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2 September, 1969.

Dear Taoiseach,

I enclose a second instalment on the Northern problem. It is unconventional, most of it obvious to you whether desirable or practicable or entirely inadmissible.

I cannot help feeling that unless we examine previously unacceptable ideas we will have only the old policy.

I am also convinced that however impossible the task we have got to get beneath the skin of Protestants while trying to get an anti-partition movement designed not to solidify Unionist opinion but to make Unionists feel that they must begin to think of possible changes.

The timing of any of this is a problem; all the proposals assume that the Civil Rights programme progresses.

I would be glad if you would agree to circulation and if you wish to amend it I am agreeable.

Yours sincerely,

ERSKINE CHILDERS

Erskine Childers

Jack Lynch, Esq., T.D.,
Taoiseach.

Anti-Partition Policy.

PRG means any group or committee consisting of Civil Servants, PR experts, political experts appointed for one or other purposes. The first memo presumed the necessity for a change of policy, was not related to emergency policy.

Here follows second memorandum.

If partition can only be ended by political action and not by force, then:

- (1) The anti-Unionist groups must be separately or collectively exhorted, by private and public PRG, to work on a long-term basis for an approach to unity. Their immediate objectives may be civil right socialism but the object is that they would accept some continuous development of policy towards unity. This is a minimum objective. If a nationalist party emerges, so much the better.
- (2) The comparative remoteness of the anti-Unionist group from the southern community has never been examined methodically. The PRG, if it is up to date, has to base its comparison on:
 - (a) Number of anti-Unionists who go south regularly without the southern political set-up, southern religious outlook, evidence of progress, etc. impinging upon them markedly. They may want to join the South at some time, they may hardly ever refer to it, hardly ever discuss it. They have not been given the economic answers to unity (see the first memo.). They are not articulate on a long-term unity plan.
 - (b) Anti-Unionists who are at present indifferent to unity because they are middle class and who do not want at all to get involved: are getting on well with Unionists.
 - (c) The Bogsider type, who can again be subdivided, who rarely go South, who are walled up mentally through deprivation and some deliberately induced bigotry.

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- (d) The traditional strongly republican group.
- (e) The extremists.
- (3) There must be a campaign for joint understanding, openly or privately, by more meetings, excursions North, by carefully chosen teams, not T.D.s; if this may cause greater antagonism, exchanges of visits by organisations, trade union effort. Booklets carefully designed to attract, not to create a political intrigue, to be distributed.
- (4) The readership of the three Dublin dailies and Sunday papers might be analysed by a public opinion private enquiry.
Where are the gaps?
- (5) This campaign requires some very clever political preparation, is long-term in character, does not relate to present crisis. The economic issue must be met. The general concept - we must move towards unity steadily. Different private treatment for different groupings.
- (6) About 200,000 to 300,000 Unionists have to be won over, in pure electorate terms, to gain unity, assuming the whole of the anti-Unionists voted for unity. We have no opinion poll analysis whatever of their views. The PRG should ask the 'Belfast Telegraph' for the public opinion poll referred to in earlier memo. Who are the 30-47%, or is it more, who said they believed partition would end some day? PRG should find out more about the poll. The submission of the Presbyterian Church to Callaghan is the authentic brief for tomorrow. Far more enquiry is needed as to how moderate Unionist feeling is developing, of what it consists. The groupings may consist of people:
- (a) Even if broadminded, utterly unable to accept economic policy which we must develop. *explain*
- (b) Blindly pro-British.
- (c) Anti-Catholic, not necessarily Paisleyite, but snobbishly also worried about Ne Temere Decree, job opportunities, divorce, general over-disciplinary character of Roman Catholicism.

(d) In jobs whose existence they believe, possibly wrongly, depends on partition.

(7) A suitable campaign, but of different type, needs mounting to get under the skin of moderate Protestant opinion. The dreadful phrase "psepsiological analysis" and consequent treatment applies to the whole effort. Far more attention to Unionists coming to chartered accountancy, medical dinners, games, etc. arranged tactfully by PRG; men penetrating these groups here and getting help from members to soften up. More journeys north. More invitations to functions here. More of our people holidaying in north. After analysis of southern newspaper readership by Unionists, some form of prestige publicity on advancing progress in South.

The subtlety of ~~theis~~ propaganda, its character, requires careful PRG and political study.

Gerry Dempsey to be asked for names of likely people in Irish Association without quoting him or whoever is southern secretary or officer.

All our people in touch with Northerners to be given a brief on the theme "Partition must end some day, let's see how this can be done".

- (8) Stages of campaign and timing I cannot evaluate.
- (9) I spoke of gradualist campaign. The Taoiseach anticipated my ideas in his recent speech. The campaigns above cannot commence till we have made up our minds on what is meant by gradualism in federation.
- (10) The only obvious economic hard-boiled offer we can make is to reduce the grossly adverse balance of Northern to South export/import differential by reduction of tariffs. We could charge less in hotels to Northerners. We could give them petrol coupons for cheaper petrol. We could add an extra inclusive
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grant paid by us in areas of the North where unemployment irrespective of religion exceeds x%.

We could offer to have ancillary industries close to the Border organised mutually, one on each side, e.g. yarn spinning and weaving. Have we firm proposals for them? Could or does I.C.C. operate in Northern Ireland, or A.C.C.? We could offer C.T.T. facilities to Northern industries. If we start EEC negotiations, discuss problems with North. What demands could we make of North? Is our I.D.A. effort good enough to offer collaboration on Ireland's industrial effort?

- (11) How much is it worth our while deliberately applying EEC type unity measures with U.K. in order to bring North closer? What character would such arrangements have? Unpleasant when related to 1932, but if EEC issue is going to progress in Europe we are merely presuming inevitable integration. Do we suggest some federal link with Great Britain or Northern Ireland only? What kind of Council could we propose?
- (12) How do we get the hardliners in the North, such as Protestant shipyard workers, to come South and meet our people? How do we penetrate this mass?
- (13) Do we confer with Cardinal Conway and Dr. Simms, Eric Gallagher, over further religious defreeze, not officially? Do we ask Protestants in South to help? How?
- (14) Situation in Northern schools. Does Catholic religious educational separation really prevent unification? What would happen if there was a change? Is it possible?
- (15) Please note I have deliberately written every idea I can conceive of, including all those that may look, or are, contrary to national interest, those that seem ultimately unattainable, with the sole object of stimulating thought.

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At the moment the Stormont Government is discredited. We could not discuss anything with them. Could we discuss all of what I have written, or some of it, with Callaghan? See if they would go along, begin to influence the Northern people?

- (16) The economic analysis is essential. Will our social services meet at some time in future? Can there be a phasing out of British net investment, current and capital?

Could we have a federal tripartite investment fund in the 32 Counties, U.K., Southern and Northern Irish.

- (17) No-one should flinch or explode. On the basis of our present policy, partition may end in 50 years. We must, at least, face realities.

- (18) We have not spelled out the official policy of All-Ireland Parliament plus Northern Government in federation. Should we do it?

This involves:

- (i) List of powers reserved to All-Ireland Parliament.
- (ii) If All-Ireland powers includes tariffs, how do we isolate but retain tariff-free privileges, facilities, industries in the North?
- (iii) Defence pact; social welfare arrangements; justice and law courts. How relate these to Northern Parliament?
- (iv) On the basis of Northern Parliament continuing, how Commerce Dept. operate vis-a-vis ours and in relation to grants. Same for agricultural subsidies.
- (v) Foreign affairs, U.N. representation.
- (vi) Do we pass an All-Ireland Enabling Act and put it in cold storage to build up Northern confidence?

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- (19) Should we adopt the principle, however compromising, of no change for ten years to take the heat off the situation?
- (20) Should we see Callaghan on the anti-Unionist majority areas? We can, with difficulty, suggest a P.R. System. In fact, difference was not great in Stormont in relation to number of anti-Unionist M.P.s.

2 September, 1969.

Summary on new Unity Programme.

1. No programme timing is indicated for policy. Depends on situation. Assumes civil rights are granted.
2. The 'no force' policy must be positive, not negative, persuasion campaign over 10-15 years. Recognition of Northern Government must be re-examined.
3. If we have to persuade the Unionists to come over, then it is no use attacking them as a long-range policy.
4. A gradualist policy of "unity will come in time" has the following implication.
5. The penetration, as described in second memo., of the anti-Unionist population, consisting of different groups, so that they can orientate policy towards persuading Unionists, developing an intelligent evolutionary campaign. This is most difficult to bring about; involves further large doses of ecumenism already evident in many areas. This assumes that in, say, one year, Civil Rights campaign will be on a rational basis of assessing and criticising progress.
6. The similar penetration of Unionist circles, as already described, in second memo. Knowing the extent and range of liberal Unionism, the meaning behind the "Belfast Telegraph" public opinion poll is important. Far more personal contacts.
7. Readership analysis of Irish newspapers and RTE coverage in the North is important for PR development.
8. The spelling out of the gradualist approach. All proposals to be examined.
9. Curtailment of new I.R.A. Recognition, when crisis ends, that the violent groups are minimal in number.
10. Republic's economic advance is the biggest asset we have, plus internal peace in the island.
11. The economics of unity must be squarely faced.
12. As an exercise, even if not published, a preparation of the All-Ireland Federal solution in its various stages. Publication a matter of policy.

4 September, 1969.