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Report

drawn up on behalf of the Political Affairs Committee

on the situation in Northern Ireland

Rapporteur: Mr N. J. HAAGERUP

PE 88.265/fin.
Or. En.

English Edition

The European Parliament referred the following motions for resolutions to the Political Affairs Committee pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure:

- at its sitting of 17 September 1982, the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr McCartin and others on Northern Ireland (doc. 1-630/82), referred to the Legal Affairs Committee for its opinion
- at its sitting of 11 October 1982, the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr Hume and others, on behalf of the Socialist Group, on the continuing conflict in Northern Ireland (doc. 1-637/82), referred to the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and to the Legal Affairs Committee for their opinions
- at its sitting of 15 November 1982, the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr Lalor and others on continued conflict in Northern Ireland (doc. 1-752/82), referred to the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and the Committee on Social Affairs and Employment for their opinions
- at its sitting of 15 November 1982, the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr Paisley and Mr. J. D. Taylor on Northern Ireland (doc. 1-833/82), referred to the Legal Affairs Committee for its opinion
- at its sitting of 7 March 1983, the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr Maher, on behalf of the Liberal and Democratic Group, on Northern Ireland (doc. 1-1264/82/rev.), referred to the Legal Affairs Committee, the Committee on Regional Policy and Regional Planning and the Committee on Youth, Culture, Education, Information and Sport for their opinions
- at its sitting of 11 April 1983, the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr Blaney on the continuing state of conflict and violence in Ireland (doc. 1-113/83), referred to the Legal Affairs Committee for its opinion.

The European Parliament referred for opinion the following petition to the Political Affairs Committee pursuant to Rules 108-110 of the Rules of Procedure:

- at its sitting of 16 May 1983, Petition n. 6/83 on the situation in Northern Ireland.

At its meeting of 22-24 February 1983, the Political Affairs Committee decided to draw up a report.

The committee appointed Mr Haagerup rapporteur at its meeting of 14-16 March 1983.

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The committee considered the draft report at its meetings of 12 December 1983, 25-27 January 1984 and 28 February-1 March 1984.

At the last meeting it adopted the motion for a resolution by 23 votes to 4 with 6 abstentions.

The following took part in the vote: Mr FERGUSSON, acting chairman, third vice-chairman; Mr HAAGERUP, first vice-chairman and rapporteur; Mr BAILLOT (deputizing for Mr PIQUET), Mr BLANEY (deputizing for Mrs HAMMERICH), Lord BETHELL, Mr BOURNIAS, Mr CROUX (deputizing for Mr DESCHAMPS), Mr DENIS (deputizing for Mr MARCHAIS), Mr DE PASQUALE (deputizing for Mr PAJETTA), Lady Elles, Mr GAWRONSKI (deputizing for Mr BETTIZA), Mr GEROKOSTOPOULOS (deputizing for Mr ANTONIOZZI), Mr HABSBURG, Mr HAENSCH, Mr von HASSEL, Mr HUME (deputizing for Mr LOMAS), Mr KLEPSCH, Mr LALOR, Mrs LENZ, Mr de la MALENE, Mr McCARTIN (deputizing for Mr SCHALL), Mr MOMMERSTEEG (deputizing for Mr RUMOR), Mr MOORHOUSE (deputizing for Lord O'HAGAN), Mr d'ORMESSON, Mr PAISLEY (deputizing for Mr ROMUALDI), Mr PENDERS, Mr SCHIELER, Sir JAMES SCOTT-HOPKINS, Mrs SCRIVENER (deputizing for Mr DONNEZ, Mr SEGRE, Mr SIMONNET (deputizing for Mr BARBI), Mr J.D. TAYLOR (deputizing for Mr NEWTON DUNN) and Mr WALTER.

By letters of 11.7.1983 and 21.10.1982, the Committees on Economic and Monetary Affairs and on Social Affairs and Employment stated that they decided not to give an opinion on the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr Lalor on continued conflict in Northern Ireland; by letters of 22.3.1983 and 2.6.1983 the Committees on Regional Policy and Regional Planning and Youth, Culture, Education, Information and Sport stated that they decided not to give an opinion on the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr Maher on Northern Ireland (doc. 1-1264/82/rev.). By letter of 17 February 1984 the Legal Affairs Committee stated that it decided not to give an opinion.

The report was tabled on 2 March 1984.

The deadline for the tabling of amendments to this report will be indicated in the draft agenda for the part-session at which it will be debated.

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The Political Affairs Committee hereby submits to the European Parliament the following motion for a resolution :

MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

on the situation in Northern Ireland

The European Parliament,

- having regard to the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr McCARTIN and others on Northern Ireland (doc. 1-630/82),
- having regard to the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr HUME and others on the continuing conflict in Northern Ireland (doc. 1-637/82),
- having regard to the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr LALOR and others on continued conflict in Northern Ireland (doc. 1-752/82),
- having regard to the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr PAISLEY and MR J.D. TAYLOR on Northern Ireland (doc. 1-833/82),
- having regard to the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr MAHER on Northern Ireland (doc. 1-1264/82/rev.),
- having regard to the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr BLANEY on the continuing state of conflict and violence in Ireland (doc. 1-113/83),
- having regard to petition no. 6/83 tabled by Dr. W. FREYMUTH on the situation in Northern Ireland,
- having regard to the report by the Political Affairs Committee (doc. 1-1526/83),

- A. conscious of its responsibility in deciding to draw up a report on one of the gravest political and social problems existing in the Community,
- B. recalling its resolution of 7 May 1981 "strongly opposing all forms of violence and expressing its determination to condemn acts of terrorism in whatever circumstances they are committed" and "recognizing that the European Community has no competence to make proposals for changes in the Constitution of Northern Ireland",

- C. taking account of the European Community's involvement in the economic and social affairs of Northern Ireland,
- D. recognizing and supporting the efforts made for several years by the Commission and endorsed by the Council to ameliorate the situation of the people of Northern Ireland by a number of projects already implemented or in the process of being implemented including the recently adopted measure for urban renewal in Belfast,
- E. recalling the Martin Report of 4 May 1981, (doc.1-177/81)
- F. bearing in mind the responsibility of the United Kingdom Government in maintaining law and order in Northern Ireland,
- G. calling attention to the huge costs incurred by the British Government and the even higher proportionate costs to the Irish Government of maintaining border Security,
- H. realizing the serious threat of terror which is not limited to Northern Ireland, but has claimed the lives of people in the Republic and Great Britain as well as in other parts of the Community,
- I. concerned that the estrangement between the two communities in Northern Ireland has prevented the normal democratic process of changes of government, thereby alienating the minority from the political system,
- J. recognizing the legitimate Irish interest in the achievement of lasting peace and stability in Northern Ireland,
- K. aware that improvement in the situation requires the closest possible co-operation between the United Kingdom and Irish Governments, taking inspiration from the resolution of conflicts already achieved in other parts of the Community,

- L. recognizing that the creation of new arrangements which have the agreement of both sections of the population and of the United Kingdom and Irish Governments would make it possible for the Community to intervene more productively through its policies for the restoration and development of social and economic life,

- M. aware that the conflict, deeply rooted in British-Irish history, is less one of religious strife than of conflicting national identities in Northern Ireland,
 - 1. Solemnly declares its readiness to assume a greater responsibility for the economic and social development of Northern Ireland to the limit of the financial capacity and legal obligations of the European Community;
 - 2. asks the Commission and the Council of Ministers of the European Community to undertake a major review of all its current and planned projects in Northern Ireland and in the Border areas of the Republic, to present an integrated plan for a major contribution to the development of Northern Ireland, in conformity with the overall objectives of the European Community and to report to the European Parliament on the progress achieved as part of this plan;
 - 3. asks the competent Community bodies to establish that all current and future EC efforts be made additional, in so far as practically possible, to the already existing United Kingdom schemes to further the development of Northern Ireland and asks the Government of the United Kingdom to cooperate fully in such an endeavour to allay all fears that the principle of additionality is not being strictly adhered to;

4. insists that projects dependent upon European Community funds should be described and advertised as such in Northern Ireland so that the people of both traditions are aware of the benefits of membership of the European Community;
5. encourages the relevant authorities and the the elected representatives of Northern Ireland to continue to co-operate with the Commission of the European Community in matters related to the economic development of Northern Ireland, to stimulate additional foreign investment, taking advantage of the remarkably good record of industrial relations in Northern Ireland and to expand the economic and commercial links with the rest of the European Community as well as with the United States of America and other parts of the world;
6. expresses its support for and appreciation of the work carried out by the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council since its establishment in November 1981, following the meeting of the then Irish Prime Minister and the British Prime Minister and since continued and expanded;
7. expresses its support for the growing British-Irish co-operation in exploiting resources on both sides of the Border in Ireland with a view to creating additional employment and to promote better understanding through a larger number and wider range of personal contacts. The recent agreement for a 22 year period, on the supply of natural gas to Northern Ireland from a field in the Republic is welcomed, as an example of mutually beneficial cooperation in the economic sphere;
8. recognizing the significance of the recently completed studies by the Economic and Social Committee of the European Community of a number of Border co-operation projects and urging the Institutions of the EC, as well as the two most directly affected Governments, to implement these plans as yet another important contribution to the economic development of Northern Ireland;

9. recognizing the need to promote more and better balanced trade between the two parts of Ireland, urges the United Kingdom to participate fully in the European Monetary System as a step towards the creation of the economic and monetary union of the Community within which monetary compensatory amounts would be abolished;
10. strongly condemns all acts of violence and terrorism in Northern Ireland and elsewhere and expresses its support for all individuals, organisations and parties who unreservedly work for the welfare of the people of Northern Ireland solely on the basis of peaceful and democratic means;
11. encourages and supports the existing co-operation between the British and Irish Governments in combating terrorism irrespective of its source and strongly urges all other member governments to underwrite this co-operation thereby reinforcing the joint European efforts against terrorism;
12. condemns those organizations and individuals anywhere providing financial or material support to terrorist organizations, and urges all governments to take appropriate measures to prevent such action;
13. calls upon the British and Irish Governments to re-examine their individual and collective responsibility for expanding and enlarging their mutual co-operation not only in matters related to security north and south of the border but also to use their influence with the two communities in Northern Ireland to bring about a political system with an equitable sharing of government responsibilities, which would accommodate the identities of the two traditions, so upholding the ideals and the concept of tolerance vis-a-vis minorities practised in the two countries and in other EC Member States;

14. urges the Parliaments of the two countries to set up, as suggested by the meeting of the British and Irish Prime Ministers in 1981, a joint Anglo-Irish parliamentary body with representatives of the two Parliaments and of any elected body truly representative of Northern Ireland, and offers to have members of the European Parliament take part in such a body in so far as that meets with the support of the British and Irish members;
15. Instructs its President to forward this Resolution to the Commission, the Council, the Governments and Parliaments of Ireland and of the United Kingdom.

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

(i)

During the preparation for this report, the rapporteur has had conversations with government members, political leaders and other elected representatives from the United Kingdom and the Republic and with representatives of all major constitutional political parties in Northern Ireland.

In addition many conversations have been conducted in Northern Ireland with people from industry, agriculture, trade unions, the churches and from educational institutions plus officials, farmers and workers without any distinct political affiliation.

It has been the rule throughout the drafting of this report that nobody has been quoted directly, and as some of the people with whom the rapporteur has been in contact have not wished to be named it has been decided to leave out names altogether.

It goes without saying that even if the conclusions and comments are based upon impressions derived from the numerous conversations - and the reading of a number of books, pamphlets and articles - the rapporteur is solely responsible for any opinion expressed and no particular view or idea can be traced back to any particular conversation or to any individual.

As to the books and other published material the rapporteur has of course had access to the vast literature available even if only - for reasons of time - a fraction of the total number of books have in fact been used.

As some of the books express views more favourable towards one point of view than to another it has been decided not to list those books and articles which the rapporteur has used except where a direct reference has been made.

Therefore the only publications listed are those from the Institutions of the European Community from which most if not all the statistical material has been derived.

Preface

This is not a recipe or a prescription for a solution of the problems of Northern Ireland. If such a recipe exists - which in the view of this rapporteur is very dubious indeed - it is not up to the European Parliament to present it.

This report has come about as a result of a call for a look into the situation of Northern Ireland backed by a solid majority of the European Parliament. The aim is basically twofold: to explain a terribly complicated situation of conflict and strife, alienation and sectarianism to non-British and non-Irish members of the European Parliament and through them maybe to wider sections of the European public at large - and to see if and how the institutions of the European Community can be of additional assistance to the people of Northern Ireland beyond the assistance already rendered within the framework of the regional policy of the Community and of the Social Fund.

Three personal observations should be registered at the outset. One is the almost total absence of direct and constructive communication between the elected representatives of the two communities of Northern Ireland. Any foreigner coming to Belfast for the first time will be deeply dismayed and indeed shocked by the division of that city into sectarian sectors often with walls separating them in a way which are a chilly reminder of the much more notorious Berlin Wall erected in 1961. The alienation and the sectarianism of the two communities in much of Northern Ireland appear to be total. It is like two nations deeply distrustful of each other living in each others' midst.

The second observation is one of deep admiration and respect for those people and institutions bravely defying the religious, political and social divisions. They are, fortunately too numerous to list although they are all worthy of mention. Most efforts of this nature are carried out by volunteers. The goodwill displayed and the energy spent are equally divided between Protestants and Catholics. The people behind such efforts are to be found in very different areas, from education to politics, from charity to child care, in Catholic and Protestant churches and religious movements as well as in ecumenical circles. They are not limited to people from Northern Ireland, but they are actively encouraged and supported by individuals and groups in the Republic, in Great Britain and indeed in certain other European countries as well.

Even if many of these individuals and groups are unique, they should not be taken to differ in one vital respect from the very large majority of the people of Northern Ireland in that they are united in a common desire for living in peace and tranquillity. Killings and intimidation have - in spite of the significant reduction in the number of lives lost during the last few years - become all too commonplace in Northern Ireland. This has only reinforced the wish of the ordinary man and woman to live an ordinary life without fear.

A final third personal observation applies to the enormous amount of scholarly effort which has been done and which is going on to analyse, to understand and if possible, to improve the situation and the terribly complex problems of Northern Ireland. The rapporteur has only, for reason of time, been able to make use of far too few of the vast number of books, pamphlets and papers which are available on the various aspects of the situation in Northern Ireland.

However modest the conclusions and the recommendations of this report and however brief the descriptive and analytical part - made necessary by the restrictions imposed upon the length of reports on non-budgetary matters - it may give rise to strong reactions, angry responses and disappointed expectations.

All this has more to do with the subject matter of the report than with the report itself. It was clear from the outset, that no report from the European Parliament or from anybody else could satisfy everybody in Northern Ireland. No attempt has therefore been made by the rapporteur to satisfy any one section of the population of Northern Ireland. Long before the report was drafted, it had become a matter of controversy. The news media have given more publicity to this report before it was even planned than to almost any other report actually adopted by the European Parliament.

The decision to draw up a report on the situation in Northern Ireland was met by strong protests and bitter resentment from some and by great expectations and relief by others. But even if the rapporteur and the majority of the Political Affairs Committee had been able to produce new formulas, new proposals and new ideas, there is no way in which such thoughts and plans could have been imposed upon the situation in Northern Ireland. This is not to say that any improvement would have to come exclusively from within. It is one of the conclusions of this report that those living outside Northern Ireland carry a great responsibility for the development in Northern Ireland. This applies in particular to the Governments of the United Kingdom and of Ireland, but it also extends to the whole European Community and to the institutions of this Community and maybe, in particular, to the Parliament whose majority asked for a report on Northern Ireland. Here it is.

Throughout this Report and indeed in most books on Northern Ireland, the words 'Catholics' and 'nationalists' are used interchangeably to describe the whole Catholic population of Northern Ireland, estimated at about 600,000 or only slightly less than 40% of the overall population. Likewise the terms 'unionists' and 'Protestants' are used interchangeably to describe the roughly 1 million Protestants in Northern Ireland. There are as a matter of fact a number of Catholics who are indeed unionists and there are some Protestants who will vote for non-unionist parties in elections. There are even a few Ulster unionists who would describe themselves as Irish but their numbers are not large. Therefore the point should be made that whenever the terms listed above are used, it should be recalled that there are exceptions to the widely accepted notion that all Catholics are nationalists and that all Protestants are unionists and that the latter feel as British as the former feel they are Irish.

A_brief_Historical_Outline

In any attempt to summarize or even briefly try to explain the situation of Northern Ireland to outsiders, the historical section must be a crucial one.

As this is out of necessity a brief report and as it has to deal mainly with the contemporary situation, this introductory historical outline can only mention a few of the dates and the events which are central to even the most superficial understanding of the sources of the conflict in Northern Ireland.

The rise of the Irish nation can be traced back to pre-Christian times to the invasion of the Celts. It developed specific cultural features, but it never became a unified and independent political entity until the 20th century. Thus, an Irish identity was clearly discernible for many centuries before it finally managed to find a political expression in terms of a free Irish state.

This is not to say that the Irish polity was ever merged with the English in the Middle Ages. Irish laws remained distinct. The Norman Kings of England were only Lords of Ireland, a title conferred by the Papacy in the 12th century, and often exercised their authority through an Irish deputy.

Political and religious struggles were merged from the time of the Reformation, because it was a distinct feature of the Irish entity that it was predominantly Catholic. This merger could be found almost everywhere in Western Europe. Nowhere were the consequences so tragic and so long lasting as in Ireland, however.

The fight between the Irish and the English - the latter, unlike the Irish, established as a centralised monarchy at an early stage in European history - was caused not just by religion but also by the attempts of the English to dominate Ireland and to take over Irish land. In fact the first large scale "plantation" or colonization, of southern Ireland took place under the Catholic Queen Mary. Irish-English history is dominated by Irish rebellions and British suppression. Both rebellion and suppression have usually been particularly bloody, and large scale atrocities have been committed by both sides.

A rebellion of the Northern Irish in 1641 identified the Catholics with the losing side in the English Civil War. A few years later Cromwell cruelly imposed Protestant domination throughout Ireland. It was not until 1690, however, that the issue was settled for a very long time. At the battle of the Boyne, the Protestant William of Orange defeated the Catholic James II, thereby ushering in the long lasting Protestant ascendancy until the latter part of the 19th century.

To this day, the battle of the Boyne is celebrated by the Protestants, and William of Orange is hailed as the conqueror and hero, who established the dominance of the Protestants over Catholics, thereby, in their eyes, securing their religious freedom.

During the 18th century, some of the Protestant landowners claimed autonomy from England. One of their number, Wolfe Tone, sympathetic with the ideals of the French Revolution, in 1798 inspired a rebellion against British rule at the height of the British struggle with France and the young Napoleon. This confirmed the ever present British suspicion about the Irish, as always willing to collude with Britain's enemies. Once again the rebellion was put down with the usual brutality and this time an Act of Union led to the dissolution of the local Irish parliament and made Ireland an integrated part of the United Kingdom.

Restrictions on Irish commerce and trade were lifted with some positive results especially in Northern Ireland, where industrialisation began to take off, as exemplified by the rapid growth of the city of Belfast. It had 20,000 inhabitants in 1800. It had 100,000 50 years later, and in 1901 Belfast had a population of 350,000.

This expansion was not equalled in the rest of the island.

The existence of Northern Ireland or rather the six separate counties of Northern Ireland, has been called an historical accident. This is not exactly true. Ulster, as it was then called, did not become what it is today by sheer accident. In fact, it was carefully planned, even if nobody could foresee the consequences.

British colonisation began on a large scale in the early 17th century. Out of 170,000 immigrants to Ireland, 150,000 were Scots and most of them established themselves firmly in Northern Ireland. Scotland and Ireland are at one point separated by about 20 kms of sea and the links between some counties of Northern Ireland and of Scotland were close for many centuries.

Colonisation was by no means limited to Northern Ireland, though this is where it took its firmest roots and where the Protestants at an early stage were in a majority. Land was confiscated throughout Ireland and a hundred years after the colonisation process began, only 14% of all land in Ireland was in the hands of the Catholics. In Ulster it was down to only 5%.

The fact that industrialisation, when it began in the early 19th century, was in the main limited to Northern Ireland, and that agriculture developed along different lines in Northern and in Southern Ireland - in the latter case with the result that lands were subdivided into small plots - constitutes another important feature in explaining the division of the island. In almost all of Ireland, British landlords were in full control and almost half the tenancies in Ireland were between one and five acres only.

The land did not begin to revert to the Irish until the late 19th century and early 20th century, and Ireland has remained a country of small farmers until this day.

Not only did the major part of Ireland remain unaffected by the economic upswing in Northern Ireland, but towards the middle of the 19th century, things went from bad to worse and turned into a disaster of appalling misery. The Irish potato famine from 1845 to 1849 is one of the few features of Irish history well known to outsiders. But the consequences are less well known.

Emigration to the United States was so large that it contributed decisively to making the Irish-Americans the second largest element of the American population. Nowadays about 40 million Americans can trace their origin back to Irish ancestors. At the same time, the number of Irish people who died from starvation, about one million, was disastrously high and left the Irish nation in a permanent state of increased numerical inferiority vis-a-vis the British, which had up to then not been the case. This can be judged from the fact that whereas the population of the Republic and of Great Britain is today 1 : 12, it was, on the eve of the potato famine, less than 150 years ago 1 : 2.

Among the many by-products of this tragedy was an increased hatred of the surviving Irish towards the British for being unable to cope with this disaster - and the arrival of more Catholics in Ulster in the hope of finding work in the more prosperous Northern Ireland.

This influx of Catholic farmers and workers from Southern Ireland led to a tougher competition for work and to increased Protestant resistance to the presence of Catholics.

This opposition took many forms, but was in the main all directed towards preserving the undisputed Protestant dominance of the affairs of Northern Ireland. The division of Belfast into Protestant and Catholic sectors, which lasts until this day, took place at this time.

In the political field, an Irish Home Rule Movement grew ever stronger in the 19th century, and successive British governments failed to cope satisfactorily with this situation, while the Protestants in the North organised themselves in order to reinforce their own position and to preserve British influence throughout Ireland. Most well known is the Orange Order, organised to stiffen the opposition to the growing Home Rule Movement.

From 1886 the British Liberal Party, at that time the first or second party in the State, espoused Irish Home Rule. But the Tory majority in the House of Lords blocked the Bills voted in the House of Commons for this reform. During the last purely Liberal Government in 1910-15 the veto power of the Lords was finally removed and the Liberals, supported by the Irish Nationalist Party and the young Labour Party voted through a Home Rule Bill, against intense opposition from the Tories and Unionists. However its passage coincided with the outbreak of the First World War and the establishment of Home Rule was delayed for the duration of the conflict. The counties of Ulster were given the right to opt out of Home Rule.

This was unacceptable to the more extreme nationalists and the famous Irish Rising of 1916 followed, during which the independence of Ireland was proclaimed. The rebellion was once again put down by the British. Once again it added to the British distrust of the Irish and their apparent willingness to collude with the enemies of Britain in crisis and times of war, a suspicion which was stimulated as late as during the Falklands war by the way in which the Republic pursued its policy of neutrality, which was perceived in the United Kingdom as anti-British.

The suppression of the rebellion of 1916 only increased the support for complete independence throughout Ireland and resulted in a clear victory for Irish republicanism in the parliamentary elections in 1918. The elected Irish members refused to take their seats in the Parliament of Westminster, but established their own parliament in Dáil Eireann. At the same time, the semi-military groups, who had long been active, were formed into an overall organisation known as the Irish Republican Army (IRA).

This time the Irish finally won in so far as the Government of Ireland Act of 1920 and the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 firmly established and recognised the independent existence of the Irish Free State, later to become the Republic of Ireland. However, Northern Ireland had already been established in 1920 as a separate unit with a provisional 'Home Rule' Parliament forming a distinct political entity. Following the decision of the Boundary Commission, established after the Treaty, and, from which, the Irish Member resigned, Northern Ireland was not limited to the 3 counties with an overwhelming unionist majority, as Dublin had hoped, but continued to be the six northern counties of Fermanagh, Tyrone, Londonderry, Antrim, Down and Armagh which remained part of the United Kingdom.

Northern Ireland after 1921

In 1921, the Anglo-Irish Treaty established the independence of Ireland on condition that Northern Ireland, through a decision of its already established provisional parliament should have the right to opt out and revert to the United Kingdom - a right that was immediately exercised on 7 December 1922. It was agreed that a Council of Ireland should be set up to prepare the basis for the eventual reunification of Ireland.

From a British point of view, this looked as if the Irish problem had been taken care of, whereas the terms to which the Irish leaders had reluctantly agreed gave rise to protests and violence in Ireland. These objections were in fact directed less against Partition than against such symbols as the fact that the King of Great Britain was to remain King of the Irish Free State. They were none the less vehement for that and the Irish Civil War 1922-23 followed, in which those who had struggled for independence against the British, fought each other. The supporters of the compromise with Britain won and from them is descended the Fine Gael Party. The more extreme nationalists, the Sinn Féin, after losing the Civil War, at first boycotted the institutions of the infant State. But in 1926, their leader, De Valera, changed his mind, formed the Fianna Fáil Party and entered constitutional politics, winning office in the election of 1932. The minority of his former supporters who rejected this, continued to oppose the legality of the Irish State and claimed the old name of Sinn Féin in politics and of the IRA in the armed struggle against the British presence in Northern Ireland, which they insisted must continue.

The fact that Northern Ireland came to consist of only six of the nine counties of the old province of Ulster, meant that the Protestants were in firm control of the political machinery. It was so formed so as to give the Protestants an overall majority and decided against the wishes of the Protestants in the other three counties. If the three other counties had been added to Northern Ireland, in conformity with the original Ulster province, the proportion of Catholics and Protestants would have been 1 : 1.

The 2 : 1 proportion came to mean, in the prevailing conditions of mutual alienation and distrust, that the normal criteria for a democratic society, that of the possibility of an alternative government, never came into existence. Northern Ireland became a one party dominated state with nationalist parties playing the role of a lobby on the periphery of power, as it has been said.

On the surface there was political consistency if not stability. Protestant ministers were usually office-holders for several years. 20 years was not unusual. However, the government was rarely an efficient one. The division of power between Belfast and London was not a happy one and the unionist majority was more anxious to preserve its strong power base and control of the political machinery than in reforms and reconciling the Catholic minority to the existence of Northern Ireland as a political entity.

Northern Ireland remained the poorest region of the United Kingdom and was particularly hard hit by the depression in the 1930's. Subsidies had to be paid by the British tax payers to Northern Ireland, but during the Second World War and again with the introduction of the welfare state in 1945 a more dramatic improvement took place in Northern Ireland and brought it closer in terms of income and employment to the rest of the United Kingdom. Prosperity, if it could be called that, did not bring a corresponding reduction in the level of violence and prejudice in Ireland. Sectarianism persisted throughout Northern Ireland. Street fights were commonplace. Job discrimination in both the public and the private sector kept Catholics out of many jobs.

Violence, however, was seen as counterproductive by many Catholics, and the IRA was still lacking widespread grass-root support. When a Unionist liberal-minded leader, Terence O'Neill, in the early 1960's introduced a number of reforms and initiated stronger co-operation with the Republic, the

initial response on the part of the nationalists was encouraging. In the end, however, this well-meaning attempt came to nothing, because O'Neill divided the unionists without succeeding in satisfying the nationalists' demand for the end of discrimination. The unionist hardliners undermined O'Neill's position as leader. Among them was Ian Paisley who has been described as the self-appointed conscience of loyalists and unionists and the militant opponent of any power-sharing scheme.

A campaign for civil rights led in 1967 to the formation of the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA). Their requests for action against discrimination and other demands hardened the opposition of the unionists to any reform and O'Neill resigned in 1969. A few months later, a traditional Orange Parade in Londonderry led to violence between policemen of the Royal Ulster Constabulary and the Catholics in the city which spread to Belfast. This led the government of Northern Ireland to ask for British troops to help restore order. They were meant to stay there for only a short time. They have been there ever since.

The arrival of the British troops was seen as a victory by the Catholics, who greeted the military forces with relief and hailed the soldiers almost as liberators. Within two years these sentiments had completely changed.

Sectarian clashes continued and took ugly forms in Belfast with the killing of a number of people and 200 houses, most of them Catholic, being burnt down. The IRA began to re-emerge, and when the Northern Ireland authorities, with the acquiescence of the British, introduced internment, it had disastrous results and alienated the Catholic minority more than ever. An illegal civil rights march in Londonderry in January 1972 led to an open clash with the military. Thirteen people were killed and the day was later remembered as "Bloody Sunday".

When the Northern Ireland government under Brian Faulkner declined to support British demands for the transfer of law and order powers he resigned. The Stormont regime began to collapse and was abolished in March 1972 whereby direct British rule was established. It continues until this day.

The following year the government launched a new plan for Northern Ireland. It included the setting up of an assembly and an executive coalition consisting of both Catholics and Protestants. It was also to include a Council of Ireland, though of a different kind to the one which had been planned already in 1921, but never carried out.

A joint executive was formed with a Protestant Prime Minister and a Catholic deputy. A British-Irish conference at Sunningdale led to an agreement of guidelines for the future political structure on the basis of power-sharing.

But by this time, the extremist Protestant reaction had hardened to the point of total obstruction. In Britain, general elections were called when Prime Minister Heath refused to yield to the miners. The results in Northern Ireland showed that many Protestants had in fact voted for Sunningdale. There was an almost 50-50 balance in votes, pro and anti-Sunningdale, but as a result of the non-proportional 'first past the post' electoral system only one out of the 12 Northern Ireland seats in the House of Commons was held by a supporter of Sunningdale - the then SDLP leader, Gerry Fitt. A general strike was called by the Protestant extremists and this brought Northern Ireland to a total standstill. The British proved unable to break the strike, the power-sharing experiment collapsed and direct rule was re-introduced. Various attempts to change the political structure were made, the latest one being when Mr James Prior arranged for the election of an Assembly in 1982 (see under 'Political Parties in Northern Ireland').

A War of Religion?

To the European from the Continent, from Great Britain, and indeed from the Republic, the fact that the conflict in Northern Ireland is often described as being between Catholics and Protestants is both shocking and misleading.

Although the killings in Northern Ireland have been on a small scale, both absolutely and relatively, compared with the carnage of the World Wars and many internal conflicts such as the Greek and Spanish Civil Wars and even in Cyprus since 1974, specifically religious warfare between Christians is something most Europeans feel they have put behind them. The growth of the ecumenical movement, especially since the Second Vatican Council, makes the killings and hatred in Northern Ireland the more anachronistic.

That the Protestant minority in the Republic and the Catholic minority in Great Britain are loyal citizens, playing a full part in public life, shows that it is not the formal position in those countries which is the problem. The facts that the hereditary Sovereign of the United Kingdom may not be a Catholic and that the Catholic majority in the Republic has voted laws and constitutional amendments which entrench Catholic views of marriage, birth control and abortion, are exploited by propagandists on both sides. But if the United Kingdom repealed the Act of Protestant Succession and Ireland became a secular state by customary behaviour as well as legal theory, it would make little difference in mitigating the passions of unionists and nationalists in Northern Ireland. The effect might indeed be merely to exacerbate their sense of suspicious isolation from the nations to which they, in theory, feel they owe loyalty.

Religion in Northern Ireland is a declining force, although Church attendance, especially among the Presbyterians, is significantly higher than in most of Europe. But in Northern Ireland, the terms "Protestant" and "Catholic" are

appropriated as badges by many people who have little understanding of doctrine and seldom attend Protestant or Catholic religious ceremonies.

The reason is not hard to find. When the Plantation of Ulster took place at the end of the C.16 and beginning of the C.17, the religious wars were at their worst in Europe. The Protestant settlers were largely Calvinist, which even now remains the major Protestant Church most suspicious of ecumenism. The tendency of colonists to regard themselves as a chosen people bringing superior skills to a primitive society was fortified by doctrine. At the same time, the strength of the Catholic Church in Britain's Continental rivals, France and Spain, identified the Irish Catholics as a potential menace to Britain.

For their part, the Catholics were conscious of their religion as an expression of their ancient culture which, in the Dark Ages had spread Christian civilisation to many parts of Europe. The new order became associated in the minds of the oppressed, with the religion of their oppressors, while to the Protestants Catholicism was seen as an ally to an external threat. The fact that penal laws against Catholics continued in the United Kingdom - although not always stringently enforced - until 1829, kept the memory of the C.17 conflicts alive until the beginnings of Irish nationalism in a modern sense.

When Gladstone, himself a devout Anglican, proposed Irish Home Rule in 1886, his opponents inside his own Liberal Party coined the slogan "Home Rule is Rome Rule" and, to many in Britain and to nearly all Protestants in Northern Ireland, this provided a rationalisation for opposing a change which was hard to oppose in terms of the prevailing political wisdom of the late Victorian age.

This was so, even though the then leader of the Irish Nationalists in the House of Commons, Parnell, was, like many champions of Irish independence before and since, a Protestant, and the Catholic hierarchy in Ireland did not commit itself to Irish independence until it was a fait accompli.

Since the establishment of Northern Ireland in 1920, the Churches have accepted the political opinions of their congregations rather than formed them. This is not to deny the sincerity of the religious belief of many people in Northern Ireland. It is to say that the conflict is one of culture and of loyalties, of memories of historic struggles rather than disputes of doctrine.

Intransigence and Good Will

Apart from the period in the mid and late 1960's, relations between Ireland and the United Kingdom were difficult and often strained.

Article 2 of the 1937 Constitution claimed that 'the national territory consists of the whole island of Ireland, its islands and territorial seas'. The demand for a united Ireland was thus made part of the Constitution of Ireland, which further strengthened the determination of the Protestants in the North to oppose any closer co-operation - not to speak of Irish unification - with the South.

45 years later in September 1983, the outcome of the referendum in the Republic to include an anti-abortion clause in the Constitution of Ireland led to a similar reaction in Protestant circles in Northern Ireland.

The repeated eruptions of violence, the formation of militant and sometimes semi-military groups on both sides, the entrenchment of the two communities, the terrorist activities of the IRA and Protestant terrorist organisations, and the leading role of extremist politicians, at the cost of moderates among the unionists, presented a dismal picture of a people or rather of two peoples bent on self-destruction because of their hatred of each other. This is undoubtedly not only an oversimplified but also a very misleading picture.

There are many expressions of good will and will for peace in Northern Ireland. One of the more spectacular examples was the emergence of the Women's Peace Movement

in the mid 1970's after the accidental death of three children following a shooting episode. The movement struck a popular note among people on both sides of the great divide and reflected a widespread revulsion against violence. In spite of the popularity of the movement and its approval and recognition from the outside world - the founders were granted the Nobel Peace Prize in 1976 - it was not possible to sustain a broad support from both Catholics and Protestants for the formation of a political force which could successfully compete with the political parties already in existence. The movement eventually petered out while calls for more drastic political action from the outside by the Catholics contrasted vividly with the determined refusal of the unionist leaders to make any concessions.

Power-sharing à la Sunningdale came to be seen by the Catholics in the late 1970's and the early 1980's as the very minimum, which could lead to a restructuring of the government of Northern Ireland. Unionist leaders have continued to see power-sharing as a step towards the elimination of majority rule paving the way to Irish unity. As a unionist put it in 1983, 'to invite Catholics to take part in the government of Northern Ireland would be equal to Mrs Thatcher asking Mr Tony Benn to join her cabinet'.

Direct British rule which has been in force since 1972 is viewed by almost everybody in Northern Ireland as only a temporary measure. It is, however, preferred by the Catholics to local majority rule and by Protestants to power-sharing. It is therefore the preferred second choice of most people for very different reasons, thus providing an uncertain compromise in a deeply divided society, where compromises have often proved to be short-lived. Direct rule provides no solution to the political problems of Northern Ireland, but as a policy reluctantly accepted by most people in Northern Ireland it bars for the time being the way to any attempt of implementing other policies.

The position of the main British parties

1. The Conservative Party. Originally a fierce opponent of Irish Home Rule when first proposed by the Liberals in the 1880's, and continuing this policy until 1921, the Conservatives maintained their alliance with the Unionist Party in Northern Ireland until the abolition of Stormont. Since then, their relations with the Official Unionists, and still more with the Democratic Unionists, have been unhappy. The Conservatives still remain the most pro-Union of the major British Parties but have made clear since Sunningdale in 1973 that they would not oppose Irish unity if a majority in Northern Ireland desired it.

In the 1983 Election Manifesto, the Conservatives stated they would: "Continue in Northern Ireland building on the courage, commitment and increasing success of the security forces, we will give the highest priority to upholding law and order. We will continue to give the support essential for the Province to overcome its economic difficulties.

"The people of Northern Ireland will continue to be offered a framework of participation in local democracy and political progress through the Assembly. There will be no change in the Northern Ireland constitutional position in the United Kingdom without the consent of the majority of people there, and no devolution of power without widespread support throughout the Community.

"We believe that a close, practical, working relationship between the UK and the Government of the Republic can contribute to peace and stability in Northern Ireland without threatening in any way the position of the majority community in the Province".

2. The Labour Party is severely critical of the Conservative Government's handling of the Northern Irish economy and in its 1983 Manifesto said it would repeal the Prevention of Terrorism Act and reform the system of special criminal courts for trying terrorist offences. The key paragraph states:

"Labour believes that Ireland should, by peaceful means and on the basis of consent, be united, and recognises that this will be achieved with the introduction of socialist policies. We respect and support, however, the right of the Northern Ireland people to remain with the UK, although this does not mean that Unionist leaders can have a veto on political development; and we accept that, to achieve agreement and consent between the two parts of Ireland, we must create greater unity within the Northern Ireland community".

3. The Liberal Party, traditionally, since the days of Gladstone a supporter of Irish Home Rule, favours Irish Unity. Its latest statement on the subject was a resolution passed at its annual Assembly in September 1983 which began by stating:
"This Assembly, noting that successive government policies have failed to find a solution to the problems of Northern Ireland, accepts the principle of a United Ireland as a long-term objective, and to this end supports:

1. The creation of an all-Ireland Council ...".

The Liberals have long hoped that the European Community could play a part in improving relations between Britain and Ireland, and, in the final paragraph of the 1983 Assembly Resolution called on "the UK Government to invite the government of the Republic of Ireland to join with it in asking the other member governments of the European Community to provide a peace-keeping force to take over the security role in both Northern Ireland and the adjoining areas of the Republic".

Liberal Assembly Resolutions are only advisory, and the Party leader, Mr David Steel, has made it known that he has reservations about the Assembly text. In company with Dr. David Owen, the leader of the Social Democratic Party, which fought the 1983 election in alliance with the Liberals, Mr Steel is establishing a committee to examine the whole question of the future of Northern Ireland in detail.

4. The Social Democrats, who were only founded in 1981, admit to the need to formulate their policy on Northern Ireland. In the 1983 joint manifesto with the Liberals, very little emphasis

was given to Northern Ireland, but the Alliance pledged itself "to encourage a non-sectarian approach to the problems of the province. We support the present Northern Ireland Assembly and will work towards a return to devolved power in place of direct rule from Westminster. We favour the early establishment of an Anglo-Irish consultative body at parliamentary level representing all parties at Westminster, Belfast and Dublin".

It would therefore be fair to summarise the position of the British parties as all of them being willing to accept Irish unity but with the Conservatives insisting on the majority of the Northern Ireland electorate choosing to accept it, while the Labour and Liberal Parties seek to promote Irish unity and the Social Democrats have not yet defined their position.

All the Opposition parties are uneasy about the threats to civil liberties posed by existing anti-terrorist laws, although the Labour Party in office operated them.

All four main British parties favour promoting co-operation with the Republic on matters of material interest and all would like devolution to elected Northern Ireland bodies, provided they have the support of significant numbers of both Catholics and Protestants.

The position of the main parties in the Republic

All four Irish parties represented in the Dáil: Fianna Fáil, Fine Gael, the Labour Party and the Workers Party are at one in hoping for a united Ireland on a basis of consent. However, until very recently, the whole issue of how to achieve it and how to accommodate the one million Protestants in the North had never been seriously considered and discussed among the Irish political parties. Irish unity is foreseen in the Constitution of the Republic and that is that. But in late 1982, it was decided to make the first serious effort to bring about a joint approach on the part of the four Irish parties and if possible, the political parties of Northern Ireland as well, to the whole question of the future of Ireland, North and South - a New Ireland. Hence the name the New Ireland Forum. The Forum was subsequently set up with a prominent Irish academic, Dr Colm O hEocha as its head and representatives of the three leading political parties in the Republic and the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) of Northern Ireland, including their four leaders. The two major Unionist parties in the North and the Alliance Party declined to take part, the first two parties rejecting it as yet another ploy to try to bring about a united Ireland.

In view of this highly significant effort by the New Ireland Forum, which expects to bring out its final report in early spring 1984, it could be misleading to attach too much significance to past statements by the parties and their leaders.

Fianna Fáil has traditionally been the most nationalist in its expression, although its policies in government towards Northern Ireland have not been markedly different from those of Fine Gael/Labour coalitions.

All four Irish Parties condemn the use of violence without reservation and successive Irish Governments have maintained a strong and effective security effort in the Border area.

All the Irish Parties have had doubts about the anti-terrorist legislation enacted in Northern Ireland but have had more widespread doubts about the way in which that legislation has been enforced.

A Constitutional oddity: Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom

Under the Government of Ireland Act 1920, the British Government created two parliaments, for Northern Ireland and Southern Ireland. The Act provided for a Council of Ireland with 20 representatives from each parliament and with the right to unite the functions of the two parliaments. The Council never met primarily because of unionist opposition. But this was not the only part of the settlement which was, in practice, ignored. Northern Ireland was, in law, completely under the sovereignty of the Westminster Parliament. The Government of Ireland Act of 1920, which established the Northern Ireland administration expressly stated this. But in fact, the Northern Irish authorities soon established a de facto autonomy in economic, social and law and order matters almost as great as that of independent Ireland. It became an established convention that devolved Northern Irish affairs were not debated at Westminster, and the Northern Irish parliament at Stormont behaved like an independent legislature. The vast majority of British legislators and voters simply ignored the unsatisfactory state of affairs in Northern Ireland. Even taxation was different in minor details from that in Great Britain. The local electoral franchise, although not that for the House of Commons, was different.

Unfortunately, the unionists abolished proportional representation during the 1920's which had been part of the settlement in both parts of Ireland as a way of ensuring the adequate representation of minorities. The Ministry of Home Affairs was voted powers of internment without trial under the Special Powers Act which in theory - although in fact few of the powers were used - attracted the admiration of Ministers imposing apartheid in South Africa, and which would never have been accepted in Great Britain.

Only in external affairs was the sovereignty of Westminster actually practised.

When, therefore, following the breakdown of public order in several parts of Northern Ireland in 1969, British troops were sent to take over some of the roles which the police could no longer perform, they were in an ambiguous position. They rescued the Catholics from attacks by Protestant mobs, but the Government of Northern Ireland was still operating its own laws. Following the Conservative victory in the United Kingdom General Election of 1970, the Home Secretary, Mr Maudling, was persuaded by the Government of Northern Ireland to allow British troops to be used to arrest nearly a thousand nationalists under the Special Powers Act, who were detained without trial. This immediately identified the British Army with the rule of Stormont and led to the rioting which culminated in Bloody Sunday in January 1972 when British paratroops shot dead thirteen Catholics.

The indignation, both intense and international, which this provoked, persuaded the British Government that it had to assert its authority in Northern Ireland, and in March 1972, the Government of Northern Ireland was abolished and the Westminster Government assumed full responsibility.

In law, the step was not an extreme one, since in theory Stormont was no more sovereign (although with much wider devolved responsibilities) than an English County Council. But in practice, it ended half a century during which the unionists had operated a virtual monopoly of power in Northern Ireland. The abolition of the Government of Northern Ireland is still bitterly resented by many unionists.

The reform of administration and law and order had already gone far in the last stages of Stormont under British pressure but the British Government and Parliament carried them further. The Special Powers Act was repealed. Proportional representation was reintroduced for all local elections, although not for the Northern Irish seats in the House of Commons. Special legislation against discrimination on grounds of religion was introduced.

It is true that the legal procedures for trying terrorists are different from those in Great Britain. But given the extent of intimidation by terrorist organisations, it is hard to see how trial by jury and the public identification of witnesses could be maintained.

The British were and are anxious to give back a large measure of de facto autonomy to Northern Ireland, but only on condition that the nationalist minority can share in self-government. This principle was asserted in the Northern Ireland Constitution Act in July 1973. The result was the Sunningdale Agreement of 1973 which established a 'power-sharing' Executive in which representatives of both the unionists and nationalists held office. As described elsewhere, this experiment broke down after a general strike organised by the more extreme unionists, and the British again assumed full responsibility for administering Northern Ireland.

The Assembly, which the moderate nationalists of the SDLP have always boycotted, and from which the Official Unionists withdrew in November 1983 following a particularly revolting terrorist attack on a Protestant congregation in church, is the latest British attempt to restore a degree of devolution. Its main principle is that powers will be devolved provided there is both substantial majority and minority support for the arrangements proposed.

in recognition of the fact that Northern Ireland is now ruled from Westminster, the number of Northern Irish seats in the House of Commons has been increased from 12 to 17. The Northern Irish constituencies now have approximately the same number of electors as those in other parts of the United Kingdom.

Great Britain has, for hundreds of years, been a centralised country in law. Some special provisions for Scotland - dating from the Act of Union between Scotland and England of 1707 - apart, the laws throughout Britain are, in all important respects, uniform. There is, however, a great deal of administrative autonomy in local government. A majority of English and Welsh court cases are heard by Justices of the Peace who are local citizens of eminence, not salaried judges. The police, except in London, are locally administered. Many functions of public life are carried out by quasi-independent bodies over which the government has little control.

In practice, the situation in Northern Ireland is widely different. While in law Westminster rules, in practice the exercise of legislative and executive powers by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland receives little scrutiny from Parliament. Most British MP's feel perhaps that history affords little encouragement for them to meddle much in the affairs of Ireland ! Local government in Northern Ireland is reduced to district councils which have been deprived of nearly all the functions of district councils in Great Britain.

Justices of the Peace do not exist. The Royal Ulster Constabulary is run as one force.

To state this is not to decry those responsible for the present arrangements. Given the depth of the antagonism in Northern Ireland, it is hard to see what else they can do. Certainly, to give police powers to local politicians would be a recipe for disaster. But it is clear that Northern Ireland is, and always has been, a constitutional oddity. No less than in its sympathies and its passions, it is administratively and in political practice, "a place apart".

Political Parties in Northern Ireland

Nowhere is this uniqueness more strikingly demonstrated than in the political parties. The parties of Northern Ireland are utterly distinct from those of Great Britain and from those of the Republic, with one sinister and one minor exception.

Taking them in order of the proportion of the votes cast that they got in the latest test of public opinion, the UK General Election of 9 June 1983, and compared with the previous test, the Assembly Elections of 1982, they are:

1. The Official Unionist Party (1983: 34%; 1982: 29.7%):

This is dedicated above all to the maintenance of the Union with Great Britain. While overwhelmingly Protestant in membership, it is nowadays less overtly sectarian than its principal rival for Protestant votes, the Democratic Unionist Party. The Official Unionists, are divided between those who want a return to "Stormont",

i.e. majority rule of a virtually self-governing province and those, notably Mr Enoch Powell, who seek total integration with Great Britain. In economic and social policy - always a very secondary consideration in Northern Irish politics - the Official Unionists are in general a conservative party.

2. The Democratic Unionist Party (1983: 20%; 1982: 23%):

This is a more extreme expression of Unionism. Its anti-Catholicism is overt. A fierce distrust of Great Britain is almost as marked as dislike of the Republic. With a lack of logic not altogether unknown in other aspects of Northern Irish life, many of the supporters of this party describe themselves as "Loyalists" to the British connection, while often urging defiance of British legislation and administration. Drawing most of its support from the poorer of the Protestants, the DUP is hostile to the old unionist establishment and populist in its economic policies. Probably the great majority of the members of the Protestant para-military and terrorist organisations vote for this party.

3. The Social Democratic and Labour Party (1983: 17.8%; 1982: 18.8%):

This party is the champion of constitutional Nationalism, and therefore overwhelmingly Catholic in membership. While advocating the unity of Ireland, it is against violence to achieve it, and it recognises that the consent of the majority of the population of Northern Ireland is a condition for re-unification. It insists,

however, that the British guarantee not to withdraw from the North against the wishes of the majority, enables the unionists to block any reforms. The SDLP's principal immediate aim is to secure a recognition of the "Irish dimension" in Northern Ireland. In economic and social policy, it is a moderate socialist party.

4. Sinn Féin (Irish for "Ourselves Alone") (1983: 13.4%; 1982: 10.1%):

This is the political wing of the Provisional IRA. It also operates in the Republic. It insists on the unity of Ireland and claims that violence is justified so long as there is a British presence in any part of Ireland. It is also determined to replace the present Irish republic, whose legality it does not recognise, by a "socialist" state. At one time reflecting a mixture of a narrow form of Irish Catholicism and fascist modes of expression as a consequence of its cultural chauvinism, its denunciation by the Catholic Church, coupled with the taste for violence cultivated by some elements of the extreme Left in the Western world, have moved it towards a vaguely Marxist position. But, in fact, its appeal is to those who hate the unionists, the British, and Irish democracy, rather than reflecting any coherent theory of government. Its new leader Mr Gerry Adams, elected in the autumn of 1983, has publicly declared his support for IRA violence.

5. The Alliance Party (1983: 8%; 1982: 9.3%):

This is the only Party of any size which draws its support fairly equally from both Catholics and Protestants. It is unionist, but in favour of power-sharing and close co-operation with the Republic.

It denounces sectarianism and violence of both Catholic and Protestant extremists. Liberal in economic and social policy, although, given the condition of the Northern Irish economy, it recognises that the state has a major role to play. Shares with the SDLP the distinction of being strongly in favour of membership of the European Community.

6. The Workers Party (1983: 1.9%; 1982: 2.7%):

A Marxist party which also exists in the Republic and which believes in the unity of Ireland, but based on the consent of the majority in Northern Ireland. Partly composed of former members of Sinn Féin who repudiated violence, it sees the present conflicts in Northern Ireland as exploitation of the working class by capitalism.

7. The Irish Independence Party (did not put up candidates in 1983):

Its raison d'être is the unity of Ireland and the withdrawal of the British. Against violence, but sees no reason why Irish unity cannot be achieved against the wishes of the unionists. Conservative in economic and social policy.

There are other very small parties, splinters from Unionism or Nationalism, and in the case of the Northern Ireland Labour Party, the Northern Ireland Liberal Party and the Ecologists, very unsuccessful attempts to imitate British parties. It is also common for different unionist or nationalist parties to make local alliances to fight a single seat by putting up a candidate without a party label. It is the essential nature of Northern Irish politics that, since there is virtually

no movement from the unionist to the nationalist side, or vice versa, the real struggle for votes is between unionist parties or between nationalist parties.

At the last election, the Official Unionists gained some ground at the expense of the DUP, but the rise of Sinn Féin at the expense of the SDLP is obviously a matter of acute anxiety to both the Dublin and London Governments. Sinn Féin is gaining strength from new voters, many of whom are unemployed and from nationalists who used to abstain from elections.

Economic and Social Aspects

One of the few things on which most people of Northern Ireland will agree is that their troubles are not primarily economic in origin. One of the obvious facts to any outside observer is that the economic conditions in Northern Ireland exacerbate the other problems. Both points of view are right.

The historical origins of the conflicts are touched on elsewhere. In this section, a brief description of the economic and social conditions is attempted. In the view of the rapporteur, too much significance should not be attached to statistics. This is for two reasons.

First: given the disaffection of a large minority of the population, official attempts to establish accurate figures of income, employment and even population, are more than usually difficult. Second: total figures for the whole of Northern Ireland can give a very misleading impression since conditions vary widely. For example, some of the worst unemployment - over 50% of the male population of working age - is in West Belfast, only a short distance from areas of considerable middle class prosperity in the southern suburbs of the city.

But some basic statistics must be stated.

Income per head in Northern Ireland is only 77% of the average in the United Kingdom, 10% lower than the next poorest part, Wales.

In the European Community, only the Republic, Greece, Southern Italy and Sardinia are poorer.

Moreover, the economic situation is getting worse. There are 40% fewer jobs in manufacturing industry than a decade ago. Total unemployment is over 20% but predominantly Catholic areas, particularly West of the River Bann, have significantly higher rates.

There are large transfers of money from the British Treasury to Northern Ireland. The fiscal income from Northern Ireland taxpayers covers only about 60% of the total public expenditure in Northern Ireland, including expenditure for security purposes. The total net annual subsidy now running at £1600 million constitutes a considerable outlay on the part of the British taxpayers and illustrates the economic problems posed should Northern Ireland sever relations with the United Kingdom.

At the same time the amount of money made available since 1973 by the European Community (over £400 million) appears to be very modest compared to the United Kingdom funding of the deficit of Northern Ireland.

However it is not possible to make a precise and balanced comparison because it is perfectly normal for any state to transfer considerable sums of money to economically disadvantaged regions such as Northern Ireland, which is by no means the only region in the United Kingdom to be the recipient of money transfers from the Treasury.

Of the total population of some 1½ million, it is disputed whether the Protestant majority is 2/3 - 1/3 or 60 - 40 or even less (a considerable number of Catholics boycotted the latest attempt to establish the figure). What is not

in dispute is that the Catholic minority is growing, and not only because there is a higher birthrate among Catholics. In the past, emigration from Catholic areas was much higher than from Protestant ones. But depression in Great Britain, the United States and other countries to which the emigrants traditionally went, has weighed particularly heavily on the unskilled and semi-skilled, which most of the Catholic emigrants were. On the other hand, the decline of Northern Ireland's traditional industries, which were concentrated in the mainly Protestant East, has encouraged emigration from those parts, especially among the highly qualified, predominantly Protestant, who can hope to get jobs outside the island much more easily.

The Catholic population is younger than the Protestant and is probably a majority already in the primary schools. However, a general economic recovery in the Western world could delay, or even reverse, these trends.

PE 88.265/fin.

It is hard to see, however, how the Northern Irish economy is to recover quickly. There are three main reasons for this. First: the violence, which though not initially caused by unemployment is certainly made worse by the large numbers of young people with no jobs and no hope of jobs, in itself discourages investment. In spite of the superior record of industrial relations in Northern Ireland, there has, of recent years, been more British private investment in the Republic, where strikes are not a rare phenomenon. Even if the number of terrorist murders continues to decline, it will be years before Northern Ireland loses its reputation for violence.

Second: the geographical remoteness of Northern Ireland from the main centres of economic activity in the European Community is a major handicap as it is for the whole island and especially for the western regions. The relative decline of the English North West - Liverpool and Manchester - the nearest really large centres of population, makes the problem worse.

Third: the traditional industries of Northern Ireland, textiles and shipbuilding, are in dire difficulties in most of the old industrialised world and, for the foreseeable future, their prospects are bright in Eastern Asia rather than on the Western edge of Europe.

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Because of the disorder and violence and the world depression, unemployment has got worse in Northern Ireland. But it was already about 20% in Londonderry even before 1968 and as high in other parts of the West, especially Strabane, as well as in the poorest Catholic areas of Belfast, where it now nears or even passes 50%. What has not been seen since the 30's, is that unemployment is now also desperately high in Protestant industrial areas in the East.

Unfortunately one of the relatively new sources of wealth in Northern Ireland, tourism, has been particularly hard hit by the terrorist campaigns. People have an understandable reluctance to take their holidays in a country, however attractive in other ways, from which come almost daily reports of violence. Happily, the 1982 figures show a substantial improvement.

The Government of the United Kingdom has made strenuous efforts in recent years to deal with the economic problems of Northern Ireland. In the financial year 1983/1984, subsidies of £440 million of public money is being invested in reviving old industries, promoting new ones and in developing the infrastructure. Harland and Woolf shipyard and De Lorean car factory illustrate the difficulties in the way of success for the first two policies. It is in the last that progress has been evident - above all in housing. Deplorable as the segregation of housing estates by religious denomination and political partisanship is - however much desired by the people concerned from fear of their neighbours - there have been enormous improvements in the physical conditions of working class homes in the last few years, especially in Belfast.

(It is a sad irony of her modernised infrastructure that Northern Ireland is far better equipped with modern prisons, where physical conditions and opportunities for training and recreation are of an unusually good standard, than either Great Britain or the Republic).

But although much has been achieved in public works and public services, the nationalist section of the population believes that they have not been given their share of the benefits provided. This is partly because, as already pointed out, unemployment is worst in the West, where the Catholic population is highest. A comparison with the plight of parts of the western counties of the Republic suggests that geography as well as prejudice may have much to do with this. On the other hand, the Border has to some extent inhibited economic development. The original pattern of land settlement established by the Protestant colonists at the end of the 16th century and beginning of the 17th century, is a constant reminder of ancient grievances.

In general, the better farm land has been in Protestant hands ever since, while the bogs and the hills yield a poor living to mainly Catholic farmers. It should not be imagined that the Protestant farmers are having an easy time. Very few of them own large properties and their margins of profit are very low. But the different kinds of agriculture in the valleys and the mountain-sides add an economic and technical division to the old political-religious cleavage. The Northern Ireland Agricultural Producers Association represent the mainly sheep and cattle farmers of the poorer lands and so are

predominantly Catholic in their membership, whereas the Ulster Farmers' Union are the representative body for the cultivators and dairy farmers of the valleys and so are overwhelmingly Protestant.

This is a classic example of how a normal divergence of economic interest reflects a bitter, if distant, past, and so reinforces the prejudices of the present day.

The same difficulties of the present, perpetuating the past into the future, can be seen in education. Except at the University level, which has a high standard both educationally and in promoting tolerance, education is a source of division in Northern Irish society. The vast majority of Protestant children attend state schools. The vast majority of Catholic children go to Church schools which are funded up to 90% by the Government. Since Catholicism and Protestantism in Northern Ireland are not only religious but national, political and cultural expressions, the divisions between majority and minority are reinforced.

Not only are the religious observances of the schools different, but the literature read, the history taught and even the games played, are separate.

To the Protestants, the rigid position of the Catholic hierarchy in discouraging mixed education is proof of prejudice and clerical domination. But to the Catholics, the schools are the one important area of public life which they control. Moreover, the Catholic teachers fear that if education was mixed, many of them would lose their jobs, since the boards running the state schools would usually have Protestant majorities.

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It is probable, however, that the segregationists in education have less support than appears. In spite of much discouragement from some of the religious authorities, the great practical difficulties of finding the staff who have a genuine understanding of the conflicting traditions of Northern Ireland and of raising the money in times of deep economic depression, there has been strong support for independent efforts to establish multi-denominational schools. It is encouraging that this has come not only from professional and middle-class parents, but from numerous working class Catholic and Protestant ones too.

This is the point to stress: that any attempt to describe the conflicts in Northern Ireland on class lines is misleading. While it is true that a higher proportion of the Catholics are poor, there are very many poor Protestants, and a substantial Catholic middle class. The violence of the last 15 years, itself a repetition of many earlier outbreaks, has tended to divide people by occupation and habitation rather than income.

One of the few sources of growth in employment is in the Security Services, both professional and part-time. While the authorities greatly welcome the recruitment of Catholics to the Royal Ulster Constabulary or the Ulster Defence Regiment, in fact hardly any join. Many Catholics would regard joining the police or the part-time soldiering of the UDR as a betrayal of their own people, but the not inconsiderable number of Catholics who support the union with Great Britain, and the much larger number who abominate the IRA, are deterred both by the suspicions which many Protestants, especially in the UDR, have of their reliability and by the extreme danger of murder by the IRA or the INLA, should they join the security forces.

These terrorist organisations have, for obvious reasons, made it a priority to assassinate Catholics in the RUC and the UDR. The result is that the proportion of Catholics in the security services is now very small and this in turn increases the sense of alienation of the Catholics and encourages them to see the expansion of employment in these dangerous jobs as another example of Protestant privilege.

In housing, the very real success of the Northern Ireland Housing Executive in providing houses on a basis of need rather than of political or religious affiliation, has had an unfortunate effect in diminishing the responsibilities of local democracy. While accurate figures are hard to come by, there is no doubt that some local authorities in Northern Ireland used to provide council houses to their co-religionists whatever their claims or lack of them, while denying houses to families on the other side of the sectarian divide. It was one such act by a Protestant-dominated council that produced the first Civil Rights march in 1968. In 1971 responsibility for public housing was taken away from the district councils and placed in the hands of the non-elected Northern Ireland Housing Executive on which both Protestants and Catholics sat. Its work in establishing and operating a points system that provides homes on proven need has been admirable. But by depriving the district councils of one of their main responsibilities, this reform has assisted in the generalisation of local democracy.

Similarly, the Housing Executive has respected, so far as possible, the wishes of people being rehoused to choose where they want to live. All too often, because of actual

or feared terrorist crimes and sectarian outrages, this has led to increased segregation and, in some cases, to the actual construction of walls between Catholic and Protestant areas. However desirable it would appear from the outside, the impartial Housing Executive cannot enforce true integration in housing. It has to be done voluntarily, but that, unfortunately, does not happen very often. Such segregation can have a direct effect on employment. If a factory is opened in a place which can only be reached by a Catholic going through a Protestant area or vice versa, that will certainly, in the areas of greatest tension, effectively segregate the employment. So, just as the colonisation of the land by the Protestants nearly 400 years ago is still a source of division, so the terrorism of today is imposing new patterns of settlement and employment on the people.

Security and Violence

Irish history has not been a peaceful one. The troubled Anglo-Irish relationship over the centuries has made it more persistently turbulent than the history of most other European countries.

However, violence in Northern Ireland has taken a definite turn for the worse since 1969 when it began to assume much larger proportions than earlier in the history of Northern Ireland. This was the year when the so-called "troubles" started for the reasons outlined elsewhere in this report.

This violence has claimed more than 2,300 human lives in Northern Ireland between 1969 and June 1983. More than 24,000 people have been injured or maimed and all

together there have been 43,000 separate incidents of shootings and bombings.

These figures and the following ones are taken from the paper, published by the New Ireland Forum in November 1983, on the cost of violence. It states that of those killed, 1,297 were civilians, 702 were from the security forces and 278 from para-military groups. 1,073 were Catholics and 864 were Protestants and only 29 of the civilians killed were not natives of Northern Ireland.

1,264 people have been killed by Catholic extremists, referred to in the paper as 'Republican paramilitary groups', and 613 were killed by Protestant extremists called 'Loyalist paramilitary groups', whereas 264 people were killed by the security forces.

The level of violence was highest in the early 1970's during which time almost half of the total number of those killed were killed. There has been a definite lessening of violence in the past few years, but a number of recent killings and bomb attacks have shown that violence is by no means over.

If the total number of people killed might seem to be comparatively small over a 13-year period, it should be recalled that they have occurred in an area of only 1.5 million people. The acts of terrorism and the clashes between para-military forces and the forces of law and order must be seen against the background of a general and widespread feeling of fear and intimidation which can only be properly understood by those who have undergone similar experiences. Even if this fear does not

pervade all aspects of daily life in Northern Ireland, and will hardly effect a number of areas at all, it does bedevil the daily lives of many people and is a source of annoyance and frustration to many more who are affected by the indirect consequences in terms of security-checks in the streets and houses and occasional police raids and interrogations.

By far the largest amount of killing has taken place in urban areas (73.5%) and in particular in Belfast and Londonderry and in certain, but not all, of the other 25 towns of Northern Ireland.

The cost is staggering. Even if it is difficult to give a precise figure, the direct cost runs into several billions of pounds sterling. The outlay to the security forces in Northern Ireland is estimated to be, for the 13-year long period, about £4000 million. If one adds the expenditure to prison staff (3000 are employed as prison staff in Northern Ireland) and the care of prisoners, plus the money paid for criminal injuries to persons and criminal damage to property plus capital expenditure on prisons, several hundreds of millions of pounds sterling can be added to the above figure.

(The number of prisoners serving prison sentences is higher in Northern Ireland than in any other part of Western Europe. Currently, 2,500 are serving prison sentences in Northern Ireland, almost half of them serving sentences of between 5 and 10 years. Per 100,000 of the total population, 164 are in prison in Northern Ireland, compared with 92 in Great Britain, 62 in Denmark and 35 in the Republic.)

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To the sums mentioned above should be added the gross loss of output in Northern Ireland due to violence. This has to be based on a more arbitrary estimate, but there are plenty of indications that the economic performance in Northern Ireland has been poorer since 1970 than in the rest of the United Kingdom (and in the Republic), and the overall loss for the whole period may come to as much as £ 3,500 million. A part of this is due to the loss of tourist revenue, which in fact in 1979 was only half of the 1969 figure.

By far the largest number of killings have taken place in Northern Ireland. Nevertheless, 72 people have been killed in Great Britain. To this figure should be added the 370 members of the British armed forces killed in Northern Ireland.

The Republic is much more effected by terrorism committed by IRA or other illegal organisations than is generally realised. It is estimated that the extra costs of security to the Republic has been about IR£ 1 billion (at 1982 rates) during the period of violence from 1969 to the present day, this corresponds to IR£38 per capita, which is four times as much as the per capita additional security expenditure for the British taxpayer.

The Northern troubles have had other adverse effects upon the Irish economy, the loss of tourist revenue for example may have been as large as for Northern Ireland.

In a wider sense the terrorist activities and the aims of the IRA and the INLA are more of a direct threat to the Republic than to the United Kingdom. These terrorists

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have never tried to hide that they do not recognise the Government in Dublin and that their ultimate aim is its overthrow and the establishment of a different kind of state.

The co-operation between the Irish and United Kingdom forces of law and order has been described by both sides as being quite satisfactory. It is generally believed that this co-operation has effectively contributed to the reduction of violence over the last few years. There has been a steady increase in the efforts of the Irish security forces to combat terrorism. Over 200 persons convicted of terrorist offences, including membership of proscribed terrorist organisations, were, at the end of 1982, serving sentences in Irish prisons.

If terrorist acts have been on the decline, the overall crime rate has been rising, at times even steeply, and the line between politically motivated terrorist crimes and crimes committed for other reasons - such as greed - is becoming blurred. The number of bank robberies has increased on both sides of the Border and although new security measures have lessened the number of bank robberies, other crimes such as armed robberies, kidnappings and burglaries of private homes and offices has increased.

There is only one major outstanding problem in British-Irish co-operation in combating terrorism. That is, the extradition of terrorists from the Republic to the UK. In several cases, terrorists have been able to avoid extradition by pleading a political motive for their crime, and Irish courts have held that extradition shall not take place for an offence committed with a political motive. This causes great bitterness among Unionists and has provoked criticism from other circles as well. The Irish have advanced legal arguments, based on international law, in support of this position which is frequently deplored by the British.

In support of their position the Irish Government point out that among member States of the Community, Italy has a similar position to Ireland while Belgium, France and the German Federal Republic do not extradite their own nationals whether an offence is political or not.

When the member States of the EC agreed to apply the Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism 1977 (which Ireland has refused to ratify), the Republic had a clause inserted allowing a state to accept extraterritorial jurisdiction.

In answer to the British complaints about the position of the Irish Government, the Republic has referred to the severe sentences handed out to terrorists in the Republic itself and to the proposal by the Irish Government in 1981 to set up an all-Ireland court system for the trial of criminal offences.

The Republic has dealt firmly with terrorist organisations. Both the IRA and INLA are proscribed. Members affiliated to such organisations are by law prohibited from having access to the national radio and television service in the Republic. This is not the case in the United Kingdom.

The Hunger Strike 1981

Even if the hunger strike in 1981 was not directly connected with the security situation in Northern Ireland, it must be included in this section, as it had a far reaching and on the whole unfortunate effect on the overall situation in Northern Ireland and on Irish-British relations - and on British reputation abroad.

A hunger strike had been started in late 1980 by a number of prisoners, sentenced for terrorist acts, in the Maze prison. It ended without casualties and led to mutual recriminations from prisoners and the British authorities

as to promises allegedly given during the strike. The IRA leadership had not supported the strike, but in the face of the resolution of the Maze prisoners to start a new hunger strike, they decided to support it and to use it for propaganda as much as possible.

The hunger strike which eventually claimed the lives of ten prisoners - Bobby Sands being the first to die - in the spring and summer of 1981, took place against the background of a pending General Election in the Republic and a by-election in Fermanagh/South Tyrone which had elected a nationalist member to Westminster. Under the circumstances, it would have been preferable to postpone the election, for the Sinn Féin put up Bobby Sands as a candidate, thereby putting the constitutional SDLP (see section on Political Parties) in an impossible dilemma. The SDLP eventually decided not to contest the seat and Bobby Sands won the election - a few days prior to his death in the prison. This led the British authorities to revise the electoral law so as to prevent other prisoners from taking part in elections. This British action and the overall British handling of the affair was viewed by nationalists and many outside observers as increasing the confrontation in Northern Ireland, at the same time creating acute political problems for the Irish political parties and the Fianna Fáil Government under Mr Haughey.

The hunger strike and the underlying tensions led to a debate in the European Parliament on 7 May 1981, the outcome of which was a resolution adopted by the majority and whose wording was mainly drafted by the rapporteur of this report.

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The Peculiar Relationship: British-Irish Connections

Although bitter political quarrels have often and long divided the British from the Irish and the Irish from each other, it would be quite wrong to suppose that the peoples of the two islands, or of the two parts of Ireland are at arms length.

On the contrary, they are mixed up together in a way that is unique in relations between independent sovereign states.

At the formal legal level, Irish citizens, with a residence in the United Kingdom, may serve as members of the House of Commons or any local council. They may vote in any British election on the same terms as a British subject. (A Bill has recently gone through all stages in the Dáil to give British subjects with a residence in the Republic the right to vote in all Irish elections.)

There have never been any controls, other than security checks, on immigration from Ireland to Britain or vice versa, and no passport is required for travelling between the two countries.

Large numbers of important institutions are organised on an all-Ireland basis. The Catholic Church, the Church of Ireland (Anglican), the Presbyterian and the Methodist Church, whose adherents together amount to over 95% of the total population of both parts of Ireland, are all so organised. The Catholic Primate of Ireland, the Archbishop of Armagh, is resident in Northern Ireland.

Many trade unions are organised on an all-Ireland basis including some which are British based. The Irish Congress of Trade Unions to which most unions in the island are affiliated, is itself an all-Ireland body.

Many sports, normally associated with patriotic fervour, draw their teams from both sides of the Border - the Irish Rugby XV, for instance.

The official neutrality of Ireland did not prevent over 40,000 Irish citizens from volunteering to serve in the British military forces during the Second World War, and there are still British Regiments who draw recruits from the Republic.

By some of the quirks and oddities which seem inseparable from British-Irish relationships, there are some United Kingdom subjects of Northern Ireland whose status is actually less in Great Britain than is that of Irish citizens. Northern Irish hereditary Peers, for instance, may not be elected to the House of Commons, nor vote for it, but unlike English, Scottish or Welsh hereditary Peers, they are denied access to the House of Lords. The British Labour Party denies Party membership to people living in Northern Ireland, while allowing Irish citizens to join the Party in Great Britain. It must be said, however, that the numbers suffering from either of these peculiar forms of discrimination are not large !

The fact is, of course, that whatever the political theory, it is impossible for two states, organised on democratic lines, who are so closely involved geographically and historically, to sever all the ties developed over generations or to prevent new ones being formed, even if they wished to do so.

However, there are examples of old links being severed - the monetary union, which had existed for centuries was broken when Ireland joined the EMS and Britain failed to do so.

The Irish-born population in Great Britain - as opposed to Northern Ireland - is 1½ million people, and in Glasgow, Liverpool, Birmingham and parts of north London, especially,

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they play an important part in political as well as economic life, particularly in the Labour Party. In Glasgow and Liverpool, there are also large numbers of Northern Irish-born Protestants, and in the recent past, sectarian hostilities were not unknown.

There are, of course, several millions of others living in Great Britain of recent Irish or Northern Irish ancestry, and a considerable number of people of English, Welsh or Scots citizenship or descent living in the Republic.

The Irish Abroad

But these minorities are small indeed, compared with the huge Irish population in the United States. While in such a mixed society to trace a single Irish ancestor may not require much ingenuity or assiduity - among politicians, especially in the Democratic Party, it is almost an occupational qualification - still, the fact that, according to the US Census Bureau, some 10 million Americans have solely Irish ancestry and nearly 30 million more some Irish ancestry, indicates the importance of the Irish factor in American life and American elections. In New York, Boston, Chicago and many other important cities, their influence is great, and inevitably, those concerned with the struggles in Northern Ireland seek to gain their support.

More or less overt supporters of the Provisional IRA raise considerable sums through the organisation NORaid, and there have also been many cases of arms trafficking to help the

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terrorists. This in spite of the fact that probably only a few thousand Irish-Americans actively support organisations like NuKAIID. Both the British and Irish Governments have devoted much energy to persuading Americans, and especially Irish-Americans, not to support the extremists. They have been helped by the denunciations of the IRA by successive American Presidents, and by the strong stand against terrorism taken by four leading Irish-American politicians, the so-called "Four Horsemen", Speaker Tip O'Neill, Senator Edward Kennedy, Senator Patrick Moynihan and former Governor Carey of New York State.

Active interest in the need to bring about a peaceful settlement to the Northern Ireland problem has also been shown by the Friends of Ireland organisation which was formed in March 1981 as a bi-partisan group of leading members of the US Congress.

But with so many voters liable to be swayed by sentiment and the memories of ancient wrongs rather than present realities, it is an effort that has to be maintained over a long period.

There is no comparable lobby favouring the unionist position even if Protestant extremism has its supporters in America, especially in the Southern States.

To a lesser extent, the Irish migrations affect the politics of both Canada and Australia, where the Labour Party traditionally draws much of its support, and many of its organisers, from Catholic Irish settlers.

On the Continent of Europe, the echoes are much fainter. The Irish Regiments of the French Army in the 18th century have no modern equivalent, and although the names of some chateaux in the claret country and of Spanish noblemen recall Irish exiles, the problem is one of indifference rather than partisanship. It is to her poets and playwrights rather than her politicians that Ireland owes awareness of her problems on the Continent.

But the American factor is ever-present in the minds of Northern Irish politicians, and is proof that any attempt to limit the concern about Northern Ireland to the British Isles is doomed to failure.

The European Community and Northern Ireland

At the time of British entry into the Community in 1973, that membership was much in dispute in Northern Ireland with most of the unionists voting against. Nevertheless on practical matters since there has often been consensus between unionist and nationalist politicians in promoting Community policies in Northern Ireland. Since joining the European Community as part of the United Kingdom, Northern Ireland has attracted a total of over £400 million from the EC in grants and loans. As is the case with all Member States, this aid complements funds provided by the national government for projects in the region. The issue of this "additionality" raises itself also in the case of Northern Ireland - a rather sensitive issue - and the Commission finds itself having to monitor more closely the "additional" nature of the funds it directs to the region.

Northern Ireland, while affected by the Community policies of the Common Agricultural Policy and Regional Policy is, in addition, classified as one of the highest priority areas as defined in the Commission's Regional Policy Guidelines of June 1977. Apart from special priority given to the areas, these areas are also entitled to an extra 10% assistance from the European Social Fund. It has benefited from non-quota* special measures for the Border areas - for the development of tourism and small enterprises, in addition to non-quota special measures to help those areas adversely affected by the restructuring of the ship-building industry, with special measures for Belfast.

* The non-quota section of the European Regional Development Fund provides aid for programmes, which can benefit by up to 70% of Community assistance, financed jointly by the Member State in operations which would not be covered by the quota section of the ERDF - such as management advisory services, aid to small and medium sized enterprises - and may go to public authorities, various firms, organisations or individuals.

The Martin Report on Northern Ireland highlighted some of the many difficult problems facing the region in not only agriculture and regional policy, but also in industry and social affairs. Indeed, following a European Parliament resolution (19 June 1981) and the Martin Report - on which the resolution was based - a regulation was adopted on 21 June 1983 outlining special measures to assist the deteriorating economic and social conditions of the people in Belfast. Whilst housing per se is not generally eligible for Community contributions, drastic measures were seen to be needed to combat the particular conditions prevailing in Belfast, hence the regulation on the urban renewal of the city was passed.

Belfast is also one of the first two areas - the other being Naples - to qualify for the Integrated Operations Plan - for projects of strategic importance for the development of the area: improvement in housing, urban transport, industrial infrastructure, vocational training, the latter three costing almost £250 million in total. A special item was inserted in the budget to cover specific measures forming part of an integrated operations plan but not covered by any of the Community's financial instruments.

The impact of the preferential rates for borrowing by the European Investment Bank has benefited Northern Ireland. In 1979, the European Investment Bank was permitted to link its lending with a special European Community interest rate subsidy - which was used for the first time by the

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Northern Ireland Electricity Service for the Kilroot Power Station, borrowing over £33 million at rates considerably lower than borrowing rates in the UK. In the past three years, several loans have been negotiated for Northern Ireland from the European Investment Bank.

In the course of the last 9 years, Northern Ireland has attracted £135 million from the European Social Fund - mainly for large manpower training programmes, but also for projects involving smaller sums of money such as the Carrickfergus project, which is a project aimed at establishing and assisting new enterprises thereby promoting the creation of new jobs. Grants have also been received for training projects in handicrafts in Newry as well as a Youth and Community Workshop to provide training for young people in skills and management techniques in areas of high unemployment as that undertaken by the Northwest Centre for Training and Development.

Of course, as agriculture either directly or indirectly sustains about 20% of the labour force, the impact of the CAP is important to Northern Ireland. However, the limitation by the Community of cheap imports of cereals from North America, due to the level of self-sufficiency in the Community, has been an area of contention due to the adverse effect it has had on pig and poultry producers. While a regulation has been passed giving limited assistance to this problem in Northern Ireland, pig numbers have fallen by some 40% and poultry by over 20% in the last decade.

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Beef and dairy farming are, however, the principal types of farming practised in Northern Ireland, and Community measures to curtail milk production have, to a certain extent, been softened in the region. Specific regulations to aid Northern Ireland agriculture have included agricultural development programmes; a cross-Border drainage programme; a beef development programme. In addition there is the Community wide farm modernisation scheme, processing and marketing of agricultural products and the improvement of farms in the less favoured areas. On the latter, a proposal is presently under consideration by the Commission for the extension of the Less Favoured Areas from the current 45% of the total agricultural land of Northern Ireland to 70%, thus enabling an increased number of farmers to qualify for further grants and development programmes. Northern Ireland has received over £21 million from the Guidance section of the CAP fund.

The Economic and Social Committee has studied the above-mentioned problems and submitted its opinion to the Council. The Committee has carried out a study of the Border areas which it found to be severely handicapped and in need of Community assistance. Despite the two specific measures to help the area - the drainage in the catchment areas on both sides of the Border, and a specific regional development measure to improve the economic and social situation of the Border areas (with special aids for tourism, small and medium-sized enterprises and handicrafts), the Committee examined whether the Community was doing all it could to assist the area, and also to see if anything

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could be done to reduce the particular handicaps to economic development which arise from the existence of the Border. Studies to date seem to indicate that much could be done to improve communications, as well as measures in agriculture (e.g. land drainage, farm modernisation), industry (e.g. marketing and training facilities), tourism (e.g. improvement in accommodation), housing, energy and education. The total cost of the measures proposed by the Economic and Social Committee would be 179 million ECUs.

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Conclusions and Comments.

The operative part of this report contains no concrete suggestions attempting to provide solutions to the problems of Northern Ireland. This is not because the rapporteur has been barred from making proposals affecting the constitutional situation of Northern Ireland. It is rather because, in the view of the rapporteur, there is no definite solution to the problems of Northern Ireland which could expect to satisfy everybody in Northern Ireland or the large majority of the two communities. However, this in no way minimizes the necessity of trying to improve the present situation so as to reduce the underlying tensions and stop the growing alienation of the population.

If certain ideas can nevertheless be put forward that may possibly be of benefit to the situation of Northern Ireland they would not be either more effective or become more credible if the European Parliament was asked to vote for or against such ideas which are personal conclusions and comments rather than concrete policy recommendations.

It is not up to an outside body like the European Parliament to appear to "dictate" anything resembling political proposals regarding the Northern Ireland situation. This is the reason why such ideas and concepts which have come out of the rapporteur's work on Northern Ireland are put forward in this final and concluding section of the Explanatory Note so that the rapporteur can take exclusive responsibility for the views expressed, the judgements made and the comments and suggestions contained herein.

1. The constitutional position of Northern Ireland is perceived by many to be unstable and uncertain. Whereas Northern Ireland is today part of the United Kingdom there is a widespread wish on the part of Northern nationalists and many Irishmen inside and outside the Republic for a united Ireland. But that is not the only cause of the perceived constitutional instability. A major cause is to be found in the conflict of identity of most members of the two communities and in the tradition of violence among extremists. An additional reason of particular

importance is the sense of insecurity among unionists as to the medium and long-term intentions of the United Kingdom government, political parties and voters regarding the future of Northern Ireland.

Nobody should question the right of nationalists to demand and to hope for Irish unity. Such hopes are deeply imbedded in Irish history. How can the Catholics in Northern Ireland and the Irish elsewhere be blamed for wanting Irish unity when they are deprived of an effective share in political power in Northern Ireland and when at least two of the four major British political parties are seen to favour Irish unity even if they do not commit themselves definitely?

Is it not natural that the wish to see Ireland united is also to be found among many voters in the United Kingdom when one thinks of (a) the loss of British lives in Northern Ireland, (b) the enormous costs to British taxpayers of supporting Northern Ireland economically and of maintaining law and order in as far as it is possible, and (c) the loss of British prestige abroad because of the unfavourable publicity surrounding the British presence in Northern Ireland?

2. It is therefore the contention of the rapporteur that the pressure for British withdrawal and Irish unity does not come only from the Republic on the Northern Ireland Catholic population but also from inside the United Kingdom. It is furthermore the rapporteur's view that the commitment to Irish unity, however sincere and historically justified, is a heavy burden for any Irish government or any Irish political party. Irish political parties are vulnerable to charges that their support for unity is fading, even though the difficulties of achieving it in the form of a unitary Irish state must be considered enormous under present circumstances. It is a particularly heavy burden, because no Irish party can escape its commitment to Irish unity, on the basis of agreement, and will not be able to subscribe to the view of this rapporteur, which is that Irish unity taking the form of a unitary Irish state cannot be brought about for the foreseeable

future. This conclusion is, however, the inevitable basis for the ideas put forward below, and it is justified by the following:

a British withdrawal would not still the violence in Northern Ireland but rather increase it to civil war proportions in view of the desperate opposition of the great majority of the 1 million Protestants to becoming citizens in a united Ireland. This opposition, whatever view one takes of it, is a political factor of utmost importance. If the fears on the part of the Protestants for the consequences of an Irish unification or even a closer association with the Republic are perceived by non-unionists to be unjustified and unfounded they are no less real.

3. The second great difficulty for the Republic is the enormous economic cost of incorporating the 6 counties of Northern Ireland in the Republic for the foreseeable future.

The necessary financial input to realize Irish unity will by far exceed what would be considered economically feasible under present circumstances unless a joint Irish-British- EC-US approach to deal with this matter were to be found.

That such a joint approach could be found and implemented is, in the view of the rapporteur, hardly realistic in the foreseeable future. References to the statement by President Carter in 1977 indicating US willingness to join with others to see how additional jobcreating investments could be encouraged, and to the assumed generosity and capacity of the European Community hardly take into account the scale of financial aid required. And without it there would be disastrous social upheavals not only in Northern Ireland but also and maybe even more pronounced in the Republic itself.

4. It is also sometimes assumed that the United States or Member States of the European Community should be willing to contribute substantial police or military forces to

assume the responsibility for law and order in Northern Ireland during an undefined period of transition from the present constitutional situation to that of some form of Irish unity.

No such willingness is likely to materialize. The rapporteur is firmly convinced that the idea of an EC peacekeeping force or for that matter a United States, a United Nations or a Commonwealth peacekeeping force in Northern Ireland is unrealistic.

Indeed the whole concept of international peacekeeping is unfortunately being severely brought into question by recent events in Lebanon and Cyprus.

5. It is the view of this rapporteur that any changes, any reforms and any improvements in the overall political situation in Northern Ireland should be planned and executed by the responsible UK authorities with the consent of the peoples of Northern Ireland and with the fullest possible co-operation with the Republic.

The Royal Ulster Constabulary and British military forces (the latter, it is to be hoped, for a very limited time) will continue to be responsible for law and order in Northern Ireland without any outside participation, and no British Government is likely to abdicate this responsibility. If these duties are not always carried out as efficiently and as fairly as they should be it is mainly because of the alienation of considerable parts of the Catholic population from the forces of law and order. This constitutes one of the most serious and disturbing features of the present situation in Northern Ireland.

While there is no one way of removing this alienation except by a new structure of political co-operation between elected members of the two communities and a degree of tolerance, often not practised in today's Northern Ireland, it is the rapporteur's view that the alienation could partly be overcome if measures were agreed by the British authorities in Northern Ireland in co-operation with locally elected representatives without

raising the constitutional question.

While an explicit understanding, not to speak of a formal agreement, between the two governments on shelving the Irish unity question - to which nationalists North and South of the Border are historically and politically committed - will hardly be possible, real progress towards improving the overall political situation in Northern Ireland could be accomplished if a degree of consensus is achieved among Irish and British political parties respectively. If Irish political parties compete with each other to appear the most ardent advocates of an Irish unitary state, and if British political parties disagree publicly and privately as to whether or not Irish unity is an achievable and indeed desirable political objective, it is difficult to see how any real progress can be made.

On the other hand, if some kind of consensus could be achieved that progress can and should be made within the present constitutional framework without prejudice to possible future changes under different conditions than those prevailing today, a basis might be found for moving ahead to a new form of partnership and co-operation, gradually healing the wounds in Northern Ireland. It is the rapporteur's view that whereas the governments of Ireland and of the United Kingdom cannot dictate the terms for such progress in the political field their acknowledgement and encouragement could improve the prospects for progress to take place with the active participation of all law-abiding parties in Northern Ireland.

6. Such a consensus must provide ways and means as to how the Irish dimension of Northern Ireland could find many more legitimate and visible expressions than is the case today, even including the establishment of joint British-Irish responsibilities in a number of specified fields, politically, legally and otherwise. It would also be understood that terrorist activities directed against the British presence or any citizen of Northern Ireland would only stiffen the will of both the Irish and the British Governments to support the maintenance of a

strong police and military presence, whereas a cessation of terrorist activities could, and indeed should, lead to a speedy withdrawal of those British military forces which are now involved in enforcing law and order. It could further lead to a substantial reduction of present police forces and subsequently to the cancellation of emergency measures, bringing back normal judicial procedures to Northern Ireland.

If this objective should be opposed by extremists on either side it would be the task and the responsibility of the UK authorities to deal firmly with it.

7. Such a development would ease the pressures for constitutional changes - and yet at the same time over a span of years make constitutional changes both less urgent and easier to carry out if endorsed by a majority of the local population.

It would be expected that the process of political reform involving both unionist and nationalist parties should be accompanied by substantial internal political reforms substituting the former one-party rule and the present direct rule with a system of participation in government by both communities. This in turn should lead to some form of devolution.

8. The "European dimension" of the Northern Ireland problem of which there has been some discussion is already a fact. But it cannot be translated into a political (not to say military) reality which has no basis in the present and likely future shape of the European Community.

In spite of the growing political identity of the European Community its operative role will, for the foreseeable future, continue to be primarily an economic and social one. The European Community at the same time, it is to be hoped, will provide the inspiration for the people of Northern Ireland to oppose and reject violence as a political instrument and eventually to accept a formula of tolerance thus resolving their conflict.

9. It is the rapporteur's view that the European Parliament has assumed a large degree of responsibility for the economic and social development of Northern Ireland by deciding to draw up a report on the whole problem of Northern Ireland. This is a unique decision. The aim has been not only to get to know the situation in Northern Ireland better - an objective it is hoped that this Report can meet in part - but also to do something about the background to the tragic and continued violence in Northern Ireland.

There is no escaping the responsibilities of the European Community. As these responsibilities cannot be carried out in the strictly political and constitutional aspects of the situation in Northern Ireland, the commitment to help all the citizens of Northern Ireland is the more powerful.

It must be executed not just by pious declarations of intent but by concrete undertakings and projects in addition to those already underway. They must be carried out in conformity with and in the context of the comprehensive Irish-British understanding, which remains the core of and the clue to, any lasting improvement of the situation in Northern Ireland.

Glossary

Like all deeply-rooted political conflicts, the Northern Ireland one has a vocabulary not easily understood by the outsider. What follows does not pretend to be exhaustive, but is a short glossary of words used with special political connotations in Northern Ireland:

The Anglo-Irish: the people of British descent from the 12th century Norman conquest arrivals, who settled in Ireland, most of them belonging to the Ascendancy or upper landowning classes.

The Apprentice Boys: an organisation similar to that of the Orangemen (see below), prominent in Londonderry, where they hold a march every August.

Black and Tans (or the Tans): an ill-disciplined force of military auxiliaries raised by the British Lloyd George Coalition Government after the First World War, to suppress Irish nationalism. Guilty of many atrocities. So-called from the colour of their uniforms.

Bloody Sunday: was in January 1972 when, during nationalist riots in Londonderry, 13 civilians were killed by British paratroops.

B-Specials: an ill-disciplined force of part-time police, notorious for anti-Catholic bias. Disbanded by the British Government in the early 1970's.

The Border: to both unionists and nationalists there is only one Border, that between Northern Ireland and the Republic.

The Civil Rights Movement: an initially non-violent organisation formed in the late 1960's to protest against discrimination, especially in municipal housing and employment, against Catholics. Originally supported by some liberal-minded unionists, it became more nationalist and extremist in a short time.

Derry or Londonderry: Derry is the old Irish name for both the city and the County, used by nationalists.

Londonderry is used by unionists because the city and County were colonised at the beginning of the 17th century by a company granted a charter by James I based in London.

Devolution: a return to extensive provincial autonomy within the United Kingdom. Official Unionists and Democratic Unionists favour this but the British, the SDLP and the Alliance insist it is only possible on the basis of the power-sharing i.e. responsibilities for legislation and administration shared between the Protestant majority and the Catholic minority. Mr Prior's plan is essentially to increase the powers of the Northern Ireland Assembly according to the degree of power-sharing that is established. Northern Ireland MP's would continue to sit in the House of Commons.

Direct Rule: what exists at the moment i.e. administration by the United Kingdom Government with only very limited powers for local district councils and the Assembly. Northern Irish MPs sit in the House of Commons - the favourite choice of few but the second choice of many.

Easter Week: in Easter 1916, Irish nationalists rose in rebellion against the British in Dublin and began the struggle which led to independence in 1921.

Eire: the Irish word for Ireland is used in English by unionists to stress the foreign nature of Ireland.

The Fenians: were a terrorist Irish nationalist movement of the mid-19th century. Had considerable influence among Irish emigrants to the USA from which a small-scale invasion of Canada was mounted in the 1860's. The word is used by unionists to describe any disaffected non-unionists.

The Garda Síochana: the regular police in the Republic.

The R.U.C. (Royal Ulster Constabulary) is the regular police in Northern Ireland.

The Hibernians: similar organisation to the Orangemen (see below) on the nationalist side, but of less political importance.

Home Rule: the proposal of the British Liberal leader Gladstone in the 1880's to establish self-government for the whole of Ireland. Rejected by the Conservatives in Britain and the unionists in Ireland who in 1912-14 organised the Protestants to demand the exclusion of Ulster from a self-governing Ireland.

Integration: Northern Ireland to be ruled exactly as other parts of the united Kingdom. Its main advocate is Mr Enoch Powell MP.

The Irish Republican Army (I.R.A.): the original IRA was the military wing of the Irish Nationalists who rose on Easter 1916 (supra) and fought the guerrilla war against the British until 1921. After the Irish Civil War, the IRA became the expression of the extremists who continued the campaign against the British Government in Northern Ireland and they also refused to recognise the legality of the Irish state itself. After sporadic campaigns of violence in the late 1930's and late 1950's, they seemed to have lapsed into insignificance until the disorders of 1968 and '69 and especially the attacks of Protestant extremists on Catholic areas in Belfast revived them. They split into the Officials and the Provisionals. The Officials have for some years rejected violence. The Provisionals are illegal in the Republic as well as in Northern Ireland.

The Irish National Liberation Army (I.N.L.A.): an extremist and terrorist organisation formed as the military wing of the extremist splinter group of the Provisional IRA (see below) known as the Irish Republican Socialist Party (IRSP). Claims responsibility for many murders.

Loyalists: term used by themselves to describe extreme unionists. The loyalty involved is to the concept of unionist supremacy in Northern Ireland, rather than to the British Government.

The Majority: for unionists means the majority (approx. 1 million out of 1½ million) of Protestants in Northern Ireland. For nationalists, it means the majority of non-unionists in the whole of Ireland (approximately 3 3/4 million out of 4 3/4 million).

Per contra, the Minority for unionists means the Catholic minority in Northern Ireland. For nationalists, it means the unionist minority in the whole of Ireland.

The Maze: is the main prison for convicted terrorists, both Catholic and Protestant, and is where the Hunger Strikers were held in Northern Ireland. The buildings of the prison are often called H-Blocks because of the design of the cell blocks.

Nationalists: a general term for those living in Northern Ireland who wish it to become part of the Irish Republic. They differ widely on how to achieve this and on other questions. The great majority are Catholics.

Orangemen: members of the Orange Lodges, so-called after William of Orange, the victor of The Battle of the Boyne in 1690. Organised for political and social purposes, they largely dominate Official Unionist politics. The oath they take on initiation in effect excludes Catholics.

Orange and Green: Orange, because William III was of the House of Orange, is the unionist colour. Green has been for generations the colour of the native Irish and hence of the nationalists. (It may have originated from the colours of the flag of the High Kings of ancient Ireland whose capital was in Tara in the Province of Leinster).

The Paras: British paratroops much disliked by nationalists especially after Bloody Sunday (supra).

Partition: the term used by nationalists to describe the establishment of the Border by the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921.

The Peace Movement: an anti-violence organisation, formed by two Belfast housewives in the mid-1970's. After initial success - it was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize - it has been much troubled by personal rivalries, financial and organisational disputes.

The Plantation: the colonisation of Northern Ireland by Protestant settlers from (mainly) the Scottish Lowlands and England at the beginning of the 17th century.

The Provisionals or Provos: short for the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) - the largest of the extremist and terrorist Irish nationalist organisations. Responsible for most of the political murders in Northern Ireland since 1968.

Republicans: supporters of a united Ireland. As an expression of hostility to the British Crown, the term is generally used by extremist nationalists and by their most extreme opponents. So supporters of the IRA are often described by themselves and by members of the unionist parties as Republicans.

Sinn Féin (which means "Ourselves Alone"): is the political and legal expression of the IRA and is similarly divided into Officials (now calling themselves the Workers Party) and Provisionals. Together they appear to have the support of approximately 5% of the votes in both parts of Ireland, the Officials more than the Provisionals. Sinn Féin was the name for those Irish nationalists who rejected all links with Britain before 1916 but in those days it was mostly a cultural and linguistic rather than political movement.

Special Powers Act: this was a law passed by Stormont which gave sweeping powers of detention and suppression to the Northern Ireland authorities. Never in fact much used until 1971, when there were many arrests, it was nevertheless offensive to all liberal opinion and was abolished by the British Government in 1972.

Stormont: the centre of Government and the local Parliament for Northern Ireland, established by the unionists after southern Ireland became independent in 1921. This system was abolished by the British in 1972. Stormont is used by unionists nostalgically to refer to their period of control, per contra, it is a "boo" word to the nationalists.

Sunningdale: the place in the suburbs of Greater London where, at the end of 1973, agreement was reached between the British and Irish Governments and leaders of both moderate unionists and moderate nationalists on a power-sharing government of Northern Ireland and the development of co-operation between Northern Ireland and the Republic. Repudiated by the extremists, especially by Mr Paisley, who led a strike against the settlement to which the Labour Government of Harold Wilson yielded in May 1974.

The Troubles: euphemistic term to describe the period of the guerrilla war against the British (the War of Independence to the nationalists) partition and the Irish Civil War. Also used to describe the period since 1968.

The Twelfth, 12th July, anniversary of the Battle of the Boyne celebrated by the unionists with massive parades and speech-making.

The '98: was the rebellion throughout Ireland against British rule in 1798. It was supported by Revolutionary France and one of its leaders, Wolfe Tone, was an Irishman of Jacobin sympathies. It has a particular significance

as the only occasion when a large number of Protestants, mainly Presbyterians (Calvinists), joined with the Catholics in rebelling against the British. They did this partly because of the general mood of the times and partly because they resented the privileges of the established Anglican Church. The '98 was repressed with great severity, numerous atrocities being committed on both sides.

The Ulster Defence Association (U.D.A.): unionist extremist organisation. Some of its most prominent supporters have called for an independent Northern Ireland.

The Ulster Defence Regiment (U.D.R.): a force of part-time soldiers used exclusively for security duties. Overwhelmingly Protestant.

The Ulster Volunteer Force (U.V.F.): Protestant terrorist organisation.

Ulster: the term used by unionists to describe Northern Ireland. Ulster was one of the old kingdoms, later provinces, of Ireland which included all the six counties (Antrim, Armagh, Down, Fermanagh, Londonderry/Derry, Tyrone), which form part of the United Kingdom, and three other counties now in the Republic (Cavan, Donegal, Monaghan). Those favouring a united Ireland therefore call the British ruled part the Six Counties. The neutral term is Northern Ireland.

Unionists: a general term for those living in Northern Ireland who wish it to remain part of the United Kingdom. They differ widely about the best means of maintaining the union and on other subjects. The great majority are Protestants although more Catholics vote for unionist parties than Protestants vote for nationalist ones. The term is used also to describe supporters of this opinion in Great Britain, just as the term nationalist is used also to describe supporters of that opinion in the Republic.

COMMUNITY DOCUMENTS ON NORTHERN IRELAND

- Northern Ireland in Europe, the impact of membership, January 1983, published by the Northern Ireland Commission office
- Working Document of the Section for Regional Development on "The Border Areas of Ireland and Northern Ireland", March 1983 published by the Economic and Social Committee
- Draft Information Report on a Development Programme for the Irish Border Areas, November 1983, published by the Economic and Social Committee
- Area analysis sheets for the report on Irish Border Regions
- Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the Cross-Border Communications Study on the Londonderry/Donegal area, July 1978
- Council Directive, 28 April 1975 (75/268/EEC)
- " " 28 April 1975 (75/276/EEC)
- " " 6 February 1979 (79/197/EEC)
- " Regulation, 7 October 1980 (EEC) No 2617/80
- " " 30 June 1981 (EEC) No 1942/81
- " " 30 June 1981 (EEC) No 1943/81
- " " 7 October 1980 (EEC) No 2619/80
- " " 21 April 1981 (EEC) No 1054/81
- " " 21 June 1983 (EEC) No 1739/83
- European Parliament Report on Community regional policy and Northern Ireland, rapporteur: Mrs S. Martin (4 May 1981, Doc. 1-177/81)
- European Parliament Resolution on violence in Northern Ireland, 7 May 1981 (OJ No C 144, 7.5.81, p.90)

tabled by Mr McCARTIN, Mr O'DONNELL, Mr RYAN,
Mr CLINTON, Mr PENDERS, Mr van AERSSSEN, Mr HERMAN,
Mr ESTGEN, Mr BERSANI and Mr PROTOPAPADAKIS
on behalf of the Group of the European People's Party (CD Group)

pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure

on Northern Ireland

The European Parliament,

- A. Recalling the task given to the Community by its founders to substitute for age old rivalries the merging of the essential interests of the peoples of Europe,
- B. Acting on the committment of the Community to the promotion of peace by cooperation,
- C. Stressing the need to maintain the solidarity of European peoples by the elimination of every possible source of tension,
- D. Considering the gravity of the situation in Northern Ireland with its accompanying toll of death, human suffering and waste of resources,
- E. Concerned that the conflict in Northern Ireland and its effects in the Republic of Ireland impose enormous security costs on two of the member states of the Community - the United Kingdom and Ireland,
- F. Mindful that the failure to date to find a peaceful solution to the problems of Northern Ireland is damaging to the image of Europe in the world,
- G. Considering that the search for peace can be assisted by the support of the Community,
 1. calls on the Community to take an active interest in the situation in Northern Ireland and the possible effects of the problem on the solidarity of the Community;
 2. asks the Community to assist the people of Britain and Ireland to work out a long term solution and give an undertaking to provide assistance in the context of such a solution;
 3. instructs its President to transmit copies of this Resolution to the Commission and Council and to the Governments of all member states.

MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION DOCUMENT 1-637/82

tabled by Mr HUME, Mr GLINNE, Mrs VAN DEN HEUVEL, Mr SEEFELD,
Mr JAQUET, Mr CLUSKEY, Mr PLASKOVITIS, Mr ARNDT, Mr TREACY,
Mr ENRIGHT, Mr PATTISON and Mr HORGAN
on behalf of the Socialist Group

pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure

on the continuing conflict in Northern Ireland

The European Parliament,

- A - recognizing that one of the ideals of the founders of the European Community - 30 years ago - was the creation of institutions to bring to an end conflict between the peoples of the European Community,
 - B - recognizing that the continuing conflict in Northern Ireland is an affront to those ideals,
 - C - recognizing the serious economic crisis in Northern Ireland,
 - D - recognizing that the European Parliament has expressed an opinion in conflict situation all over the world,
 - E - recognizing the interest of the European Community in peace and stability in all parts of the Community,
1. Calls on the competent committee of the European Parliament to hold formal hearings on the situation in Northern Ireland with a view to establishing ways in which the European Community can contribute to the ending of the political and economic crisis in Northern Ireland;
 2. Calls on its President to forward this resolution to Council, Commission and the Member States.

MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION DOCUMENT 1-752/82

tabled by Mr LALOR, Mr DAVERN, Mr CRONIN, Mr JUNOT and
Mr ISRAEL

pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure

on continued conflict in Northern Ireland

The European Parliament,

- A. anxious to promote peace and prosperity amongst the peoples of Europe,
 - B. considering the deepening economic crisis in Northern Ireland,
 - C. considering the continued suffering and loss of life in this part of the Community,
 - D. considering the efforts already undertaken by the European Economic Community to assist Northern Ireland,
 - E. considering the failure of the responsible authorities to restore peaceful conditions conducive to economic and political stability,
1. Calls on the European Commission to bring forward further proposals to improve the economic and social structures in Northern Ireland;
 2. Calls on the Council of Ministers, meeting in political cooperation to open discussions between the UK and Irish Governments with a view to adopting an agreed plan for political and economic reconstruction, taking into account the aspirations of the people of Ireland to live in peace, harmony and unity.

MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION DOCUMENT 1-233/82

tabled by Mr PAISLEY and Mr J.D. TAYLOR

pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure

on Northern Ireland

The European Parliament,

- A. recalling its resolution of 15 June 1981 which recognized that the European Community has no competence to make proposals for change in the Constitution of Northern Ireland,
- B. considering the agreement by the Council of Ministers with the resolution of 15 June 1981,
- C. considering declarations by the Commission that it has no role to play in the constitutional affairs of Northern Ireland,
 1. Reaffirms that the European Community has no competence to make proposals on the constitutional and political affairs of Northern Ireland;
 2. Deplores and repudiates the contrary assertion of Motions of Resolution Doc. 1-630/82; 1-637/82 and 1-752/82.

MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION DOCUMENT 1-1264/82/rev.

tabled by Mr MAHER
on behalf of the Liberal and Democratic Group

pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure

on Northern Ireland

The European Parliament,

- A. convinced of the positive role of the European Community in healing disputes between its Member States,
 - B. deploring the continuing conflict in Northern Ireland which causes so many deaths and so much human suffering, destruction and cost to two Member States,
1. Calls on the relevant committee of the European Parliament to present a report on all aspects of the Northern Irish problem, with a view to promoting European Community initiatives, political, legal, economic and cultural, which can help to resolve the conflict;
 2. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the European Commission and Council of Ministers.

MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION DOCUMENT 1-113/83

tabled by Mr BLANEY

pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure

on the continuing state of conflict and violence in Ireland

The European Parliament,

- A. convinced that the peace and security of all citizens are a matter of primary concern, and are inseparable from the prosperity and well-being that are the immediate goals of the Community,
 - B. convinced also that a state of tension involving two neighbouring Member States is a threat to such peace and security, and must be considered a concern of the whole Community,
 - C. deeply concerned at the continuing state of conflict and violence in Ireland, and at that endless toll of death and suffering that results,
 - D. considering that an understanding of the economic, social and historical factors that have led to the present situation is vital to any lasting solution,
 - E. feeling, consequently, that it has a duty to investigate the current situation, its origins and antecedents, and to elaborate any proposals or launch any initiatives that could contribute to a lasting peaceful settlement based on tolerance and prosperity,
1. Instructs its competent committee to investigate the situation in Ireland, particularly in the six counties of the north, to hear witnesses, to assemble documentary evidence of all kinds, and to prepare a full report to Parliament;
 2. Requests its President to convey the text of this resolution to the other Community institutions and to the Member Governments.

Petition No. 6/83

pursuant to Rules 108-110 of the Rules of Procedure
by Dr. William FREYMUTH

Subject : The situation in Northern Ireland

In view of the killings and general unrest caused by the continued British occupation of Northern Ireland, which serves no useful purpose either for Ireland or Britain, I maintain that it should be left to the public to determine whether Northern Ireland should remain British Territory or not.

The legal claim to British sovereignty in Northern Ireland may perhaps be questioned, and indeed in my enclosed statement I have developed my own legal argument which demonstrates, I believe the contradiction in the British claim, particularly when it is compared with the arguments advanced by the British justifying their action in the Falkland Islands.

For the above reason I would request that, in the context of its investigation into Ulster's problems, the European Parliament takes account of the legal position as I have developed it in my enclosed statement, and uses this statement, and its eventual publication by the Parliament, as a tool for obliging the British government to solve the Irish problem by the democratic process as soon as possible.

Luxembourg, 7 April 1983

Dr. William FREYMUTH
Occupation : Retired Lawyer
Nationality: British
45, Beach Priory Gardens
Lord Street West
SOUTHPORT, Merseyside PR8 2SA

Great Britain

The complete correspondence and the enclosures have been transmitted to the Committee on the Rules of Procedure and Petitions.