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Desk by 1445 hrs.

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PB/84/9/2095/JS

PS/Secretary of State (L&B) (M)

cc - PS/Mr Scott (L&B) (M)
 PS/PUS (L&B) (M)
 PS/Sir E Bell ✓
 Mr Bourn
 Mr Brennan (M)
 Mr Doyne-Ditmas
 Mr Merifield
 Mr Coulson
 Mr Radcliffe
 Mr Gilliland

PC23419.



1. Mr ~~Coulson~~
 2. SEC/1

SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETINGS WITH CHIEF CONSTABLE AND GOC:

17 SEPTEMBER 1984

The Secretary of State will chiefly want to hear what the two Chiefs have to say. The following are the main heads through which he may like to guide them.

Current Scene and Outlook

How do they reckon the security forces have come through the last 3 months of parades and demonstrations (now virtually concluded?). How do they see the rest of the year developing (often a period of increased terrorist activity and tension)?

/The marching season from early July brought no surprises, but the arrival of the Noraid delegation and the Galvin Affair on 12 August gave the republicans an opportunity to provoke street disturbances and harassment of the security forces throughout the month. The question leads into that of community relations: see below. The police are anxious about another aspect of community relations - the Loyalist hunger strike at Magilligan and the risk of their being required to put down consequent street disturbances in protestant areas. Their implied message to us is that ~~whatever~~ the political imperatives in terms of prison control, we should find some means of avoiding a re-run of 1981 with the Loyalists.7

Police/Army Co-operation

How are relations between the two forces working on the ground and at staff level today?

/Frankly rather a beginner's question, but useful to get a comment from both Chief Constable and GOC. "Police Primacy" is now second nature to all concerned, but tensions inevitably occur beneath the surface. The Army are apt to feel that police planning and performance can verge on the amateur, while the police at heart would like to be

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left alone to complete the job. Feeling is especially strong in the case of the Ulster Defence Regiment (who also lack friends in some parts of the Regular Army). Aside from the UDR, Army support for the RUC is provided by two "roulement" units, who are here for 4½ months, and six resident units, here with their families for nearly 2 years. We look to further reductions in due course. There are many issues in this tissue of relations to be dealt with in our current security policy review 7.

Cross Border Security Co-operation

How is co-operation working today? What sort of contribution can we look for in the security area, towards the advancement of Anglo-Irish relations?

/This is chiefly for the Chief Constable, since cross border co-operation is carried on exclusively between the two police forces; but the GOC is interested, especially in possible developments. Our assessment is that co-operation is quite good in the routine sense on the ground, but is strained at the higher level, most notably between the Chief Constable and the Garda Commissioner. There is an intricate history to this, on which it would be best not to let the Chief Constable embark at this meeting. I hope to be discussing with the Police and Army next week their ideas for developing the present state of co-operation 7.

Security Force/Community Relations

How does the RUC stand with the community today - especially the minority? Does the Chief Constable consider the Galvin Affair likely to be a lasting setback as the Provisionals would hope, or merely localised and short lived? Are Police Commanders having any success in building up useful relationships with leaders of the minority community, either individually or through liaison committees?

/The Chief Constable is highly sensitive to the importance of building up confidence in the minority, and tends to be bullish about progress. He has tried hard to instil the same attitudes all through the force (which is today predominantly protestant), but with mixed success. The average Commander today (there are outstanding exceptions) is rather more apt than a few years ago to retreat into his professional shell rather than take risks in the pursuit of the doubtful goal of community harmony 7.

RUC Management and Morale

How does the Chief Constable assess the morale of the force?

Is his new management structure working well (at the beginning of the year a new rank of Senior Assistant Chief Constable was created, and 3 were appointed, to form an inner consultative circle with the Chief Constable and his Deputy; it was hoped that this would free the Chief of over-concentration on routine and detail)?

The Chief Constable's relations with elements in the force, notably the Police Federation, have sometimes been tempestuous. This is very much a reflection of tensions within the protestant community, especially in the context of attitudes towards the minority and the Republic. Besides, his disciplinary style is stern and his technique of management personalised and sometimes subjective. There is a range of issues here that we expect HM Inspector, Mr Philip Myers, to treat in the Report on his Annual Inspection; but the formal position is that we are awaiting this Report, and the Secretary of State should not give any hint that we are yet privy to Mr Myers' views 7.

Current Management Issues

We have a number of issues running with the RUC and/or the Police Authority, on which the Chief Constable ought not to expect the Secretary of State to be fully informed after a mere week; substantive discussion might therefore be better avoided. The main ones are:

A. A new RUC Training Centre. The present Centre at Enniskillen is inadequate, and a new site must be found. Our aim is to get the Police Authority to assess a small number of possible sites, so that the Government can reach a reasoned decision. The Chief Constable would be happy if the choice fell on St Patrick's Barracks, Ballymena, presently the home of The Royal Irish Rangers. It is one of our alternatives, but MOD have not finally decided whether to give up training there, and the issue is highly fraught politically. We can give the Chief Constable no indication of the outcome.

B. Rayner Scrutiny on Police Accommodation Arrangements. We shall shortly give Ministers recommendations and an action plan on a scrutiny completed in the summer. Reconciling the interests of the RUC, the Police Authority (who are statutorily responsible) and DOE Works Services has not been easy. The Chief Constable's main interest is in the more rapid fulfilment of his needs; I doubt if we

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
shall wholly satisfy him, but there should be some modest improvement.

C. Police Expenditure and Overtime. The containment of expenditure is a severe problem at present, and the Chief Constable is sensitive to suggestions that he is less than assiduous in ensuring that money is only spent on essential tasks. Overtime is a particular problem, running as it is possibly some 24% above this year's target, though there has been some abatement in the last few weeks. Ministers have consistently assured the Chief Constable that the RUC must have the resources that it needs to counter terrorism - a point of some political significance in the Unionist connection; but it is important that the Chief Constable should realise that this may have severe negative effect in other areas - indeed that the Police Authority itself has an obligation to stay within its budget and thus to seek savings elsewhere for such over-expenditure.

We have no similar current issues of significance with the GOC 7.

Background

A note of basic security statistics and force levels since 1969 is attached.



P W J BUXTON

14 September 1984

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 14 SEP 1984
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THE SECURITY SITUATION 1969-83

References	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984 (To 31 March)
Fatalities:																
RUC	1	2	11	14	10	12	7	13	8	4	9	3	13	8	9	7
RUCR	-	-	-	3	3	3	4	10	6	6	5	6	8	4	9	2
Army	-	-	43	103	58	28	14	14	15	14	38	8	10	21	5	6
UDR	-	-	5	26	8	7	6	15	14	7	10	9	13	7	10	9
Civilians*	12	23	115	321	171	166	216	245	69	50	51	50	57	57	44	24
Totals	13	25	174	467	250	216	247	297	112	81	113	76	101	97	77	48
Terrorist incidents:																
Shootings	-	213	1,756	10,628	5,018	3,206	1,803	1,908	1,081	755	728	642	1,142	547	424	226
Bomb†	8	170	1,515	1,853	1,520	1,113	635	1,192	535	633	564	400	529	332	367	183
Incendiarises	-	-	-	-	-	270	56	239	608	115	60	2	49	36	41	6
Totals	8	383	3,271	12,481	6,538	4,589	2,496	3,339	2,224	1,503	1,352	1,044	1,720	915	831	415
Finds:																
Weapons	-	324	717	1,264	1,595	1,260	825	837	590	400	301	203	409	317	200	146
Explosives (tons)	-	0.4	2.6	27.4	31.6	23.7	9.9	16.9	2.7	3.5	0.9	0.8	3.4	2.3	1.7	35
Terrorists charged:																
All offences	-	-	-	531	1,414	1,374	1,197	1,276	1,308	843	670	550	918	686	613	397

* Includes suspected terrorists

† Includes devices 'defused'

1. POLICE NUMBERS: 1969-84

<u>Strength Figures</u>	<u>RUC</u>	<u>RUC Reserve</u>
31 December 1970	3800	324
31 December 1971	4086	1284
31 December 1972	4257	2134
31 December 1973	4391	2514
31 December 1974	4565	3860
31 December 1975	4910	4019
31 December 1976	5253	4697
31 December 1977	5692	4868
31 December 1978	6110	4605
31 December 1979	6642	4514
31 December 1980	6943	4752
31 December 1981	7334	4871
31 December 1982	7718	4840
31 December 1983	8003	4494
31 July 1984	8055	4470

2. ARMY AND UDR NUMBERS: 1969-84

<u>Force Levels (Maximum Strength)</u>	<u>Regular Army</u>	<u>UDR</u>	<u>Total</u>
1970	9616	4008	13624
1971	14224	6786	21010
1972	21266	9245	30511
1973	17211	8959	26170
1974	16085	7976	24061
1975	*15150	7833	22983
1976	14781	7838	22619
1977	14621	7745	22366
1978	13664	7894	21558
1979	13130	7484	20614
1980	12553	7559	20112
1981	11295	7570	18865
1982	10338	7238	17576
1983 31 Dec	10308	6934	17242
1984 31 July	9382	6630	16012

*Including temporary reinforcements for S Armagh