Britain, universities had been located deliberately 'in areas where lodgings were already available; but as a long-term solution they were not desirable'. The men from the U.G.C. again reiterated that they would advise on a site only if the Stormont government provided them with a list and would make the final decision without them. When choosing sites in Britain the U.G.C. was influenced by 'the presence of higher technical institutions which were potential technological universities'; by the regional planning needs; by the availability of initial sites of two hundred acres or more, and room for further expansion; and by the proximity of a town with reasonable facilities.

Clearly nervous of giving misleading impressions the Committee decided to confine its visit to Magee ('to see the existing facilities') to a single day. They would meet the faculty, the trustees, and non-faculty heads of department, but would avoid the Association of University Teachers and all local authority representatives beyond a courtesy visit to the city's Guildhall. This sensitivity, however, was not extended to the documentary case prepared by Magee: '...the intention is to look at the evidence submitted by Magee University College on the way to Derry as there would not have been an opportunity for doing this
beforehand, and to review the day as far as possible on the return journey'. In the weeks before the Committee's visit to Magee there were some important developments. The Promotions Committee for the Coleraine/Portrush/Portstewart area submitted its case for the siting of a second university in this area. Also, the Provost of Trinity College wrote confidentially to Lockwood and indicated likely changes in the old Magee-Trinity relationship. Finally, a few days after the Committee's visit the Vice-Chancellor of Queen's informed Ewing that their expansion difficulties would preclude Queen's from becoming part of any second university.

It would be instructive to consider for a moment the extent to which the proposals put forward by Coleraine and by Londonderry reflected the criteria of the U.G.C. as outlined at the fourth meeting. Coleraine devoted some one-and-a-half pages of its five-page document to the matter of student accommodation. Its Promotions Committee had taken the trouble to investigate the background to the establishment of the new universities in Sussex and Essex; both of these had been located where students could avail of nearby seaside accommodation. Universities which could be located thus would save £3,500,000 in building costs, assuming a student population of 2,500 (the U.G.C. felt that 'the minimum viable' student population was 3,000). The Portrush/Portstewart area, it was claimed, could provide accommodation for 2,600 students, 'the largest single block of accommodation anywhere in Ulster'. The local hoteliers' association had been consulted and, not surprisingly, was enthusiastic. At second glance, however, it seems possible that the 'accommodation factor' may have been thus trumpeted as Coleraine's strongest argument simply because it had few others of any substance. The need for a two hundred-acre site with room for further expansion was also high on the U.G.C. list of influential factors. Coleraine's Promotions Committee, however, merely referred to the existence of 'several suitable locations', two in particular, but did not go into further detail. The fact that Coleraine was not part of anybody's regional planning was got over by urging the siting of a university as 'an ideal opportunity to assist an area which lies outside any present scheme for industrial development in this part of Ulster'. The opposition was dealt with succinctly by references to sites where a university 'would add to existing problems of over-crowding, lack of housing facilities, etc.' Moreover Portrush and Portstewart, being holiday towns, were well accustomed to 'the boisterous voice of youth'.

The case for siting the university in Derry, as presented by the City Council was more extensive, better balanced, and more expensively presented. The historical claims of Magee to be the focal point of any
proposed university development were stressed throughout the document. However, the problems of fitting Magee into the mould of the 1950s/1960s type of university were less than properly addressed. An unspecified number of the students who attended Magee were accommodated in hostels on or near the campus. It was unfortunate, perhaps, that the case explicitly committed Magee to the concept of hostel accommodation in the interests (it was said) of the ‘interchange of ideas’. The likelihood of a demand for private lodgings was dismissed in terms of an inevitable if regrettable necessity; the Council believed that ‘there will be little difficulty in meeting this demand’. The Council was aware of the need to find a two hundred-acre site; but unlike Coleraine, which had offered at least sketch-maps of its favoured two sites, Londonderry’s Council felt that ‘it would be premature to disclose those which it has in mind’. The probable effects of such a disclosure on the market-price of sites might have been obviated by confidential disclosure to the Ministry of Education, but there is no evidence that this was considered at the time (late 1962) the case was drawn up.4

The ‘Submission’ to the Lockwood Committee put forward by the Londonderry branch of the Association of University Teachers placed due emphasis on student accommodation, but in its failure to relate the problem to a proposed student population of 3,000 it may have done more harm than good. Magee had for instance ‘been able to house a large proportion of its students: there are over one hundred undergraduates in College residences at the moment’. The Association clearly was aware of the U.G.C.’s feelings on conveniently adjacent lodgings, and a brave attempt was made to portray Derry as a place proliferating with kindly landladies. But the figures which would have been so helpful were omitted. The position was scarcely helped either by the ‘Submission’s’ portrayal of Derry as a culturally-deprived city which was without a decent concert-hall or cinema or art gallery and for which Magee’s library and lecture-rooms represented the sole oasis.5 A further document, submitted in June 1964 by Queen’s University’s Student Representative Council, raised in a manner as direct as that of the Coleraine Committee the matter of the proposed university’s contribution to the area of its location. While the Coleraine ‘Proposals’ concentrated in part on the long-term value to tourism of any increase in hoteliers’ incomes, the Queen’s students claimed that a university ‘would give a considerable impetus to industrial expansion’ in Londonderry and a consequent rise in the city’s population.6

As it turned out, Lockwood’s Committee was not much more impressed with its tour of Magee than it had been with its visit to Queen’s. Plainly some members of the academic staff had waxed lyrical on the College’s strange administrative network. The only connection
allowed in the College's constitution between the Trustees and the Faculty was that the President and one other member of the academic staff would attend (by invitation) meetings of Trustees where very often time did not allow for sufficient discussion of Faculty viewpoints. Also there was 'the difficulty of communicating to lay people matters which were of academic importance'. A Joint Committee had of late become 'necessary' but even this body was 'informal'. To make matters worse the Faculty consisted only of professors, leaving non-professorial staff no means of airing their views other than through their Heads of Department who sometimes were not themselves professors. Relations with Trinity College had been good, though the Magee staff were aware of probable changes in the air. Relations with Queen's, on the other hand, had been uniformly bad. Efforts in the past by the Trustees to have Magee made a constituent college of the University had failed due to opposition from Queen's. Relations had frozen still further when Queen's 'had at the last minute accepted students for whom they had previously not had places and who had opted for Magee as their second choice, thereby forcing Magee to abandon courses'. The opportunity which existed for students of Queen's to begin their studies at Magee had rarely been availed of, and had now ceased in practice. But despite these difficulties (which would of course vanish in the event of Magee becoming a new university) the Committee members were aware of an air of complacency similar to that which prevailed at Queen's. In the College's senior staff they detected 'an apparent lack of dynamism...which could be dangerous in a situation of expansion'. Nobody at Magee 'seemed to have formed any clear ideas about how the College should develop or what shape any future university development at Londonderry should take....'

A further feature of the fifth meeting (at which the visit to Magee was reviewed) was the appearance of John A. Oliver of the Ministry of Health and Local Government and J.M. Aitken, the Ministry's Chief Planning Officer, both of whom gave the Committee a summary of the state of regional planning in Ulster. From this summary it was clear once and for all that there was no possibility of expanding Queen's to meet the demands of the expected increase in student numbers during the next decade. However, Derry had not so far asked for a regional plan 'and growth there was regrettably slow compared with the rest of the country'. Nor had the Ministry any 'specific plans' for the Londonderry area.

But it was now time for the Committee to meet Ulster's interested bodies. Parties who would appear before the Committee were advised that 'they would be expected in the main to make a case for setting up a second university outside Belfast and to give their views as to the
form that any such university should take'. The Committee would not discuss the question of location but 'their recommendations could have a direct effect on general location'. The government advisers returned to their personal drawing-boards and realized that with the elimination of Belfast and the probable elimination of Armagh (though this was never stated explicitly) the pressure would mount steadily on the Committee:

...the broad distinction between “in” and “out” of Belfast may not be good enough when...the availability of lodging houses may be an important factor. In an area so small as Northern Ireland it may not be realistic to think that a decision in principle to have a new university can be taken without reference to considerations which would in fact pinpoint the location.

The Committee's terms of reference were indeed wide enough for greater freedom to be allowed to it if this was felt to be the best way forward. However, the advisers were worried at the prospect of the government being handed 'a clear-cut recommendation which may be unacceptable for political reasons'. Eventually the most cautious of solutions was opted for: The Committee should avoid taking evidence orally from any single interested area. The only limitation should be that of time - 'we should try to ensure that the Committee's time-table does not prove impossible of achievement merely because the Committee goes through the motions of taking oral evidence in order to please'. Meanwhile on stage there was a not-dissimilar discussion taking place between Lockwood and Ewing. Lockwood indicated a preference for seeing teachers' unions ('merely for the good of public relations') and also the Education Boards of the Church of Ireland, Methodist and Presbyterian Churches, but not Queen's, Magee, local authorities or training colleges. Ewing, however, felt that it might be 'unwise' not to meet representatives from Londonderry Corporation and Armagh City Council. The Committee in general seemed to agree that the hearing of oral evidence from the various interest groups would be 'politic...because it would lay a foundation of goodwill for the reception of the Report'.

At the Committee's sixth meeting in mid-April the post-mortem on the Magee visit continued; but on this occasion firm decisions were foreshadowed. Due to its 'circumscribed mental outlook' and its 'cramped physical situation', Magee 'could not be adjudged the best nucleus for a major expansion'. The need to provide for the older members of staff and the College's historical association with Presbyterianism would create further problems were it to be given a
university cachet. It was decided that if there was indeed to be a university in Derry it would not involve Magee as an independent body or as a constituent college in any federal arrangement: 'but that it should be a completely separate, autonomous body absorbing Magee as part of its Faculty of Arts'.\(^5\) From this moment onwards the question of where the new university would be sited was separate from the Magee problem. The Committee, however, continued to interest itself in finding some solution to the question of Magee's future status. There were sound and salient reasons for ensuring that Magee 'should be given a definite purpose'. For instance the continued existence of Magee ('in its present form') in the event of the new university being sited elsewhere in Ulster might 'distort the pattern of the new body or else it would perish from attrition'. If, on the other hand, the new university were to be established nearby Magee 'might, indeed, take it over by assertion of "squatters' rights"'. The proposals considered by the Committee varied from continuing Magee as a centre for extra-mural studies, to making it a regional college for arts and liberal studies, to abolishing it altogether and transferring its staff to the new university. The Committee then compared the various proposed sites, the discussion centring quickly on the Coleraine option. The point was made again that the area offered ready-made student accommodation 'which would enable available money to be spent on other facilities'. Coleraine moreover, like Armagh, was near the Bann and Lough Neagh which would be useful to the new university's proposed development of marine biology. Notably no possible site in Londonderry was considered during this discussion. Magee could not be a constituent college of the new university; and the unspoken conclusion seemed to be that Magee's historical claims would make impossible the development of a new university in Derry either separately or in any way connected with the College unless the College was absorbed altogether. Lockwood proposed to consult the Ministers of Education and Finance as to how far the Committee should commit itself to a site, as the matter would have 'considerable political implications'. There was no doubt, however, that the Committee's 'thinking' appeared 'to point inescapably to a particular area'.\(^6\)

Mid-May was taken up with interviewing the various representative bodies that wished to address the Committee. Lockwood asked to have the interviews tape-recorded and the salient points later typed up. A parsimonious Finance Ministry, however, refused to authorize the expenditure of twenty-two shillings for the necessary spool of tape, forcing the Committee to borrow a tape from the Stormont House of Commons.\(^7\) The interviews themselves were somewhat anti-climactically in that, despite forewarning of the scope of the intended discussion,
none of the interested parties seem to have prepared themselves accordingly. All had their personal agendas, to which they adhered so closely that their answers were frequently unfocussed and bore little relation to the questions being asked. The Education Boards of the Church of Ireland, the Methodist Church, and the Presbyterian Church appeared together before the Committee and discussion centred on Biblical studies and teacher-training. Lockwood rather mystifyingly encouraged them to ask questions, then stated that he probably wouldn't answer them, and finally warned them against reading any implications into the way in which his questions to them were put. The Association of University Teachers sent a joint contingent from Belfast and Derry, but neither half was prepared for Lockwood's questions on their view of an ideal university, and the discussion quickly lost direction. Despite Lockwood's efforts to keep the exchanges on a 'general' footing the Derry representatives succeeded in illustrating every point by reference to Magee.

In retrospect Lockwood's treatment of the Armagh Urban and County Council representatives was less than kind. Because (unknown to them) Lockwood and his Committee had all but excluded Armagh from serious consideration, he had no hesitation in being other than direct with them. They were questioned directly on the suitability of Armagh as a location, only to have their reply treated facetiously. With similar directness they were informed of the need to 'make a material financial contribution towards the capital cost', together with a rate to provide for part of 'the recurrent expenditure' of the new institution: 'Now, on site, how much land would your authority be prepared to offer as a free gift...?' The honest answers of the councillors laid bare, as Lockwood intended that they should, the legal inability of the Armagh authorities to strike rates in support of higher education without government sanction. A suggestion by Lockwood that the Armagh business community was promoting the setting-up of a university for peculative reasons was followed by a further dismal exchange. In this Venables managed to wrong-foot the councillors into implying that their proposed university had been planned 'without concern' as to the eventual employment of the graduates.

Lockwood and his colleagues initially handled the Londonderry councillors with far greater care. The Committee seemed interested primarily in getting the councillors' views on Magee's possible relationship with the new university should it be sited in Derry. The councillors were well aware of the various oddities of Magee's administrative structure; in one degree or other all of them felt that the College could serve only as a base or launching-pad from which the new institution could develop. Thereafter '...it might be turned into a
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teacher-training college or anything at all. It doesn't matter. You are
taking from it the best use you possibly can' (Coun. Austin). As
Venables tried to persuade the councillors to consider scenarios for the
new university that did not involve Magee the discussion became
heated. Despite the apparent indifference of the councillors to the long-
term fate of the College they seemed to regard it as the embodiment of
Derry's historical claim to be 'The Site', and they were not willing to
part with this idea. Lockwood then, rather in the same manner in
which he had dealt with the Armagh delegates, probed Derry's ability
and willingness to site and finance the new university. The councillors' replys were less than conclusive and, when challenged that their
proposed rate increase would yield only one-fifth of the desired figure,
they could only refer to Ulster's relative poverty as compared to
England.

The members of the Coleraine Promotions Committee simply
claimed to 'have no idea' about universities in general; they had instead
'concentrated our efforts and our studies on the suitability of locations
in the North of Ireland'. Taken aback perhaps by such honesty,
Lockwood forebore to ask how they could study sites when they had
no concept of suitability, and simply asked them to put their case. The
delegates then held forth on the subject of Portrush guesthouses and
Sussex/Essex precedents until Lockwood interrupted. Would the
university itself be attractive to students? 'it isn't a geographical siting
or the physical attractions, it's the nature and stimulating quality of a
new institution'. This drew the not-unintelligent reply that 'the
attractability of a university depends very largely on the philosophy of
the staff — the people who develop the policy of the university'.
Somewhat disappointingly, there were no very original responses to
Lockwood's queries on the financial aspects of siting and subsequent
support; the delegates replied simply that their local authority was no
better equipped than any other in Ulster without government sanction.
Their only positive venture was to point out to Lockwood that one of
their proposed sites was 'mainly' county council land 'of recent
acquisition' and that, should Lockwood's Committee favour their area,
the remainder of the site could be obtained 'with the utmost speed'.
The Committee, and particularly Venables, were much more impressed
by the delegates' promises of scholarship and fellowship endowments
from local industries.68

Meanwhile the basic scaffolding of the eventual report of
Lockwood's Committee was being put in place. From mid-March Zelda
Davies, the Committee's indefatigable assistant secretary, began to
rough out the preliminary sections of the report.69 By mid-May the first
draft was ready for revision in the light of comments from Committee

668
members. Ewing was relieved that all of these comments ‘point fairly well in the same direction’ and so reduced the need for extensive re-writing.60 The Working Party of 1963 which had acted as a sort of midwife to the birth of the Lockwood Committee had, as we saw earlier, been directed to continue at least temporarily. In reality it seems to have made its report in October 1963 and thereafter ceased to exist.61 In mid-April 1964 the senior officials at Stormont prepared to fill the vacuum with a fresh working party ‘to keep pace with developments in the Lockwood Committee’. Only senior officials from government departments most closely concerned with the detail of the Lockwood deliberations — Finance, Education, and Agriculture — were to be members; Ewing and Davies were specifically excluded. To some considerable extent such a body was intended to mirror in its functions those of the working party which had shadowed the emergence of the Robbins Report. The Stormont officials were concerned to keep to a minimum any delay between the publication of the Lockwood Report and the subsequent announcement of the government’s intentions. Kidd and Scott, departmental assessors on the Lockwood Committee, would sit also on the working party. Thus ‘it would be relatively easy, when desirable, to indicate to the Committee the reactions of the Working Party to their recommendations before the latter became final’. Or put another way, the Lockwood Committee could be forewarned of likely political fall-out resulting from their conclusions.62

By mid-May the Committee began to come to grips with the problem of location. It will be remembered that early in March senior civil servants were concerned that Lockwood’s Committee might present the government with a recommendation that would be specific but politically awkward. This, however, would only be the case if the Committee was to take fuller advantage of its terms of reference and assert the right to select a particular site. At the important eighth meeting early in May (as we have seen) Lockwood declared his intention of consulting the relevant ministers on the extent to which the Committee should lean towards any individual site. At the same time he undertook to sound out the views of the U.G.C. chairman, Sir John Wolfenden, on this and other points. Wolfenden was quite prepared to forego the original plan whereby the U.G.C. was to offer advice to the Ulster government, and saw no reason why the selection should not be made by Lockwood’s Committee.63

At the tenth meeting in late May the Committee heard senior officials from the Ministries of Commerce, as well as Labour and National Insurance, say that industrialists generally believed Derry to be ‘too remote’ a place to set up operations. So, it seemed, the final hurdle had been cleared. The Committee prepared to recommend a specific site.
The recommendation would be framed in the Report 'by stating the determinants which led to the choice'. The Committee met again within a week. Before proceeding to discuss each proposed locality in terms of perceived advantages and disadvantages, it was firmly agreed 'that the existence and future of Magee College should not be a factor in influencing the choice and location and that Magee should cease to function as a University College but should if possible be given some new purpose....'

With regard to Derry the Committee felt that, while a suitable site 'probably' could be found on the city's outskirts, the poor housing situation would necessitate the building of expensive student accommodation. More disturbing was the stated belief that the city was not likely to develop further industrially and that it was a 'frontier town' which had never lost the 'siege mentality'. It was hinted that the founders of the new university might find their attention distracted and their energies dissipated by the local sectarian tension (the expression 'cold war' was used). Armagh also could produce an appropriate site but suffered like Derry from a poor housing situation and besides, it was said, had a population too small to 'service' a university. Moreover it was on the fringe of the New City/Belfast region and so would add little to the development of the rest of Northern Ireland. Somebody made the point that it was now the British trend to 'keep universities out of the cathedral town atmosphere'.

The proposed New City itself (later Craigavon) was considered as a location, but not only was the city and its student accommodation still in the planning stages, but it was subject to the same limitation as Armagh in that it was too close to Belfast to shed its developmental light on the rest of the province. The Committee worried also that 'the fate of the university might become dependent on the success of the New City'. The Committee was, it emerged in discussion, not entirely convinced of the adequacy of either of the two sites suggested by the Coleraine representatives, but felt that an appropriate site 'could probably be found'. More enthusiasm was expressed for the availability of lodgings at Portrush and Portstewart. In what would in retrospect be a moment of great fatuity the Committee opined that Coleraine's 'proximity to Londonderry would soothe hurt feelings and attract support, while easing the demise of Magee'. It was stated also (though the source of the information was not revealed) that 'Londonderry County Council favoured it rather than Londonderry City itself'. The only academic criterion which seems to have counted in the Committee's weighing of advantages and disadvantages related to the capacity of each area to facilitate studies in marine biology. Derry and Coleraine were deemed to have passed this particular test but, very
oddly, Armagh was not. Interestingly, of the various local representative bodies interviewed, only those from Armagh had impressed the Committee with their presentation. The only real disadvantage listed for the Coleraine area was that 'it had no cultural amenities'.

The minutes of the Lockwood Committee meetings are unsatisfactory in that they are not verbatim transcripts and usually it is impossible to ascertain precisely by whom which point has been made. If there were still doubts and disagreements in the Committee at this stage on the point of locating the new university they are not spelt out. It was felt necessary, nevertheless, for Kidd to report at the conclusion of the above discussion that he had been told 'in confidence' by U.G.C. officials that in the immediate future money would be provided only for academic buildings 'and not at all for Halls of Residence'; that it was in fact axiomatic for the U.G.C. to check the level of potential student accommodation already available in areas which aspired to host a new university. The Lockwood Committee, concluded Kidd, could of course depart from U.G.C. policy, but 'it would be necessary to support any departure by very strong arguments'. As Kidd finished, Park offered to get details of accommodation available in the Coleraine area, and Ewing said that he would check the Coleraine area for suitable alternative sites.66

From this moment onwards Stormont officials concentrated on framing a recommendation from this half-decision, and, partly as a result of this, the position would become a very difficult one to reverse. For instance, the Coleraine Promotions Committee knew almost immediately that victory was theirs. Ewing consulted the principal Coleraine representatives on the point of alternative sites within their area. His enquiries were cloaked in hypotheses but he 'mentioned that Sir Peter Venables had been in the neighbourhood and that there was a possibility of your [i.e. Lockwood's] coming at a later juncture'. The Coleraine representatives, who could scarcely have misinterpreted such sudden close attention, instantly produced half-a-dozen sites, and a gratified Ewing extended to them an invitation to dine privately with Lockwood. Ewing was agreeable even to the presence at the dinner of Coleraine's chief planning officer, 'provided publicity is not given to the occasion'.67

Meanwhile back at Stormont, Kidd was reporting to the Working Party that no clear decision had been reached by the Committee but that it had become obvious that 'the trend of opinion was in favour of Coleraine'. As Kidd had seen it, the Committee 'were unanimous in excluding Armagh and Londonderry and the problem had resolved itself into a straight choice between the New City and Coleraine. So far
it appeared to the Committee that the balance of advantage lay with Coleraine. It wasn't an ideal site but it was the site which to the Committee's mind offered the best chance for the success of the new university.

At this same meeting of the Working Party the Ministries of Education and Finance were given a foretaste of the type of reaction which eventually would greet the Lockwood recommendations in the public arena. The New City having been depicted by Kidd as so prominent a candidate, its chief promoters (John A. Oliver and Mr. Green of the Ministry of Health and Local Government) attempted to undermine the supposed advantages of Coleraine. 'Many' of those present (the word 'everyone' was scored out in the account of this exchange) attacked the importance attached to the immediate availability of student accommodation. It was agreed, though without reference to figures, that the cost of building halls of residence 'would be marginal in relation to the expenditure on tutorial accommodation'; that it would be petty and ludicrous to allow the siting of Ulster's only alternative university to be 'unduly influenced by so temporary a factor'. Oliver pointed out that the new university would need time to develop and that its student population would hardly exceed five hundred for the first five years. Green warned of possible embarrassment for the government if, having foolishly allowed Lockwood's Committee to choose the location, it might then be found necessary 'for wider reasons than would concern the Committee' to reject the recommendation. No firm conclusions were reached, however, and the Working Party could only hope that the Committee's eventual recommendation would be sufficiently qualified by academic considerations as to allow the government enough lee-way to reject it if need be.

The matter was not allowed to rest. Within a week Brooke (of Commerce) and Jones returned to the attack, accusing Kidd of neglecting the claims of the New City simply because, being still at the planning stage, it had no local councillors to plead its case. Zelda Davies was forced to circularise half-a-dozen ministries with details of the other claimants' cases, and to obtain those ministries' various views by phone 'due to urgency'. Lockwood, doubtless prodded by Kidd and Ewing, made placatory noises to Oliver. The level of disagreement which prevailed amongst the senior officials may have contributed to the Lockwood Committee's terms of reference being laid before the cabinet on 22 June. Confirmation was sought and obtained from the cabinet (rather unnecessarily, or so it seems) for the Committee to select a location for the new university. For good measure Professor Tom Wilson (who was based at Glasgow University and had long been an adviser to the N.I. government on economic development) was
brought in to condemn any proposal that the new university should be located in the New City.71

The New City having thus been effectively excluded from consideration, the Committee were left to put their recommendation into words. Most of the remaining meetings of the Committee were given over to the discussion of individual draft chapters of the report. These discussions evidently did not lend themselves easily to expression on paper since no details were recorded. The minutes of the thirteenth meeting in late June 1964 were, stated Zelda Davies to an enquiring Lockwood, ‘deliberately very short’. Thereafter they became almost telegraphic. No mention of location was made in the minutes of the fourteenth meeting, though a notice for the meeting had referred to ‘a preliminary meeting of Northern Ireland members, to discuss the location of the second university’. A handwritten addendum to Zelda Davies’ copy of the agenda merely indicates that the matter of location was indeed discussed.72

The finished report was wide-ranging, of some complexity, and had to be put together in a hurry. The background correspondence suggests that its basic structure was outlined (perhaps from some ‘general’ model for such reports) by Davies. This was checked and improved upon by Ewing and was re-drafted sometimes in great detail by Dunbar and Kidd. As the chapters were drafted each Committee member was circularised and their comments and contributions noted and included, subject no doubt to the outcome of discussions by the Committee meeting collectively. In the regrettable absence of the substance of these discussions it is difficult to arrive at any firm conclusion as to the relative influence of civil servants and Committee, and indeed of individual members within the Committee on the composition of the report. Some general points, however, can be inferred from the surviving evidence. Since the civil servants were all within easy reach of each other, and at least two of them were employed virtually full time in drafting the report, it seems clear that they enjoyed a potential advantage over the Committee members. The Committee members were not only scattered across England and Northern Ireland but had only limited time to devote to the draft chapters. Also, since the timetable was still controlled by the Stormont administrators the members were at the mercy of whatever time constraints might be attached to each draft chapter. It is worth pointing out, however, that most (if not indeed all) of the above circumstances apply to government committee reports in general and were not peculiar to the Lockwood Committee or even to Northern Ireland official committees. All committees are influenced in some degree by their secretary even when that secretary acts purely in an executive
capacity, as Ewing did. That influence is correspondingly greater when the committee is divided between representatives of professions and a civil service executive, particularly where the executive sets the pace, supplies the resources, and provides the scaffolding for the finished report.

However, while an awareness of these factors is useful in appreciating the relationship between the Lockwood Committee and the Stormont civil service it should be said clearly that the practice of report-building in this case was far less sinister than the theoretical circumstances might suggest. The most frustrating aspect of this area for the historian is the piecemeal nature of the evidence. In mid-March (as we saw earlier) Davies began to produce 'rough working drafts' of the report's preliminary sections; in her own words these represented 'my preliminary ideas of the general pattern of the report'.

A surviving member of the Committee (William Mol) informed the present author that the Northern Ireland members recognized their English colleagues' broader experience in the art of university-getting and tended to look to them for guidance in those areas outside of their own specializations. Certainly Venables and Jackson collaborated closely from an early stage in the revision of the early draft. Jackson thought that Venables' 'first draft' (it is unclear whether this was a revision of the earliest draft by Davies and Ewing or a completely fresh version by Venables) was 'quite excellent as a sequential statement on what the two of us regard as the core of the problem'. During the July revisions Venable thought 'very little' modification necessary to Jackson's piece, 'but quite a bit of Mol's section' had to be altered. Jackson's revision of one chapter was so substantial that Venables was moved to say how 'much easier it is sometimes to write an entirely fresh version than to endeavour to adjust someone else's copy'. Lockwood's own papers relating to the Committee have never come to light, but comments in the Jackson/Venables correspondence indicate that the latter members were not casting their revisions either in collaboration with him or at his direction.

Towards the end of May Ewing had received most if not all of the members' comments on the first draft-report and was ready to recast the original 'skeleton'. There is a clear suggestion in a letter from Davies to Jackson at the end of June that Jackson had been asked to recast substantially Ewing's second draft. According to a grateful Davies, 'the drafting is causing considerable problems, the greatest being the lack of time in which to do it thoroughly and carefully'. Jackson had tried to follow the sequence of your draft but inevitably it came out rather differently. What I suggest is that you supplement what I have written by points which you feel must not be missed...'
point however, the illness which had already begun to afflict Jackson became more severe and in mid-July he abandoned redrafting altogether. By Jackson's own account the report's appendix may be largely his creation. By late October Dunbar was satisfied with the penultimate draft. He submitted it to the Treasury with a recommendation that only minor changes would now be necessary.

From this point onwards the Stormont administration, politicians as well as civil servants, began to prepare for the public launch of the report. The process began rather ominously with a handwritten note by Davies on the set of routine letters to Committee members dealing with their expenses. The note expressed anxiety that each member's Committee papers should be destroyed. It was suggested that for preference members should not burn the papers themselves ('this is rather messy') but should return them to Ewing. While it was true that there were eight non-government persons on the Committee and that the risk of a leak was multiplied therefore by eight, Ewing's concern on the point was somewhat excessive. When Mol wrote back cheerfully that he hadn't yet got round to the work of destruction he was urged almost by return to 'make sure' that all was incinerated or sent back. In Rebbeck's case Davies even offered to have the papers collected from his workplace.

Ewing's unease merely reflected the deeper unhappiness felt about the report at more senior levels. The final draft represented a political minefield of such magnitude that the Stormont officials made one last attempt to persuade the U.G.C. to share the burden with them. On 24 November Benn, Ewing and Kidd appeared before Wolfenden. The U.G.C. responses were frank and held no comfort. Wolfenden was adamant that 'there could be no question of the U.G.C. being brought in by the Northern Ireland Government to re-do the Lockwood Committee's work or to assist the the Government in over-ruling the Lockwood recommendations'. Benn referred broadly to the inevitably 'controvertial' nature of the location issue and revealed the continuance of 'pretty stong feeling' in favour of the New City. Wolfenden replied that there could be 'no question of the U.G.C. being asked to re-advise about the location...or to arbitrate between the claims of different places'. The U.G.C. would be happy to offer advice on a choice of site within the location selected or to adjudicate between the suitability of different sites at that selected location. Wolfenden was clear, however, that the U.G.C. would not 'be put in the position of possibly having to say that there was no suitable site at Coleraine'. Benn battled on bravely to point out the 'politically...extremely difficult' matter of the closure of Magee. The government, he said, 'might well flinch' from the closure and 'decide to play for time'. Ministers would either try to
construct 'some form of association' between Magee and the new university or hope that Magee would expire naturally due to lack of support from Trinity ('which no longer had any particular interest in Magee as a backdoor'). Wolfenden again 'refused to have anything to do with Magee' as this would imply interference with the Lockwood recommendations. The clear if unspoken message was that Benn and Kidd had made their bed in 1962 as far as the U.G.C. was concerned, and now they could lie on it between their ministers and Lockwood. Wolfenden could only advise that, in the event of the government rejecting the proposed closure of Magee, the possibility of some association between the College and the university should become a matter for the new institution's Academic Planning Board. Both sides in the discussion recognized, however, that any such association 'would have a potentially weakening effect on the new university' and 'would make the task of the A.P.B. very difficult and controvertial' and so would inhibit people from serving on the Board. The inescapable conclusion seemed to be, that if the new university was to succeed, Magee would have to go. Benn concluded the meeting with a statement which may have been born of pure weariness:

There was', he hoped, 'at least an outside chance that the Government might postpone decisions or might decide to reject the greater part of the Lockwood Report and to concentrate on building up Queen's and Magee.81

The memorandum placed before his cabinet colleagues by the Minister of Education a fortnight later showed that Benn and Kidd had ingested such nuggets of positive advice as Wolfenden had to offer. The Lockwood 'reasoning' on location was 'sound' and the cabinet was urged to accept it. The Minister would have preferred 'on grounds of sentiment and tradition' to reject the proposed closure of Magee, but if the new university was to stand a chance, that closure was an absolute necessity. Magee's academic standards were inadequate, its links with Trinity would soon be ended, and it would only be a drain on financial resources needed for Queen's and for the new university. Moreover, the continued existence of Magee would have a de-focussing effect in relation to the developing new university and no Academic Planning Board or vice-chancellor would wish to be 'saddled with a continuing liability' for the College. Nevertheless the Minister recognized the clear 'political folly' for the government to be seen as the deliberate killer of Magee. He was emphatic that an alternative role for the College had to be found. The possibility of Magee becoming a teacher-training college was mooted. This could be 'an emergency short-term' solution in the
first instance. But the possibility existed of associating the College with
the university eventually ‘if, as may prove to be the case, we run into
real difficulties in the attempt to create a truly inter-denominational
Education Centre in the new university’.82

The cabinet, when it came to discuss the Lockwood
recommendations on 21 December, was divided in its views on Magee,
and the Prime Minister’s irritation with the Committee’s proposals could
not be disguised. Against the Minister of Education’s argument that to
continue ‘a relatively derelict institution’ such as Magee would ‘risk
wrecking’ the new university the Minister of Commerce insisted that
Magee should be part of the new institution. The Minister of Home
Affairs supported the Lockwood proposals and the Minister of Finance
pointed out that the Treasury would balk at supporting Magee as well
as the new university. The Prime Minister commented that the Treasury
attitude ‘made the situation even more difficult than he had
anticipated’. Having served on the Acheson Committee’s enquiry into
Magee’s affairs in 1949 O’Neill was ‘acutely aware of the strength of the
lobby which could be assembled in its support’. The Prime Minister
said also that he had at one time hoped that the Lockwood Committee
would recommend an institution akin to the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology rather than ‘any conventional British university’.83 As
cabinet members adjourned the discussion for the Christmas period the
storm clouds gathered outside the walls of Stormont. Information
leaked and on 30 December Sir Basil McFarland, a former mayor of
Londonderry, remarked in the course of an after-dinner speech that he
doubted if the Lockwood Report would ‘do Derry much good’. Rumours that Coleraine was the chosen location had been current, in
fact, since early December.84

When the cabinet resumed discussions on the issue in the New Year
the only real area of unity was in the resolve to postpone publication
of the report (it had been due to emerge on 19th January 1965) until
ministers ‘had reached decisions’ on it. By the end of the meeting most
ministers (Commerce, the Minister in the Senate, the Chief Whip, and
the Prime Minister) were in favour of keeping Magee in existence; only
the Ministers of Education and Finance were opposed, and the latter
was beginning to weaken. Notably however, the debate tended to
centre on the ‘preservation’ of Magee and at no time did the cabinet
seriously consider reversing the Lockwood recommendations to the
point where Magee would become the nucleus of the new university.
Even when the Minister of Agriculture made his modest contribution it
was to suggest that some site ‘on the outskirts’ of Londonderry would
be ‘an acceptable compromise’. In retrospect the cabinet appears to
have made a considerable error in separating the two issues. The
ministers clearly took the view that it was Magee that mattered most to Derry and that the location of the university there would be a matter of only secondary importance. The Magee-centred nature of the public campaign which followed has had the effect of further blurring the realities of the time. By the end of this meeting prospects for a review of Lockwood's Magee recommendation looked distinctly better. The Minister of Finance, while holding fast to his original arguments, agreed with his colleague from Commerce that a memorandum 'directed to the specific problem of Magee and possible alternative solutions' would be helpful. The Chief Whip painted a forbidding picture of 'a dangerous and powerful' alliance which might be formed from 'disgruntled people' in Derry, Armagh, Queen's, and even the New City site at Lurgan/Portadown, as well as from former Magee students 'throughout Northern Ireland'. The Minister of Finance suggested that the difficulty over an Academic Planning Board might be obviated by 'asking them specifically to consider whether Magee could be associated'. It was possible that the planners might resolve the issue by turning Magee into a teacher-training college; if they failed to find a solution at least the blame for closing Magee would be spread a little further and the odium attaching to the cabinet lightened somewhat. The Prime Minister felt that Magee might be 'particularly suitable' for teacher-training. The Minister of Education, his isolation complete, agreed to produce a further memorandum.

By the time the cabinet members met again a week later the Minister of Education's second memorandum had been before them for several days. Its fifth paragraph stated baldly that the government was 'reluctant' to close Magee and would ask the Academic Planning Board to consider incorporating the College as part of the new university. The Minister, however, was very frank that no A.P.B. would accept such an instruction; nor, if the matter were pressed, would it be possible to recruit an adequate Board. A letter had been received also from the Attorney-General, E.W. Jones, who was the member of parliament for Londonderry. The letter warned of the damaging effects of the 'extensive rumours' circulating in Derry about the Lockwood Report. It urged the temporary retention of Magee until the College could become part of the new university and suggested that it might be 'a nucleus for the new faculties in its subjects'. The position of the staff, the letter went on, should be secured and some definite role ('technical or otherwise') put in hand for Magee. The letter from Jones had not been introduced without reason. O'Neill intervened to say that the letter had reinforced his view and that of 'several' other ministers that closure of Magee 'without any prior consultation with the Party, with Magee or with Londonderry interests – would produce a storm which
could capsize the entire Report'. He pointed out the likelihood that the Academic Planning Board might merely repeat the Lockwood recommendation on Magee, 'and possibly at an even less opportune time'. Most of the senior British academics from whose ranks the Board would be recruited would be aware that the U.G.C. had declined to advise on Magee. When the Board got under way these British academics would probably pay close heed to the views of Lockwood and the U.G.C. and give less attention to 'the purely local factors which the Cabinet was bound to consider'. O'Neill re-worded the Education Minister's fifth paragraph; the word 'reluctant' was discarded in favour of the more definite statement that 'the Government cannot agree' to the closure of Magee. The notion of passing the matter to the Academic Planning Board was dropped and a final decision, it was stated, would emerge only after 'thorough discussion with the responsible authorities'. The ministers were less definite regarding the Attorney-General's suggestions as to the interim function of the College and the position of its staff. It was decided to offer a 'temporising' reply to a Parliamentary Question on the issue which would loom within a few days. In the end, after much haggling, Jones himself helped in the final re-drafting of the paragraph. Many of his 'strongly held' views were carried in the face of ministers who clearly would have been happier to demur."

But back in Londonderry the stormclouds were about to burst. The whirlpool of rumours which had been stirred up in the wake of McFarland's 30 December speech found expression in late January through the formation of a University for Derry Committee. 'Government policy', the Committee stated, 'seems directed towards the isolating of the north-west in general and Derry in particular'. The proof of this pudding, it was asserted, would be evident should the new university be located anywhere except Derry. The intensity of the reaction to the report (published at last on 10 February) must have made it obvious to all within Stormont and to every Lockwood Committee member that the issue had a political significance utterly disproportionate to its actual subject-matter. Magee College heard the news a week previously from the Attorney-General who seemed concerned to distance himself from the decision. While he was of course a member of the government, he explained, he was not actually in the cabinet: 'I have, however, as a matter of precaution, assumed that the rumours we have heard, are correct'. Some forty-eight hours before the report appeared, the University for Derry Committee organized a large and well-attended all-party public meeting at the Guildhall. On the day following publication of the report the same committee met the Prime Minister and the Minister of Education (now
H.V. Kirk) and later dined with the Attorney-General. Jones was alarmed by the 'quality' of the committee's membership: "I refer particularly to Mr. Jack, who is the City Solicitor, and Dr. Sidebottom, who is a Londonderry citizen of standing, and a supporter, passive even if not active, of the Government'. Jones again pressed the Stormont officials to consider some compromise arrangement for Magee – some faculties at Magee, some in Coleraine; call the new body the University of the North-West, etc., etc. Issues that crossed party lines had been relatively unusual in Ulster politics; and the Attorney-General had few doubts as to the potential of this particular matter to undermine the government. It had been less than a month since O'Neill had entertained the Irish Taoiseach, Sean Lemass, an event which had come as a surprise even to some of his cabinet colleagues. The university question, and its Magee aspect in particular, bristled with unseen dangers:

From the political point of view [Jones went on], I believe we are likely to have against us all the Opposition plus Messrs. Warnock and Nixon. This, in itself, is running the matter pretty fine irrespective of the situation in Londonderry. What happens there is my problem to some extent – but only to some extent because if an Independent or Labour candidate intervenes there such an infection could well spread to the great delight of the Nationalists who are already rubbing their hands over what is happening in Londonderry. And, of course, that is what is being aimed at. This campaign is not related solely to the University but I feel that we must try and get our people out of it by giving them something which they feel may "wash their face" [i.e. the compromises suggested by Jones].

On 18 February a two-minute silence was observed in Derry; public houses and many businesses closed for much of the day; and two thousand vehicles participated in a motorcade to Stormont to protest at the decision. Organized by the University for Derry Committee (or Action Committee, as it had become known), it was led jointly by the city's Unionist mayor and a Nationalist M.P. On this day also a deputation of Magee staff met with the Minister of Education, attended closely by Scott and Ewing. The deputation's suggestion was that Magee might teach some of the new university's courses and that these courses might either continue at Magee or, alternatively, 'that the staff and students could be transferred to the new university as soon as circumstances permit'. The following day saw a further meeting of some consequence, not least because of its later
effects on the popular perception of the Lockwood affair. It is necessary now to go forward in time to the famous moment early in May when the Unionist M.P. Robert Nixon told of the existence of seven allegedly 'nameless, faceless men' (whom he named), influential members of the Londonderry Unionist Association, whom he claimed had opposed the siting of the new university at Londonderry and with obvious effect. He claimed also to have received from an unnamed cabinet minister the more damning information that 'we directed Lockwood to site the University at Coleraine'. Nixon's allegations were taken up by the Nationalist M.P. Patrick Gormley in a parliamentary speech several weeks later and woven into the now-familiar fabric of the government's betrayal of the North-West and its determination to starve it of resources.32

Those persons portrayed as the 'nameless, faceless men' met with the Prime Minister and the Minister of Education on 19 February. Far from attempting to influence the government (however belatedly) on the matter of locating the university at Coleraine, they appear to have accepted the government's position very reluctantly and were seeking to salvage Magee. The typed account of this meeting is remarkable for the coherence which it brought to what was clearly a rambling discussion, and for the care taken to omit the baldly sectarian remarks which occur in the original minutes. Favourable reference was made to the Action Committee's statement of various points overlooked by Lockwood - 'Hope there is enough material in it to enable Govt. to change its decision and propose something more for Magee'. Whatever about the shortcomings of Magee, they were clearly unhappy about Lockwood's less-than-adequate reasons (as they saw them) for denying the university to Derry itself. Despite the Magee-centred nature of the discussion it is clear that matters of industrial development and their possible political implications for local politics were also on the agenda. Buchanan assured an apparently sceptical Prime Minister that despite the plans now 'being formulated whereby industrial development could take place in Derry', they (the Unionists) could 'still retain our position'. O'Neill wondered about the intended number of Protestant employees and asked 'how', in the event of industrialization in Derry, 'is it possible to insure against a radical increase in [Roman] Catholic papes [sic]?' Glover insisted that there was no change in the Unionist policy on industrial development in Derry, and that the university question was being viewed 'as an exception' in that area of policy. The underlying fears of the Unionists were hinted at darkly by Brown who warned that the loss of even one or two electoral wards would lead to Unionists losing control of the Londonderry Corporation. Concern was expressed that things were becoming so finely balanced
that the Corporation ‘refuses to receive Royalty’. Glover added to the sombre atmosphere of the meeting by observing that ‘R.C.s [were] getting employment – opening [their] own shops – taking custom away from others’. When the rather disjointed discussion returned to the university question proper it was pointed out squarely by Buchanan that unless something were done for Magee it simply would not survive. The men suggested that Magee should have one of the faculties of the new university – perhaps a law faculty. The new institution would take time to develop, it was argued, so Magee was necessary at least in the short term; its staff, however, would leave unless some assurance was given to them. The ‘faceless men’ concluded the meeting by extolling the usefulness of Magee’s library, the availability of at least some extra student accommodation in Derry, and by pleading with O’Neill and Kirk to end the public outcry by using Magee as the ‘skeleton’ from which to develop the new university:

We should bring the new university into being immediately but place it in Magee and proceed from there to develop without prejudice to the bulk going to Coleraine. In time it could be decided what faculty should remain in Londonderry and what goes to Coleraine.94

As a parliamentary debate on the issue approached early in March the government came under almost overwhelming pressure to spell out the precise nature of the compromise suggested in the fifth paragraph of the White Paper which had accompanied the Lockwood Report into print.95 The Attorney-General who clearly was aware of the ‘faceless men’s’ proposal, urged Kirk to consider it, ‘whether it is good educational practice or not’, and reminded the Minister that Derry was ‘always a very important stone in the constitutional set-up’. The debate, lasting sixteen hours, was spread over three days; even more than the public meetings and the motorcade to Stormont, its sheer fury was a reflection of cross-community concern over the issue. Both Ewing and Lockwood were taken aback. Ewing, in a clear understatement, found the debate ‘for the most part...distinctly unpleasant’.96 Lockwood outwardly was determined to ‘tough it out’, but at least one committee member recalls that he was bitterly hurt by some of the public reaction. In an interesting letter to Jackson he remarked that ‘In my experience most choices [of location] have to be arbitrary. What other way is there of choosing?’97 Sensitive to the Nationalist allegation that the North-West was being starved of resources, the government had tried its best to prepare its counterblast. John Oliver was drafted in to provide briefing
material on the various efforts that had been made on Derry’s behalf by the government. Oliver believed that the real problem in developing the area stemmed from the obstructive attitude of the local authorities: ‘In municipal administration they are reasonably efficient. In town and country planning their arrangements are practically non-existent and they give us no openings whatsoever’. Derry was, he felt, ripe for the attentions of a planning consultant and the drawing-up of a Matthew Plan for developing the area:

But the internal stresses are so great and the attitude of the City to modern planning so completely obstructive that one cannot conscientiously advise this course at present – nor until there is a change of attitude on the part of the City Council.

But an interesting feature of the Lockwood debate was the way in which the issue was seized upon by O’Neill’s enemies in an attempt to bring him down. First-hand evidence is still lacking in this murky area, but it appears likely that the attempt may have been spearheaded by the former Attorney-General Edmond Warnock who, by O’Neill’s own account, was his committed enemy. O’Neill, ever a gambler and barely a month after receiving the almost-unanimous support of his party for his meeting with Lemass, felt safe enough to make the university issue into a virtual motion of confidence. It almost failed to pay off; the Labour attempt to amend O’Neill’s proposed acceptance of the Lockwood Report was defeated by only eight votes. O’Neill’s awareness of how narrow his escape had been was borne out at the cabinet meeting late in March when the issue of a placatory statement on the position of the Magee students and staff was discussed. O’Neill, mindful of his backbenchers, pressed for the clearest emphasis on the government’s wish that Magee ‘be incorporated in some way in the new University’.

The political dragons having been defeated, attention turned to the conciliation of the Magee establishment. Jones had already assured O’Neill that ‘if the staff were enlisted the teeth of the opposition would be drawn’. The Attorney-General met with Action Committee-members who were sullenly acquiescent and some of whom (Magee staff-members) seemed concerned for their individual futures. Jones felt their morale was sufficiently low and he recommended to Kirk ‘their upgrading as anything that can be done to weaken their opposition to our – that is the Government – decision would be invaluable...’ He held separate meetings with the Chairman of the Magee Trustees, T.F. Glass, and with Brown and Marshall. Glass he found insistent that Magee should have full constituent college status ‘with full courses to
degree level in a number of faculties...plus law, with the chance of securing a medical faculty...’ Jones saw little room to negotiate and moved on the Brown and Marshall who dismissed Glass’s conditions as the type of ‘nonsense’ with which Magee could not cope. Both men felt that (‘as a minimum’) Magee should remain an arts college and a preparatory centre for the Presbyterian Theological College.\(^{90}\)

The patchwork solution eventually worked out, mainly between Jones and Kirk, reflected the divided state of College opinion, the political need to quiet public unrest and government concern lest no Academic Planning Board could be formed. But it boded ill for the future of Magee. The Cabinet Secretary (H. Black) was ‘glad’ to report to the Minister of Commerce (Brian Faulkner) that they had ‘moved away from the frightening prospect of Magee being given a virtual monopoly of the arts faculty of the new University’. Benn, meeting with Wolfenden in London on the same day (13 April) informed the U.G.C. chairman that it was proposed to make Magee a constituent college, able to offer full degree courses ‘in a reasonable range of subjects on the Arts side’. Back in Belfast it was agreed that duplication of subjects between Coleraine and Magee should be kept to a minimum, and that ‘there should be no suggestion of adding additional faculties to Magee’. Detailed proposals for linking Magee with the new university were again revamped after discussions with the U.G.C. and in fear that no A.P.B. would be formed.\(^{89}\) It was suggested in cabinet that the proposals should be published ‘if the Trustees should prove obdurate’. After much difficulty the Magee Trustees accepted the proposals ‘at least as a basis for discussion’. The new Minister of Education (W.K. Fitzsimmons) responded to this procrastination by quietly identifying individuals amongst the Trustees who might prove more amenable.\(^{88}\) When the cabinet came to refer to their ‘Magee problem’ in May 1965 in the context of a discussion on the proposed A.P.B., the Prime Minister had the last word. The ‘real object’, as he put it, ‘of all the agitation was to make the Government go back on its decision in favour of Coleraine. There could be no reversal of a course to which Ministers were totally committed’.\(^{87}\)

It all ended, of course, in tears. The government’s promise that Magee would offer full degree courses could not be honoured in the long term, and Magee remained the poor relation of the New University of Ulster until both bodies were merged in 1984. But in the wider arena of Ulster politics and social history such things had by then ceased to matter. For most people the damage had been done when O’Neill’s government first accepted the siting of the university at Coleraine, and then rejected massive public pressure to reverse the decision. The government’s response, rightly or wrongly, was further
evidence in Nationalist eyes of the Unionist establishment’s antipathy to the North-Western parts of the province (where a sizeable proportion of Catholics lived), and of Unionist determination to keep the area and its people impoverished and downtrodden. By itself, the reversal of the decision and the siting of the university at Magee or anywhere else in Derry could not have prevented or even postponed the violence and disorder which led ultimately to the end of Stormont rule. But it seems undeniable that that the university issue was one of the triggers which lent to other events and factors a direction and coherence which they might otherwise never have possessed. This paper does not attempt the larger task of coming to grips with those contemporary perceptions which were of such importance in making the Lockwood affair into the trigger that it was. A few tentative conclusions, though, may be offered.

Firstly, it is my contention that, whatever the truth behind the supposed Unionist conspiracy to ‘starve’ the North-West, the belief that this was so had long taken root in the collective Nationalist mind by the time Lockwood appeared on the Ulster scene. The implications of this belief were serious. When the Lockwood Committee came into being practically no-one in Nationalist circles (and certainly not in Derry) was prepared to regard the Committee as a group of well-meaning, professional people with a complicated job to do and who were bound by clear terms of reference. In the eyes of Derry Nationalists (and, it transpired, of a great many Unionists also) Lockwood’s committee had only one task – to locate the university where it obviously belonged, at Magee, or, at the very least, in Derry. In retrospect it seems probable that O’Neill’s government, in its failure to recognize the magnitude of the crisis, did not help matters by keeping secret the processes which had led to the Committee’s recommendations. But then the report had given, as fully as was thought proper, the Committee’s reasons. It is very doubtful whether the Derry public of 1965 would have accepted or believed any explanation no matter how reasonable. The complacency which the Committee members found so remarkable on their visit to Derry and Magee, and which was manifested before them again in the oral presentation by local representatives, was the clearest demonstration that Derry regarded itself simply as entitled to the new university.

The facts indicate that the Lockwood Committee made its decision on the location of the university on the basis of practices long accepted as sound with regard to the establishment of new British universities. This – all unknown, it must be said, to the English members Lockwood, Jackson and Venables who largely ‘led’ the rest of the Committee – was where the logic of the decision failed. Economic, social and cultural conditions in Ulster were not those which obtained elsewhere in
Britain. Tensions underlay the competition for the university between Derry and Coleraine which were far removed from the sort of rivalry with which Lockwood was more familiar, and of which he, Jackson and Venables almost certainly had no proper appreciation. The fact was that neither the Derry public nor the Lockwood Committee knew the background to what the other was dealing with. It can never be proven that the Coleraine Promotions Committee had been ‘coached’ in the type of case it should make. The ‘locations’ criteria most popular with British university-planners had been readily available in print for some years. The unpalatable notion that the Coleraine promoters had done their research more thoroughly and approached the matter with less complacency deserves recognition, however belated. Likewise the ‘faceless men’, now a euphemism for all supposed Unionist double-dealing and bigotry, turned out to have been rather less malignant than the legend would have us believe. What is sinister about their involvement is the clarity with which it demonstrated the influence wielded by local Unionist politicians even on an issue which transcended purely local interests. Further evidence of this was provided by John Oliver’s account of his efforts to interest beleagured Derry Unionists in developing their locality.

It may be true in regard to Ulster that all local grievances were merely a manifestation in microcosm of some deep malaise. But it has to be said that, specifically regarding the university question, allegations of conspiracy in the higher areas of the Stormont administration are not borne out by the evidence. It is true that the Belfast civil servants appear to have been less than candid in their dealings with the U.G.C. A contradiction lay at the heart of the Stormont officials’ strategy for dealing with the university issue, but I suggest that it is a contradiction not unknown with regard to civil servants everywhere and in all eras. They wanted to control the process by which decisions about the new university would be made; but they did not want to be saddled with the responsibility for those decisions once they had been made. Hence the gymnastics which were indulged in to get the U.G.C. to advise them to form their own Ulster committee; hence also the shambling attempts at the end to toss the (by then very hot) political potato back into the U.G.C.’s lap. On the only occasion (the 11th meeting) when the senior officials were seen to ‘nudge’ the Committee towards Coleraine, it was clear that they did so only in response to an indecisiveness that was threatening to paralyse the Committee at a stage when time was running critically short. By this point the essential features of the decision were already well in place.

Despite the ludicrously tight schedule (which could only have damaged the report’s credibility); despite the regrettable, though not-
unusual circumstance that the bulk of the Committee was 'led' by those members who had least experience of Ulster, the Lockwood Committee emerges (from this treatment at least) with its integrity intact. It had never been the Committee's task to solve 'the Magee problem', and it was not the Committee's fault that its limited involvement with Magee led, however indirectly, to the outbreak of the 'troubles'. John Lockwood, who died only a few months after the publication of his last report was soon to become one of the scapegoats of Irish history.

Appendix 1

Members of the Lockwood Committee

Sir John Lockwood. Classicist. Master of Birbeck College; former Vice-Chancellor of University of London. Chairman of Secondary Schools Examination Council; Working Party on Higher Education in East Africa; Grants Committee on Higher Education; Ghana; West Africa Examinations Council; Voluntary Societies Committee for Services Overseas; member of several committees on education in Africa and other overseas matters.


Major John Glen. Former Assistant Secretary at Ministry of Education, Northern Ireland.

R.B. Henderson. Managing Director of Ulster Television.


Dr. Denis Rebbeck. Managing Director, Messrs Harland and Wolff, Belfast.
Appendix 2

Members of the Northern Ireland cabinet, 1962-66.

1962
Prime Minister: Right Hon. the Viscount Brookeborough, C.B.E., M.C.

Minister of Finance: Capt. the Right Hon. Terence Marne O'Neill.

Minister of Home Affairs: Right Hon. A.B.D. Faulkner.

Minister of Labour & National Insurance: Right Hon. H.V. Kirk.

Minister of Education: Right Hon. Ivan Neill.

Minister of Agriculture: Right Hon. H.W. West.


Minister of Health & Local Government: Right Hon. W.J. Morgan.

Minister in the Senate: Senator Col. the Right Hon. the Lord Glentoran, H.M.L.

Attorney-General: Right Hon. W.B. Maginess, Q.C.*

1963
Prime Minister: Capt. the Right Hon. Terence Marne O'Neill.

Minister of Finance: Right Hon. J.L.O. Andrews.

Minister of Home Affairs & Minister of Commerce: Right Hon. A.B.D. Faulkner.

Minister of Labour & National Insurance: Right Hon. H.V. Kirk.

Minister of Education: Right Hon. Ivan Neill.

Minister of Agriculture: Right Hon. H.W. West.

Minister of Health & Local Government: Right Hon. W.J. Morgan.

Minister in & Leader of the Senate: Senator Col. the Right Hon. the Lord Glentoran, H.M.L.

Attorney-General: Dr. the Right Hon. W.B. Maginess, Q.C.*

1964-5
Prime Minister: Right Hon. Terence Marne O'Neill.

Minister of Finance: Right Hon. J.L.O. Andrews.
Minister of Home Affairs: Right Hon. William Craig.

Minister of Labour & National Insurance: Right Hon. H.V. Kirk.

Minister of Education: Right Hon. Ivan Neill.

Minister of Agriculture: Right Hon. H.W. West.

Minister of Commerce: Right Hon. A.B.D. Faulkner.

Minister of Health & Local Government: Right Hon. W.J. Morgan.

Minister in & Leader of the Senate: Senator Col. the Right Hon. the Lord Glentoran, H.M.L.

Attorney-General: E.W. Jones, Q.C.*

1965-6
Prime Minister: Right Hon. Terence Marne O'Neill.

Minister of Finance: Right Hon. Ivan Neill.

Minister of Home Affairs: Right Hon. R.W.B. McConnell.

Minister of Health & Social Services: Right Hon. W.J. Morgan.

Minister of Education: Right Hon. H.V. Kirk.

Minister of Agriculture: Right Hon. H.W. West.

Minister of Commerce: Right Hon. A.B.D. Faulkner.

Minister of Development: Right Hon. William Craig.

Minister in & Leader of the Senate: Senator the Right Hon. J.L.O. Andrews.

Attorney-General: E.W. Jones, Q.C.*

*The Attorney-General, while a member of the government, was not in fact in the cabinet.
Appendix 3

Principal civil servants referred to in the text.

P.S. Ross (Treasury, London).

Mr. Gerrard (Secretary to Robbins Committee).

Robert Dunbar (Finance, N.I.).

David Holden (Finance, N.I.).

R.H. Kidd (Finance, N.I.).

W.T. Ewing (Education, N.I.).

Zelda Davies (Education, N.I.).

John A. Oliver (Development, N.I.).

J.M. Aitken (Development, N.I.).

J. Scott (Education, N.I.).


A.C. Brooke (Commerce, N.I.).

H.E. Jones (Commerce, N.I.).

J.M. Benn (Education, N.I.).

H. Black (Secretary to N.I. cabinet).

A.C. Williams (Education, N.I.).

References

1. Londonderry Standard, 22 May 1929.
4. A. Hawthorne (Education) to G. Mullen (Finance), 3 August 1961, PRONI FIN 18/41/8. The principal civil servants referred to in the text of this paper are listed in Appendix 3.
the committee on higher education in Great Britain under the chairmanship of Professor Lord Robbins (Cmd. 2154, 1963).


10. Memorandum, 9 Feb. 1962, tells of a deputation from the County Armagh Educational Committee which was received by the Minister for Finance, the Permanent Secretary, and Holden. Briefing material for this meeting (by W.F.A. Charlton, dated 8 Feb.) states that 'The three methods used by Armagh to calculate the demand for University places can be criticised'. Also, J.W. Moore (President, Coleraine Chamber of Commerce) to Capt. Terence O'Neill, 28 Feb. 1962, and the reply from O'Neill, 6 March 1962, PRONI FIN 18/41/8.


14. Dunbar to Williams, 12 Nov. 1962, PRONI FIN 58/1.


19. The members of the Working Party were: J. Scott, R.H. Kidd, A.T. Park, R. Jones, W.G. O'Brien (secretary); J. Finney and G.I. Dent of Education; T. Moore of Agriculture; C.P. Black of Labour and National Insurance; Mr. Reid of Commerce. Home Affairs did not wish to be represented, and Health and Local Government withdrew when Holden suggested that the official's credentials were inappropriate. PRONI FIN 58/1, series of letters, 22 Nov. to 13 Dec. 1962.

20. Working Party Minutes, 4 March 1963; the point regarding the projected figures came from the 'Confidential' paper W.P. 1. PRONI FIN 58/1.


23. 'Confidential' note of meeting in Finance Secretary's room, 29 May [1963]. Present were Permanent Secretary, Holden, and Kidd; Scott and Dr. Williams represented
Education. For Holden's earlier views see his memo of 19 Feb. [1963], PRONI FIN 58/1. On his copy of the 29 May report Kidd noted that the Working Party had been chaired by an Assistant Secretary and peopled by Principal Officers, and so was not 'top level'. PRONI FIN 58/12.


26. Andrews to Iliff, 2 July 1963, and Iliff's reply of 10 July, Note of the meeting between Holden, Kidd and Iliff, 19 July, with Dunbar's handwritten note to the Minister, 22 July. Andrews pressed Iliff for a decision on 29 August, and was sent the negative reply on 31 August. PRONI FIN 58/12.

27. Note of meeting between Kidd, Scott, and Harding of the Treasury on 6 Sept. 1963 (note is dated 9 Sept), PRONI FIN 58/12.


32. 'Notes for Minister' (undated but clearly mid-Oct. 1963), PRONI FIN 58/12.

33. Minute of meeting between Holden, Williams, Kidd, Lockwood and Jackson on 31 Oct. 1963 (minute dated 5 Nov.), PRONI FIN 58/8. See also the N.I. civil servants' briefing material for this discussion in PRONI FIN 58/12. Also the same file's Lockwood to Holden, 31 Oct. 1963, signifying Venable's agreement to serve.

34. Andrews to William Mol, 1 Nov. 1963 (Mol was Headmaster of Ballymena Academy and President of the Ulster Headmasters' Association); Andrews to Rebbeck, 6 Nov. 1963; Andrews to J. Young, 6 Nov. 1963 and his reply of 8 Nov.; Andrews to Newe, 7 Nov. 1963; Newe to Dunbar, 13 Nov. 1963; Andrews to Glen and to Henderson, 20 Nov. 1963, and their respective replies, 21 and 22 Nov. (It seems clear that the invitations to Glen and Henderson, and their acceptances, had had to be carried out by telephone; the official warrant for the Committee was signed by Andrews on 20 Nov.). PRONI FIN 58/12. See also Dunbar to Lockwood, [20] Nov. 1963, which explains about the eighth member and briefly introduces the Ulster members. A list of members, probably attached to the above letter, notes that Miss Murray had been 'stationed in Derry' as Chief Officer in the W.R.N.S. during World War II. PRONI FIN 58/8.


36. Lockwood to Andrews, 12 Dec. 1963 regarding the Training Colleges; Ewing to Lockwood, 9 Jan. 1964, on the timescale. PRONI FIN 58/8. A copy of the N.I. Government Information Leaflet on the Committee is included as L.C.4 in PRONI FIN 58/6. The enquiry into the training colleges was prompted by the Committee itself: At its first meeting on 6 December attention was drawn to the fact that the
demand for university education...affected the numbers entering teacher training (and vice versa), and that 'the numbers of graduates affected the supply of graduate teachers'. PRONI ED 39/3.

39. Memo, Ewing to Kidd, 18 Jan. [1964], PRONI FIN 58/8. This seems a little odd; a bound typescript of Armagh County Council's case had been prepared in April 1962.
41. Dr. Park further offered to liaise between the Committee and the Economic Plan Working Party.
42. Appendix to Minutes of fourth meeting, 31 Jan and 1 Feb. 1964, PRONI ED 39/3.
43. Minutes of fourth meeting, PRONI ED 39/3.
46. A typescript copy of 'A Second University for Northern Ireland: Proposals for the Coleraine/Portrush/Portstewart area' remains amongst the Magee College Papers in the Magee Library, 9.5.
47. City and County Borough of Londonderry: submission to the government of Northern Ireland presenting the Case for the promotion of a university at Londonderry [1963].
48. A typescript copy of 'Londonderry Association of University Teachers: submission to the Committee on University and Higher Technical Education, Northern Ireland' remains amongst the Magee College Papers in the Magee Library, 9.5.
49. Memorandum to the Committee on higher education under the chairmanship of Sir John Lockwood (Belfast [1964]), 33.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid.
54. Minutes of sixth meeting, 12, 13 and 14 March 1964, PRONI ED 39/3.
55. Ibid.
56. Most of this material has been taken from the unrevised minutes of the eighth meeting, 1 and 2 May 1964, which are slightly more informative than the 'approved' minutes, PRONI ED 39/3.
57. Davies to Mr. McDonald (Finance), 27 April 1964, PRONI FIN 58/9.
58. All transcripts of the Committee's interviews (these are in fact verbatim transcripts rather the synopses originally planned) are in PRONI FIN 58/2.
60. Ewing to Rebbeck, 20 May 1964; Ewing to Jackson, 26 May 1964, PRONI FIN 58/9. See also the brief correspondence between Jackson and Venables, 2 and 7 April 1964, Imperial College, University of London, Lord Jackson Papers, file FV.
61. PRONI FIN 58/1.
J.C. Baird (Agriculture), 5 May 1964; note of Working Party preliminary meeting, 12 May 1964, indicating that the original members were: Dunbar and Kidd (Finance), Benn and Scott (Education), Baird and Young (Agriculture), with a Mr. Darling of Finance acting as secretary, PRONI FIN 58/11.

Minutes of eighth meeting, and of ninth meeting, 14, 15 and 16 May 1964 (appendix), PRONI ED 39/3. On 13 May, two days after Lockwood had met with Wolfenden, he dined with the Ministers of Finance and Education and their Permanent Secretaries; see the summary (initialled by Davies) of the discussions on location, PRONI CAB/9D/31/2.

Minutes of tenth meeting, 29 and 30 May 1964, PRONI ED 39/3.

It is inconceivable that such an opinion could have been inferred from any remarks made by council representatives interviewed by the Lockwood Committee in May.

Minutes of the eleventh meeting, 5 and 6 June 1964, PRONI ED 39/3. See also the briefing material by Kidd on locating and siting, dated 4 June 1964, PRONI FIN 58/9. It is notable that only five of the non-civil servant members were present at the eleventh meeting: Murray, Venables and Rebeck were absent.

Ewing to Lockwood, 8 June 1964; memo [to Kidd] from Zelda Davies [8 or 9 June 1964] indicating that the proposed dinner originated with Lockwood (apparently); Ewing to Lockwood, 12 June 1964, PRONI FIN 58/9.


A.C. Brooke (Commerce) to Kidd, 17 June 1964; Davies' circular letters to various ministries, 16 June and 3 July 1964; Davies to Oliver, 22 June 1964, PRONI FIN 58/9.


Documents LC 93 and LC 96, dated 19 June 1964, PRONI FIN 58/7. Minutes of the twelfth meeting, 19 and 20 June 1964, at which Oliver spoke at length in response to members' enquiries about the New City's suitability, PRONI ED 39/3.

Davies to Lockwood, 3 July 1964, PRONI FIN 58/9. Minutes of thirteenth (26 and 27 June 1964) and later meetings. The Committee met for the last time on 24 October, PRONI ED 39/3. Interestingly, as late as mid-July Venables himself was 'not finally committed' on the question of location; both he and Jackson felt that the government ('on the sheer grounds of practical politics') would opt for the New City. Both men believed also that this was Lockwood's view; see Venables to Jackson, 14 July 1964, Imperial College, University of London, Lord Jackson Papers, file FV. The New City proposal was thrashed out fully at a 9 July meeting with Oliver and J.M. Aitken; see appendix to fourteenth meeting, PRONI ED 39/3.

Notes by Davies, 23 March 1964, PRONI FIN 58/8.

Venables to Jackson, 2 April 1964; Jackson to Venables, 7 April 1964; Venables to Jackson, 14 July 1964, Imperial College, University of London, Lord Jackson Papers, file FV.

Ewing to Jackson, 26 May 1964; see also Ewing's letter to Rebeck, 20 May 1964 in which he reports the receipt of comments from 'about half a dozen members and assessors', PRONI FIN 58/9.

Davies to Jackson, 30 June 1964, Imperial College, University of London, Lord Jackson Papers, file D6.

Jackson to Ewing and Davies, 28 June 1964, PRONI FIN 58/9.
78. Jackson to Ewing and Davies, 28 June 1964; Jackson to Davies, 11 August 1964; Davies to Jackson, 24 August 1964; Ewing to Jackson, 18 Sept. 1964, PRONI FIN 58/9.


80. Davies to Major Glen, 9 Nov. 1964; Mol to Davies, 8 Nov. 1964; Davies to Mol, 10 Nov. 1964; Davies to Rebbeck, 18 Nov. 1964, PRONI FIN 58/9.


86. PRONI, CAB/4/1288, Cabinet conclusions of 13 Jan. 1965.

87. PRONI CAB/4/1289, 20 Jan 1965. The eventual published version of paragraph five read: 'The Government has considered the conclusion reached by the Lockwood Committee that the implications of the establishment of a second university in Northern Ireland are inescapable for Magee University College, and the view of the Committee that there is no alternative to the discontinuance of the College as a university institution. After such consideration, the Government is not prepared, in present circumstances, to accept the Committee's view in these respects. Accordingly the Government proposes to investigate further whether the College can be incorporated in the new university and, in addition, proposes to promote, in Londonderry, an important centre of higher non-university education which will have the dual advantages of helping to satisfy the growing demands for such type of education and, with that end in view, of utilizing the considerable resources of that part of the Province'. Higher Education in Northern Ireland: Government statement on the report of the Committee appointed by the Minister of Finance (Cmd. 480 [N.I.], 1965).

88. A former member of the University for Derry Committee, Aidan Clarke, recollects that moves for the formation of the committee followed soon upon McFarland's speech.

89. The members of the University for Derry Committee were: John Hume, Arthur Jack; Brian Gallagher, a dentist; John Garmany, chairman of the Association of University Teachers at Magee; Michael Canavan, a prominent local businessman; Dr. Aidan Clarke, lecturer in history at Magee; Dr. D.H. Sidebottom, president of the Londonderry Rotary Club; Dr. Desmond McCourt, senior lecturer in geography at Magee. Details from Williams, thesis, 88, n.54. The Lockwood Report was published under the title, Higher Education in Northern Ireland. Report of the Committee appointed by the Minister of Finance (Cmd. 475 [N.I.], 1965).

90. Jones to C.J. Bateman (Secretary to Cabinet), 11 Feb. 1965, PRONI CAB/9D/31/2. Handwritten notes of a conversation between Kidd, Scott and Bateman indicate that the proposed compromises were discussed and examined.

91. Ibid., report by Ewing of the Magee staff deputation's meeting with the Minister of Education, Scott and Ewing, 18 Feb. 1965.

92. The allegations and their supposed sources are discussed cogently in Williams, thesis, 93-9. See also Denis Coles (Magee) to Evelyn King (MP, Westminster), 20 Feb. 1965, PRONI CAB/9D/31/2. 'Derry has a large catholic population and it would seem to be for this reason that a small group of influential unionists are anxious to site the new University in Presbyterian Coleraine. Indeed two
members of our own staff do not want, apparently, development in Derry because it would benefit the Catholics'. For one Unionist view of the controversy, see Paul Kingsley, *Londonderry revisited* (Belfast, 1989), 99-117.

93. Major J.S. Glover (later Unionist Mayor of Londonderry); Rev. John Brown (staff member, Magee); J.F. Bond (solicitor to Unionist Party); Sydney Buchanan (editor of *Londonderry Sentinel*), and Mr. Thompson were the Unionist representatives who met with O'Neill and Kirk on 19 February. Nixon later added the names of Rev. Emeritus Professor R.L. Marshall (Magee), Dr. Abernethy, and Robert Stewart (businessman), but seems to have been unaware of Thompson.

94. 'Note of discussion between the Prime Minister and the Minister of Education with representatives of the Unionist’s [sic] Organisation on Friday, 19th February'. The fuller handwritten notes of the meeting appear to be by Kenneth Bloomfield, O'Neill's private secretary. See also (same file) the follow-up document by Rev. J. Brown, 'The setting-up and development of a new university in Northern Ireland', in which he points out that 'The plan has the further advantage of being safe and conservative'. PRONI, CAB/9D/31/1/2.


96. Ewing to Mol (enclosing relevant copies of *Hansard*), 9 March 1965, Mol Papers (in private hands). See also Ewing to R.G. Griffiths, 9 March 1965 ('Life was fairly difficult...'), PROL, UGC 7/257.

97. Information from William Mol. See also Lockwood to Jackson, 4 March 1965, Imperial College, London, Lord Jackson Papers, file D6.

98. Memo, Oliver to Cabinet Secretary, 17 Feb. 1965, PRONI, CAB/9D/31/1/2.


100. PRONI, CAB/4/1297, Cabinet conclusions of 31 March 1965.

101. Jones to Kirk, 2 April 1965; Jones to O'Neill, 7 April 1965, PRONI, CAB/9D/31/3. According to the earlier (2 April) letter, Brown had been one of those who had advised O'Neill to buy off the Magee staff-members on the Action Committee.

102. Black to Faulkner, 13 April 1965, and Faulkner's reply, 15 April, PRONI, CAB/9D/31/3. Memo by Benn on his 13 April discussion with Wollenden; memos by Copleston, 22, 26 April [1965], PROL, UGC 7/257.

103. Extract from Cabinet conclusions of 23 April 1965; Memorandum for the Cabinet by Minister of Education, 6 May 1965, PRONI, CAB/9D/31/3.