

hibernia

FORTNIGHTLY REVIEW

'71 INTERNMENT '74

FEW ENOUGH PEOPLE in the South seem to be worried that almost 600 men and women are interned without trial in Northern Ireland today. Although there was a strong reaction in the South to the original internment and to the subsequent brutalities and torture, the public concern seems to have waned with the years. Out of sight, out of mind now seems to sum up the Southern feeling. Nor is this attitude too surprising. Most people, North and South, have been sickened by the violence and feeling incapable of doing anything about it, try to dissociate themselves completely from it. To the extent that the violence emanates from the paramilitary organisations—such thinking is logical enough. But the employment of official violence is, or at least should be, a prime concern for everyone living on this island.

Internment in Northern Ireland is operated under authority of the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973. By virtue of this Act, the authorities may arrest any citizen and hold him for twenty-eight days under an "Interim Custody Order." In practice, the average detainee has been held between 7/8 months before his case is heard by a commissioner. During these hearings, evidence is taken in camera in the absence of the defendant and his lawyer, and is, therefore, incapable of contradiction. On occasions, commissioners will not even summarise such evidence to the defence. The commissioner is within his rights not to give a summary, but it puts the defendant in an impossible position if he does not know the general nature of the evidence against him. Witnesses cannot be examined as to their credit because their identity is not revealed. Neither can hearsay evidence offered by members of the security forces be challenged. However, the Crown can cross-examine the defendant so that his credit alone is at issue.

The whole procedure is a travesty of justice. The commissioners, crown prosecutors and special branch present themselves as a co-ordinated unit against the detainee. In no sense could the hearings be described as judicial or even quasi-judicial. Instead the whole charade brings the law into contempt. For this reason alone one must strongly oppose, in principle, the operations of N.I. (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973.

But not only is internment wrong in principle, it has been shown also to be futile in practice. A recent opinion from the leader of the Alliance Party, Mr. Oliver Napier, stated that "there has been no evidence in the last three years that a policy of internment can either defeat violence or even reduce it. In fact, all available evidence suggests that the contrary is true." Certainly internment is a continuing cause of violence; the arrests are violent; the interrogations are violent and the whole operation of the internment camp is violent. Sometimes the violence is physical and overt. All the time it is implicit and psychological. The resistance also is violent, of course. Nor is there any guarantee that an end to internment would per se reduce the current level of violence. But if the record is anything to go by, this much is certain: while internment lasts, and while the instruments of internment continue to be employed, there is no hope at all of a return to peace in Northern Ireland.

No lasting peace can be restored in Northern Ireland unless the new authorities and structures are respected by the two communities. Moves towards the re-establishment of political authority must take priority, but the re-establishment of legal authority is no less important. This process involves not only the establishment of an acceptable police force in the no-go areas, but the much more difficult creation of a trust and confidence in the rule of law amongst the minority community. For too long that trust has been wanting because it was undeserved. For too long the judiciary in N.I. was drawn almost exclusively from committed Unionist supporters. For too long the R.U.C. enforced the law in a partisan manner. For too long the Special Powers Act was employed in a biased and partisan fashion against the minority community.

The way ahead must include the enactment of a strong Bill of Rights, the repeal of the Emergency Provisions Act, and, of course, the creation of an acceptable police force. But if the citizens of N.I. are to respect the rule of law, then the cardinal principle of that law must be held sacrosanct. No person should be deprived of his dignity or liberty by any authority unless he is positively shown to have committed an offence against the law of the land. While the Government fails to respect the rule of law, it is futile to expect otherwise from its citizens. First and foremost, therefore, in the interests of peace, must come the release of all internees.

There is growing realisation, especially in the North, that internment must be abolished. The Alliance Party has now joined the S.D.L.P. in this conviction and several prominent Unionist politicians have personally expressed a similar view. The British Government has set up the Gardiner Committee to look into the procedures of detention and the criminal law. Regrettably, however few southern Irish politicians have expressed any opposition to the continuation of internment and little or no pressure on the British Government to abolish this iniquity has been exerted from the South. For this reason we are taking the initiative in launching a campaign in support of the resolution which appears on our front page. Initially, fifty distinguished signatories have confirmed their support. We now invite our readers to join the campaign in organising mass signatures, in having this resolution adopted by meetings, clubs or associations of any kind, or by volunteering time or funds in this cause. On December 10th next, International Human Rights Day, the supported resolution will be presented to the Secretary General of the United Nations, and to the Prime Ministers of Great Britain and of Ireland.


"We are opposed in principle to the internment of civilians without trial. We also believe that internment in Northern Ireland, now three in operation, is both a continuing cause of violence and a primary obstacle to the success of peace initiatives. For these reasons we call for immediate release of all internees in Northern Ireland."

All signatures are contributed in personal capacity

John Arden	*Joseph Cunnane	John B. Keane	Matt Merrigan	James Plunkett
Kadar Asmal	Austin Currie	Thomas Kilroy	Michael Mulcahy	Liam de Paor
Billy Blease	*Edward Daly	Patrick Kilroy	Harry Murray	John Robb
Andrew Barr	Margaretta D'Arcy	Thomas Kinsella	Melina Mercouri	Mary Robinson
Donal Barrington	Paddy Devlin	Brian Lenihan	Michael Mullen	Francis Stuart
Tom Barrington	Seamus Deane	Bill Loughnane	Oliver Napier	'Jock' Stallard
Fenner Brockway	David Greene	Tomas MacAnna	John O'Connell	David Thornley
Claud Cockburn	Brendan Harkin	Sean McBride	Peadar O'Donnell	Mikis Theodorak
Pat Crerand	Charles J. Haughey	Terence McCaughey	Eileen O Faolain	Derrick Waldron-Ly
Flor Crowley	Seamus Heaney	Siobhan McKenna	Sean O Faolain	Brigid Wilkinso

Internment: A Moral, Legal And Political Disaster

Kevin Boyle



Aerial view of Long Kesh camp

71 INTERNMENT '74

A LEGAL critique of internment without trial in Northern Ireland or executive detention as it is currently known, confirms, whatever about legal theory, that in practice the use of emergency powers by governments leads inevitably to abuse.

Emerging Situations

According to legal theory enshrined in international human rights covenants, emergency situations in public security or health can be met by emergency measures. Internment without trial is one such peculiarly British emergency measure which derogates from the normally protected rights of liberty, bodily security and family rights. The theory, however, dictates that such powers must only be used as a last resort, and only to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation. Most important, and not surprisingly least often present when such powers are invoked, there must exist a democratic, stable government enjoying widespread popular support which faces a threat from an illegitimate and undemocratic source.

Any honest attempt to test these principles against the history of the North over these last three appalling years, from the period prior to the introduction of internment in August 1971 to the present date, cannot avoid the conclusion that the detention policy has been operated in contempt of the rule of law.

Military Overkill

Indeed, many would go further and say that the decision to embark on internment, the brutal manner of its initial implementation, in particular the military overkill of the minority neighbourhoods from which internees were taken and the cruelties inflicted on those detained, have been the single most important factors in precipitating the continuing ignominy of the North.

Three years of internment has not stemmed violence but

served only to provoke and sustain it. It has not contained conflict but widened it in every conceivable way. It has not solved the emergency but deepened it to a degree where at present a mood of despairing of any solution pervades both demoralised Northern communities.

Three years of internment has also led to dangerous shifts in political control. The rise in the political prominence of the British army which has responsibility for working the internment policy has been gradual but unmistakable. Civil Government is increasingly seen to depend on military decisions: power appears to rest in the hands of generals rather than ministers, and the judicial process is so circumscribed with, and circumvented by, emergency rules passed under military pressure, that its independence is under constant threat.

Initial Decision

The initial decision to introduce internment in August, 1971, was in clear breach of legal principle governing recourse to emergency powers. Northern Ireland was admittedly a community in political crisis, but the character of that crisis was governmental. It had been brought about by a flagrant policy of exclusion from power, discrimination and repression practised by the local Unionist regime against the Catholic community. This policy was compounded by generations of neglect at Westminster for what was ostensibly an integral part of the British democracy. Patently it was a situation that required radical and determined political action to restore civil rights. Instead, after a reluctant intervention, the then Labour administration at Westminster imposed a few palliatives but otherwise allowed the situation to fester. The inevitable angry reaction from the minority community was met by calls for a military response. Eventually it was forthcoming in the decision to intern.

Evidence now abounds that far from being the reluctant agents of a panicky Stormont Government, on that ill-fated date, 9 August, 1971, the British Army had been pre-

paring for a military effort which would include large-scale internment, at least 6 months previous. Hindsight now makes clear that official thinking had determined upon a policy of military repression of the minority community, in the vain hope that it would forestall the need for a protracted effort at a political solution.

Such a policy might appear cynical, but more relevant it was orthodox. Internment without trial, which is no novelty in Ireland (it has been invoked on five previous occasions in the North alone), was invented by the British as a military response to colonial troubles. In India, Cyprus, Kenya and Aden, to mention but a few cases this century, large-scale internment was a standard feature of British policy to stifle popular or nationalist movements. Northern Ireland was exceptional only in the immediate and disastrous cycle of violence the policy precipitated.

Legal Abuses

The actual experience of internment over three years presents an unrelieved picture of legal and administrative abuse. In August and September 1971, over 700 people were arrested for internment. A Northern Ireland court in the case of *In Re McKerr* was to hold that each and every such arrest had been illegal. While this decision did not invalidate their subsequent internment all those wrongly arrested were entitled to compensation.

In a further decision in 1972—*Londonderry Justices, ex parte Hume*, the court declared the Special Powers Regulations on which the entire military operation was based, to be *ultra vires*. This decision which could have forced the release of all detained, was quickly reversed by new legislation from the Westminster Parliament.

The abuses which accompanied the interrogation of internees are notorious. The *Compton Inquiry*, set up in August, 1971, to investigate complaints of torture and brutality, despite its best efforts to disguise the facts, confirmed the existence of "interrogation in depth," whereby selected individuals were subjected to psychological disorientation in order

to gain information. The report also confirmed the systematic "ill-treatment" meted out to others detained in the initial military swoops.

Later the *Parker Committee* acknowledged that the techniques of depth interrogation were officially sanctioned and that the British Army had begun training the R.U.C. special branch in their use from March, 1972.

Torture Techniques

While these bizarre forms of torture were subsequently abandoned, complaints continued to flow in the early months of internment about the use of more traditional forms of brutality, beatings, electric shock, burnings with cigarettes and even the administration of drugs. At the same time a policy of unrestrained harassment of minority housing estates was being waged. Complaints against the military involving reckless shootings, random assaults on citizens and the wrecking of homes, became common place.

Strasbourg

In this situation, the Government of the Republic, in response to Northern pressure, lodged in December 1971, a series of complaints at the European Commission of Human Rights at Strasbourg. Citing internment, torture and community harassment the Irish Government rightly alleged that British policy towards the North had degenerated into a military assault on the minority in violation of the European Convention of Human Rights.

The Republic's case at Strasbourg was followed in 1972 by further petitions to the European Commission by individuals in the North, who complained that the policy of torture by the R.U.C. and military during interrogation was still continuing. Despite British denials that torture or brutality occurred during interrogation, it was not until mid-1973 that any noticeable reduction occurred in the volume of complaints by those arrested. Throughout these entire periods only one police officer was prosecuted arising from complaints of torture, and he was acquitted. In November, 1972, largely

in response to international pressures and particularly the embarrassing proceedings brought by the Irish Government at Strasbourg, the U.K. Government announced what purported to be dramatic changes in the policy of internment without trial. Internment was to be "phased out," a legal commission under Lord Diplock was to enquire into means of dealing with internees through the ordinary criminal courts and the Special Powers Act was to be repealed.

But these initiatives did not, as hoped, spell the end of internment. If anything, they embedded the policy even further into the system of political control in the North.

Internment, it transpired, was to be renamed "detention" — as meaningless a change in nomenclature as the substitution of the title Maze Prison for Long Kesh Internment Camp. Further detention, unlike internment, would be even-handed; Loyalists as well as Republicans began to be detained. This policy has served only to move Loyalist organisations and communities from their previous indifference to internment to outright opposition. In addition, under the new procedures for detention, judicial commissions would have the final say on whether a man was to be held without trial.

Window-dressing

The Commissioners, however, have proved to be window-dressings; the hearings at which informer evidence is relayed to a Commissioner by a Special Branch officer from behind a screen, often with the detainee and his lawyer excluded, have only served to emphasise the complete control over peoples' freedom which lies in the hands of the Army intelligence and the political police.

With regard to regulations relating to people held under Interim Custody Orders (and so not technically under detention), the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973 laid down that "A person shall not be detained under an interim custody order for a period of more than twenty-eight days from the date of the order unless his case is referred by the


Chief Constable to a Commissioner for determination and where a case is so referred the person concerned may be detained under the order only until his case is so determined." As a result the referral procedure is simply be used to keep prisoners "on ice" for a long period, and as the Alliance Party submission to the Gardiner Committee (see below) points out: "The average length of time between service of Interim Custody Orders to service of li of allegations, in our experience, is about seven months."

There are other procedural matters worthy of examination: Proceedings before a Commissioner take place in private; the defendant may be excluded from being present when the Commission is receiving evidence; evidence is taken from anonymous witnesses who consequently cannot be examined by the defence; hearsay evidence, often self-contradictory, cannot be tested, and on. All of these procedures would be unthinkable in a judicial system in the Western world, yet they are enshrined in the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973, passed by the House of Commons July of last year.

A Disaster

With presently 600 men and women detained without trial the latest initiative is yet another Commission of Inquiry, this time into the functioning of the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973, which replaced the Special Powers Act and under which internment is now authorised. The Commission, which is currently sitting, is led by Lord Gardiner, a former Labour Lord Chancellor, who has an international reputation for support for human rights. It can only be hoped that reviewing the past three years, he will conclude that internment has been a moral, legal and political disaster, and that it must be ended. It is simply that the ending of internment is a pre-condition to any political future for Northern Ireland.

Kevin Boyle is a Lecturer in Law, Queen's University, Belfast.



Artist's impression of the Long Kesh tribunal.

To Long Kesh And Back

'71 INTERNMENT '74

IN OCTOBER, 1971, William Hutchinson sat in a Wessex helicopter ferrying internees to the newly opened camp outside Lisburn called Long Kesh. As a warder at Crumlin Road Gaol, he was not used to internees, and he certainly was not used to a place like Long Kesh. He was warder on the very first helicopter load of internees to arrive in the camp. Some time afterwards, unhappy with the whole business, he resigned, and took a job in the Bass Charrington brewery in Andersonstown.

Now, three years later, William Hutchinson is back in Long Kesh, this time as an internee. Like many Protestants, Mr. Hutchinson's relatives simply could not believe that he could be interned like that. Certainly, he is a member of the Ulster Defence Association, but then large numbers of able bodied men, perhaps the majority, from the Shankill Road are members. "They'd been raiding us for several weeks," said Mr. Hutchinson. "They kept coming back saying that they'd got anonymous tip-offs saying we had guns. But they never found anything."

Last February 12th, Scottish soldiers arrived at 4.45 in the morning and searched the house. "They were very polite," recalls Mrs. Hutchinson, "but just as we thought they were leaving, one turns to Jackie (her husband's usual name) and said: 'I'm arresting you under Section Ten of the Emergency Provisions Act.'"

Mrs. Hutchinson had no idea what to do next. The departing soldiers told her her husband was being taken to Tennant Street police station, but she was to discover hours later that he had in fact been taken to the interrogation centre at Ladis Drive. The following few days were a nightmare, relieved only by a quick visit to her husband in Ladis Drive, where he expressed that only-too-common belief that it was all a shorty. Now, eight months later, Mr. Hutchinson still has no idea what the allegations against him are. His wife and two young children live on £11.30 a week state benefit and his son's school work has fallen apart at the seams.

The Hutchinsons feel that whatever happens, he cannot return to his job as maintenance engineer at Bass Charringtons, which is in the middle of a Catholic area: "He always got on well with the people there, but of course they'd be suspicious now he's been interned and it might be dangerous for him."

Like Mrs. Hutchinson, Evelyn Beattie was shocked and appalled by Long Kesh and its incredible conditions. She went through the conventional reactions of disbelief and outrage when her husband was taken from their Newtownabbey home last June, at the height of the Ulster Workers strike. Like the Hutchinson home, the Beattie home is a little Protestant palace, clean and almost unnervingly neat. All around the cupboard are the family pictures, and neatly stowed underneath is a fat wad of newspaper photo-

graphs showing Andie Beattie looking after an outing of old-age pensioners or running some social function in the area. Just like Mr. Hutchinson, Mr. Beattie is a member of the U.D.A., and is probably one of the best known men in Newtownabbey. He runs the U.D.A. club in the area and is responsible for organising the widespread social work that paramilitary bodies inevitably become involved in.

The fact that he was a member of the co-ordinating committee of the U.W.C. strike. His local prominence and his membership of the co-ordinating committee, at a time when a number of U.D.A. men were wanted for terrorist acts in Newtownabbey, almost certainly ensured his detention.

His wife, nervous, pleasant, warm, frequently close to tears, has had a rude awakening: "We've had our eyes opened. We never believed that Catholics had to put up with the half the things they said they did. We never really cared, but we believe them now."

The Beattie children seem to have avoided most of the traumas that frequently affects youngsters when a parent is rudely removed in the middle of the night. But, like the Hutchinson family, there is a lingering disbelief, a resentment at the unprecedented indignity of having to get money off the dole, and an unfeeling and recurring disgust at each entrance to the several acres of mud, wire and corrugated iron that is now called Her Majesty's Prison, The Maze.

FROM THE list of complaints it would seem that the Maze would be better suited for animals.

One realises that people who break the law must be punished, but this kind of treatment would seem to be out of the ordinary.

Food served to the prisoners is always virtually cold and of very poor quality; prisoners have to use one wash hand basin as well

as one toilet among 30 of them; many of the prisoners' personal belongings have either been damaged or destroyed; the huts in which the prisoners sleep are in great need of repair, many having leaking roofs as well as being rat-infested; newspapers have been banned from the prisoners and television viewing is prohibited; there is gross overcrowding with twice as many in the

huts as there should be.

It is now essential that the Loyalist people begin to realise the sort of treatment being meted out to our people in this prison by the Whitelaw regime.

—From a statement by FRASER AGNEW and JAMES RODGERS, members of the Vanguard executive and prominent Young Unionists (26 Jan., 1973).

'71 INTERNMENT '74

END INTERNMENT CAMPAIGN

Already a number of leading politicians, trade unionists, Church leaders, writers and artists North and South, as well as international figures have signed the resolution (see below) calling for the release of all internees in Northern Ireland. We are now asking YOU to support this campaign in whatever way you can. A complete list of signatories will be presented to the British Government, the Irish Government and the United Nations Human Rights Commission on December 10th, which is International Human Rights Day.

What YOU Can Do

Collect as many signatures as possible from (adult) members of your family, work colleagues, friends and acquaintances at home and abroad, on foot of this resolution and return them immediately to the address below. Additional copies of this 8-page pull-out are available on request.

Resolutions

1. Table the resolution for the agenda of your next trade union/society/club/association meeting, and if it is passed send the details to the National Committee and to your local newspaper.

Volunteers

assist this Committee and/or establish regional committees. Volunteers please contact the address below.

Funds

4. As you will appreciate, an international campaign of this size will cost a considerable amount of money, so we are asking for donations (of whatever size) to fund the campaign. A progress report of the campaign will be published in each issue of HIBERNIA.

End Internment Campaign

206 PEARSE STREET, DUBLIN 2
TEL. 776317

Internment Without Trial

"We are opposed in principle to the internment of civilians without trial. We also believe that internment in Northern Ireland, now 3 years in operation, is both a continuing cause of violence and a primary obstacle to the success of peace initiatives. For these reasons we call for the immediate release of all internees in Northern Ireland."

SIGNATURE NAME (print) ADDRESS

- 1.....
- 2.....
- 3.....
- 4.....
- 5.....
- 6.....

The Experience Of Internment: Inside and Outside



A group of Derry and Tyrone internees in Long Kesh.

71 INTERNMENT '74

PATRICK McNALLY, a 27-year-old bricklayer, married with two small children, was taken from his home in Ambreda Gardens, Armagh, on the morning of 9th August, 1971, during the first internment round-up. He is taken to Ballykinler camp in County Down and for six days was tortured by being hooded, spreadeagled against a wall for long periods of time, subjected to high-pitched noise, deprived of food, drink and sleep, and physically beaten. His family had news of him for eleven days after his arrest, when they were informed that he was in Crumlin Road Jail in Belfast.

On 23rd August Patrick's 27-year-old brother Cathal is picked up at his parents' home in Daire's Willows, Armagh. He was interned in the prison ship, the "Maidstone", and later in the Maze prison, Long Kesh, where he appeared three times before the Appeals Tribunal, but was refused release each time.

The main reason for re-detaining him was that according to the authorities, if released, he would once again come under the harmful influence of his Republican father. The defence counsel questioned this on the grounds that his father had suffered a number of heart attacks, was a semi-invalid as a result, and was thus patently unable to take any part in political affairs. Cathal McNally, convinced that the whole tribunal proceedings are a pointless exercise, has refused to appear to plead in any future review of his case.

Although Cathal McNally wasn't tortured and brutalised to the same extent as his elder brother, he is now one of the dozen or so internees who have been inside various prison camps ever since August, 1971. Patrick was finally freed in December, 1973, after a campaign by local clergy to have him released, to look after his young family and two ailing parents. The family as a whole have had a rough time since the

sons were interned: the husbands of Mrs. Alice McNally's three daughters have repeatedly been picked up for questioning and two of them were held in Ballykelly, Co. Derry, for 3 days. Her husband, a sick man with a bad heart condition, was also taken to Ballykelly six months ago, and after a day's questioning she was called up to take him home, since the British Army weren't willing to take the responsibility for bringing a man in his weak state back to Armagh in a military vehicle.

Mrs. McNally believes that her husband's reputation as a long-standing local Republican is the main reason for the break-up and continuing harassment of her family. She says that if it hadn't been for the intervention of Father Murray, a local priest and indefatigable defender of the rights of the interned men, her eldest son would still be in Long Kesh. She hopes that Cathal's recent adoption as a "prisoner of conscience" by Amnesty International (whose concern is with political prisoners who have neither practiced nor advocated violence in pursuit of their aims) will strengthen his case with the British authorities. Up to now she has hoped in vain.

71 INTERNMENT '74

MRS. CHRISTINA DOUGAN of D'Alton Park, on the other side of Armagh from the McNallys, has four sons. Three of them have been interned at various times and the youngest is living across the border for fear of being picked up as well.

Frankie "Tex" Dougan, a 35-year-old married man with 5 children, who now lives off the Falls Road in Belfast, was one of those taken in the first round-up on 9th August, 1971. He was released from Long Kesh last summer, and since then has survived one assassination attempt, has been into Castlebegh Barracks for several three-day interrogation exercises, and has had his house ransacked by troops on more than one occasion (he is married to the

sister of Gerard Kelly, one of the Winchester Eight hunger-strikers).

John Dougan was arrested in January, 1972, on a charge of possessing firearms. After being acquitted for lack of evidence he was lifted as he left the court, spent several days in the Palace Barracks and the Royal Victoria Hospital, where he was sent to recover from the effects of drugs administered during army interrogations, and ended up in Long Kesh with an internment order. He was released last Christmas, and has been holding down a job and living at home in Armagh since then, despite being regularly hauled off to Gough Barracks for lengthy interrogations.

The third son, Martin (22), is the one who has suffered most from his imprisonment. He too was picked up at home in Armagh on that first August night and taken to Ballykelly for interrogation. He was trussed up like a chicken, taken up in a helicopter and told he would be thrown out, and so badly beaten that he didn't even

remember being transferred to the "Maidstone" prison ship for a few days afterwards.

He was freed from Long Kesh just a year after his arrest, and although his nerves seemed to have been badly affected by his period "inside", a local priest found him work as a janitor in an Armagh secondary school. During the next fifteen months he regularly saw a psychiatrist in St. Luke's Hospital. Despite this, in November, 1973, Martin was re-arrested under the Emergency Provisions Act, taken again to Ballykelly for questioning, and to Long Kesh for detention.

His mother relates how she saw her son in Ballykelly on the night of Friday, 9th November: "He was in a bad state. He appeared as if he was drunk. His eyes were dead looking. His speech was very slurred. He couldn't concentrate. When you talked to him his mind seemed to be miles away. His whole body was just shaking. When we asked him what he felt

on, he said he had a lovely bed and a lovely room. He kept looking up at the ceiling. He said a Special Branch man had washed his face for him. He continued to speak in this confused way". He was also told at various times that both he and his younger brother Rory would be shot.

Meanwhile, Mrs. Dougan has been living alone in a pensioner's council house and looking after the three children of her deceased daughter. Her son-in-law, Joe Heaney, having been himself interned from August, 1971, to April, 1972, has been living and working in Killarney for two years, afraid even to visit his family for fear of further harassment. Her other daughter's husband is also in Long Kesh together with his three brothers.

Mrs. Dougan gets under £13 a week in home assistance, children's allowance and old-age pension, although since John's return she has been able to draw on his dole money and wages. She estimates that her house has been raided more than 30 times since 1971, and one Special Branch man has even tried to bring her, a 64-year-old woman, in for questioning, on the grounds that she was part of a Provisional I.R.A. active service unit.

The reasons for the harassment of the Dougans are all too obvious. Her late husband was interned for 5½ years in the forties, Frankie did 3 years in the fifties, and both elder sons make no secret of their Provisional sympathies. But local priests and neighbours are adamant that Martin, whose health has been shattered by his experiences in the various camps and who now suffers from serious bouts of depression, had little to do with any political movement at any time. Like so many detainees, he believes that his appearances before the Appeals Tribunal are sometimes a formality, more often a cruel farce—Mrs. Dougan tells of the Special Branch witness who claimed that Martin had ridden through Armagh on a bicycle carrying no less than 41 tons of explosives.

The Very Reverend Malachy Coyle, administrator of the Armagh diocese, has personally asked for the release of Martin Dougan to allow him to be with his mother and recover his good health. At his hearing last month, the learned judge decided that for the safety of the community his detention without trial would have to continue indefinitely.

71 INTERNMENT '74

BILLY REID, a 27-year-old father of five from the Falls Road area of Belfast, is another man who offended the Special Branch. In July, 1971, Reid, together with four other men, was arrested in a house in Springfield Road and was later charged with "possessing the tools of crime" (an overcoat, hats and nylon stockings were found there). He was remanded on bail and made two further court appearances being remanded on continuing bail each time.

During the initial internment snoop on August 9th, 1971, he was arrested under the Special Powers Act. He was held in Long Kesh for fifteen months appearing eventually before Mr. J. C. Leonard, one of the Detention Tribunal commissioners. Evidence against him was given by a uniformed R.U.C. man who sat behind a curtain which obscured the upper part of his body and who was described as "witness A."

Witness A told how he followed a man called Joseph Clarke to a house and how, when he entered, he saw Reid there also. Special Branch men then arrived and arrested every civilian in the house. In answer to questions witness A agreed that he did not know the precise address of the house, the name of the owner or if Reid might have had a legitimate reason for being there. When witness A disappeared from behind the curtain the Commissioner explained the term "in camera" to Reid and told him the next witness would be heard in secret. For some reason which

was not explained, however, Reid having been initially taken from the room was returned there before witness B—whom he recognised from interrogation sessions as Detective Inspector Harry Taylor of the Special Branch—started to give evidence.

Reading from notes Taylor explained that Reid's house had been under observation from September, 1970, until July, 1971, by the police and the Official I.R.A. who were going to raid it for guns and ammunition. When asked the address of the house which was being watched Taylor gave it as "2, Little Distillery Street." This upset the evidence a bit since Reid's address was listed correctly with the Commissioner as 39 Drew Street. When Taylor was questioned about which house was being watched and which house was believed to have had weapons in it he abandoned his notes and said: "Commissioner, I tell you the truth when I saw this lad on August 9th I was very surprised."

He went on to explain that Reid had "a good character and had never missed a day's work in his life." When asked to explain why Reid had spent 15 months in Long Kesh, the Special Branch man said it was "probably because he was found in a house where there were tools of crime." He could not produce these and he forgot to tell the Commissioner that the charge relating to these tools of crime had been withdrawn nearly a year before.

Reid was released that day. Prompted by his wife, Reid got in touch with a solicitor and made statements to him and the Association for Legal Justice giving details of his "trial." Shortly afterwards he was back in Long Kesh. This time he does not know what was said about him; but he does know the Special Branch think he is "a clever bastard who gets his name in the newspapers."

THIS report was published in Hibernia on 3rd August 1973. Billy Reid is still in Long Kesh today.



Peter McLachlan




Stanley Orme



Garret FitzGerald



Austin Currie



Andy Tyrrie



* Edward Daly

WHY DO I add my voice to those calling for an end to detention? I must make it clear that I have never been happy with the use of this kind of procedure because it makes a nonsense of civil liberty as I have always understood it. I accept it as a short-term measure in a difficult situation. I consider neither the old Special Powers Act nor the new Emergency Provisions Act provides a satisfactory form of internment for those occasions when such a procedure has to be used.

—PETER McLACHLAN, Unionist Assembly member for South Antrim (25 July, 1974).

AT THIS historic moment the Campaign for Democracy in Ulster appeals to the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland to make a gesture fitting to the occasion and end internment now.

—STANLEY ORME, after the signing of the Sunningdale Agreement (11 Dec., 1973).

I CANNOT understand how the British Government have not yet realised how lunatic it is to keep the internees locked up.

—DR. GARRET FITZGERALD in London (1 Sept., 1972).

I AM prepared to stick my neck out and say that there is a real possibility of a further release of internees when the Whitelaw conference is held next week. After all, the British Government has now made clear its conviction that internment has been a failure and must be brought to an end.

—AUSTIN CURRIE (20 Sept., 1972).

THE U.D.A. have taken the decision not to support any politicians in future elections who do not support calling for the end of detention.

—Statement by ULSTER DEFENCE ASSOCIATION (11 July, 1974).

I FOUND the living conditions there (in Long Kesh) to be vile, inhuman and deplorable.

With the exception of Cage 22, in which some effort has been made to provide reasonable living conditions, I found the huts to be overcrowded and insanitary. I was quite horrified by it all. I could not have believed that such conditions could exist had I not seen them for myself.

This state of affairs can only serve to make men more embittered and to build up a legacy of further violence.

—DR. EDWARD DALY, Bishop of Derry (9 May, 1974).

What They Said About Internment

The Longest-serving Internees

OF THE hundreds of men and women interned in Northern Ireland, the following have been interned since the very beginning: PHIL McCULLOUGH, Enadon, Belfast; SEAN MURPHY, Andersonstown, Belfast; GERRY MAGUIRE, Andersonstown, Belfast; MICHAEL DONNELLY, Derry; EAN McKENNA, Newry; KEVIN HANNAVAY, Kashmir area, Belfast; MOSS GRIBBON, Armagh, and Art McAlinden.

Today, August 9th, 1974, these men have been interned without trial for exactly three years. Below we reproduce letters and statements smuggled out of Long Kesh from two of them.

'71 INTERNMENT '74

IT IS almost three years since I was arrested and imprisoned on August 9th, 1971. From that date I have been interned (defined, is now the official terminology) without charge or trial.

To explain what living in a cage with eighty other men is like, is difficult in the extreme. The many pressures that the internees are subjected to, the ever obvious factor of the deprivation of liberty, the almost total restriction of movement, the rabness of the surroundings, the monotonous routine of getting through another day, the conspiracy to wear you down, you can soon come to terms with, accept, if you like the enormous obscenity of your arbitrary arrest and imprisonment. It has happened, it is a fact. You may even allow that they — the establishment, while not having any moral right to jail you, are doing a good job of "weathering" the storm of World Opinion, over the existence of their very own concentration Camp. But this

doesn't help you do your time.

Many accounts of the conditions that we live under in the huts of Long Kesh, have appeared in the press. A good few of these accounts detailed the leaking roofs, broken windows, damp walls, etc. It has been said that the Ministry of Agriculture regulations governing the keeping of pigs would, if enforced in Long Kesh, provide us with better living conditions. That is a fair enough comment. Much play is made of the "educational facilities" which the authorities have provided us with. These facilities consist of one tiny hut 12ft by 6ft in each Cage and an "education officer" whose job it is, to ensure that any internee who wants to be educated, is given every opportunity, to further himself. What, is seldom mentioned is the fact that for two years, we have been demanding educational facilities, that the teachers who come into us twice a week, do so of their own accord and they arrange for us to sit examinations, and provide us with books and tuition; the education officer, though does hand out pencils and jotter, from time to time.



"Walking in the rain"—Long Kesh.

The hardest part of internment is the uncertainty of it all. You just don't know when or if you will be released. Any day could be the one which sees you walking out the gates as a free man—if you can call yourself free — while internment still exists. The constant speculation of imminent releases (noised about by prominent S.D.L.P. members at regular intervals) has the effect of unsettling internees, who see the "burning issue of internment" as a political football being booted about from party to party but never quite getting past the British goalkeeper of the day. It is only when you have lived (existed might be a more apt word) in these Cages and felt the anger and frustration of internment, that you can appreciate and determine

the very fine line which exists between sanity and insanity. That at least twelve men (to my knowledge) have crossed that line, is a crime for which British politicians must answer. Add to this the anxiety of women and children deprived of husbands and fathers, the financial strain placed on families, the jobs lost, the years wasted and you begin to know what internment means.

So, the days grind on in Long Kesh. We hear the happy news that one or two men have been released. Then we hear that a few more have been arrested and in a day or so, they will be with us in the Cages. We are told that we must be kept here "for the protection of the public and to preserve the good government of Northern Ireland". The pub-

lic isn't being all that well protected and Northern Ireland isn't enjoying good government. Would ending internment cause a major deterioration in the state of affairs? Perhaps the truth of it all, is that arbitrary arrest and imprisonment without trial is a valued weapon in the hands of those who intend to abandon. Today, it is mainly Republicans and a few ultra-active Loyalists who are feeling the edge of this weapon—tomorrow, it may be you.

SEAN P. MURPHY, Hut 132, Cage 22, Long Kesh Camp.

PRIOR TO internment day I was in steady employment. I had been married in 1968 and was building my home. I was earning on "piece work" an average of £40 p.w. It could be said that I took an active interest in civil rights agitation in Derry. My arrest and internment was a shock to me. A greater shock was the torture which I endured after my arrest. I spent my first four weeks of detention in Crumlin Road Prison. I was in the second batch of internees to be moved to Long Kesh. I arrived at the camp on the day before the famous "hamburger riot" in Cage 2 in 1971. I suppose I had the initial feeling that Long Kesh would be better than the Crumlin. Time spent here—now nearly three years—has caused me to reconsider my initial impression. I'm now of the impression that Long Kesh is a "concentration" camp. Everyone is cooped-up together. Pettiness from the authorities is rampant. It's a constant struggle to keep your dignity and prevent physical and mental decay.

I've now spent three Christmases here and it looks like a fourth. The winters are particularly severe. Avoidable inconvenience is caused by the authorities in their failure to supply adequate heating, lighting, recreation, study facilities


and simple things like running water. Overall the food has been of very poor quality from the beginning. No real improvement has been made in it. Visiting for my relatives, indeed all relatives, has continued to be a real scourge. No consideration is given to the wishes of those who have been interned. They are on a regular six week basis, and frequently these are violent.

I would say that my stay in this place has created traits in my personality which are not suited to normal life. Uncertainty about release means uncertainty about life generally. Very few plans are capable of being made for the future. On release I know that I'll have a task re-adjusting. I'm sure tho' that time will overcome such problems.

One exists from day to day here. I've watched my young son grow from infancy since my arrest—he was only one year old when I was first arrested. He only knows me from in here and seeing me on the visits. I've seen releases come and go and tho' maybe I "suffered" disappointment initially time has inured me to talk of release. When it comes I'll believe it.

The whole design of this place seems to be directed towards breaking the spirit — towards enforcing the internee to vegetate. At best one barely exists here. There is no real life as such. Throwing people of different age groups, different attitudes to life, differing personalities and interests randomly together causes inevitable friction. The lack of privacy, inability to get away from the "sardine tin" existence causes frustration. Needless to say, depression affects one and all, and the inability to do anything to help your relatives through family difficulties outside, causes great frustration.

MICHAEL DONNELLY, Long Kesh Camp.



Being "lifted" in Belfast.

The Harrassment Of Eamonn Loughrey

71 INTERNMENT '74

EAMONN LOUGHREY had lived in Unity Flats since his marriage in 1970. He worked as a builder's labourer, kept an aviary, and organised football games for the local youths. He was rounded up, along with hundreds of other young Catholic workers in the early days of internment, and held without charge or trial until after the fall of Stormont. His release, in April, 1972, came in the period when Whitelaw's new regime was making overtures to the Catholic politicians, tempting to justify the espionage with a sprinkling of benevolence.

But Loughrey was not to enjoy his freedom in peace. As he himself put it: "As an x-internee I was immediately branded as an R.A. man." Marine Commandos who had occupied Unity Flats only one week after his release stopped him frequently demanding an account of his every move and threatening him. On every occasion when he reported their activities as legal, he reported the matter to the "proper authorities", the R.U.C., in keeping with constant pleas from security forces to do just this. But the harassment continued, and increased in proportion to the volume of his complaints.

He had one particularly frightening experience on 5th August, 1972: "I had been to visit (a neighbour) in Unity Flats. When I left, there were soldiers either end of the balcony who closed in on me... They accused me of a lot of atrocities... including the Oxford Street bus station bomb and said

they would leave me in a pool of blood as I had left others, and they were going to shoot me." The incident was related in full to the police.

The Commandos' threat was carried out, when, 12 days later, Eamonn was shot in the back at his own front door. The security forces' statements on the shooting were wildly contradictory. They claimed that he was shot "during a brief gun-battle"; that he had "fired six rounds from a Thompson sub-machinegun"; that he was shot some time after another gunman had "fired five rounds from a high velocity rifle"; that he was shot in the head while giving a rifle to another man; that he was shot in the neck while taking a rifle from a youth; that he was shot at 5.50 p.m.; that the incident in which he was alleged to have been involved occurred at 5.58 p.m.; that only one round was fired at him and that he was alone at the time (except for the youth). In fact, he was shot twice, in the back and arm, and was with his wife at the time.

71 INTERNMENT '74

After Eamonn had spent more than two months in hospital, all charges of possessing a weapon were dropped on the orders of the D.P.P. By the end of November, 1972, he was again a free man.

He was unable to work because of his injuries, and was in need of constant medical attention. He stayed at home as much as he could, for every time he went out he was harassed. He continued to complain to the "proper

authorities" and this plight received coverage in the Belfast press.

On 8th May, 1973, he was arrested under Section II of the Special Powers Act (membership of an illegal organisation). This, the first official attempt to bring such a charge against him, came over a year after his release from Long Kesh, and nine months after the shooting. He was held at Castlereagh for 65 hours without charge, and was only released after the intervention of British Labour M.P., Kevin McNamara, a member of the same trade union as Eamonn's father.

In a statement sent to McNamara immediately on his release, he alleged that during interrogation he had been offered the choice between internment and becoming a paid informer. He was offered £10 a week to join the I.R.A. and pass on information to the security forces. He refused, and, as Special Branch reports show, an application for an interim custody order was then made.

Loughrey was determined to push the charges of bribery and intimidation against the Special Branch as far as he could. McNamara made the matter known to the national press. On the same day as his release from Castlereagh (10th May), the British Defence Minister, Lord Carrington, admitted in Parliament that bribery and blackmail had been used in another case to obtain information on the I.R.A.

On 12th June Loughrey was informed that an investigation into his complaint was under way. But before he could see the matter through he was re-arrested and interned once more in Long Kesh (27th June).

While there he was visited by a police officer who asked him if he had anything to add to his statement. He replied that he had not, as it was a true and complete account of what had happened. On the basis of this Whitelaw later wrote to McNamara, "Since Mr. Loughrey's arrest he has refused to co-operate in any way or make any statement about his previous allegations against the Army and... without such co-operation investigations into the allegations cannot proceed." The R.U.C. went as far as to inform McNamara that Loughrey intended dropping the matter altogether.

71 INTERNMENT '74

When Loughrey heard of this he wrote to McNamara again, "I can state quite categorically that I wish these charges to be pursued relentlessly against the R.U.C. Special Branch not only because the threat to intern me has been carried out, but happenings like these must be exposed wherever and whenever they occur."

When Loughrey's case came up before the Commissioner at Long Kesh last December, he was to find himself the victim of those same informers whose ranks he had refused to join.

"Evidence," from seven informers in all, was related to the court by members of the security forces. Three of them were paid on a regular basis, one of them was given money for a holiday, two were arrested and released after they had passed on "evidence" against Loughrey, and the last was a local

snooper whose information, according to the policeman who related it to the court, "was partly what he heard and partly an assumption on his part." The reliability of the information received was called in question by virtue of the fact that it was contradictory; different positions in different companies of the I.R.A. were mentioned by the informers, six of whom were supposed to be "self-confessed members" of the same Battalion to which Loughrey allegedly belonged.

In spite of all this, the Commissioner accepted the allegations of the paid informers, ignored all evidence favourable to Loughrey, including that of the R.U.C. Community Relations Officer in the area and the local priest, and upheld the detention order. Loughrey's own professions of support for the Assembly, acceptance of the principle of re-unification of Ireland by consent alone, desire for peace, will-

ingness to report to the police every day, and his recognition of the court, all counted for naught.

If, as Eamonn Loughrey has always insisted, he is not a member of the I.R.A., why have the security forces been so determined to get him out of the way? The fact that he registered official complaints against their behaviour at regular intervals was clearly annoying them. At the time of his second internment he was pursuing two very serious cases against the Army and the R.U.C.: that of shooting him, and that of attempted bribery and intimidation. Inside Long Kesh his effectiveness would be reduced to a minimum. With him out of the way, Whitelaw and the R.U.C. were able to convince McNamara to drop the case.

THIS report was published in Hibernia on 15th March 1974. Eamonn Loughrey is still in Long Kesh today.



Recent picture of internees from Andersonstown.

What They Said About Internment

INTERNMENT is a recruiting sergeant for the I.R.A.

—HAROLD WILSON, when Leader of the Opposition.

TO BE quite honest, I was in favour of internment to begin with. But since I was interned, and with all our men inside, we can appreciate what it means.

—DAVE PAYNE, U.D.A. spokesman.

WE ARE anxious to start discussions about the future of the North, but we would not commit political suicide by doing so, so long as one man is interned. Get internment out of the way and you will be surprised what will happen.

—PROVISIONAL I.R.A. spokesman.

THE MAZE PRISON, Long Kesh, and the girls' prison in Armagh are breeding a loathing of English politicians among the next generation in the North... People have been shaken to witness the drilling of squads and the Colditz-like atmosphere in Long Kesh.

—TOM DALYELL, Labour M.P. for West Lothian.

THE NORTHERN Ireland Civil Rights' Association has found in a survey on the effect of internment of the father had had on 14 families that the children were cowed and their mothers depressed

and in need of psychological help after direct contact with the security forces.

—IRISH TIMES (19 Jul 1972).

I REMEMBER the first time I saw it, with all the barbed wire and the watchtowers, it was like the concentration camps, like the films. And it is a concentration camp. My relations are all ex-servicemen. They fought to rid Europe of that sort of thing.

—SISTER OF A LOYALIST INTERNEE (31 Dec., 1973).

THE ENDING of internment would be particularly appropriate at a time when there are strong indications of real community development away from the old entrenched positions in the North.

Politicians who call for peace and an end to violence must be prepared to make the first move themselves. A decision to end internment by the British Government would be an important incentive to the new Northern Assembly in its task of reaching agreement on the future political structures of Northern Ireland.

—Statement by Senator TREVOR WEST and Senator AUGUSTINE MARTIN (13 July, 1974).

Internment: The Record Of Three Years

Michael McKeown

YOU WOULD not have needed a futurologist in the North in March, 1971, to predict that the situation was going to get a lot worse. Bloodmindedness was the mood of the time and as the Provisionals, the British Army, the Officials and the Unionists indulged their respective attitudes of intransigence, the population of Belfast became exposed if not mired to a nightly round of gunfire and explosion. It was against this background that the hard man of Unionism, Brian Faulkner, replaced the depressed and frustrated Chichester-Clarke as Premier. Faulkner's reputation rested in part upon his success as Minister of Home Affairs during the abortive R.A. Border campaign of the 'fifties and he hung to a somewhat naive belief that the failure of that campaign had been cured by the combined use of internment and the B. Specials. In March, 1971, he could invoke neither of these instruments. The Specials had been disbanded following the Hunt Report of October, 1969, and since security was now essentially a matter for the British Army decision on internment could not be a unilateral one. The consent of the British Government was required and in Spring, 1971, it was not forthcoming.

As the level of violence rose through the Spring and into the Summer (there were 28 explosions in February and 91 in July), so also did the clamour for internment and after the Independent Unionist, Bertie McConnell, called for it during a debate in Stormont the cry was taken up by all elements within the Unionist spectrum. The British Army authorities were not convinced, however, and regularly briefed journalists about the difficulties and counter productive effects of internment. They could also point to the fact that despite the rising total of explosions, many of these were of nuisance value and the average amount of explosive used was less than ten pounds. As well as this, June and July had been quiet compared with the sectarian gun battles of the previous year. Brian Faulkner, however, displaying the same resolution that had won him the Premiership, kept impugning the British Government until in July he got his way and the British Army was authorised to put itself at the disposal of the Unionist Government in the introduction of internment.

After a "dry run" on July 3rd, 1971, the real thing was launched on August 9th. In swoops which netted in all 342 men, radicals, republicans, survivors of the 'forties and 'fifties periods of detention, brothers and fathers of wanted men, and occupants

of households formerly occupied by Republicans, were rounded up, and subjected to varying degrees of ill treatment and brutality. By the end of the month a hundred men had had to be released because of the gross mistakes made by the British Army and the R.U.C. and nobody seriously disputed the claim of the Provisional I.R.A. that they had lost only 56 men in the operation.

The civil and political implications were immediate. Twelve people were killed in the rioting which accompanied the swoop operation and by the end of August the total dead for the month had risen to 35. Many Catholics withdrew from appointed positions on statutory bodies: the S.D.L.P., which had already withdrawn from Stormont, announced that it would engage in no talks with the British Government until the end of internment and, further, that it was supporting the rent and rates strike which had spontaneously developed. The Community Relations Commission and the Northern Committee of I.C.T.U. called for an end to internment and throughout the North 23,000 households withdrew their rents and rates. The security implications were no more satisfactory. Although on Oct. 15th Brian Faulkner announced that in relation to the defeat of terrorism, "the long haul policy is over," few paid much attention as the level of violence continued to rise and the amount of explosives used in September and October totalled 46,000lb. in bigger and more frequent bombings.

71 INTERNMENT '74

As Faulkner had hoped, however, the initial reaction subsided but only to a plateau of violence and bitterness such as the North had never before known. As the swoops continued and a new prison camp was opened at Long Kesh and the number interned had by November risen to 539, the Government of the Republic announced that it intended to lay charges against the British Government before the Strasbourg Court. The Compton Commission, appointed by the British authorities to investigate allegations of brutality, discovered that brutality lay merely in the eye of the inflictor and had no objective reality and a new song, "The Men Behind the Wire" swept the nationalist areas of the North. At a dance hall in Tyrone a band which admitted that it was not in their repertoire had their instruments destroyed and they were chased from the hall.


Throughout the Winter for the ever-increasing number of internees (by February it had risen to 796) a grim routine of tedium had descended,

broken only by the occasional spectacular escape or the recurring battles with military personnel raiding their compounds, or by the reverberations of legal judgments like that of the McElduff case or that handed down by Justice Lowry which pointed to the illegality of their arrest and detention. But the British Parliament could always change the law to give retroactive legality to all that had been done in its name and, meanwhile, although the protest marches were resumed the opposition to internment was increasingly fragmented as Provisionals, Officials and S.D.L.P. each went their own way. The Faulkner regime signalled its indifference to the opposition and its determination to adhere to its policy by opening a new camp at Magilligan on January 16th to take the overflow from the Kesh and Crumlin Road. That determination carried the total to 915 in March before the Northern Ireland Government was replaced by a Direct Rule administration appointed by a British Government newly alarmed by the repercussions to the events of Bloody Sunday.

71 INTERNMENT '74

The new administration led by William Whitelaw was not committed to internment and signs of fresh thinking came on April 7th, 1972, when 73 internees were released. The policy departure initiated at that point prevailed for five months. By June 6th the total released had risen to 470 and by September the total held had fallen to 238.

During those five months there had been significant if erratic military and political developments. The Officials had proclaimed a cease fire which they observed in a rather arbitrary style. The Provisionals had negotiated a cease fire which sundered after a fortnight in the heat of the Lenadoon confrontation. The U.D.A. had demonstrated their numerical strength in a face to face encounter with the military and Loyalist assassination squads were enjoying the freedom of the city. In July, 1972, the level of violence soared to a fantastic peak with a total of 2,778 explosions and shootings and over a hundred people killed. Although Loyalist sources were responsible for about a third of the fatalities, the Provisional I.R.A. within the space of a fortnight had killed twenty people in wholesale bomb attacks in Belfast and Claudy. At the end of July the launching of Operation Motorman brought about the elimination of the Republican No Go areas and the establishment of a massive British Army presence in those



areas. Corrugated fencing sprouted everywhere enclosing military compounds bearing exotic names like Fort Apache and Fort Silver City and in the wake of these developments on August 7th the S.D.L.P. announced that it was going to engage in talks with Whitelaw.

In September the numbers held without charge began to rise again. By October they had risen to 272 and by November had reached a total of 286. There had been a slight fall in the number of incidents but a big fall in the number of fatalities. In August there had been 126 bombing incidents and 55 people killed; by December there were 48 bombing incidents and 28 people killed. The security situation was improving or at least returning to its post internment level of the previous year, but internment was only one of the factors which might have contributed to this improvement. The others were improved military surveillance on the ground and a loss of support for the Provisionals which was reflected in a better flow of information and an increasing number of court charges.

Meanwhile, Whitelaw in his attempts to grapple with the political implications of internment had officially abolished internment in November, 1972, and replaced it by a system of detention monitored by three Commissioners. For the internees it was a change in name only paralleling the change in name from Long Kesh to the Maze. An automatic review procedure was built into the new provisions and on November 10th, to the accompaniment of much publicity, the Commissioners made their first two orders for release. But the programme of arrests continued and as on average the Commissioners released only about one-third of those appearing before them the total continued to rise. The process had a dynamic of its own which was not sensi-

tive either to political modifications or military considerations. On January 1st, 1973, a new milestone was passed when Liz McKee was interned. She was the first woman to be interned and as if to demonstrate that all the discriminatory features in the original machinery had now been eliminated, the first two Loyalists were interned on February 5th. Throughout the Spring as the political parties manoeuvred for the run-up to the Local Government and Assembly elections the internment graph rose steadily. By July, 578 were inside, of whom 29 were Loyalists, and the Army was again claiming that there had been significant improvements in the security situation. Nevertheless, in June 30 people had been killed, and 110 explosions and 303 shooting incidents had been logged. Whatever improvement had occurred might have been because of the fact that in the eleven months since Motorman over 1,200 people had been charged in the courts with offences of a terrorist nature.

71 INTERNMENT '74

With its tendency towards self-generating growth the number held had risen by October, 1973, to 636, at which point one of the main arguments advanced in favour of internment was eliminated. On October 15th non jury trials were adopted for scheduled offences of a terrorist nature and the argument that detention was necessary because juries could be intimidated went out the window, but not the policy of internment. Nevertheless, after the Sunningdale Agreement was released the new Secretary of State, Francis Pym, made a concession to the S.D.L.P. by announcing the release of 65 internees in time for Christmas, 1973. By early New Year, however, ten of them had been put inside again with a lot of new faces. Of

the total slightly in excess of six hundred held as the New Year opened, 33 had been in detention since 1971 and 16 of those had been in since August 9th.

With the formation of the new Executive attention switched back to Stormont as the public watched to see how the new experiment would work. The S.D.L.P. had promised a speedy breakthrough on the issue but as the months passed without any progress discontent began to bubble up again among all those for whom internment had become the essential test of the British Government's good faith. Not one paid any attention when Merlyn Rees, the new Labour Secretary of State announced that he would release internees under a parole system into the care of reputable public figures, and having secured a few columns inches of publicity pointing to his good intentions, the idea quietly died the death. It was hoped however, that an Administration which, while in Opposition, had opposed the Emergency Provisions Act would ensure that while in power it would not be re-enacted. That hope died in June when it was re-enacted and when the British Army in a most irregular Press briefing indicated their opposition to the ending of internment.

Now just six months after the Labour Government assumed office, there are more interned than there had been under the Conservatives and nine of those have been interned or locked up or detained or held without trial for exactly three years. To those men the terminology does not matter, but for the British Army, the Conservative Party and the Labour Party the problem remains the same. How do they get of the hook on which Brian Faulkner impaled them thirty six months and a thousand and four deaths ago.

Michael McKeown is the Northern Correspondent for Hibernia.



British soldiers outside Long Kesh

The British Army's Point Of View

Robert Fisk

71 INTERNMENT '74

THE BRITISH ARMY in Northern Ireland is rarely in much doubt about the people they want to arrest even though they may not have the evidence for an open court. Most unit command posts in Belfast possess their own miniature gallery of photographs showing men whom they want to detain and some of these pictures—taken during the regular "screening" operations—the suspects holding a blackboard with their names scrawled over them—are supplemented with brief descriptions of the crimes which the men or women are alleged to have committed.

Perhaps the most ambitious picture collection in recent months was housed in a battalion operations room in West Belfast where four entire walls were covered with photographs of local Catholics, pasted onto the hardboard in rows beneath appropriate designations: "Intelligence Officer, 3rd Batt. I.R.A.," a card would say, or "Finance Officer, Officials." Across some of the pictures a hand had written in blue biro "zapped" and when the individual has escaped from custody—in one case an internee—there was an occasional addition "re-zapped."

That is not to suggest that the British Army in the North see any similarity between their war and the failing struggle of the United States to contain the Viet Cong in the Far East but it is the same kind of de-personalisation. Although the pressing of criminal charges is infinitely preferable, internment without trial is, for the military authorities, an efficient, speedy and secure method of reducing the strength of the I.R.A. For this reason, the mortality of locking men and women up without trial is not an immediate issue in the operations rooms of West Belfast. And as most British officers would tell

you, internment is legal under the Emergency Powers Act.

These days, they have to furnish a lot more "evidence" before a man is sent to the Kesh without a court appearance than they did in the days of Brian Faulkner's Stormont Government. The old R.U.C. Special Branch files showing a man to have been only a member of the I.R.A. were enough to have a man interned back in 1971 and the British Government were appalled to find this out after direct rule. William Whitelaw told the Irish Government as much a few months after he assumed the role of Secretary of State in the North. Neither the army nor the police nor the Northern Ireland Office are prepared to talk about the current method of collecting proof of a man's guilt but it seems that an average of six "traces" of a suspect's alleged terrorist activities have to be produced by the army or police before he is considered for Long Kesh.

These traces may consist of telephone calls from informers whom the army say are reliable or of actions which have been witnessed by soldiers on the streets. Evidence put before the commissioners at the secret hearings at Long Kesh suggest that even "association" with an I.R.A. officer may be a sufficient trace although several people in the Government are not entirely happy with such methods. A soldier who sees a man walk into an Andersonstown semi in which an I.R.A. sympathiser is known to live may come to the conclusion that the visitor is a suspect but if he is only calling for a collection on behalf of the local community centre, the army will not find this out.

In other words, whatever facts are placed before the Secretary of State about a man's activities may lead to inaccurate conclusions—open courts tend to prevent this

happening. Ironically, however, the very need to assemble so much information about a suspect has served to strengthen some army officers' belief in the worth of internment. Junior officers will willingly acknowledge that criminal proceedings are preferable against an inmate but when questioned privately about the reasons for a man's internment, have been known to say: "But we know he's guilty." This conviction that the majority of the men behind the wire have indulged in active terrorist operations is further reinforced by the prisoners' behaviour inside the camp. If the men there are innocent, soldiers will ask you, then why do they parade around in paramilitary clothing and practise arms drill and have photographs taken of them holding dummy rifles? One soldier once suggested to me that if they were innocent, they wouldn't try to escape would they—the ultimate "sine qua non."

Many politicians, of course, believe that anyone interned who is not an extremist will swiftly become one behind the gates of the Kesh and Harold Wilson has admitted that the camp is a training ground for the I.R.A. One Ballymurphy man found himself caught in one of the more absurd traps which the Commission has sprung earlier this year when evidence from the army suggested at his review that he was still a dangerous I.R.A. man and evidence from the police said that he should be kept in Long Kesh because he was an I.R.A. officer in the prison compound.

Journalists are frequently urged by soldiers—unofficially, of course—to print the allegations which are made against internees. Occasionally the prisoners are happy to furnish such details themselves because they believe, the evidence is so flimsy but this underlines another fairly deep-seated feeling among soldiers and a not entirely

blameworthy one. The army—and this is not an official view because the military authorities do not make an official on-the-record comment on internment—wonder why on earth the Government should want to call Long Kesh "the Maze." Privately, many officers still refer to internment rather than the more anemic "detention" and those soldiers who work near Long Kesh still find it a little strange to refer to it as a prison instead of a "camp."


In the end, of course, the *raison d'être* for internment—in the army's eyes—is that it has to continue so long as violence persists at its current rate and so long as the courts are not effective in dealing with crimes of violence. General Sir Frank King, the G.O.C., said in an interview with the Belfast News Letter earlier this year that the Long Kesh intake and the level of violence in the North tended to correspond to each other. The Government are not so certain about this.

The army also admit—once again unofficially—that internment is something they would rather not have to help to implement. It is pointed out that nowadays, at least, there are four people charged in the courts for terrorist offences for every man locked up without trial. And asked about the morality of keeping 600 of so men in Long Kesh, the answer will come back: what about over 1,000 dead. Internment, one is told, is "a necessary evil" but what the army cannot explain is where the three-year cycle is to stop. If internment stays while violence persists and violence—in spite of its recent decrease—still goes on, then when does internment end? Long Kesh, where political and military ends meet as they do nowhere else in the North, remains as much an enigma for the army as it does for the politicians.

Robert Fisk is the London "Times" correspondent in Ireland.

Reading List

- *JUSTICE IN NORTHERN IRELAND: A study in social confidence. By Tom Hadden and Paddy Hillyard. Cobden Trust. 80p.
- *NORTHERN IRELAND — THE MAILED LIST. A record of Army and Police brutality from Aug. 9th-Nov. 9th, 1971. Campaign for Social Justice in Northern Ireland. 35p.
- *WHITELEAW'S TRIBUNALS: Long Kesh Internment Camp—Nov., 1972-Jan., 1973. By Father Denis Faul and Father Raymond Murray. 30p.
- *REPORT OF THE ENQUIRY into allegations against the security forces of physical brutality in Northern Ireland arising out of events on the 9th August, 1971. Chairman: Sir Edmund Compton. H.M.S.O. (London). 52½p.
- *REPORT OF THE COMMISSION to consider legal procedures to deal with terrorist activities in Northern Ireland. Chairman: Lord Diplock. H.M.S.O. (London). 31½p.
- *NORTHERN IRELAND (EMERGENCY PROVISIONS) ACT, 1973. H.M.S.O. (London). 29p.
- *NORTHERN IRELAND BILL OF RIGHTS (Text and Explanation). As introduced into the House of Lords by Lord Brockway, slightly revised. Connolly Publications. 15p.
- *NORTHERN IRELAND 1968-73: CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS (2 Vols.). By Richard Deutsch and Vivien Magowan. Blackstaff Press. £3.25 each.
- *BRITISH ARMY AND SPECIAL BRANCH R.U.C. BRUTALITIES: Dec., 1971-Feb., 1972. By Father Denis Faul and Father Raymond Murray. 30p.
- *THE HOODED MEN: British Torture in Ireland, Aug.-Oct., 1971. By Father Denis Faul and Father Raymond Murray. £1.00.
- *CIVIL AUTHORITIES (SPECIAL POWERS) ACT (Northern Ireland) 1972 (Reprint to 1969). H.M.S.O. (Belfast). 11p.
- *REPORT OF AN ENQUIRY INTO ALLEGATIONS OF ILL-TREATMENT IN NORTHERN IRELAND. Amnesty International.
- *REPORT ON PROCEDURES FOR THE INTERROGATION OF PERSONS SUSPECTED OF TERRORISM. Chairman: Lord Chief Justice Parker. (Minority Report — Lord Gardiner.) H.M.S.O.



To: HIBERNIA, 206 PEARSE STREET, DUBLIN 2.

I wish to avail of your Special Introductory Offer and I enclose £1. Please send the next 12 issues to —

NAME

ADDRESS

Published by HIBERNIA NATIONAL REVIEW Ltd., 206 P Street, Dublin 2. Tel. 776317. Printed for the Publishers by The Times Ltd., 31 Westmoreland Street, Dublin 2.